A new chapter in the textbook on naval tactics is being written in the Mediterranean today. Departure from traditional doctrines of naval employment occurs daily. The Mediterranean has seen the first signs of new naval tactics in the missile age. The Jordanian crisis in September 1970 proved that no longer may naval task forces expect to group in classical manner, search out the enemy, and engage. On that occasion, Sixth Fleet and Soviet Mediterranean Fleet units were interspersed at times.
It has become routine practice for Soviet men-of-war to shadow our attack aircraft carriers. We, in turn, trail their "high-value" units. Soviet surface ships and land-based aircraft monitor Sixth Fleet and NATO exercises. New Soviet ships of all types now train and exercise routinely in the central and eastern Mediterranean.
The growing Soviet naval strength in this area has caused many to question the capability of the U. S. Sixth Fleet to perform its stated mission of helping to maintain peace and stability on NATO's southern front. The fact is that under existing pressures, we are walking a tightrope of adequacy; at some points, the rope is beginning to fray. Our still formidable fleet is being forced to accommodate to a new environment far different from the one which it dominated for almost a quarter century. The change has come about chiefly through design but also somewhat as a result of neglect. The designing influence is the Soviet Navy and its Mediterranean Fleet, which gives ever more convincing evidence of its growing capability and professionalism.
Generally, it is a "have" fleet. It has new ships, modern weapons systems, well-trained and highly motivated personnel, and a "back yard" logistics base with prepositioned stocks of ammunition and fuel plus a reinforcement capability which is the envy of every naval commander. This force has very few apparent weaknesses. It lacks only two very important assets: sea-based aircraft, and the experience the men of the Sixth Fleet have acquired on frequent deployments to the Mediterranean and in recent years to Southeast Asia where combat operations have molded them into top professionals with a confidence and skill equal to any challenge. It is the American Bluejacket's proven performance which somewhat quiets a growing anxiety for the future. We have been asking virtually wartime-type sacrifices and devotion to duty from him for almost 25 years. Pride alone will not sustain him indefinitely. He must continue to have the best available ships in which to fight.
The U. S. Sixth Fleet. The attack carrier striking force is the heart of our Sixth Fleet. It comprises two attack carriers and their assigned destroyers. It is a mobile, self-sustaining force independent of base support except for major repairs. The Sixth Fleet spends about 50% of the time at sea training and exercising in the western, central, and eastern Mediterranean. Each area is covered through a series of continuing unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral (or NATO) training exercises conducted with the various friendly nations bordering on the Mediterranean.
The Sixth Fleet's concurrent role as a NATO striking force requires that it be ready to provide assistance and support to Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The Fleet's presence has long been recognized as being of prime importance in maintaining Greek and Turkish ties to NATO, since almost the only external support, immediate or over the longer term, that either nation may rely on in the event of conflict must come by sea. The most capable aircraft available in the southern region of NATO are those of the Sixth Fleet. Within the balanced force operating concept is a combined Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team of some 1,500 Marines embarked in four or five amphibious ships. Theirs is the traditional Marine mission: land and stabilize the situation, as they did in Lebanon in 1958.
A Fleet Without Bases. The Sixth Fleet operates independently of fixed bases. The Fleet does, however, receive significant support from U. S. and Allied shore bases in the northern Mediterranean littoral. Through Naples and Sigonella in Italy; Athens, Greece; and Rota, Spain, are staged considerable logistics. The commercial airfield at Soudha Bay, on the Greek island of Crete, provides back-up support. The Soviets have a logistical advantage, since their lines of logistics communication are so much shorter. The Soviet capability is most impressive in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean where Egypt and access to the Black Sea provide essential resupply and reinforcements. Conversely, the Soviets are painfully aware of the need for air support. In recognition of these factors, they generally operate close to their supply base and under their shore-based air umbrella.
