“ASW—The Crucial Naval Challenge”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 126-141, May 1972 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Captain Frank C. Collins, U. S. Navy—Captain Smith’s essay on what we must do in countering the submarine, not unlike Uriah Heap and his expressed “Pride in his humility,” appears, by its tangential attacks on present systems, to offer little hope or many answers in the area of ASW. Having high regard for Captain Smith’s background and his dedication to the problem which ASW poses, I read his essay eagerly hoping to find some answers to the questions he posed in his prize-winning essay of 1971.
Alas, I found more which was negative than positive. Again we heard the voice of a prophet of doom and gloom when what we need is some hope that all is not lost in future encounters with the wily submarine even before that encounter occurs.
Some positive truths in his well-written monograph come through; however, they are obscured by virtue of his preoccupation with (1) the surface ship as an unsatisfactory ASW platform and (2), his zealot-like abhorrence of low-frequency, high-powered sonars—it is almost as if by verbal harangue we could magically discard this significant capital investment in our naval arsenal. Would it not appear more reasonable to learn to exploit the capabilities that both the surface escort and the SQS-26 sonar represent?
Similarly, like so many of our present day prophets, he again imbues the submarine with an aura of invincibility which cannot really be justified with facts. The Soviet Hotel-class submarine, which recently made all of the front pages as she struggled for survival in the North Atlantic in peacetime, is a case in point. As another case in point, consider the relative terror which the sound of a hot running torpedo creates in the mind of a submariner versus his colleague on the surface. To the former, it has a dirge-like quality of finality, while to the latter, it could mean little more than immobility or the inconvenience of a life raft.
Captain Smith dismisses enthusiasm and the positive attitude shown by those charged with designing a viable ASW capability by implying that they are not facing facts. Is it reasonable to assume that facing facts necessarily equates with sackcloth, ashes, and hand-wringing? Does it not make more sense that we view the threat, review the history of naval warfare in order to illuminate the threat in its proper perspective, and then get on with determining a solution which is a reasonable prediction of what our enemy might do rather than what technology predicts he could do? I submit that ASW may not hinge on revolutionary technology as much as in learning to exploit effectively the platforms and equipment in which we have already so heavily invested. The prophets of doom in the late 1940s, through the 1950s and early 1960s, predicted that the nuclear age had made warfare too frightening to contemplate; thereupon we entered the age of compromise with an implacable foe who yet remains, despite our President’s commendable “excursions for peace,” our undiminished foe. And 27 years after we incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we are still using conventional ordnance to bring peace to the world, despite our huge stockpiles of multi-megaton weapons, super-accurate missiles, and our preliminary conquest of space. It appears clear that technology has not yet driven man to disregard the irrationality of using weapons of massive destruction.
This brings us to the point which Captain Smith mentioned, but did not fully develop in his fine article; viz., warfare in the late 1970s and 1980s may not be as much sinking enemy submarines as it is rendering them impotent. Many years ago, as an instructor at the San Diego Fleet ASW School, I recall a British colleague of mine describe effective naval warfare with the typical style of dry British wit. Knowing the reverence and esteem with which we hold John Paul Jones, he would always point out that the famous encounter between Pearson and Jones in the Serapis and the Bon Homme Richard, represented in actuality, a British victory. For while Captain Jones was heroically proclaiming “We have not yet begun to fight,” the convoy that the Serapis was charged with protecting stealthily escaped. Did the surrender of the Serapis really then, constitute a victory for Jones? Is ASW a brute force encounter, which decrees that we sweep enemy SSNs up in a dust pan in order to claim effectiveness, or is it possible to outwit him and thus cause him to fail in his mission of controlling the seas? Another picture which might illustrate this point is the strategy of a football team faced with a massive line against which it is impossible to gain ground. One southern university which remained undefeated in 1946, did so, not by virtue of brute force, but rather by brains. Finding themselves in possession of the ball at midfield near one of the sidelines, the quarterback called his huddle in the center of the field. The center broke from the huddle early and centered the ball to the centerfield huddle, which romped easily for the winning touchdown. While this was not a strategy which could effectively be used repetitively, it illustrates a quality we must concentrate on more in our ASW fleet than we do when we depend solely on brute force rather than the wise development of tactics.
Captain Smith, while recognizing the truth that merchant convoys will always play a significant role in logistically supporting our maritime allies, bewails the albatross they represent about our ASW necks. He speaks of a need for speedier, more-maneuverable merchant ships, while the facts of life as demonstrated by our short-lived Mariner class merchantman and the development of our slow super tankers and bulk cargo carrier confirm the fact that we will for the foreseeable future, in the main, have to provide protection for slow to moderate speed convoys. Our answer here appears to lie in developing the modular organic ASW capability for these vessels. Again, we must keep a proper perspective of warfare. The Mark 37 torpedo gave the submariner a relatively long-range weapons capability, yet ask any submariner his tactics for delivering this torpedo—it was to close to four to six kiloyards. May not the SSNs come closer than the advertised range of their missiles in order to ensure greater probability of a hit?
The claim that “. . . none of our ASW sensors is individually or in the aggregate, very good . . .” taken at face value is probably correct. Yet, as we probe deeply into this anomaly, it appears that the fault often is not in the equipment per se, but rather in our inability to realize its potential for lack of emphasis in training and the development of tactics. For this equipment in the framework of technological sophistication, far outstrips anything with which we have ever fought an ASW war at sea.
We must be careful not to confuse tactical capabilities with any loss of a national will to win. That subject, while inexorably impacting on the outcome of a future war at sea, must be fought in other arenas. At the risk of being termed an unrealistic Pollyanna, I would suggest that President Nixon’s very strong stand in Vietnam in the face of heavy political opposition might offer a glimmer of hope in this area.
