A Navy Without Weapons?
By Dr. John T. Bonner, Jr., Vice President for Educational Services, The Ohio State University
Considering the recent academic typhoons which have sunk Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps departments at some eastern universities, and the wailing winds of many educators demanding a reduction in officer courses, it may seem paradoxical to hear an educator plead for the retention of an ROTC course currently being scuttled. It is, perhaps, equally incongruous that one academician attempting to preserve a traditional Navy course is a former Army officer.
In mid-1971, the naval weapons course was eliminated from the NROTC curriculum at most colleges and universities. By mid-1972, the weapons course will be blown out of the water at The Ohio State University and also a few other educational institutions which have fought for its retention. Why is this basic Navy course being scuttled? Do the professors of Naval Science request its deletion? The answer is no. A survey of 24 professors of Naval Science indicated that only two were in favor of eliminating the weapons course, while 22 were opposed to the deletion. It is interesting to note that Naval Weapons (or Naval Ordnance) has been one of the core courses of NROTC since its earliest beginnings in 1926. No objections to the subject have been raised until the past two or three years.
Is the course in naval weapons being scuttled because it is no longer useful to our midshipmen? Again the answer is no. According to Principles of Naval Ordnance and Gunnery (NavPers 10783-A):
“. . . it is well to remember that all naval line officers have weapons department assignments sooner or later in their careers, and that it is worth working to make such assignments successful and profitable in terms of broadened background and increased knowledge and experience. Moreover, on your effectiveness as a member of the weapons department can depend the lives of your shipmates as well as your own.”
This statement was buttressed by a representative of the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BuPers), who insisted that nearly 50% of the new ensigns going to sea would soon occupy a billet in a weapons department. Additionally, it must be noted that every qualified officer of the deck must have a basic knowledge of weapons in order to fulfill his responsibilities.
Is the course in naval weapons being eliminated from NROTC curricula in order to conform with the curriculum of the U. S. Naval Academy? Once again the answer is no. The Academy maintains an entire Department of Weapons and Systems Engineering, which offers 20 courses and encompasses a faculty of 33. Particularly cogent are the courses “Introduction to Naval Engineering and Weapons Systems,” which includes the study of “Naval Guns, Missiles, and Fire Control Systems,” “Shipboard Weaponeering” and “Weapons Systems Engineering.” Each midshipman, at the Naval Academy, regardless of his major, must take both of the first two listed courses which include approximately 90 contact hours of pure weapons instruction. By comparison, the naval weapons courses offered at NROTC colleges and universities encompassed approximately 60 contact hours. As taught at The Ohio State University, the course includes such supplementary topics as a study of radar, applications of electronics, division and department administration, communications, and the synthesis of tactics with the order of battle. If the time spent on these topics at the Academy were to be computed, the number of student contact hours would be even more disproportional. Not only Academy graduates, but also officer candidate school (OCS) graduates will continue to receive weapons instruction. Thus, only NROTC commissionees will be handicapped by their lack of information about naval weapons.
Is the weapons course being sacrificed to appease the campus radicals who have attacked the ROTC as the proximate target of the military establishment? This author hopes not. The Navy has won considerable respect by its refusal to surrender to the unreasonable demands of campus revolutionaries.* Only a small percentage of institutions producing an even smaller percentage of commissionees has been lost. Some of the academic institutions which have cast off their NROTC programs are already making overtures for the return of the programs. Having been committed to the battle over ROTC on one campus, this writer knows that the NROTC program was commended for the practical nature of its course content, including the weapons course. Why, then is the weapons course being abandoned at NROTC institutions?
One of the most frequently voiced objection to the naval weapons course is that it is too difficult for non-engineering students. If the subject is taught as a sophisticated, computer-oriented systems course, the objection is valid. Of the 55 institutions now offering NROTC, only six could be classed as engineering-oriented. Many of the other institutions which comprise the Association of NROTC Universities also have strong colleges of engineering, but draw large numbers of their midshipmen from Liberal Arts, Education, Agriculture, or Business Administration backgrounds. The magnitude of non-engineering students is probably demonstrated by the fact that the majority of the faculty members who coordinate NROTC programs come from such academic disciplines as History, Education, Philosophy, Political Science, Forestry, Law, Business, and Languages.
* See L. M. Kryske, “NROTC at UCLA: The Colors Still Fly,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1971, pp. 18-25.