The Importance of Logistics. The question of a logistics base is critical to any military operation. In this respect, problems confronting the Sixth Fleet and the Soviets are vastly different. To support the normally 40-ship Sixth Fleet, seven or eight auxiliaries—one repair ship, three oilers, two ammunition ships, and one or two refrigerator ships—are generally on call. For the day-to-day consumables not immediately available overseas, support from the United States is conducted on periodic replenishment cycles. Some supplies are prepositioned in limited quantities, e.g., petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) and ammunition in NATO stock farms and depots throughout the Mediterranean. Such Service Force ships as the USS Seattle, a new combat support ship, carry the burden of sustaining the Fleet over one million square miles of ocean. She and her sister ships, which performed superbly during the Jordanian crisis in September and October of 1970, can be likened to a one-stop country store with a gas station out front.
To support their 50-plus ship Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, the Soviets usually have about 15 support ships prepositioned within the Mediterranean. They have the additional option of using their merchant shipping of deploying additional ships on short notice from their Black Sea Fleet. It is common knowledge that the Soviets use their commercial vessels both for military and political purposes. Their central and western Mediterranean units are normally replenished underway or at anchor, but the bulk of their force gets its provisions from shore-based facilities in the Black Sea or from selected Arab ports, such as Alexandria. The close proximity of the "locker room" to the "playing field" gives the Soviets the decided advantage in this critical resupply-reinforcement aspect and they are aware of this advantage. They normally have the oilers available and on station in sufficient number to accommodate a much larger combatant force. When a contingency situation arises, their combatants are deployed from the Black Sea to where their logistic support awaits. Probably in the hope of expanding their logistics base, and no doubt for other reasons, the Soviets are now providing military and financial assistance to Mediterranean nations who will accept it. The Arab Republic of Egypt provides support facilities to Soviet naval forces. Recently Soviet merchantmen have quadrupled their calls to Libya.
The geographic advantage, already described, which enables this large, modern, and growing Soviet Fleet to move quickly to and from the Mediterranean is important. In this respect, the Soviets have a chokepoint factor—the Montreux Convention controlling the Turkish Straits. It is somewhat restrictive on surface ship movement, specifying total tonnage allowed in the Straits and requiring advance notice for transits.
Sea Control. The problem of protecting long sea lines of logistic communications is directly proportional to their length and to the ability of the opposition to challenge. The heavy concentration of Soviet surface, subsurface, and air forces in the Mediterranean—some sea-based, some land based—combined with the great transiting distances from the continental United States to Gibraltar and then across 2,000 miles of the chokepoint-studded Mediterranean is a sobering prospect.
The situation is reminiscent of the early days of World War II when the Allies were trying to supply Malta and the Germans and Italians operated from air fields along the North African coast and Italy. The Italian Fleet was the largest in the Mediterranean. German and Italian submarines were taking an awesome toll of allied shipping. Heavy losses among Allied oilers, stores, ammunition and combatant ships forced us to sail through Gibraltar three times the tonnage necessary to sustain Malta. Two-thirds of our shipping and supplies were lost to enemy action during the most critical months. Considering that Malta is only halfway across the Mediterranean, the problem confronting us today is doubly serious. NATO has been concentrating on a solution. Only through the combined efforts of our NATO allies is the problem solvable.
Commander Naval Forces Southern Europe (ComNavsouth) is responsible for protecting the logistics line across the Mediterranean in the event of hostilities involving NATO. Toward this end, ComNavSouth will use ships of the United Kingdom, Italian, Greek, and Turkish Navies with Sixth Fleet support. The carrier strike forces of the Fleet can be used to provide alt protection, and would attack those sea forces and bases which threaten the mission.
Soviet Land-bated Air Support. The port facilities now available to the Soviet Navy and the possibility that the Soviets will obtain the use of more such facilities have led some observers to conclude that the maritime age in the Mediterranean may be a thing of the past. The implication that the assumed decisiveness of Soviet control of important airfields in turn guarantees, ipso facto, the control of strategic bodies of water, i.e., the Bosporus and Dardanelles, is dangerously overstated. Critics of seapower further contend that the Soviets can "control" the Mediterranean Sea, even though denied free passage of their ships through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, purely by the establishment of a series of airfields along the North African coast. The inference that airpower in the Mediterranean, as represented by Soviet land-based aircraft, together with their political machinations which have gained them access to strategically located airfields, is a decisive factor neutralizing the presence of Allied naval forces is open to challenge.
While hostile aircraft based along the southern edge of the Mediterranean certainly could take a heavy toll of shipping in that sea—until the aircraft and their bases can be destroyed—they can in no way "control" the Mediterranean in the sense of denying its use to properly defended mercantile and naval ships.