For many years, the submariner has had it pretty much his own way in the war at sea scenario. Like Pavlov’s dogs, ASW forces have learned to roll over and play dead when matched against a foe they could not see in an environment he seemed unable to penetrate. Yet, Captain Smith as one of the recognized architects of the tactics developed by the Uptide series in the Pacific, has given us more hope for ASW’s future than perhaps any technological breakthrough. Uptide efforts have not discovered any magic which renders the environment transparent, rather they concentrated on the development of tactics, which exploited the weakness of the submarine, viz., his almost total reliance on acoustics. By confusing his picture, they have rained a degree of disorientation on the invisible foe which has put him on the defensive and demonstrated that surface forces can survive in a high performance nuclear submarine environment.
Some positive truths do appear in Captain Smith’s piece. His articulation that submarines are not the answer to the problem is realistic, as is his dismissal of the solution lying in any technical Utopian breakthrough. His articulation of the need for more oceanographic knowledge cannot be gainsaid; his call for less platform parochialism is vital, though in this area, it is safe to say that surface ASW forces have been unparochial to a degree that has relegated them to a junior partnership on the “ASW Team” in the matter of research and development (R&D) and other procurement, Navy (OPN) funds. Perhaps the surface sailor’s modesty has been driven by his smug knowledge that his mission would always include infinitely less specialization than just ASW. Captain Smith’s recognition of the need for slow, inexpensive, platforms to exploit the potential of towed passive arrays has been well-recognized in Washington ASW circles. His highlight of the helicopter as an inexpensive and much needed adjunct to the wide-ranging patrol (VP) aircraft which spits out its expensive and short-ranged sonobuoy is another economic fact of life we have been generally slow in recognizing. But can any of these air platforms survive in a 24-hour per day ASW environment without the presence of the unglamorous surface escort? He rightfully questions an acceptance by the strike community of any derogation of attack aircraft implied in the CV concept. Yet. when survival of the CV is the issue, can there be any haggling over priorities here?
Readers of Captain Smith’s essay might also take heart in the fact that all of his equipment recommendations are currently either in process of R&D or procurement. Towed arrays will begin their entry into the Fleet this year, AirTASS is being looked at and, most recently, the Navy requested proposals from industry to develop a high-speed, towed active sonar, which would fulfill the high-frequency, low-power classification and localization attack sonar that Smith suggests. With the introduction of the Mark 48 torpedo and continued improvements in the Mark 46 lightweight torpedo, hoepfully [sic], our weapons capability will keep pace with the threat.
The fact that introduction of the submarine-launched cruise missile involuntarily intertwined AAW with ASW is unfortunately not highlighted in Captain Smith’s essay. The PF’s suite, with its duct-only sonar and LAMPS versus its heavy antiship missile defense (ASMD) and point defense should be ample proof that terminal destruction of the enemy missile is a real consideration. The Sea Control Ship supports Smith's contention that we need a platform with a reasonable command and control capability to support air-carried sensors.
Unfortunately, Captain Smith, despite his recognition of the fiscal realities of warfare, fails to come to grips with the capital investment represented by our surface ASW units with their high-power, low-frequency sonars. Is it not more realistic to learn to use this equipment in the tactical context it represents than to write it off as an unusable liability? He then speaks of submarine quieting as a nemesis to our current preoccupation with passive sensors, but in that day when the submarine’s radiated noise fades into the ambient oceans, will we not then be faced with the need for long-range, active-detection capabilities? Even now, submariners talk about their future need for active sonars to detect the threat.
The neglect to emphasize the need to develop expertise in the exploitation of current equipment, weakens Captain Smith’s treatise. If we are to survive in this area of naval warfare, we must get on with the development of tactics which capitalize on the submarine’s relative blindness and the submariner’s insatiable curiosity, as an air-breathing, light-loving creature, to see as well as hear his adversary. Fortunately, men, not machines still determine the outcome of naval warfare.
Rather than throw in the towel to a foe which seems invincible, we must, as Sun Tzu succinctly summarized, recognize that in “. . . warfare there are no constant conditions.”
Antisubmarine warfare, like it or not, is still the key issue in naval warfare. As long as nuclear holocaust is the abhorrent alternative, projection of power ashore will remain our number one issue in warfare between maritime nations, and getting this power ashore will be the task of ASW forces.
“Navy Medicine: A New Prescription”
(See P. A. Flynn, pp. 42-47, February; p. 98, June; p. 95, August; and pp. 96-98, October 1971; p. 104, February, pp. 107-108, March; and p. 99, April 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Alfred N. Krauss, Medical Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve, Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, Cornell University Medical College—Dr. Flynn is correct in pointing out that the high standards of Navy medical care are due in large part to the professionalism of the Revive medical officers as physicians. I disagree, however, with his contention that a Federal Medical School will solve the Navy’s “doctor shortage.”
Navy corpsmen are being trained and licensed in many states to act as physicians’ assistants. On active naval service, there are many instances where independent duty corpsmen act in the place of physicians. It would seem to me that the Navy would stand a better chance of retaining these men at the same time it met many of its health needs by expanding its program to train and use these valuable enlisted personnel. A Federal Medical School is an expensive proposition, not only in terms of money, which is in short supply at present, but also in terms of personnel. As any physician can tell you, the number of teachers in medical school is several times greater than the number of students. It would be necessary to recruit many men from active duty Fleet billets to serve on the staff of the medical school, thus aggravating even further the shortage of physicians in the Services.
Furthermore, the Navy would have a chance to pioneer in the use of paramedical personnel, as well as educating its members to make use of these people. Since they need not serve at sea, they need not all be Servicemen. Servicewomen could also be used, thus further enlarging the pool of potential recruits. As enlisted or commissioned warrant personnel, these advanced corpsmen would be less expensive in terms of wages than physicians, and with a lesser likelihood of unfavorably comparing their salaries to civilian practitioners, they would be more likely to make the Navy a career.
Their role in the retention of physicians should not be underestimated. By eliminating much of the routine in the doctor’s daily practice—well babies, minor lacerations, colds, and the like—a physician could concentrate on care of the more seriously ill. His interest in his work setting would increase and he would consider more favorably remaining in such an environment.
It is my belief that at this time a Federal Medical School would be a grave misapplication of resources. To spend money and manpower on this project, while ignoring a most valuable resource of manpower, which is being taken advantage of by those in the civilian sector, would be a mistake. As its second century begins, the Navy Medical Corps still has an important leadership role to play in the delivery of medical care.
