Japan's View of Korea

Mushrooming below these South Korean youngsters is a modern capital that has been raised from the rubble left when the First Marine Division liberated Seoul from the North Koreans in September 1950. While that Korean War did not involve an inward-turned Japan directly, a resurgent, outward-looking Japan must now consider Korea as a significant factor in its future.

Somewhat obscured by recent events and actions in the Far East is the worrisome problem implicit in the question: What place does Korea hold in the minds of the Japanese leadership and the Japanese people as far as national security is concerned?

Even within an environment increasingly dominated by the image of Peking, the query is significant for a number of reasons. First, by virtue of geographic position, major international issues that have arisen on the Korean peninsula have always directly affected Japan. In less than a century, three major wars have been fought on this peninsula. The first two conflicts, the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, were brought about by conflicting national interests on the peninsula with Japan the victor in both instances. The Korean War did not involve Japan directly, but the Japanese islands were significant as a base of operations and logistical support for the United Nations Forces.

Second, 25 years after a devastating defeat in World War II, Japan is the third ranking economic power in the world behind the United States and the Soviet Union. Equally significant, it is the only industrial power in Asia. But, quite unlike prewar Japan, this economic power is exercised in the absence of military power. Though protected under the U. S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960, this bilateral arrangement is subject to constant review and possible change. With some type of solution pending in South Vietnam and in keeping with the Nixon doctrine of a “lower profile in Asia,” to include the announced reduction of U. S. forces in South Korea, it would appear that these conditions would have great moment on Japan’s view of its national security.

Third, as we enter the decade of the 1970s, power politics in Asia, and particularly Northeast Asia, no longer involves only the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States. The idea of a monolithic Communist giant casting an imposing shadow over Asia has given way to two distinct Communist factions, those of the Soviet Union and Communist China, whose politics on the international scene are by no means parallel. Though Japan is strongly allied with the United States, the economic policies and internal politics of Japan will allow only discontinuous parallels to exist for the two countries on the international scene. As time passes, Japan will continue to play more of a major, independent role in what is becoming a multipolar Asia. One focus of this multinational interest will be Korea, just as it has served as a focus historically.

It is necessary to offer some background to Korean and Japanese relations in an effort to analyze the current Japanese view of Korea.* Fundamental to this consideration is Korea’s early political and cultural relationships with China.

“Geographically, Korea’s face is toward China and her back toward Japan.” This statement goes far in explaining and understanding Korea’s cultural and political heritage until the latter part of the 19th century. Appended as Korea is to the Asian land mass along the borders of Manchuria, it is not surprising to find a special relationship between Korea, the Hermit Kingdom, and China, the Middle Kingdom, a relationship based principally on the Confucian ethic.

The fundamental element of Confucian thought is inequality. This is implied in the basic relationships between Emperor and subject; husband and wife; father and son; friend and friend; elder brother and younger brother. There will always be someone in control. In the absence of unequal status, man would return to barbarism and chaos where his desires were no longer under control. Translated in terms of relations between states, the Confucian ethic, coming from the Middle Kingdom, relegated border states to inferior status. China assumed the relationship of elder brother, the border states the subordinate position of younger brother. It was this relationship that Korea accepted and functioned under until the closing years of the 19th century.

As the latter half of the 19th century began, circumstances were changing in a manner that would significantly alter Korea’s place in the Confucian family of nations and in international politics. The Manchu Dynasty was beginning to decline in effectiveness. Serious encroachments were being made on the coast of China by Western powers as a result of the Opium Wars and the resulting treaties. Russia, by treaties in 1858 and 1860, had gained territories north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River. In Japan, the Meiji Restoration began in 1868. A significant element in the restoration was that of overseas expansion.

Before treating in any detail the interactions between Japan and Korea in the 19th and 20th centuries, it would be well to bear in mind some significant facts of geography and history that might have an impact on present perceptions.

One should immediately recognize Japan’s insularity and position with regard to the Asian land mass in general and Korea in particular. It is the thrust of the Korean Peninsula southward that brings Japan into closest proximity with the mainland.

Writers of Japanese history and culture have not overlooked this insularity and limited isolation in the development of the national character of Japan. Former Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer points to both advantages and disadvantages in this isolation. One asset, he notes, has been the development of a true nation-state, one with a distinctive culture and language within clearly defined geographic limits. However, this isolation has bred a certain degree of self-consciousness that has made the Japanese rather tense in internation contact and exhibiting little concern and sensitivity to the feelings of others. He states, “. . . they have seemed obsessed with a sense of either superiority or of inferiority toward the outside world. Japan’s isolation may help explain some of her extremes in her international relations. . . .”