In addition to being counterbalanced by Western control of the land on the opposite side of this inland sea, the Soviet African bases must withstand the sea-based airpower present in NATO's Southern Striking Force.
For the massive logistic support which would be required for sustained Soviet air operations, the Soviets would be dependent upon resupply from the sea. This would be denied them by (1) control of the straits of ingress, and (2) by the Western naval forces in the Mediterranean, which could be resupplied and continually augmented by sea.
Moreover, although Soviet airpower based in North Africa is indeed a capability to be considered seriously and one that might initially cause great problems at sea in the Mediterranean, Soviet airpower could, in time, be reduced to manageable proportions, leaving NATO and the Western nations in control of the sea lanes. The important consideration is to prevent any Soviet capability from gaining a military edge which could not be overcome.
The Soviet Mediterranean Fleet: Capabilities and Limitations. Although it possesses a powerful offensive capability, the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, like its sister fleets (the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets), is still very much defense-oriented. Necessity dictated this approach because the Soviet Navy is designed for one objective—to counter the efforts of the U. S. Navy to establish control of sea lines of communication and to project seapower ashore. Its concurrent missions are oriented to destruction of our carriers, the defense of a burgeoning merchant marine, and to "show the hammer and sickle." The growing Red Fleet in the Mediterranean was and is base-limited; although it is only a matter of time before the Soviets acquire the expertise necessary to perfect their rudimentary techniques of underway replenishment. They have the necessary support ships. Their use of commercial shipping has already been mentioned, but they labor under certain handicaps. Lacking sea-based air cover, their surface units are vulnerable as is their logistics train.
The Soviet Mediterranean Fleet is heavily dependent upon surveillance provided by surface combat units, submarines, and intelligence collection ships (AGIs) using visual means and a few reconnaissance aircraft. It is vulnerable to air attack. It is analogous that the more numerous the Soviet Fleet, the more attractive aircraft carriers are in quickly reducing the overall effectiveness of this force. Given Soviet superiority in naval guns, an advantage which can be achieved quickly by deployment of additional ships from the Black Sea, and long-range strike capability provided by surface-to-surface missile (SSM) equipped ships and submarines, only aircraft carriers among all existing Allied navy ship types provide even the opportunity of quickly overcoming this threat. Given ample nuclear submarines and ample time, a submarine fleet might attrite the Soviet Fleet forces, but it would take too long.
The Missile Threat. The Soviet SSM weapons system threat is well suited to surprise attack. For use at ranges beyond its own radar horizon, it is heavily dependent upon accurate target locational information from a "forward observer." Because of the size of the SSM, and the limited number which can be carried on board any ship, proper target identification is a primary requirement. Ships are maneuverable. Their relative motion both to the firing ship and to friendly ships in company complicate both location and identification problems for the SSM. The missile is also highly dependent upon a favorable electronic environment. Since Soviet Fleet units in the western Mediterranean are virtually without air cover, they are dependent upon surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and conventional AA guns for defense from air attacks—defensive systems that are themselves vulnerable to jamming, electronic deception and to low-level aircraft attack. Their SAMs cannot be hidden, as they were in North Vietnam. When one considers the range of uncertainties involved in the Soviet SSM system on the one hand, versus the relatively straight-forward (and predictable) problems that we face using carrier aircraft and relying on human judgments for problem-solving on the other, the great advantages enjoyed by aircraft carriers become apparent.
If we postulate "open ocean" situations after an outbreak of hostilities, aircraft carriers are vastly superior to SSM ships by every measure. Why, then, were SSM ships built? The Soviets know their limitations better than we do. In attempting to offset or neutralize the power of the U. S. Navy, they developed the SSM and built a number of ships with that system as its main battery. They built SAMS to defend their SSM ships from air attack, and developed a family of air-to-surface sues (ASMs) for their aircraft. The Soviet Union had already developed a substantial and increasingly proficient submarine force. When one considers the Soviet problem in shifting from a defensive naval posture, heavily oriented towards the use of submarines, to a more expansive navy capable of exercising control of the seas, and of effecting that transition in the face of the awesome power of the U. S. Navy (not to mention British and other navies), the attractiveness of SSMs becomes very great. It provided the earliest possible achievement of a credible threat against more numerous U. S. and Allied surface ships. The SSM ship can be used in surprise attack against aircraft carriers at an outset of hostilities. However, at over-the-horizon ranges, it always remains dependent upon surveillance, which must be provided by others.