Lieutenant Commander Patricia A. Warner, Nurse Corps, U. S. Navy—I disagree with Dr. Jannings in his February 1972 comment. We cannot afford to have corpsmen, or any other health team member wasting energy acting as “barriers” between the physician and the consumer. Perhaps, it would be wiser to say that all health-oriented providers should concentrate on becoming communicative, innovative facilitators for the delivery of improved health care to the active duty, retired, and dependent consumers of the Navy and Marine Corps.
Traditionally, the role of the medical officer has been a curative one involving the functions of diagnosing, treating, operating, and prescribing. The Nurse Corps has addressed itself to the care functions required by consumers; the Hospital Corps has facilitated both the care and cure aspects by performing duties delegated to them.
Today, the roles of modern health team members are undergoing vast changes in anticipation of the demands placed upon their services by highly versed consumers. These consumers are now insisting on primary, as well as secondary and tertiary preventive health measures as their right, not their privilege.
Nurse Corps officers, educated as specialists and master clinicians in pediatrics, orthopedics, community health, and various medical-surgical programs are ready to assume additional diagnostic and therapeutic functions as they assess human responses and potential health problems through such activities as: (1) case-finding (2) preventive health education and counseling, (3) provision of supportive and rehabilitative measures, and (4) the execution of therapeutic programs prescribed by physicians and dentists. Hospital Corps personnel are being prepared to assume more independent and highly technical responsibilities, which will enhance the delivery of health care.
As the cure and care responsibilities of all health team members increase and overlap, a certain amount of role blur is to be anticipated; this will necessitate the utmost in communication skills between all members of the team. The days of the dependent “Nightingale” handmaidens and the subservient “loblolly boys” are over; nurses and corpsmen have important independent contributions of their own to make.
“The Soviet Marine”
(See C. G. Pritchard, pp. 18-30, March 1972 Proceedings)
Captain William C. Chapman, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Pritchard’s article is timely, and probably not at all inaccurate. I am somewhat apprehensive, however, that the uncritical and casual interpretation of those familiar with U. S. amphibious operations may give the Soviet Marines of the 1970s more credit than they deserve. The author himself has recognized this possibility, and in his conclusions rather firmly noted the limitations of the Soviet Marines; he also notes that “. . . the renascent Soviet Marine Corps may have within it the seeds of larger Soviet naval strategy.” The evidence of that renaissance would, to my mind, include some elements that have not yet emerged. For instance, the pictures which supplement the article show some impressive landing craft, but no bombardment vessels. One can, in fact, search the Soviet press and literature in vain for any pictorial evidence of a true shore assault capability of the type that American amphibious forces found a necessity to fighting ashore on a hostile, defended beach. Pritchard’s article drove me to a closer examination of the Soviet account of their much heralded world-wide naval maneuvers in 1970, the operation known as “Okean.” Although the volume is well illustrated, and the Marines are featured in several places, nowhere is there any evidence of an ability to force a landing. The article “From the Surf to the Granite” (pp. 126-134 of Okean, Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 1970) describes a major amphibious training operation against the Rybachi Peninsula in the Far North. The key sentence is “. . . the landing force proceeded to the objective secretly.” Much is made of air support during the landing, and I must admit that “. . . intensive artillery fire against the strong defense points which developed . . .” is described—in toto in just the eight words noted above. The article had already noted that the assault vessels approached the beach as the close air support aircraft went in, without any bombardment from the naval vessels themselves.
Similarly, one searches the daily editions of Red Star in vain for any evidence of shore bombardment vessels in the sense of the Pacific operations, Normandy, or Inchon. We are dealing, at this time in history, with something on a different scale. And the Soviets will have much to learn if they are to graduate into the big leagues of amphibious warfare. We learned the hard way, from Tarawa.
One can argue from history that they may never do so. Soviet amphibious operations since Peter the Great have generally been leapfrogging tactics, using the superior carrying capacity of the sea to bypass either poor terrain or defended river lines. (One needs to exclude Catherine the Great’s assault on the Turkish Empire by sea—all the way from St. Petersburg via the Mediterranean to the Peloponnesus. Such a projection of naval power is unusual in Russian history—but commonplace in British.) Within the narrow waters of the North, Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean seas, with an umbrella of air power and a hedgehog of undersea capability to beat off opposing naval strength, leapfrogging is sufficient. Even in the Pacific, objectives in Korea, China, or the Northern Japanese islands require no giant steps for Ivan.
But the projection overseas of Soviet power by amphibious assault is not yet, as I read the tea leaves, within their power. By commercial and political insinuation, yes, unless some more resistance is mounted than seems to be coming at this time; but by assault, the amphibious capability is just not there.
One can argue, of course, that neither does the United States still have the capability. When cruisers went missile, as when fighters went missile, we became intrigued by technology and abandoned the simple virtues of firepower for illusory promises of the systems analysts. Fortunately, in this circumstance, Admiral Gorshkov’s planners seem to have done the same. The Kresta-Kynda cruisers and the Kotlin-Kildin-Krupny destroyers, insofar as they have substituted missiles for guns, have been castrated when it comes to support of amphibious assaults.
All of which is a long way of saying that Mr. Pritchard’s article needs to be read carefully. He has wisely written of the Soviet Marines, and it is well to watch them. But do not give them overmuch credit until available evidence can justify it.
Former Military Men Have a Place in Defense Industry
Rear Admiral Herman Reich, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—On 9 January 1972, an Associated Press news bulletin appeared in newspapers across the country. The first two paragraphs read as follows:
Nearly 1,000 high-ranking military officers left the Armed Forces in the last three years to join the largest defense contractors dealing with the Pentagon, a new survey shows.
Senator William Proxmire (Dem., Wis.) charged that the figures indicated that the “incestuous” relationship he often has criticized between defense executives and their military counterparts still exists.