It is true that a midshipman from a non-engineering background could be capsized in the waves of sophisticated technology if the naval weapons course were taught as a highly specialized course in computer-oriented systems. It is also true that the Bureau of Naval Personnel would be hard-pressed to supply competent instructors for such a highly specialized approach to naval weapons. At the last three annual meetings of the Association of NROTC Universities, BuPers has admitted the inability to supply adequately trained officers to staff the weapons courses, while the academicians have retorted, “If you can’t supply the faculty, why force us to offer the course?”
There is, however, a better solution. The half-dozen technology-oriented institutions would continue to offer the weapons course as presently constituted. Students at such institutions as Georgia Tech, M.I.T., Rensselaer, et al, would find the course challenging, and the Bureau of Naval Personnel would be able to supply the limited number of officers needed to handle the sophisticated subject matter. Graduates of this type of weapons course would be available to the Navy as highly-trained specialists.
At institutions with a Liberal Arts flavor, the naval weapons course could be conducted in a less specialized atmosphere for the benefit of midshipmen who would probably become assistant weapons officer shortly after commissioning. The subject could be taught by most naval officers who had served in a weapons capacity. At The Ohio State University, the naval weapons course is taught by a young lieutenant who is a submariner. After auditing approximately one-third of his course, this author is convinced that he is doing a splendid job of explaining complex concepts in understandable terms. The midshipmen at Ohio State will become more competent officers because of the information they receive in the naval weapons course.
What this writer proposes is that the weapons course be tailored to the distinct personalities of the various educational institutions which it serves. Individualized courses, based upon diverse student backgrounds, is a time-tested educational practice. Nearly every complex university offers a number of courses designed for specific types of students. “Law for engineers,” “accounting for education students,” and “mathematics for business students” are sample titles which decorate many university catalogs.
Permitting each academic institution a degree of flexibility in its ROTC curriculum has been proposed by every recent major study of ROTC. In 1969, the special committee on ROTC to the Secretary of Defense (commonly called the Benson Committee after its chairman, Dr. George C. S. Benson) recommended that “. . . a cooperative effort between the Armed Services and the universities in developing the ROTC curriculum.” The committee also recommended “. . . more discretion to instructors . . .” which would appear to indicate tailoring the courses to the background of each individual class.
On 15 March 1971, a meeting of representatives of the Association of American Colleges, American Association of State Colleges and Universities, Association of American Universities, National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, resulted in the adoption of a joint policy statement which stated:
“The authorizing law should be revised to provide that the curriculum of the several programs shall be developed and established as a joint and mutual responsibility of the participating academic institution and the respective military department.”
Of even greater importance was the statement that:
“. . . consistent with the central objections of the officer evaluation programs, maximum flexibility should be permitted to adapt the program to local conditions on individual campuses.”
The way out of the dilemma is clear. Every major academic association has endorsed the principal [sic] of flexibility if ROTC courses. The Navy need not choose either the dilemma-horn of a super-technical course which is difficult to staff and beyond the capabilities of non-engineering students, or the goring horn of a general course, which is not sufficiently challenging for students with a comprehensive technological background. Each institution may design a course to meet its own individual needs, while continuing to serve the Navy’s need for junior officers with naval weapons backgrounds.
Another objection to the weapons course has been voiced by the campus revolutionaries. The radicals’ demands usually run like this: “Weapons are for killing; all killing is immoral; no immoral subjects should be taught on the college campus; therefore, weapons should not be taught in educational institutions.” It is the same argument which has plagued the Army ROTC courses in rifle marksmanship. Without engaging in fruitless debate about living in a violent world and needing the tools to protect ourselves from violence, it would be a simple matter to use the semantic device of making the weapons course a part of ships systems and calling the course Ships Systems I or II or III.
Whatever the nomenclature, it is apparent that a weapons course should be maintained at the NROTC colleges and universities. Our graduates need the information in order to compete with graduates from the Naval Academy and OCS. The Navy needs junior officers who are prepared to fill weapons billets on their first tour of sea duty. We educators who recently have won bloody battles to preserve NROTC as a justifiable academic program need to know that the programs for which we fought will not arbitrarily be scuttled.