No Longer a Permissive Environment. The presence and capability of this Red Fleet has forced a new approach to Sixth Fleet planned operations in the Mediterranean. The fact is that there is no longer a permissive environment where once the Sixth Fleet moved at will. Formerly, there was no opposition force powerful enough to contest the availability of the sea lines of communications in support of NATO in the event of a confrontation.
In recent speeches, the Chief of Naval Operations has identified the modern roles and missions of the Navy. He has dwelled heavily on the sea control mission and capability. In the absence of any potential opposition, there is no problem with sea control. What is available by way of naval competence can be used exclusively for the projection role. In Vietnam, we enjoyed a permissive sea environment. In the Mediterranean, there is an opposition Navy; forces at sea able to say, "Look fellows, you'd jolly well better be aware that we're here and think about us before you start committing everything to this projection mission. Because, if you don't take care of that threat at sea, then You're not going to have anything to project with." And, if the projection force were launched, there might well be nothing to come back to. This "threat elephant" must be eaten one bite at a time. The immediate threat—the air, the missile, the ship—must be accommodated, and after that is resolved in a kind of ink blot manner, the capability can be expanded into the project mission.
First, one must plan on protecting the sea lines of communication—protecting the oilers, the food ships, the ammunition ships that would be needed, together with the reinforcement ships with the soldiers and Marines who might be required to reinforce the NATO flank. Recall the previous reference to World War II when the Allies had this very salutary experience in the resupply of Malta requiring sea control. The decisive factor then, as it is today, was the availability of sea-based air. Until carrier air support was forthcoming, the Allies got a bloody nose. This force must control the seas. If total control cannot be exercised, then there must be concentration on sea protection in the hemisphere immediately above and below this logistic force or this Marine force or Army force, or whatever reinforcing force, as it moves.
The Sea Control Mission. How ready is the Sixth Fleet to accomplish the task of sea control? Aging ships and budgetary restraints have been affecting readiness. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has said that he anticipates readiness will suffer in the face of the severe budgetary cuts the military has experienced. The ships are there. .3b begin with, the average age of U. S. combatant ships assigned to the Sixth Fleet is about 19 years. The average age of the Soviet force in the Mediterranean is about seven years. The disheartening thing is that the Soviets have already begun to phase out certain types of ships which they apparently consider obsolete, replacing them with new and more capable construction. These "obsolete" ships are about 10 years old.
There is no way of correlating dollars directly to readiness. In fairness one must admit that, despite a drastic ship deactivation program in the U. S. Navy, there are still only slightly less than the same number of ships deploying, on roughly the same deployment cycles, to the Mediterranean. In certain cases, capability is improving owing to the availability of newer weapons systems, such as more advanced high-performance attack aircraft for our carriers and improved ASW aircraft. In the present Mediterranean environment, the Fleet Commander must settle for many old ships in numbers sufficient to permit partial surveillance and escorting of high-value ships (CVAs, AOs, Amphibs). Given the choice (and all else being equal), the preference is for high-performance new ships in fewer total numbers. Budget restrictions on fuel money, limiting operating days, and flight hours, have hurt. Something as important as training cannot be curtailed without it hurting. The controlling factor is the continuing growth of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. If the Soviet build-up continues, there must be a commensurate increase in the Sixth Fleet, either in numbers or quality (preferably both) and certainly an increase in operating funds. The disadvantages, should war be thrust upon us, are obvious. The degree of reinforcement required is difficult to establish; but, depending on the extent of this growth, the need for additional assets is an inevitable conclusion.
At what level will they be required? In September and October 1970, the Soviets had 52 ships in place as tension in Jordan grew. In very short order the number rose to 72. At that point there was a requirement for the USS John E Kennedy. The Kennedy arrived as did additional support ships—missile ships, most of them—and it was just like the sun coming up in the middle of the night. It was not a question of numbers. Numbers alone are incomplete indicators. It is the capability of the ship that counts. From the American point of view, the arrival of the Kennedy was the hoary Texas Ranger riot story all over again, wherein the Ranger, asked why he was the only man who had been sent to quell the disturbance, replied, ''you only got one riot, aincha?"