Of course, Japan’s insularity and isolation do not imply the development of a purely independent culture any more than Great Britain’s insularity gave birth to an independent culture. It is because of the relative geographic positions of Japan and Korea that the latter served as a cultural bridge between the Middle Kingdom and Japan.

The long isolation ended for Japan in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration. As Japan began to look beyond the islands once again, Korea was the first to appear on the horizon. This ultimately led to a treaty between Japan and Korea in 1876, representing the first fracture in the China-Korea relationship.

In spite of Korea’s treaty with Japan and the treaties with other nations that ultimately followed, the country still occupied a gray area in international politics. It was independent enough to negotiate separate treaties but not independent enough to pull completely away from Chinese influence. The Confucian concept still held on. As late as 1894, China’s control of Korea was almost complete.

In 1885, China and Japan had entered a convention in which each agreed not to send troops into Korea except in emergency. Such an emergency arose in 1894 when the Ton Hak Rebellion threatened the Korean throne. Both China and Japan dispatched troops. Though the rebellion had been put down, a crisis emerged with both Chinese and Japanese troops on the peninsula.

In the course of about two weeks, Japan was able to dominate the Korean government which issued a call for the withdrawal of Chinese troops. This precipitated the Sino-Japanese War which ended with Japan’s victory in 1895.

The resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki included China’s recognition of Korea’s independence. Additionally, it involved the transfer of Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan, payment of indemnities, and the opening of trading privileges for Japan in selected parts of China. However, Japan was compelled by Russia, France, and Great Britain to give up the Liaotung Peninsula originally ceded in the treaty.

Russian and Japanese competition on the Korean Peninsula grew serious during the latter part of the 19th century, particularly in the face of declining influence from the Manchu Dynasty in China. By the opening years of this century, Russian influence had grown considerably in Manchuria, causing the Japanese added concern. In 1903, Japan opened talks with Russia to settle these matters of conflicting interest in Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese minister in St. Petersburg stated:

“Corea is important in Japan’s line of defense, and Japan consequently considers the independence of Corea absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Japan possesses paramount political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence in Corea which, having regard to her own security, she cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, any other power.”

These negotiations were unsuccessful. Though Russia was ready to acknowledge Japan’s dominance in Korea, Russia felt that Manchuria was out of the Japanese sphere and should not be a part of the treaty. Diplomatic relations were broken, and on 8 February 1904, Japan attacked Port Arthur, thus opening the Russo-Japanese War.

The Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905, firmly consolidated Japan’s interests in Korea. The defeated Russian government recognized these interests. Also, Japan was able to gain the Liaotung Peninsula which it was forced to reject in 1895, as well as some railroad rights in southern Manchuria.

Even before the end of hostilities, Korea became a virtual protectorate of Japan by a protocol signed in 1904. Japan’s complete control of Korea was manifested in annexation in 1910. This control remained absolute until Japan’s defeat in 1945.

Some generalizations might be offered when viewing the historical background of interactions between Japan and Korea through World War II.

First, Korea had never been in a position to exercise full and complete independence in international relations. In theory, independence might have existed at times in the latter part of the 19th century; however, the government was usually under the strong influence of a foreign power. This condition may be explained in part by a combination of geographic and cultural influences. Certainly Korea’s membership in the Confucian family was owing to its juxtaposition to China and the continued infusion of Chinese culture into the peninsula. As China weakened towards the closing decades of the Manchu Dynasty, this influence was quickly replaced by powers ready to fill the void, either Russia or Japan. This readiness can be explained to some degree because of Korea’s strategic position in Northeast Asia. The enmity of an independent Korea could jeopardize the economic, political, or military aims of any state seeking ascendency in the region.

Second, there appears a certain periodicity in Japanese history with regard to foreign contacts and expansion. Since the 7th century, Japan has had identifiable periods during which it alternated in looking inward and outward. On each occasion that Japan had held an outward view, being able to turn from the problems of domestic consolidation and reform, Korea has been the first state with which it has had to deal. Japan has had to confront, if not Korea directly, other powers on the peninsula whom it deemed a threat to its security.

Thus, by virtue of Korea’s close proximity to Japan, the latter has historically perceived special interests on the peninsula.