Admiral, R. N., 1776
By Captain Alexander W. Moffat, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
Falconer’s Marine Dictionary, printed in London in 1776, is a remarkable volume. Following the title page is the following dedication, “To the Right Honourable The Lords Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, this work is by their Lordships Permission, with the Utmost Respect, Inscribed by The Author.” William Falconer’s definition of the duties and responsibilities of an Admiral, if updated 196 years with respect to tactics and logistics, could come close to applying the qualifications sought in a modern Task Force Commander. Falconer’s definition, quoted herewith in part, is worth reading for its magnificent prose alone.
“The admiral, or commander-in-chief of a fleet, being frequently invested with a great charge, on which the fate of a kingdom may depend, ought certainly to be possessed of abilities equal to so important a station and so extensive a command. His fleet is unavoidably exposed to a variety of perplexing situations in a precarious element. A train of dangerous incidents necessarily arise from those situations. The health, order and discipline of his people, are not less the objects of his consideration, than the condition and qualities of his ships. A sudden change of climate, a rank and infectious air, a scarcity, or unwholesomeness of provisions, may be as pernicious to the former, as tempestuous weather or dangerous navigation to the latter. A lee shore, an injudicious engagement with an enemy greatly superior, may be equally fatal to both. He ought to have sufficient experience to anticipate all the probable events that may happen to his fleet during an expedition or cruise, and, by consequence, to provide against them. His skill should be able to counteract the various disasters which his fleet may suffer from different causes. His vigilance and presence of mind are necessary to seize every favorable opportunity that his situation may offer to prosecute his principle design; to extricate himself from any difficulty or distress; to check unfortunate events in the beginning, and retard the progress of any great calamity. He should be imbued with resolution and fortitude to animate his officers by the force of example, and promote a sense of emulation in those who are under his command, as well as to improve any advantage, as to frustrate or defeat the efforts of his ill fortune.
“The most essential part of his duty, however, appears to be military conduct. As soon as the fleet under his command puts to sea, he is to form it into the proper order of battle, called the line. In this arrangement, he is to make a judicious distribution of strength from the van to the rear, throwing the principle force into the center, to resist the impression of the enemy’s fleet, which might otherwise, at some favorable opportunity break through his line, and throw the van and rear into a state of confusion.
“A competent knowledge of the seas, weather and reigning winds, of the coast or region where he is stationed, is also requisite, as it will greatly facilitate his plans on the enemy. It will enable him to avoid being improperly embayed, where he might be surprised in a disadvantageous situation; and to judge whether it will be most expedient to attack his adversary, or lie prepared to receive his assault. When his fleet is forced by stress of weather or otherwise to take shelter in a road or bay, it will likewise suggest the necessary conduct of keeping a sufficient number of cruisers at sea, to bring him early intelligence, that they may be ready to cut or slip the cables when they are too much hurried to weigh their anchors.
“When the admiral intends a descent on an enemy’s coast, or other attack which may be attended with complicated or unforeseen incidents, his orders should be delivered or drawn up with the greatest accuracy and precision: they should be simple, perspicuous, direct, and comprehensive; they should collect a number of objects into one point of view, and, foreseeing the effects of success or defeat, appoint the proper measures to be adopted in consequence thereof. History and experience confirm the necessity of this observation, and present us with a variety of disasters that have happened on such occasions, merely by a deficiency in this material article. In the commanding officer, inattention, barrenness of expedient, or a circumscribed view of the necessary effects of his enterprise, may be equally pernicious. And general orders ought to be free from pedantry and perplexity, which always betray a false taste and confused imagination, besides the probability of producing many fatal consequences.
“When an admiral conquers in battle, he should endeavor to improve his victory, by pushing the advantages he has acquired as far as prudence directs; a conduct which merits his attention as much as any in the action! When he is defeated, he ought to embrace every opportunity of saving as many of his ships as possible, and endeavor principally to assist those which are disabled. In short, it is his duty to avail himself of every practicable expedient rather than sink under his misfortune, and suffer himself to become an easy prey to the enemy.
“He should be sufficiently acquainted with civil law, to judge with propriety of the proceedings of courts martial, and to correct the errors, and restrain the abuses which may happen therein by mistake, or ignorance, or inattention.
“Much more might be observed on this occasion. It appears, however, by the general outline which we have sketched, that the office and duty of an admiral requires greater skill and more comprehensive abilities than is generally supposed necessary to the command of a naval armament. And that he ought to be qualified, at least in this kingdom, to assist at the councils of his sovereign, and enter into the enlarged system of protecting his country from an invasion by sea, or of meditating a descent on an enemy’s coast; as well as to improve navigation and open new channels of commerce.”