The presence of that third carrier contributed substantially to my peace of mind and, so much more importantly, to the peace of the world.
The Jordanian Crisis. A brief look at the Jordanian crisis situation as it developed last fall will provide some insight into Soviet capabilities. As the Sixth Fleet, on orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deployed eastward toward Jordan to take up a position and be prepared to assist U. S. citizens in that country, it numbered 45 ships. As stated above, the Soviets had approximately 52, the majority of which were already in the eastern Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet was augmented by an additional carrier task group and escorts. The USS Guam and other amphibious ships already earmarked for NATO exercise "Deep Express" sailed from the east coast a day early. When the two fleets were joined in the area of Jordan, there were some 40 ships standing-to in what resembled an international boat show. The Soviets had approximately 20 ships and submarines in the immediate area. Within less than one day's steaming time of U. S. forces, the Soviets maintained approximately 50 additional ships and submarines, 26 of which were combatants, including seven SSM firers and eight ships carrying surface-to-air missiles. Parenthetically, additional reinforcement for the Sixth Fleet was ten days to two weeks away. Soviet ships followed all major Sixth Fleet ships as they cycled in and out of the area of operations from Greek and Turkish ports. As the Sixth Fleet watched and waited for orders at "Camel Crossroads" the Soviets also watched and waited. The two fleets gave no evidence of undue stress. Both sides operated in a normal and restrained manner. There was none of the nonsense of their ships running in and around our men-of-war at close range. It was evident, the Soviets were under the direction of a seasoned seaman who not only knew well the capabilities and limitations of his equipment, but also was sensitive to the potential seriousness of the situation.
The Eastern Mediterranean. Before and since that crisis, the Sixth Fleet has been accused of abandoning the eastern Mediterranean to the Soviets. If there has been a reduction in numbers there, it has been by design rather than default. U. S. units continue to operate in the eastern Mediterranean and sometimes into the "deep eastern" basin when necessary. If additional presence is required there, the Fleet will go. The proposition that we should stay and train in the deep eastern basin in strength is unrealistic and wasteful. In order to be useful we must be well honed all the time. That means intensive training all the time. For example, the young gentlemen who fly our high-performance aircraft must do it day in and day out. The eastern basin has a low ceiling of interlaced commercial airline routes. During the Jordanian crisis, some 75% of the aircraft that were intercepted and escorted were commercial airliners. Under the circumstances, adequate exercising and training cannot be conducted in that area. This doesn't mean we intend to ignore it. We can and do monitor activity in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, it isn't necessary to be alongside or in the immediate vicinity of targets to conduct contingency air operations. Our carrier-based attack aircraft have very long ranges.
As important as it is to keep track of Soviet high value ships, there simply are not sufficient assets to put one on the tail of each of their units. To do so would interfere with training. And obviously spreading out ships very seriously affects the ability to capitalize on the capabilities of the numbers available and to deploy them in positions of tactical advantage.
The Three-Dimensional Threat. The size and capability of this Soviet Fleet presents a three-dimensional threat. Working from the overhead down, first is the air threat which at the present time is constrained by their reliance on shore bases and by problems associated with overflight rights. A relatively small air contingent of Soviet-made Tu-16 Badgers, BE-12 Mail Amphibians, and AN-12 Cubs conduct reconnaissance of U. S. and other nations' naval forces in the Mediterranean. They provide, among other things, locational information and identification of specific units, and they facilitate submarine and surface-to-surface missile employment. The TU-16 Badgers are not suitable for direct bombing attack on maneuvering ships because they are highly vulnerable to our surface-to-air missiles as well as to our defending fighters. However, their use of long range air-to-surface missiles is a serious consideration.
