Few aspects of Soviet foreign policy in recent years have attracted as much attention as the enormous increase in both the quantity and quality of Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean. The traditional role of the U. S. Sixth Fleet as protector of NATO’s southern flank has been seriously challenged and the presence of powerful Soviet naval forces has injected a new element into the volatile politics of the Middle East and North Africa. Although this situation has received a good deal of attention in the West and has prompted some responses from NATO, such as the organization of improved methods of surveillance, there seems little realistic possibility that the immediate future will witness any significant improvement in the Mediterranean naval picture.
In fact, there is a very strong possibility that the situation will deteriorate sharply within the near future because of developments on the strategically located Balkan peninsula. One of the greatest weaknesses of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean thus far has been their lack of permanent bases from which to operate. Although they do possess the limited use of some shore facilities in friendly Arab states, their Mediterranean units have been forced to use permanent Soviet bases in the Black Sea or the distant Baltic and Arctic Seas. Such dependence on the use of the Turkish Straits and Strait of Gibraltar (and the Suez Canal, if it is ever reopened) would obviously place the Soviet Navy at a serious disadvantage during a time of actual or threatened war, and even in time of peace, serves to weaken the deterrent effect of the presence of Soviet fleet units.
Recognition of the strategic value of direct and unimpeded access to the Mediterranean has been one of the most constant themes of Russian foreign polity in both its Tsarist and its Communist forms. Imperial Russia waged a long series of wars in the 18th and 19th centuries against Turkey in order to gain control of the Straits. This drive has continued during the 20th century, and control of the Straits was one of the most important rewards promised Russia by Britain and France for her participation in World War I. Most recently, Stalin made a bid for control of the Turkish Straits following World War II, only to be thwarted by the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the deployment of the Sixth Fleet.
But the Soviet Union’s postwar drive to the Mediterranean was not concentrated entirely on the Turkish Straits. The possibility also existed for a time that direct access to the Adriatic could be obtained through the incorporation of Yugoslavia and Albania into the Soviet satellite empire. This possibility collapsed in 1948 when Tito, resentful of Soviet attempts to subjugate his country, broke with the Soviet Union and led Yugoslavia onto the path of national Communism. In addition to the many other effects of this decisive schism within world Communism, it meant the loss of any immediate possibility of direct Soviet access to the Mediterranean.
It is true that tiny Albania, largely inspired by a fear of Yugoslavia, remained loyal to the Soviet Union following the break between Stalin and Tito. But Albania was cut off from contact with the bulk of the Soviet empire by the hostile hinterlands of Tito’s Yugoslavia and NATO Greece. Although a few Soviet submarines did operate from a base near Valona, even this limited Soviet naval presence was lost in 1961 when Albania, now allied to Communist China, broke decisively with the Soviet Union.
The defections of Yugoslavia and Albania from the Soviet camp have had serious ramifications in many areas of Soviet foreign policy, and it would be a mistake to exaggerate the purely naval aspect. But the fact remains that the emphasis on Soviet naval power in recent years cannot help but serve as an additional incentive to the Soviet leadership to aim at the reestablishment of control over these states. The presence of Soviet naval bases in the Adriatic would be an historic accomplishment and increase immeasurably the influence of the U.S.S.R., especially in the Middle East.
The doctrinal basis for such a re-establishment of Soviet power has already been laid down in the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. At the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet spokesmen asserted the right and indeed the obligation of one socialist state to come to the aid of another when the existence of socialist rule was being threatened by hostile forces. Needless to say, the question of whether socialism is actually threatened would be decided in practice by the Soviet Union as the foremost member of the world socialist commonwealth. This concept of “limited sovereignty” for socialist states could easily be invoked in the case of Yugoslavia and Albania, each of whom has strayed into heresy by Soviet standards.