Religious Pluralism and Navy Chaplains
By Captain R. G. Hutcheson, Jr., Chaplain Corps, U. S. Navy, Director, Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Chaplain Corps Planning Group
A representative of the National Jewish Welfare Board (JWB), visiting the Newport Naval Base, was invited to attend a meeting of local chaplains. No Jewish chaplain was permanently assigned to the area, and the senior chaplains of all Newport-based activities, ashore and afloat, had been called together to discuss ways of providing religious services for Jewish men. As the meeting was drawing to a satisfactory close, the JWB representative stated that “Only in the military would you find a scene like this—a group of Christian clergymen, Protestant and Roman Catholic, sitting around working out arrangements for Jewish services.” Ecumenism has become a dominant theme in contemporary American religious life. The ecumenical era came of age in the mid-1960s following the Second Vatican Council, the entry of most of Eastern Orthodox Christendom into the World Council of Churches, and the involvement of major Protestant denominations in the Consultation on Church Union. Observing this ecumenical emphasis of the times, older Navy chaplains have tended to smile smugly and say, “This is nothing new to us; we’ve had it in the Navy for years.”
In a superficial sense the statement is true. To the extent that “ecumenism” means an improved climate of cooperation and friendly relations between those of different churches; to the extent that its thrust is in the direction of charitable understanding; to the extent that “ecumenism” refers to practical accommodations when persons of different Protestant denominations worship together, the Navy Chaplain Corps has certainly been ecumenical for a long time. But traditionally, ecumenism is a church-oriented word. For many it is basically a movement toward elimination of denominational lines. It implies concrete steps toward the establishment of one all-encompassing world-wide Church. In this sense, the statement of the old-timers of the Chaplain Corps is decidedly misleading. What we have had in the Navy is not ecumenism but cooperative pluralism. While it has helped to provide a climate in which ecumenism can flourish, religion in the Navy is more accurately described simply as an extension of the religious pluralism of American society in general.
In some ways, the Navy offers an improved version of pluralism. Representatives of all religions, both chaplains and concerned laymen, have worked within the same organizational framework, and because they have all been engaged in the same task of staking out a religious claim on men’s lives, within the context of a military society oriented in other directions, they have, of necessity, made common cause with each other. There has been more cooperation, and perhaps less bickering (in part because a military organization simply will not put up with it) than has all too often been characteristic of religious pluralism in American society in general. But the pattern, essentially, is the same.
In the belief that those separated from normal opportunities for worship and devotion by the necessities of military Service, may not legitimately be deprived of the right to freely practice the religion of their choice, the United States has, from the beginning, provided chaplaincies as integral parts of the American military establishment. The pattern evolved by the naval chaplaincy has been determined by three basic American principles: (1) Every American has the right to practice the religion of his own choice; (2) The state, while favoring no single religion or denomination above any other, encourages all; and (3) A principle which is a less precisely defined, but generally agreed upon recognition that the American religious climate is properly one of mutual respect, understanding, and cooperative co-existence between adherents of different religions.
The religious complexion of the chaplaincy is determined by denominational quotas. The quota system uses percentages based on the religious affiliation and preferences of naval personnel, and is designed to reflect faithfully the religious complexion of the American population at large.
Once appointed, the chaplains who make up the quotas of the various faiths and denominations are assigned to duty on ships and stations throughout the Navy and Marine Corps on the basis of continuing attention to the requirements of religious pluralism. A “denominational spread” to meet the needs of as many groups as possible is the goal in assigning chaplains to any given organization or locality.
At the local level, the requirements of religious pluralism are met by the assigned chaplains through the operating principle of mutual responsibility. This is a long ingrained tradition in the Chaplain Corps, accepted by every Navy chaplain as the working basis of his ministry. Each chaplain is obligated not only to serve those of his own faith or denominational group, but also to make provision for those of other faiths and groups. As an example, there is an exchange of services among chaplains—a Roman Catholic chaplain assigned to one ship celebrates mass on board another ship, whose chaplain is Protestant.