Next are the previously mentioned SSM0 weapons and their surface ship launching platforms. Missiles from ships have altered traditional naval tactics and formations. Because of them, the practice of placing a circular screen around a high-value ship has changed. If there were more missile ships, the days of the circular screen might be entirely over. The fact that sonar detection ranges are so radically reduced in the Mediterranean complicates the defense. To take full advantage of a missile ship's missile radius envelope, ships are positioned with a little overlap. But these ships have an ASW mission as well. If their sonar ranges do not match their missile range, they must be positioned closer together to ensure that a submarine doesn't get between them. This diminishes their AA posture. The solution lies in adequate numbers of ships to do the job. With our present number, we rarely achieve a satisfactory defensive posture. We are always forced to compromise.
Finally there is the Soviet missile-firing submarine. This submarine with its missiles is potentially the most serious, for, first, we must find it. Failing that, we have to contend with the missile once launched.
The primary weapons system which counters this triple threat is the CVA. The aircraft carrier has considerably longer strike ranges than have SSM ships, many more attack vehicles, its own inherent and vast surveillance capabilities (electronic and visual), several thousand tons of offensive ordnance and an intelligent identification and guidance system that can accommodate to uncertainties—a pilot. It has a formidable defense capability. It is capable of sustained action in a wide variety of roles. Assuming that we don't lose our shirts in a surprise attack, the Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers can concentrate an awesome air power strike against Soviet combat ships and maintain this power in sustained combat, since aircraft are in a sense re-usable missiles. The ability to concentrate air strike forces against targets of our choosing, simultaneously, in widely separated areas, is a fundamental advantage that the Sixth Fleet enjoys. Our intensive surveillance efforts are partly for reducing the prospects of a successful surprise attack and partly to prevent technological surprise.
The Gatekeepers. The Soviet force has established several patterns of operations. They make great use of their intelligence collectors, the AGIs. One is always maintained off Rota to observe Polaris submarine movements and to watch the Straits of Gibraltar.
They usually keep an AGI and an hydrographic survey ship in the Strait of Sicily's choke point. They also maintain another off the coast of Israel. In addition, they use their combatant ships for surveillance. There is usually a missile or rocket ship in the area between Sardinia, Tunisia, and Sicily, and there are usually combatants either east and/or west of Crete. They trail our high-value ships with combatants. Normally, when our important units—the amphibious ready group with Marines and the aircraft carriers—are at sea, their forces will closely intermingle with ours. When not working in a surveillance role or exercising; they are normally in Port Alexandria or Port Said, A.R.E., or at anchorages. These anchorages are located throughout the Mediterranean, in international waters, where the depth is usually less than 100 fathoms. No nation's permission is required for their use. The most frequently used anchorages are Mellila Anchorage just north of Morocco; Alboran Island, east of the Strait of Gibraltar; the Gulf of Hammamet, northeast coast of Tunisia facing the Strait of Sicily; Hurd Bank, just east of Malta; Kithira Island, south of the Greek Peloponnesus; east of Crete; in the Gulf of Sollum, at the northwestern corner of Egypt; and east of Cyprus. Constant surveillance of geographic choke points or "turnstiles" is a well established Soviet practice. This tactic is clearly a part of their battle plans. Their interest in controlling the choke points is apparent in their exercises in the Mediterranean and worldwide. For example, exercises in the Mediterranean have included as objectives amphibious landings along the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. To protect the landing they use a defensive force of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft as a buffer against any attempt at intervention from outside sub-surface, surface, or air forces.
While the exercise is proceeding in a particular area, locally defended by the defensive forces just mentioned, they also put combatant forces into the strategic choke points. Thus, they accomplish their objective. They protect the area of assault and on a Mediterranean-wide strategic basis, they exercise at preventing any intervention by any country of the objective area by choking off access routes. This strategy could also serve to interdict the sea lines to the southern flank of NATO as previously described.
The NATO Surveillance Effort. Our own CTF-67, (ComASWForSixthFlt) has a concurrent NATO hat as the Maritime Air Command Mediterranean (MarAirMed), a NATO command located in Naples, Italy. He coordinates the collection and continuous dissemination of air surveillance information to the navies of participating NATO member nations. Through MarAirMed, the Sixth Fleet actively shares its aircraft assets and information to help provide effective surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea without duplication of effort. No aircraft are assigned to MarAirMed in peacetime; they remain under national control. Of the highest priority is the further strengthening of surveillance efforts of all types.