Would that the birth of a new, effective weapons system were as simple as an “incestuous” relationship! The development and production of today’s sophisticated weapons entails intimate knowledge of requirements; a background of basic and applied research; costly facilities, tools, and testing devices; engineering know-how and creativity; but above all, the people involved are what count. Both government and industry leaders look for integrity in the other’s personnel. There must be trust and teamwork between the parties and dedication to getting the job done, and to ensure success there must be experience. Industry furnishes the scientific and engineering experience. The military has the practical experience that only comes from being the user. When a person from one or the other group crosses over into the opposite sphere, the individual takes with him a new and peculiar knowledge that rounds out the ability of his new organization to perform better.
There are genuine benefits to be had by the nation that permits a strong infusion of retired military into its defense industry. This is a point of view that has not often been expressed in print. There are many reasons for this reticence, such as: the security aspect of many programs; the protocol within the Services, government, and industry that preclude all except a few from being spokesmen; the pressures existing in getting a job done that dictate, “no time available;” the day-to-day changes that occur in the international, domestic, and defense scenes that often make rebuttal untimely.
All in all, the critic has exposed what he considers to be a deplorable or less than desirable situation. From where he stands, considering his duty to his constituents and from his suspicions about the frailty of human nature, he has pinpointed key objections:
- Influence on major decisions:
Critic’s argument—Favoritism could result because military men on the selection team hope to obtain jobs in defense industry in the future. Or conversely, ex-military men, now in industry, use their friendship with those still on duty.
Answer—Too many factors and too many people are involved in major decisions to permit anything like a close personal influence in selection, either by an individual or a group of individuals. Proposals are read by technical, business, and military experts. There are individual specialists who read specific sections. There are detailed grading sheets. There are source selection teams and reviewing boards. Recommendations from the working levels go higher to the Service Secretaries and the Department of Defense, where they receive a thorough going-over. Then there are geographical, labor, and political considerations. Before final selection, the Secretary of Defense or even the President may have his say.
(2) The inside knowledge ex-military men have of budgets and allocations may result in unfavorable price quotations to the government.
Critic’s argument—If industry knows what the government has to spend, it may pad prices submitted.
Answer—A good estimate of the funds available for any development is desirable as a measure of the level of effort desired by the buyer. Industry is naturally keenly interested in what this figure might be. Amounts available for some programs or projects are well known, but for many others this is not true. Real budgetary knowledge by any recent military man seldom runs the full gamut of current projects. What he does know accurately is dependent on how recently he cut his Service connection and how close he was to the particular project of interest. In this competitive world, no industry that pads prices can last long. It seems pretty farfetched to believe that inside budget information by recent ex-military hirees could materially affect prices quoted for like Services. Also, price receives the closest kind of scrutiny during contract negotiations and again during plant audit.
(3) The free movement of military men into defense industry or of industry personnel into Department of Defense jobs smacks of a conspiracy.
Critic’s argument—It is a conspiracy. The military-industrial complex is out to milk the country dry.
Answer—The “high-ranking” officers referred to by Senator Proxmire in the opening of this discussion were 993 officers above the rank of major or lieutenant commander. The bulk of these were retired.
How did these men go about getting their jobs in industry? Let us take the case of a man we can call Captain Q, U. S. Navy. He has been passed over for selection to rear admiral and contemplates retirement. The captain is married and has two children in college. He is too young to just play golf, and besides he needs a job. His retirement pay, though valuable, has deflated in proportion to the general rise in the cost of living. It takes money to keep those youngsters in school and provide a good home.
There are many fields open to Captain Q, such as teaching, insurance, real estate, and the like, but in Q’s case, he has a master’s degree in electrical engineering and his considerable past experience in weapons system development and procurement. To seek a place in defense industry seems logical, but the questions now are who and how to approach.
He prepares a resumé of his qualifications in which he states the date of his availability. He decides upon the part of the country where he and his family would like to live. He lists all of the defense firms within this area and selects ones to which he would like to apply. He circulates his resumé by simply mailing blind. Sometimes, however, if he knows someone who works for a company, he might inquire if there is a better way. It is even possible that such a friend may volunteer to circulate the resume for him. Sometimes, he answers advertisements, or if he knows a company executive well, he may write a personal letter. He then sits back and waits.
Usually, a percentage of those firms addressed are interested and reply. From industry’s standpoint, the first requisite is that they have a need to fill a job. After that, does Captain Q qualify and how well will he fit in? Just as Q was himself a bit timid about applying, so industry is a bit timid about making an offer. Is the position at a level suitable to the age and experience of the applicant? No matter how much responsibility Q had in the Navy, the work will be new to him, so what sort of starting salary is justified? Is the new job challenging, and is it a job that requires more than just engineering knowledge? Will his years of military experience contribute to the company in turning out a more acceptable product?
The point is that there is little likelihood of any conspiracy, conniving, or secret promises made one way or another prior to hire. Rather, the premise is “here is a good man, with certain capabilities. We have need of these capabilities in such and such a billet and he will be placed there.” Of course, there is tacit recognition of Q’s years of military service and his status as a retired senior officer. General liason [sic] with the Service customer is certainly eased by the presence of people like Q on the company’s roster. At the same time, the company recognizes clearly that Q cannot be used as a salesman or to negotiate contracts, so therefore Q must fit a useful job when hired.
The leaders of industry are men of integrity. They are competing for large important contracts, but generally disdain shady practice. The retired military man is also a man of integrity. He wants no part of any unfair advantage. He wants to make the best use of his past experience and accumulated knowledge, but above all he wants to roll up his sleeves and do a job.
These are typical considerations for most new ex-military hirees. Certainly, there is the case of the prominent vice admiral, recently retired, who becomes a consultant to company management, whose several leading executives he knew well while still in the Service. Such arrangements are few and often of short duration. Regardless of permanency, however, the advice given often results in better accommodation by industry to the needs of the Services.
Such accommodation as this does not consist of blindly going along with all that the government asks for in its many requirements and invitations to bid. A responsible industry should argue if the requirements are difficult or costly to attain. Can you, Mr. Navy, do with less and still be effective? Do you need all the data requested? How about the cost of maintenance? Such arguments coming from strictly civilian company personnel might not be palatable. When voiced by an individual, however, on the inside of the contractor’s councils, but who everyone knows has a strong sense of loyalty to the Service of which he was only recently a part, they assume much more meaning.