On a more elaborate scale, there are standard procedures for coordinating the exchange of denominational coverage in Navy ports and in operating units at sea. The staff chaplain of the senior commander has responsibility for coordination, while all other chaplains have the responsibility of informing him of their needs and availability. When chaplain exchanges will not suffice, the services of civilian clergymen, where available, are used. Lists of English-speaking clergymen of various religions in frequently visited ports are a standard resource used by shipboard chaplains deploying to the Mediterranean, the Far East, or other operating areas. In the absence of either chaplain or civilian clergyman, provision is made with lay leaders, who conduct religious worship for their own groups.
Distinction between administrative and religious areas—A major reason for the effectiveness of the religiously pluralistic ministry in the naval service is the fact that the naval chaplaincy draws a clear-cut distinction between the organizational/administrative area, in which the chaplain functions without regard to his denominational affiliation, and the religious area, in which he functions as a representative of his own church.
Organizationally, the Chaplain Corps is fully integrated. In contrast to the military chaplaincies of certain other nations, where there are parallel Protestant and Roman Catholic chaplaincies, each with its own Chief of Chaplains and organizational structure, our chaplaincy is administratively unified. A Roman Catholic senior chaplain may, and frequently does, supervise the work of a group of chaplains made up not only of other Roman Catholics, but also Protestants of a variety of denominations, and perhaps Jewish, Latter Day Saints, or Eastern Orthodox chaplains. The same title, “chaplain” is used to address priests, rabbis, and ministers alike. The Chief of Chaplains may be of any religion—administratively there is no distinction.
Religiously, however, each chaplain’s ministry is determined by his own church. The right of the chaplain to conduct public worship—and by implication his entire religious ministry—in accordance with the rites, rules, and practices of his own church is carefully detailed in Public Law and in Navy Regulations (Article 0807). The attitude of the Navy is not one of grudging acceptance of this principle as if it were a limitation on the chaplain’s ministry, but rather an active encouragement of a vital relationship to his own church as the basis of a chaplain’s ministry. This takes the form of a clear recognition that every chaplain is the subject to the authority of his church as well as to the authority of the Navy. Ecclesiastical endorsement is required, and if endorsement is withdrawn, a chaplain cannot continue to serve as a religious leader. Active cooperation and assistance are extended to the denominational authorities responsible for the ecclesiastical supervision of their clergymen in the chaplaincy. In all these ways, the chaplain’s ministry is recognized as being in the fullest sense an extension of the ministry of the denomination that ordained him and endorsed him.
This clear distinction between the integrated organizational/administrative area, and the uncoerced religious area, is the working basis of the Navy chaplain’s ministry to a pluralistic society. The principle is summarized in the phrase that has become the motto of the Navy Chaplain Corps, “Cooperation without Compromise.”
The Protestant Program—It is not with regard to “cooperation without compromise” between Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews, and those of other religions, but with regard to the so-called “Protestant Program” in the Navy that misunderstandings most often arise. Certain fallacious statements are heard frequently such as, “Navy chaplains give up their denominational identification and are known only as ‘Protestants’;” “Every Navy man who is not Roman Catholic or Jewish is considered a Protestant and must take part in the Protestant program;” or “The Armed Forces have developed a ‘Military Protestant Church’ which competes with the various Protestant denominations in communities where bases are located.” None of these statements is true.
A source of much of the confusion is the widespread use of the term, “General Protestant Service.” Strictly speaking, there is no such thing. A service is conducted by a chaplain, who, though he may represent any one of a number of denominations, considers himself Protestant. It is open to all worshipers who, whatever their denominations, consider themselves Protestant. Such a service may legitimately be called a Protestant service. Certainly this is a more convenient term for use in the Plan of the Day or on the Bulletin Board than “Service Conducted by a Methodist Chaplain Open to Protestants of All Denominations.” But the term “Protestant Service” carries with it no implication of enforced conformity. There is no established liturgy for such a service, nor even a normative pattern. Every chaplain is entirely free to follow the liturgy and forms of his own denomination, with such adjustments as his denomination may permit, and he may care to make, to the fact that the worshipers come from many denominations. The fact that most chaplains of Protestant denominations do make such adjustments is not an indictment, but an indication of their desire to be relevant. Such adjustments are by no means mandatory. Navy worshipers are accustomed to a variety of liturgical forms—as well as to frequent changes in liturgical forms as chaplain follows chaplain—and they take it all in their stride.