After World War II, the Japanese immediately turned inward. In the minds of some, Japan is still an inward-looking nation. Foreign Minister Aichi has characterized this inward turn of Japan in a recent article in Foreign Affairs. He notes that with the complete exhaustion of the home islands after the war, the first concern was for economic reconstruction. The people desired no involvement in the international troubles around them. This condition was further strengthened by the constitution, particularly Article IX, in which Japan renounced the use of arms in settling international disputes.

Aichi points to two problems the Japanese have to face domestically. These are public hazards, such as industrial pollution, and the creation of social capital. He maintains that the quest for solutions to these problems will strengthen rather than weaken the inward-looking Japanese.

A state’s preoccupation with domestic problems can, of course, change with time. This change can be brought about by the resolution of the problems and/or by the external pressures and circumstances that force a pragmatic leadership and citizenry to recognize certain challenges and national goals on the international scene. It is likely that these conditions, particularly in the 1970s, will cause Japan to begin to turn outward once again.

► Economic interdependence. No state is truly self-sufficient. This is particularly true of Japan, where the natural resources to support heavy industry are not available in sufficient quantities in the home islands. Japan’s attainment of the third-ranking economic power in the world is maintained through trade, generally the importing of raw materials and semifinished products and the export of the finished materials.

Regionally, about 50% of Japan’s imports and exports are oriented towards North America and Europe. This is a marked departure from the prewar pattern, which was largely oriented toward Asia. This new shift in trade with the more developed nations should in no way mask the rising importance of Asian markets, either as a continued source of raw materials or as a market for Japanese goods. Indeed, the significance of Asian markets for Japanese goods will continually rise as economies of developing Asian nations grow and become more stabilized.

Japan’s recognition of the importance of economic growth and stability has been manifested in its contributions to various regional aid programs. Between 1964 and 1968, 57% of Japan’s governmental and private aid has gone to Asian countries. Regionally, Southeast Asia has received the largest share, 25%. But it is significant to note that the Republic of Korea received the largest share to a single state, 12.3%. Japan, with the United States, is the largest subscriber to the Asian Development Bank. Japan has no small stake in the economic and political stability of all of Asia.

► The Nixon Doctrine. In the summer of 1969, President Nixon, speaking on Guam, pronounced what has come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. The three key elements of this doctrine were summarized in his foreign policy statement to Congress in February 1970. The United States will keep its treaty commitments. The United States will provide a nuclear shield for any allied state or any state the security of which is vital to American or Asian security. And, finally, in nonnuclear aggression, the United States will provide economic and military assistance where necessary. However, the nation directly threatened will assume the burden of providing manpower for its defense.

Striking closer to home for the Japanese are the recent talks between the United States and the Republic of Korea regarding reduction of forces in South Korea. If Japan does view the defense of South Korea as vital to Japan’s security, then the removal of U. S. forces without the attendant strengthening and modernization of the Korean defense establishment could have far-reaching implications on Japanese defense policy.

The recent agreement concerning the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972 is another implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, though this problem demanded a solution long before the doctrine was proclaimed. With the ultimate reversion, Japan will assume responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa. Thus, for the first time since the end of World War II, Japan’s defense responsibilities will move beyond the shores of the four main islands. This cannot help but expand the vision of Japan as to Asian security in general and the home islands in particular.

► A multipolar Asia. Another factor that will alter Japan’s inward view is the multipolarity in international relations. The dominant power equilibrium still lies with the Soviet Union and the United States. However, given Japan’s economic strength and China’s split from the Soviet bloc, these two powers must be considered in any balancing relationship, particularly in Northeast Asia, where historically all four states have maintained vital interests.

Just after the outbreak of the Korean War, a survey asked, “Does Japan need military forces?” The survey in September 1950, yielded a 54% affirmative response. However, a survey regarding attitudes towards rearmament and defense expansion showed a drop from 50% in favor in 1953 to only 31% in favor in 1957. During the intervening period, tensions in Korea and Indochina had subsided. The results of these surveys may be indicative of the significance the Japanese place on Korea concerning their national defense.

In a speech in Australia in July 1968, former Foreign Minister Miki stated there were three factors that influenced the formation of Japan’s foreign policy: Japan’s geopolitical position; the national goals of the people; and the international environment surrounding Japan.