Industry and the military are continually seeking a better “modus operandi” between them. There have been instances in development where the military has blazed a trail of great achievement and set examples of first rate management capability, but in other areas has failed miserably. There have been similar ups and downs in industry. The factors that enter into good or bad results are most complex. They run the gamut from early decisions as to where to spend the research dollar, and at what point in a program to introduce new technology, to the meshing of sub systems into an integrated weapon, to organization and accounting methods, to the costs of labor and material, and even the rate of inflation. The one common factor that enters in is the collective judgment of the people involved.
For example, integration of electronic sensors and computer systems is often a work of art, skill, trial and error, and understanding. Art and skill takes one kind of person, the dedicated, imaginative, creative engineer. Trial and error calls for the patient, mathematical, precise technician. Understanding requires the practical, flexible, innovative user.
In spite of all the planning and care that enters in beforehand, a new ship, aircraft, or weapon is rarely delivered and found to be 100% acceptable to the men who are to be its operators. Small, and sometimes large, changes are necessary. In the past, corrections have continued, sometimes throughout the life of a system. Industry and military leaders have come to know that where enough of the user kind of thinking has entered in early, costly changes become minimal. Hence, defense contractors continue to embrace the military retiree.
The writer is a retired Naval Reserve officer and now also retired from the defense industry. My active duty in the Navy exceeded ten years and my working time for a major defense contractor also exceeded ten years. During the other working years of my life, I was an independent business man, owning my own business, entirely divorced from any dealings with either government or government suppliers.
Among the early surprises that awaited me in the defense business were the “general and administrative” and “overhead” expenses allowed by the government. I reflected, at the time, that as an independent business man, I would have loved to have my customers picking up these nasty items, before I figured on profit. As the years passed, however, I came to appreciate the many risks involved in the defense business and the fact that the final net profit to industry was usually very small.
In conclusion, it is submitted that not too many people take seriously the critic’s connotation of the phrase, “military-industrial complex.” Similarly, not too many industry or military people have deigned to answer. It is only when a participant in the defense game is entirely retired that he has the time or can afford to get stirred up by repeated accusations that most often have little merit.
“Beefing up” the Black Gang
Lieutenant Commander Paul D. Rogers, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—I have noted with concern the lack of attention given the deepening crisis in the engine and fire rooms of our surface ships.* This is due in part no doubt, to the fact that the difficulties of patching up ancient boilers and balky machinery have been with us for a long time, and are not problems which have suddenly sprung out of the bilges to demand our attention.
The fact is, however, that the maintenance dollar requirement to keep our conventionally-powered ships reasonably mobile is growing at an alarming rate. This is particularly true of our 1,200-psi steam plant installations, many of which are of comparatively recent vintage. The manifold problems of these beasts, as related in the daily flow of casualty reports (CasRep), keep them moving toward the top of the Naval Ship Systems Command (NavShips) “problem parade,” despite the stiff competition from many other maintenance nightmares which the Navy has acquired over the years.
Newspaper headlines which tell of AWOL Navy boilermen seeking sanctuary in a church, the rumors of near-mutinies, and casualties smacking of deliberate sabotage, indicate that plummeting morale, approaching desperation, has a major role in these maintenance problems.
I had the opportunity to deal with the problems of morale and training of engineering ratings as a FRAM I engineer officer prior to the Vietnam build-up, and later as the machinist mate/boiler tender (MM/BT) rating control officer at the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BuPers). Quite obviously, the wartime demands placed on a peacetime Navy, the increasing complexity of the job, and a less-than-supportive attitude among a large segment of the civilian populace has since aggravated the problem to crisis proportions.
Many of the problems in the engineering department, including morale, are common throughout the Navy. The evils of the long deployments, the long hours, the short pay, and short shrift received from their civilian peers are widely recognized and need not be dealt with here. The “Black Gang,” however, has some unusual problems.
Despite the increasing complexity and vulnerability of our steam propulsion plants, the individuals being trained to operate and maintain them continue to be selected from among the lower intelligence strata of the recruit population. This practice reflects the scarcity of high-quality input and the ever-increasing demand for electronics ratings. It also reflects the preferences of a large number of the intelligent recruits who know where the high paying jobs are in the civilian economy. Once assigned, the group ultimately earmarked for engineering duty goes through a second screening at the class “A” school level, where the top people are again skimmed off for the nuclear power program. Those remaining, who are sufficiently motivated and capable of doing a responsible job, are simply too few for the needs of the surface Navy.
With the very notable exception of Admiral Rickover’s nuclear power program, the training of engineering department ratings has suffered from a lack of unified direction, quality control, and sound technical support. The nuclear power program, the sonar projects, surface missile systems, and command and control systems all have powerful program managers in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav), BuPers, and the Material Commands. No such sponsor exists in the conventional propulsion area. Hence, supporting programs have too often resembled a spastic octopus in a horse race.
Although I am sure there are notable exceptions, no group in the Navy receives less recognition for the vital, arduous, gut-busting job they do than surface ship engineering ratings. Much of this neglect stems from the fact that few senior line officers have had any significant amount of engineering experience, and are therefore ill at ease in an engine room. Most often, the engineers are an out-of-sight, out-of-mind-group until the lights go off and the wheels stop turning. Add to this picture the total lack of pro-pay, and too-frequent examples of eight to ten-year continuous sea tours, and it becomes easy to see how the enlisted career man finds it easy to adopt a “what-the-hell” attitude.
The foregoing problems are certainly not unknown to working level personnel within the Navy who are familiar with what goes on in the engineering spaces. Indeed, many imaginative ideas have been put forth and some have been tried at the type commander level. The missing element has always been a solid coordinated push from the top. The program management technique used with success in other areas should be applied to put the surface propulsion plants back on their feet. This program manager (PM) or managers, must be given sufficient status within OpNav, BuPers, and the technical commands to allow him to compete effectively for the personnel and material resources necessary for the job at hand.