ASW in the Mediterranean. The problem of greatest magnitude in the Mediterranean is antisubmarine warfare. The "ground rules" of the ASW game—something like having all three outfielders on a baseball team wearing blindfolds—would be intolerable were it not for the fact that these handicaps apply alike to both teams. Speaking of ground rules, the aforementioned Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, restricts the passage of Soviet submarines through the Turkish straits. Thus, most of the Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean come the long way down from the Northern Fleet, which is the largest of the Soviet submarine fleets.
Once they reach the Mediterranean, Soviet submarines may operate almost without limitation. However, the Mediterranean is no goldfish bowl. There are high ambient noise levels in the water owing to the high density of shipping (2,000 ships are estimated underway in the Mediterranean every day) and "layering" in summer months make sonar conditions extremely difficult. As indicated, these same water conditions appreciably increase the difficulties facing an attacking submarine.
The reduction in the number of ASW carriers seems to be a paradox in view of the Soviets' heavy emphasis on submarine warfare and the unique problem ASW presents in this part of the world. Only periodically since World War II have we had ASW carriers in the Mediterranean. We have never been able to afford a steady-state deployment.
This leads to another important subject: carrier use and air group composition. For example, during her Mediterranean deployment last fall, the USS Independence had an ASW helicopter squadron embarked. This is the Second time this has been done. Of course, there have been the traditional differences among the proponents of strike aviation on the one hand, the proponents of AM aviation on the other; and the supporters of the Hunter Killer group (HUK) concept versus the land-based patrol aircraft believer. Then there are the submariners who feel that the best way to find a sub is with another sub. Our best results have accrued from the complementary capabilities of all hands applied to the problem. In this, we are showing a healthy departure from the traditional by experimenting with a mix of planes on our carriers to meet specific missions. There is considerable promise from putting a composite capability on certain of our floating airfields, but at a cost in reducing our strike potential.
Conclusion. The United States can no longer with impunity allow its oilers and other support ships to steam unescorted. Sea protection and sea control is critical to such ships. Sea control must be earned. In this small sea, it is no longer available by assumption. That logistic umbilical must be inviolate; otherwise, operations come to a grinding halt very quickly. The plain numbers limitation in the Sixth Fleet is becoming aggravated for several reasons. One, the age and material reliability of the older ships work increasingly against us. We are having a difficult time with these older ships. They are breaking down, and repair parts are not always available. Additionally, the problem is aggravated by inadequate numbers of first-line types of ships, such as those with a missile capability and long-range sonar. The third factor of aggravation keys to a requirement to keep ships of high interest and potential under surveillance to preclude surprise, which tends further to fragment our limited forces.
Aircraft can indeed help with surveillance. Surveillance around the clock, 24 hours a day, could become a necessity because reaction times are becoming shorter and shorter.
In 1967, there were 25 Soviet ships in Mediterranean waters. That number more than doubled in two years from 35 in 1968 to as many as 72 in 1970. At this writing, there are 64, while our force numbers have declined. Now, in view of the magnitude and capability of this Soviet presence, the combined support of the NATO navies becomes increasingly important. NATO works in the Mediterranean. It is working daily in the valuable exchange of information and the perfecting of operating techniques at sea on bilateral and multilateral exercises. We must and do depend more and more upon our friends for help. The net result is most gratifying. It is an absolute necessity that the quality of performance continues to improve. This can only occur through the acquisition of additional numbers of new aircraft, ships, and missiles with high-performance capabilities for all Free World nations, not just the United States.
Lately we are hearing encouraging statements from authoritative spokesmen regarding the so-called renaissance of the U. S. Navy. Congressman F. Edward Hebert, the new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has promised more funds to rebuild the Fleet. He has predicted that reconstruction of the Navy will go forward until we have, in his words, "a more modern Navy, a Navy that will challenge your wildest imagination." These are heartening words indeed.
In the interim, the Sixth Fleet will continue to do its job. In this regard I have charged my shipmates in this Fleet to direct their energies to becoming so proficient in the fundamentals of naval matters that the unexpected can be taken in stride. This is our operational goal. But, while readying ourselves for the unexpected, we must not overlook the obvious.
Whatever the cost, we must prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a military edge which could not be overcome.