Expanding on the first point, he noted that Japan’s insularity and paucity of natural resources compel Japan to pacifism and internationalism. They make isolationism unthinkable. In spite of Japan’s proximity to mainland Asia, history has taught the Japanese that Japan cannot rule the continent, nor will the Japanese people submit themselves to rule by the continent. The outgrowth of the situation is that foreign policy towards mainland China, the Koreas, and the Soviet Union must be based on co-existence and co-prosperity through mutual respect and nonintervention.

Strongly implicit in the speech is Japan’s concern for a stable political situation on the peninsula of Korea, one that is controlled by a power that has no designs on expanding control to the Japanese islands or inhibiting Japanese economic interests.

In May 1969, then Foreign Minister Aichi gave strong support to the defense build-up and support of U. S. forces in Korea, stating this to be the prime reason North Korea has not been able to reunify Korea by force of arms. Immediately relating this to Japan, he wrote:

“To be sure, since Japan is surrounded by the sea, it faces only a limited threat compared with continental states insofar as direct land invasion is concerned. Nevertheless, it is extremely easy to mount an attack on Japan from the air or the sea, or to obstruct the nation’s commerce with other countries. Even in the case of a land invasion, in terms of techniques, an attacking country has only to control strategic areas . . . , therefore, if we are not prepared to resist aggression, there would be slight difference between a continental nation and an island country . . . Once the international balance of power is disrupted, an attack can be mounted for a very simple motive—for instance, a mere difference in social system or a desire to expand a country’s sphere of control in order to enhance its own security.”

Probably the most explicit statement regarding Korea and Japanese security was made by Prime Minister Sato before the National Press Club in Washington in November 1969. Speaking of the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty and the use of bases in Japan, he stated:

“In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for the United States forces, in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Government of Japan towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.”

The significance of Korea apparently had an impact on the Japanese Defense Agency planning. In 1965 it was revealed that the agency had established a hypothetical situation of an invasion of South Korea by land and air forces from North Korea, supported by Red China’s aircraft. Under the “Three Arrows” plan, the Prime Minister would address the nation noting the danger imposed on Japan by direct aggression by Communist forces and calling for their defense of the fatherland. The study also included emergency mobilization of the Self-Defense Forces for national defense and internal security.

The 1965 normalization accords between Japan and Korea were reached, partly through Japan’s perception of Korea in national security matters. Traditional Japanese interest in Korea was one of the positive factors working in favor of normalization. Korea is held to be a potential threat to Japan if in the hands of an unfriendly power.

Competition with Communist China was another positive factor. Japan is best equipped to compete with Communist China for the role of leadership in Asia. In this quest, the stability of Korea becomes a vital strategic stake for Japan.

From the few statements noted earlier, it appears that the Japanese, particularly the political leadership, have not lost sight of the significance of a stable, friendly Korea to the national security of Japan. Economic aid to South Korea, the normalization treaty, and the base provisions in the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty are major manifestations of this realization.

Thus far, emphasis has been placed upon conditions that could cause Japan to turn outward and, given this outward turn, the place Korea holds in the minds of the Japanese. It would be well now to examine the position Korea occupies in the larger area that Japan deems strategically vital.

Professor D. C. Hellmann considers three security zones to be vital to Japan.

First priority is given to Communist China, particularly since it has developed a nuclear capability.

The Soviet Union, South Korea, and Taiwan constitute areas of second priority. Any hostile action by the Soviet Union would probably be answered by the United States. Also, the Sino-Soviet split tends to reduce Soviet pressure on Japan. South Korea and Taiwan are of strategic importance if Japan comes under conventional or nuclear attack. Military moves in these areas would probably invoke Japanese intervention.

Southeast Asia, of third priority, is out of Japan’s military sphere but, nevertheless, is economically important for markets, capital investments, and raw materials.

Professor James Morley has inferred from Japanese defense programs three slightly different security zones. The first is the home islands, which the Self-Defense Forces are prepared to defend. The second zone is the Far East including South Korea, the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, and Taiwan, including the sea and air space around them. Since these areas are within several hundred miles of the main islands, they would be of strategic significance in limited or conventional warfare. Morley points to the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars as manifestations of this policy in earlier Japanese history. The third zone Morley defines as those areas outside Japan’s ability to influence militarily.

Further, Morley views Korea as “. . . the eye of the storm in Northeast Asia, the vortex of the confrontation of Soviet, Chinese, Japanese and American power.” One can begin to perceive the critical nature of Korea’s position when viewing the security zones defined by Hellmann and Morley as they are depicted at the top of this page.