It is not required, or even expected, that all Protestant laymen will attend the services conducted by any particular chaplain, or that all those who do attend will find their needs fully satisfied. Every effort is made to supplement the available “Protestant services” with various denominational communion services and sacramental ministries where needed, and to encourage contact between laymen and their own denominations. But because Protestants are accustomed to cooperating, worshipping together, and crossing denominational lines, the cooperative Protestant program in the Navy provides a viable system that meets the needs of most Protestants most of the time. The key to such a program is voluntarism by both clerical and lay.
Without any coercion on the part of the Navy, chaplains generally find that they can serve Protestants from a broad denominational spectrum; and far from finding themselves compromised by so doing, they find it an exciting and challenging ministry. Laymen, for their part, equally without coercion, find that they can be served by chaplains from a variety of denominations; and far from being compromised, they find it a richly varied and rewarding form of church life. The significant thing is not only that it works, but that it works well. It is properly labeled religious pluralism rather than ecumenism. But, nevertheless, it has set a pattern for practical ecumenism which, as successive generations of young Americans have passed through the Armed Forces in the years since World War II, has contributed immeasurably to the growth of the ecumenical movement.
This discussion of the chaplain’s ministry to a pluralistic society has, of necessity, been offered primarily in terms of the liturgical, sacramental, and spiritual aspects of that ministry. It should be noted that the ministry has been a satisfying one for chaplains not only because of the cooperative modus operandi worked out on the basis of mutual respect and mutual responsibility, but also because chaplains have recognized, earlier in some instances than their civilian counterparts, the now generally accepted significance in ministry of the serving witness in secular society. A chaplain, not merely as an administrator serving without regard to denominational affiliation, but as a priest, minister, or rabbi representing his own ecclesiastical body, is accustomed to serving as counselor/confidante to the entire crew of a ship or station. Beyond the ecclesiastical context which assumes a pastor-congregation relationship, he has long met his parishioners in the purely human context, as a concerned person in encounter with another person. It is the connotation of concern for Servicemen as human beings of value in their own right—as thinking, feeling, individual persons—which the term “chaplain” primarily carries in the naval society.
In the serving ministry to persons as persons, the particular beliefs and denominational affiliation of the chaplain are assumed on both sides as being his context, but they do not make demands on the other uninvited. It is because of this ministry to the whole naval community, and not just because he makes arrangements for divine services for all, insofar as he is able, that a Roman Catholic, Baptist, or Episcopalian chaplain can be known as the “the chaplain" of his ship, rather than as chaplain only to the 30%, 10%, or 2% who are adherents of his church. The deepest and most significant dimension of a chaplain’s ministry to a pluralistic society may well be his ministry to that society, rather than to its pluralism.
CAPE: A First for the Navy
By Lieutenant Commander Tommy W. Goad, U. S. Naval Reserve-R
The use of the digital computer for training purposes within the Navy has now come full circle. The first half of the circle, as shown in Figure 1, is represented by the breakthrough in real-time simulation. Extremely realistic environments for training command and control personnel are now being generated with computer complexes. The second half of the circle is represented by one of the newest uses of computers by the Navy—Computer Assisted Performance Evaluation (CAPE).
CAPE is a process in which a computer program is used to extract and manipulate data gathered as the result of trainees performing in mockup against a simulated environment. The environment is created through computerized generation. The philosophy is to compare what the trainees did, to what they should have done according to some standard. Since computers can be used to record every event and action that transpires during an exercise period, and because the training system is computer-based and controllable, it is feasible to make such comparisons.
The first known Navy CAPE efforts occurred in conjunction with the Tactical Advanced Combat Direction and Electronic Warfare (TACDEW) simulation system at the Fleet Anti-Air Warfare Training Center (FAAWTC) at San Diego, California. The project is being developed by a triumvirate of FAAWTC staff, Navy Personnel Training Research Laboratory (NPTRL) personnel, and contractor representatives. The contractor is, in turn, under contract to the Fleet Computer Programming Center, Pacific, which serves as project manager. Project interrelationships are shown in Figure 2.
[Figure 1, depicting the computer simulation cycle]
[Figure 2, depicting the CAPE project interrelationships]
The first stage of the CAPE project, called EVAL I, was centered around individual training. Three programs have been delivered: one each for surface operations (SO), air intercept control (AIC), and carrier controlled approach (CCA). These prototype programs are undergoing an analysis, verification, and debug by NPTRL and FAAWTC, with instructor usage being phased in throughout this year.
The evaluation concept is shown in Figure 3. The three essential elements of the operation are data-recorded, data-manipulated, and data-output.