Thus far, the Soviet Union has refrained from taking such a serious step as the invasion of these states, for the risks involved have seemed out of all proportion to the gains. Although the United States has no formal treaty obligation to come to the aid of either country, we have expressed on several occasions since 1948 our strong desire to see Yugoslavia retain its national independence and have backed up this desire with concrete economic and military assistance. Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, tensions mounted between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. and fears were expressed that the Brezhnev Doctrine would be invoked to justify the overthrow of Tito as it had been in the case of the Czech leader Dubcek. Such fears arose again last year in connection with plans for large-scale Warsaw Treaty Organization maneuvers in Hungary and Bulgaria. The Yugoslav response to such Soviet pressures has generally been strong. Tito has mobilized popular opinion through propaganda campaigns and has made it clear that Yugoslavia’s armed forces would offer resistance, unlike those of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In conducting foreign affairs, Tito has strengthened his ties with the United States, China, and Romania, another Balkan state which has begun to veer away from the Soviet line into its own brand of Communism.
Meanwhile, in the Far East, relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China deteriorated to the point of armed clashes along the border. The prospect of a two-front war against China in the East and Yugoslavia, backed by the United States in the West, was not appealing to the Soviet leadership and undoubtedly contributed to the generally conciliatory policy the Soviets have been following in Western Europe. This desire for a relaxation of tensions in Europe has found concrete expression in the 1970 renunciation of force treaty with West Germany and last year’s agreement with the United States, Great Britain, and France, regarding Berlin. Currently, the main emphasis in Soviet European policy is on the calling of a European Security Conference which would, presumably, have as its main goal a general agreement to accept the status quo, especially the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Needless to say, any new crisis in the Balkans would end any chances for a European détente at the present time and involve new risks for the Soviet Union. It may very well be that a policy of détente in Europe will continue to hold out the greatest advantages to them.
But any realistic assessment of the situation in Europe must take into consideration several important new factors which may soon tempt the U.S.S.R. into undertaking a new drive for territorial expansion in the Balkans despite the consequences for détente. The most important of these is the increasingly unstable internal situation in Yugoslavia as the long rule of Tito comes to an end. Ever since it came into existence following World War I, Yugoslavia has been plagued by the problem of bitter jealousies and hatreds among the several peoples who were joined together in the new state. Of particular importance has been the bitter animosity between the Serbs and the Croatians, the two largest of the component peoples. This antagonism has meant that the threat of civil war has hung like the sword of Damocles over the very existence of the Yugoslav state. Thus far, Tito has successfully kept the situation under control and has maintained a unified state, but he will be 80 years old this year and the problem of a successor has not been satisfactorily solved.
Recent developments in the United States cannot fail to encourage the Soviet Union to take advantage of this internal friction. The quasi-isolationist tendencies stemming from the Vietnam War have produced a general antipathy to new commitments in foreign affairs, even in the case of traditionally friendly states. It would be immeasurably stronger in this case since the Soviet threat would be directed not against our NATO allies but against other Communist states. In Soviet eyes, the possibility that the United States would take any effective steps to save Yugoslavia and Albania is further decreased by the sharp decline in American strategic power in recent years. The establishment of parity in strategic weapons leaves the United States with sufficient strength to deter the U.S.S.R. from launching an all-out attack. But it also gives the Soviet leaders increased confidence in their ability to successfully take a calculated risk in launching more limited operations in such peripheral areas as the Balkans without fear of a major confrontation with the United States.
The conjunction of these factors could soon produce a situation along the following lines. The death of President Tito would remove the linchpin of Yugoslav unity. The long-suppressed resentment of the Croatians against what they consider to be their domination and exploitation by the Serbs could easily lead to a brutal civil war such as recently destroyed the unity of Pakistan. The Soviet Union, invoking the Brezhnev Doctrine, would declare that the existence of socialism in Yugoslavia was being threatened by the civil strife and that a real danger existed of the re-establishment of capitalism. Then, at the real or contrived invitation of one of the two contending nationalities, Soviet and other Warsaw Treaty Organization forces would enter the country from Hungary and Bulgaria. A continuation of the invasion into Albania could be easily “justified” in view of the bitter dispute which has been going on between that state and the U.S.S.R. for years concerning the proper way to achieve Communism. The reaction of the United States would undoubtedly involve much vocal denunciation, as at the time of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, but it seems improbable that this country, with the internal scars of the Vietnam war still unhealed, would actually intervene directly in this struggle between opposing brands of Communism.