[Map depicting “Japan’s security zones according to Hellman.”]

[Map depicting “Japan’s security zones as inferred by Morley.”]

It is beyond the scope of this article to present all the various scenarios and alternatives open to Japan in national security matters. For example, so much depends upon which political faction in Japan has control of the government. Also, a great deal depends upon the actions of Communist China on the international scene in the years to come. However, given the realities of conditions in Asia today, one vital question the Japanese must face is the matter of rearmament.

Military force is a basic factor in international politics. Yet it is rarely noted that Japan plays a leading role in all aspects of international affairs in East Asia except the military realm. This has resulted in an inflation of the international power of China. It is reasonable to ask how long Japan will forsake this role in an area it has long accorded special attention.

Pressures for rearmament can come from several sources: (1) the nuclear power of Communist China; (2) the matter of nuclear respectability; (3) a sharp reduction of U. S. presence in Asia, depending on security arrangements with the United States and other Asian states; (4) positive commitments based on strategic concerns in North and Southeast Asia and Japan’s place in the balance of power.

An additional point related to (3) above is any attempt by North Korea to unify the peninsula by military means. This is particularly pertinent given the explicit views of the Japanese leadership regarding a politically stable Korean peninsula. It will be interesting to note if any compensating action is taken by Japan when U. S. forces are withdrawn from South Korea.

Since 1960, Japan has been steadily increasing defense expenditures. The year 1960 showed an expenditure of 0.4 billion, rising to 1.3 billion in 1968. In 1971, with the conclusion of the Third Defense Build-up Program, the Ground Self-Defense Forces will have about 180,000 personnel in uniform equipped with medium tanks, artillery, and surface-to-air missiles. The Maritime Force will total about 142,000 tons, including destroyers and submarines. The Air Self-Defense Force will consist of about 880 aircraft, the backbone of which are F-104J and F-4E Phantom interceptors.

The level of expenditures for defense since 1960 has never exceeded 1% of the GNP. But, given the tremendous growth rate of Japan, this limitation has still permitted an absolute increase of threefold in less than a decade. If the line is held at about a 0.9% share of the GNP going to defense, by 1975 another threefold increase will have been realized with expenditures that year possibly reaching 3.6 billion dollars. Such a defense outlay would substantially increase Japanese defense capabilities in the sea lanes and air space adjacent to Japan.

Such a modest defense expenditure in terms of percentage of GNP does not, of course, assume a Japanese move toward a nuclear capability; however, the economic and technologic potential exists. Japanese scientists involved in the peaceful use of the atom have gained expertise in nuclear power production. Nuclear-powered electrical plants provide a source of plutonium. Pocket capabilities have already been proven. Given this foundation it is acknowledged that Japan could produce a modest arsenal of nuclear weapons with a delivery system within one year after the decision is made.

It appears, however, in the near future at least, that no drastic build-up can be expected in Japan’s military power beyond the continued sophistication of its self-defense capability. Article IX of the Constitution places legal limitations on the structure and capabilities of the force. But some interest has been evident in changing and clarifying Article IX while still retaining the pacifist principles and the renunciation of force in national policy.

Clearly, the same conditions that could cause Japan to turn outward once again could cause Japan to make major, positive changes in the defense establishment.

If events on the peninsula move in a direction that will threaten Japan’s economic or military security, it may reasonably be expected to move either unilaterally or in concert with other states to thwart these events.

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Major McCracken graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1959. He studied Korean at the Army Language School, 1961-62, and served a tour of duty in Korea, in 1962-1963. He received a Master’s Degree in Geography at the University of Wisconsin in 1968 and has done additional graduate work at Rutgers University. From 1968 to 1971, he was Instructor and Assistant Professor in the Department of Earth, Space, and Graphic Sciences at West Point. In July 1971, he was assigned to Vietnam with liaison duties with the Korean Forces in that country.

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California Hospitality

Two Crusader F8U jets collided over Borrego Springs, California, and the pilots were forced to bail out. A group of townspeople watched the parachutes open and start their descent. Suddenly, a lady stepped into a nearby restaurant and ordered a cup of coffee “to go.”

The minute the first pilot touched down, she offered him coffee and a cigarette.

—Contributed by Lieutenant J. T. Meriwether, U. S. Navy

(The U. S. Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)