As his initial project the PM must exert some pressure on his counterparts to share the wealth in high-quality personnel. Recent innovations, in prime movers and in propulsion system automation, promise major reductions in the number of engineers who will be required in the newer ship classes. The sophisticated plants of the general purpose amphibious assault ship (LHA), Spruance, and patrol frigate (PF) classes, however, will hardly perform any better under the ministrations of the conventional hammer and Stillson wrench man than do the current, 1,200-psi automatic combustion control systems. Action is needed now to improve the quality of input, and to segregate those men who are fully capable and qualified from those who have merely been exposed.
Having selected and qualified capable men, let us recognize the importance of the vital job they do by meting out the bonuses and proficiency pay on a par with that received by other topflight technicians. This does not necessarily mean that we must paper the whole fireroom with pictures of dead presidents, but certainly the top five or six people who inevitably bear the responsibility for making things go should stand second to none in the pay line.
The problem of successive end-to-end sea tours could also stand some imaginative thought. The possibility of establishing additional shore billets for engineers is being explored again, for the umpteenth time. Desirable as it is to provide a regular break in the rigors of sea duty, this approach has always been stymied by the exorbitant cost of paying highly-skilled men to do little or nothing once every two years. I dislike this approach not only because it is expensive, but also because it is an affront to a skilled individual to place him in a menial job or in a job he is unprepared to do. Additionally, the aforementioned critical skill shortage on board ship is sure to be aggravated by the creation of large numbers of new billets ashore.
I believe that a less-expensive and more effective approach would be to provide inport relief crews, who would accomplish in-port maintenance and operate the plant for local operations when necessary. The goal here would be to provide our career engineers with 60 to 90 days of consecutive paid leave each year. The port relief units would increase the number of professionally-oriented shore billets and would thus allow somewhat more frequent shore rotation than is presently the case. Variations of this policy have been in effect in the merchant marine for several years, with apparently satisfactory results.
A second alternative would be to take a portion of the dollars which would be expended on additional shore billets and create a system of sea pay with significant annual increases after two successive years at sea. This approach has a major advantage in that it should make going to sea more attractive—and this after all, is what it is all about.
In summary, it is perfectly obvious that our surface propulsion plants cannot long remain the stepchild of the Navy. The stepchildren have been overlooked by the fairy godmother too many times and some changes are in order. If we intend to maintain a naval presence in far-flung places, we had best try a new tack.
“Shipboard Habitability: Restricted Areas”
(See M. J. Byington, Jr., pp. 24-31, January 1971; and pp. 92-93, January 1972 Proceedings)
Commander Thomas B. Buell, U. S. Navy—I interpret the remarks by Rear Admiral Batcheller in the January 1972 Comment and Discussion section to mean that habitability will always receive last priority in shipboard design, and that the designers will, at best, pay lip service to the CNO habitability standards. Commander Cockell’s Professional Note in the same issue, on the DLG modernization program is the most recent example of the designers’ failure to comply with these standards.
Commander Byington eloquently stated the current thinking on this subject within the Navy—apathy and hypocrisy. The Navy claims to be people-oriented, yet machines take precedence when priorities are established within a ship in the competition for the environment. Our machinery is allocated the precise amount of space, ventilation, and temperature control needed for its most efficient operation. Our people get what is left over.
To cite some very recent examples, the enlisted berthing areas on our new LSDs are an abomination. The berths are located in what are essentially machinery spaces and passageways. The noise and heat are unbearable. CPO berthing and messing have regressed and are shameful in the LSDs and the DE-1052-class ships. The DDGs of ten years ago gave CPOs a modicum of privacy and individual berthing, which is not apparent today.
This writer disagrees with Commander Byington’s contention that the Fleet is hesitant to make its displeasure known to the Washington material commands. Writing letters to Washington is futile. For instance, the after crew’s head in the DDG-2 class has for years been notorious for its lack of ventilation and resultant foul odors, high humidity, and rapid deterioration. Commanding officers of these ships have written to the Naval Ship Systems Command time and again without response. When it became apparent that no help could be expected, a DDG recently installed a high-capacity exhaust fan in the bulkhead and vented it into an adjacent fan room. Problem solved.
This episode illustrates that any improvement in habitability must originate within forces afloat, because nothing seems to come from Washington. This writer endorses the author’s thesis that command attention can usually make a ship at least tolerable, if not comfortable.
The author was not able to determine just who in Washington was responsible for determining and enforcing shipboard habitability standards. This is surprising, because this writer has always assumed the Ship’s Characteristics Board established the standards and that the Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command translated these standards into building specifications and ensured that the builders met these specifications.
Shipboard habitability is a very serious problem of immense magnitude and complexity. Either our naval architects and designers are insensitive to the hardships they impose upon our seagoing sailors, or else they consider that a solution is hopeless. There is a glimmer of hope in what is being planned for the habitability standards for the DD-963 class. Perhaps other ships now being designed will also receive some improvement. But the greatest problem is to improve the habitability of those hundreds of ships now in commission. For these ships, the future is dark indeed.
“At Sea—Where We Belong”
(See R. C. McFarlane, pp. 36-42, November 1971; and pp. 103-104, July 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander W. Spencer Johnson, U. S. Navy—In his cost-analysis justification for stationing fewer Marines ashore and more-afloat, Major McFarlane cites a figure of $1.4 billion for shipbuilding and conversion to achieve a two-MAF lift. He does not specify what the breakdown would be in terms of increased numbers of LKAs, LSTs, LPDs, LCCs, or LPHs. An additional consideration would be the cost of increased numbers of modern escort vessels for ASW and AAW protection of a sizeably increased amphibious force constantly on station.
One wonders whether current numbers of LPHs in service are sufficient to the task of supplying both amphibious lift and decks for close support aircraft. Perhaps the new concept of a sea control ship could be configured to operate a mixture of assault and utility helicopters, as well as squadrons of Harrier aircraft, improved with higher performance engines and flown by Marines, to provide close air support. This would leave our ever-diminishing number of attack aircraft carriers free to provide fleet air and antisubmarine defense as well as a modicum of close air support for any amphibious undertaking.