The occupation of these two states, with their rugged terrain and long traditions of guerrilla warfare, would not be a simple or bloodless affair for the Soviet Army. But, in the absence of outside Western intervention, it seems reasonable to expect that the bulk of the region could be brought under the control of loyal satellite regimes within a relatively short period of time, thus greatly enhancing the Soviet Union’s position in Eastern Europe and acquiring warm water ports on the Adriatic which would significantly increase its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In evaluating the possibility of such a situation actually arising, recent events inside Yugoslavia are of special interest. The strength of Croatian nationalism manifested itself dramatically in November and December of 1971 in serious rioting by students in Zagreb, the Croatian capital, in protest against what they charged was blatant economic exploitation of their republic by the Serbs. What gave these disorders their main significance was the fact that this new outburst of nationalism was not simply tolerated by Croatian Communists but was actually fostered by them. This means that the dominant political force in Yugoslavia, the League of Communists, is itself badly split along nationalist lines. Although Tito moved quickly to purge the Croatian Communists of those elements guilty of “nationalist aberrations,” the grim possibility of civil war has thus arisen even while President Tito continues to exercise his stabilizing leadership. One of the great fears of the present Yugoslav regime is that the Soviet Union will forge an alliance with the disaffected Croatians, rendering support in the struggle against the Serbs in return for such eventual concessions as the acquisition of naval bases. Reports from Croatian emigré organizations have lent substance to these fears. For indeed, some Croatian nationalists have become so dissatisfied with the situation in Yugoslavia that they have actually called for the creation of an independent Croatia under Soviet protection.
At this point in time, no one can say with certainty what the future holds for Yugoslavia. Steps have been taken, at least on paper, to provide for a smooth transition of power following Tito’s death or retirement. Measures for political, economic, and cultural decentralization have been undertaken in the hope that they will convince the various nationalities of the desirability of remaining part of a unified Yugoslavia rather than striving for its dissolution. But the success of these measures is still very much in doubt and the real possibility exists that the collapse of the Yugoslav state will pose enormous new problems for the United States in the very near future. The question may soon arise as to how far the United States and its allies are prepared to go to preserve the barrier between the Russians and the open waters of the Mediterranean.
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Lieutenant Sullivan received his commission through OCS in 1965 and graduated from the Navy Supply Corps School in 1966. After duty on board the USS Annapolis (AGMR-1) in the Western Pacific from 1966 to 1967, he served as an instructor at the U. S. Naval Academy from 1967 to 1969. Following his release from active duty, he resumed his graduate studies at the University of Notre Dame and is currently a Ph.D candidate in the Department of Government and International Studies.
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A Sad Lack of Discipline
In the line of naval discipline, there is nothing to compare with a British submariner of the “Old Guard.” One such was Senior Naval Air Liaison Officer, South East Asia Command, and I was on his staff at U.S.A.F./R.A.F. Headquarters North of Calcutta, in 1944. He bitterly resented the free and easy ways of his American allies.
One day, we were jeeping our way out of the main gates of Headquarters and we passed an American sentry leaning against his box. Saluting a British officer was farthest from his mind. I was ordered to stop the jeep. At that moment, the commanding general’s limousine drove by, with a beautiful blonde sitting in the back.
The sentry began to run toward us, to the great satisfaction of my commanding officer, who sat erect in the jeep grimly anticipating a handsome apology from this insolent fellow. The sentry, however, breathlessly pointed to the receding automobile and panted,
“Geez! Did-ya see that blonde?”
—Contributed by James Dawson
No Disrespect Intended
During the Korean War, not to salute an officer when and wherever you met him was a punishable offense. My husband, a lieutenant, was a strict, but fair man. One day, he and I were in a hurry to catch a bus. As we turned a busy corner in New York City, four Marines nearly collided with us.
The two Marines in front stopped quickly to salute, throwing the two in the rear off balance. All four fell to their knees. A police officer, not having seen the mix-up, saw only my husband’s hat in the gutter.
“Did these men show you any disrespect?” he asked, glancing sharply at the young Marines.
“Ah, no,” my husband replied, brushing off his hat, “Not only did they show respect, they paid homage as well.”
—Contributed by H. V. Reed
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)