[Figure 3, depicting the evaluation concept]
Data for evaluation can come from numerous sources, but for EVAL I, only the data automatically generated from the simulation program is recorded on the disk. This includes such things as preprogrammed conditions and events, alterations made to the simulated environment as the exercise progresses, and trainee reactions.
The evaluation program is loaded into a computer upon completion of the training exercise. An operator selects the particular exercise and program (SO, AIC, CCA) through a teletype interface with the computer. The program commences its run when all the files of data from the disk have been read in. The first pass of the program reconstructs the entire exercise in a matter of seconds. The next pass extracts and files that data required for the particular area to be evaluated. The next operation is to perform the manipulations and calculations according to the programmed routines. The final operation is to print-out the listings of the evaluated data on a highspeed printer.
Three types of data are produced by the program. The first consists of summaries, averages, and general information. Some items, such as date instructor, trainee, and mockup assignment, are filled in manually. The second is selected chronological track histories, including pertinent information such as when a ship was maneuvered from one station to another. The third type of data is snapshots of selected tracks. These can be requested on-line, and some are automatically produced. For example, each time an interceptor aircraft goes after a bogey (enemy) and attempts to shoot it down, the tracks of the two aircraft are laid out according to their geographic positions, with significant events annotated. In addition to program listings, the exercise can be replayed in its entirety for further critiqueing.
Surface Operations—The SO program is designed to be used in performance evaluation of maneuvering, tracking, naval gunfire support, and radar-assisted piloting training. A sample program printout for surface operations is shown in Figure 4. The first four items under category I are totals of the number of estimates made during the course of the exercise for set and drift, closest point of approach (CPA), surface contacts, and targets. The next item is the total number of times the ship was determined to be off-station by more than a prescribed amount. The next is the number of times that the maneuvering ship came within 1,000 yards or less of a carrier or cruiser. The last item is the total number of collisions between the training mockup and other vessels.
As noted from the title, category II items are average errors made (a simple matter of computing each error, totaling all the errors, and dividing by the number of times the particular type of report was made). On board ship, the maneuvering board plotter would report to the bridge the range, bearing, and time of CPA of an approaching ship; using TACDEW, these reports to the bridge are entered into the computer by staff personnel for later evaluation.
Figure 4
SUMMARY SO EXERCISE—552
Category 1—SO Exercise Totals
Set and Drift Est.—2
CPA Est.—5
Surface Contact Est.—5
Target Est.—2
Off-Station Det.—2
1,000 yds from Hvy Violations—1
Collisions—1
Category 2—SO Exercise Error Averages
Set and Drift Est.—8 degrees, 1 knot
CPA Est.—2 minutes, 100 yards, 12 degrees
Surface Contact Est.—5 degrees, 75 yards
Target Est.—6 degrees, 80 yards
Air Intercept Control—The AIC program is designed to serve as a tool for the instructor in determining how effective these controllers are in using interceptor aircraft as weapons in a hostile situation. The exercise totals cover such items as: number of intercepts attempted, number of hostile targets killed, and number of bogey position reports made. Exercise averages include: error in reported bogey speed, heading, and altitude, and bogey distance from friendly forces when shot down.
Carrier Controlled Approach—The CCA program is designed to assist in determining the effectiveness of CCA air controllers in bringing in aircraft (in the simulated environment) for landings on board the carrier under radar close control. Such data as number of wave-offs and number of glide path corrections ate produced by the evaluation program, along with several average error calculations.
The second stage of the CAPE project, known as EVAL II, is an evaluation program for anti-air warfare (AAW) team training. The model for developing this program is a short, advanced AAW team/task force training course, patterned after standard Fleet AAW doctrine.
The initial phase of EVAL II—producing the operational specifications for the program—has been completed. These specifications include definitions of the performance and situational variables deemed necessary to properly assess personnel performance during an AAW engagement. The specifications also lay the framework for future expansion of the evaluation concept into more advanced applications. Actual programming for EVAL II is planned for Fiscal Year 1973.
The follow-on to this effort will include such things as evaluating live Fleet exercises, operation orders, operational programs, and development of an on-line evaluation capability.
CAPE is a continuing, dynamic process. As each new evaluation program is analyzed, improvements are made not just to the program, but to training concepts and training exercise philosophy as well. Each time the iterative process is completed, there is further assurance that improvements are being made where most needed—in the readiness of the Fleet.