Another consideration is that of naval gunfire support for amphibious operations. Destroyers currently in production or recently added to the Fleet have a gunfire support capability much reduced from that of their World War II predecessors. Although the 5-inch/54-caliber is a much improved gun over the 5-inch/38-caliber, most new destroyers now find themselves with only one gun or, at most, two. A requirement may be generated for a destroyer-class vessel equipped with new, lightweight 8-inch guns and 5-inch 54s in sufficient quantity to fulfill a primary mission of supporting amphibious fleet elements, and an equivalent role in ASW defense. Alternatively, the former proposal of converting battleships or heavy cruisers now' in the Reserve Fleet to amphibious support roles may bear further study. Such ships, suitably converted, could combine troop-lift capabilities with the gunfire support capabilities necessary to the task.
Subsequent articles by Major McFarlane and others well-versed in both naval and marine aspects of amphibious operations might further elaborate on Major McFarlane’s excellent proposals. Problems of force structures required, in-depth cost estimates, requirements for air support and naval gunfire support vessels should be explored in greater depth. Major McFarlane has opened the door to a host of such thoughtful articles which I, for one, greatly look forward to reading.
Naval Aviators: White Sheep or Black Sheep?
Lieutenant T. G. Shown, U. S. Navy—A naval aviator is required to have a “warfare specialty” before he can be promoted to lieutenant commander. As the name implies, he is expected to become an expert in his particular area, and that requires a great deal of work and motivation. Unfortunately, the motivation is not always there when the individual is in a warfare specialty not of his own choosing, or worse, one to which he has requested not to be assigned.
This critical decision as to what an aviator’s warfare specialty will be is a random selection made as he completes his flight training. It is random for two reasons: (1) the billets which are available are the ones which must be filled, and (2) the detailer will assign the best students (as determined by flight grades) to the Fleet seats even if they asked for a support squadron as a first choice. So we see that a man who has performed well in flight training and who has something like “request no air antisubmarine squadron (VS)” on his preference card is likely to get a VS if, (1) the VS is the only thing open the week he comes up for orders, or (2) the VS is the only Fleet seat available that week. Our new aviator is, moreover, expected to become enthusiastic about his new warfare specialty and perform well within it even though he had no effective voice in choosing it. If he fails to perform well in his new billet, his career will not be successful. He has routes available to him to change specialties, but from personal experience and observation, I have seen no evidence that these routes are well-traveled. At this point, I should make clear that I am not referring to changes as fundamental as helicopters to jets, or props to jets, but rather changes like patrol squadron (VP) to VS or VS to air transport squadron (VR), or other changes between similar types of aircraft.
Let us examine the reasons for this assignment policy. Currently, the detailed tell the new aviators that the only way to advance is to go to a Fleet seat and that the support squadrons (VR, VC, VRC, VRF) are “dead ends.” This implies that those aviators assigned to the support roles are something like “black sheep.” Thus, the detailer will always try to place the students with the highest grades in the Fleet seats, whether they want to go there or not.
Now, let us consider what could be done to rectify this situation which, if left untouched, will continue to cost the Navy in terms of retention and performance hindered by lack of strong motivation. I feel that the Bureau of Naval Personnel could make some changes which would reduce the bad effects of the random selection for the first tour (the tour during which the young officer will probably make up his mind whether to stay or leave the Navy). First, not every aviator will be satisfied to pursue a career in a field (warfare specialty) which he had no effective voice in choosing. A solution here is to make it easier for an aviator to have a split tour in the field he desires during his first sea tour. You might find that an officer would agree to extra obligated service for this opportunity to move into a field which appeals to him. Secondly, if Lieutenant Commander King’s discussion** is correct, that “. . . there are no set requirements for promotion other than performance. . . ,” then an aviator should be able to have a successful career in support squadrons with no warfare specialty other than “support” itself. We are all aware, however, that this is not the case at the present time, and the officer without a “warfare specialty” will probably not be able to make lieutenant commander. I recommend that we establish a career pattern within the support community I submit that if aviators were polled on the acceptance of this idea, the results would be positive. There might not be the same opportunity for command as in other communities, but I am not at all sure that every aviator wants to command a squadron as much as he simply wants to fly.
Is it not about time we got rid of the “black sheep” image of the support aviators and acknowledged them as the important contributors they are to the Navy’s overall mission? Just as the project officer is being elevated in prestige, we should recognize the support community as a bonafide career pattern for an officer. You cannot expect to get the same performance from a man who is told that he is in a “dead end” billet as you would if his performance while in a support role were recognized by selection boards as equal to that of the man serving in a warfare specialty. It should be a simple matter to direct future selection boards to normalize a man’s performance so as to be recognized as the same regardless of where it is carried out.
We are constantly being told that one of the detailer’s chief objectives is to make the officer competitive for promotion to commander when he reaches the proper point in his career. This is a frightening prospect for the aviator to face when he considers that he might be sent to a billet he does not want at all, while a billet he wants goes to another aviator who had lower performance marks. I feel that the detailers should be instructed to place a person’s personal desires over what he “needs” for his career. Naturally, the needs of the Service will always come first, but if a man wants to sacrifice the probability of obtaining a command for job satisfaction, let him. You will have a better man in the job.
As we seek to have an all-volunteer force and a smaller, more efficient Navy, we must seek to give each man the sort of position he wants to work in for 20 or 30 years. We may then expect, and get, his most highly-motivated efforts.
I submit these thoughts for consideration by members who are closer to the other end of this problem than I. It is my hope that the Navy will seek to give the aviator more voice in the choosing of his warfare specialty and upgrade the support role to one of “respectability.” Let us recognize the role of all naval aviators as vital to our Navy, and do away with “black sheep” and “white sheep.”
Editor’s Note: In an effort to provide a timely response to the matters discussed in the foregoing letter, the Proceedings requested, and obtained the following comments by the Head, Aviation Lieutenant Commander and Junior Officer Detail Section (Pers B1302), Bureau of Naval Personnel.
Lieutenant Commander J. C. Roy, U. S. Navy, Aviation Initial Assignment Officer—The opening statement of Lieutenant Shown’s letter is somewhat misleading. Officers are promoted on performance; performance as a naval officer not a VP/VR pilot or naval flight officer (NFO). However, the path to commander and aviation command screen, (CO of a squadron) is most accessable [sic] in a warfare specialty, VP, VS, VAW, VQ, and the like. Traditionally, non-warfare specialty squadrons are commanded by officers who have the performance necessary to screen for commanding officer, but, because of a paucity of commands, were unable to receive command in their particular warfare specialty.
One of the most important points for a new naval aviator comes when his initial assignment is made. Students completing in a given time frame (normally one month) are ranked according to class standing. This position is determined by a combination of basic and advanced flight and academic grades. Student assignments are based on their performance, on billets available, on the needs of the Navy, and on the student’s personal preference. Historically, the majority of prop students request VP assignments. There are 24 operational VP squadrons and only six VR/VRC squadrons. Therefore, more VP billets than VR billets will be available in a given time frame.
A check of the last six months’ prop completion lists reflect that VR assignments were made to individuals requesting them, followed by VP assignments to students who finished lower than the man asking for VR. If the few VR billets are filled, the student’s second or third choice is considered. If none of the individual’s choices are available, the detailer must still fill the remaining requirements to meet the “needs of the Navy.” The remaining billets cannot just be gapped until someone requesting it completes flight training. In short, if the top-ranked student completing wants VR, and it is available, he gets it.
Our fledgling aviator is expected to perform as a naval officer applying himself to the best of his ability in order to accomplish the mission of the activity and, ultimately the mission of the Navy. He can use the assignment as a stepping stone to future promotion and an assignment more to his personal liking. As previously stated, assignments are earned with performance. No billet is a “dead end” and no detailer considers any billet as such. Selection boards and detailers look at performance in the job, not just the job itself. Promotion and assignments are based on performance as reflected in the officer’s fitness report. If an officer turns in poor performance owing to lack of motivation or any other reason, he cannot expect to compete for a given assignment with a contemporary having better performance.
If an aviator wants to change specialties, he is required to submit an official letter, endorsed by his commanding officer, to the Chief of Naval Personnel requesting the change. As a detailer, specifically the initial assignment detailer, I can attest that these routes are indeed well-traveled. The individual request is approved or disapproved in accordance with the officer’s performance, availability of the requested assignment, and his availability as indicated by the endorsement.
If an officer desires to stay in a non-warfare specialty, he is free to do so, but he will be counselled either by his commanding officer or his detailer concerning the warfare specialty route to commander and command screen. The detailer is responsible for providing his constituent with the information and assignments necessary for a successful naval career.
The terms “random selection” and “no effective voice in choosing” (assignments) appear in the text of the letter. It is insinuated that officer assignments are made in a haphazard fashion with little or no consideration for individual preference. This is not the case. The detailer truly represents the individual and makes every effort to get the assignment his constituent wants, if it is available, and if none of his contemporaries with better performance requests the assignment.
In an effort to point out some discrepancies in the recommended “solutions” the following is offered for consideration:
If a first-tour aviator were allowed to “split” his first tour in two different activities, several factors would come into play. A period of 18 months to two years is required to qualify as a patrol plane commander (PPC) and about the same to be designated a transport plane commander (TPC). To permit split-touring would require two, costly, permanent change-of-station moves, and in some cases RAG training, in a three-year period, plus rotating a pilot just as he reaches his maximum effective usefulness to the command. This would destroy any semblance of officer stability within a command as well as cause considerable family upheaval. If this suggestion were adopted, while our roving aviator traveled from squadron to squadron, who would fly as PPC/TPC and accomplish the squadron mission? If a six-to-seven-year first sea duty tour were implemented to accomplish this, who would man the ships, RAGs, and shore activities? If none of this officer’s choices were available when he was up for assignment or rotation, should he be left where he is until one of his choices becomes available? This might be acceptable if he were in a VP squadron, attempting to get into postgraduate school, but what if he were in a CVA trying to get some shore duty? If he “requests no VS,” how can a detailer justify leaving a billet gapped, while holding a pilot in limbo until his first choice is available? What is suggested is an assignment process that could conceivably have officers finishing their obligated service still awaiting a first assignment. There are great inadequacies in these proposed solutions.
In summary, it is necessary to understand that the basic mission of the Navy is to “keep the sea lanes open.” In order to accomplish this mission in the face of the enemy, the warfare specialty squadrons logically are given the responsibility. However, the mission of the Navy could not be accomplished without the contributions of all activities—warfare and support. There is no limit to the opportunity available either in promotion or assignment for the individual who has initiative, ability, and the drive to succeed. The present aide to the President of the United States was selected early for commander and command of a patrol squadron. His first tour was with an air transport squadron.
Soliciting Continued Parental Guidance
Captain R. W. Dickieson, U. S. Navy—While I was commanding officer of a Pacific Fleet ship, weekly, following Captain’s Mast, I would send a letter to the parents of those under-21, single men who had been found guilty. The letter, which solicited continued parental guidance even though the son no longer resided at home, was a subtle way of ensuring that the offender would tell his parents that he had been in trouble.
My letter was intended to make the man accountable to his parents in much the same way that the Captain’s Mast held him accountable to the Navy. When they learned that such a letter was being sent, most men did not like the thought that their parents were about to become aware of their offenses. Of course, others appeared not to care. The reaction may well be a reflection of the relationship that existed between the man and his parents.
Reactions from parents also varied widely. About one-third of the parents did not reply. A few parents felt that their son had been mistreated. Most parents, however, were truly concerned, and expressed a sincere desire to help get their son back on the track.
One angry parent wrote to say that she felt a fine of $175.00 for not getting a haircut was too severe. Her son had neglected to mention that it was his fourth time at Mast, and that insubordination to a senior petty officer was also involved. A second letter to that parent may have altered her image of the way the Navy handled its disciplinary problems, for I did not hear from that parent again, and more important, I did not see the man at Mast again.
* See C. F. Fischer, II, “Damage Control: Before, Not After,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1972, pp. 44-48.
** See J. R. Webb and C. J. King, Jr., “Retention and the NAS Nugget,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1972, pp. 106-107.