U. S. Fleet To Get New Permanent Homeport in Greece
(Stephen Klaidman in The Washington Post, 8 February 1972)
The United States and Greece have reached agreement on the use of Piraeus as the home port for a carrier task force of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, the State Department announced.
Details are now being worked out in Athens between U. S. Ambassador Henry J. Tasca and the Greek government. Final agreement is expected in a matter of months. It is expected that about 3,500 dependents of Sixth Fleet personnel and their households will be installed in Greece by the U. S. government.
Piraeus, the port of Athens, will become the main Mediterranean home port for the Fleet, which also has a facility at Gaeta, Italy. The move will enable more Sixth Fleet ships to remain on station for two years at a time, rather than the present six months because of the need for sailors to return to the United States to see their dependents.
State Department spokesman Charles Bray in announcing the agreement in principle cited reduced costs in a period of tight defense budgets and the Soviet naval buildup in the eastern Mediterranean as two of the major reasons for the agreement. He did not say what form the arrangement with Greece would take, but he indicated that it would not be a treaty, which would require Senate approval.
Bray said, however, that key senators and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee had been consulted about the negotiations with Greece. He also said that NATO members had been informed and that he was not aware of any objections.
There is opposition in the United States and among the northern members of NATO to any action that could be construed as aiding the Greek military junta.
Asked whether the administration would try to circumvent such adverse opinion at home by seeking an agreement that did not require Congressional approval, Bray cited his earlier statement that individual members of Congress had been consulted, but he did not answer the question directly.
NATO approval is not necessary for such an agreement between Greece and the United States, both of which are alliance members.
Greece will benefit from the agreement to the extent that the 3,500 dependents will spend money there; facilities will probably be built for them, and perhaps, at some future date, the United States will modernize and enlarge the Piraeus harbor.
When asked why the United States made the homeport arrangement with a regime that is “repugnant” to many Greeks and Americans, instead of elsewhere in the Mediterranean, Bray said: “We have expressed disappointment at the slow pace at which democracy is returning to Greece,” but we have also said that “. . . when U. S. and NATO security is involved . . .” we would do what was necessary, indicating that Piraeus was the best available location for Sixth Fleet ships.
Friendly Encounters Normal For U. S., Soviet Ships In Med
(Paul Hofmann in The New York Times, 4 December 1971)
An informal talk at the Gaeta, Italy, Lions Club by a U. S. naval officer has disclosed that American and Soviet warships had an encounter off the Italian West coast in late November, exchanged messages and shadowed each other for a few days.
“It was a perfectly courteous encounter,” a public affairs officer on board the missile cruiser USS Springfield (CLG-7), flagship of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, explained.
The officer said that while he was not able to disclose the exact wording of the voice messages between the Springfield and the Soviet naval formation, the American greeting might have gone like this: “Good morning. We will be in company with you for some time. Wish you good sailing.” The Soviet reply might have been equally civil, the officer said.
The Sixth Fleet spokesman said that oral exchanges between American and Soviet warships in the Mediterranean took place occasionally, both in English and Russian—“we are equipped for both languages.”
The Soviet Union is building up its Mediterranean fleet, and encounters with American warships occur almost daily. Several near-collisions between naval units watching and stalking one another in the Mediterranean have been reported in the past. For some time, Washington and Moscow have sought to avoid such incidents.
The episode recounted by the American officer in the Lions Club of Gaeta, the permanent base of the Sixth Fleet command, found its way into the Italian press and caused some uneasiness. Noncommunist Italians do not like the idea of Soviet warships steaming up and down the country’s 5,000-mile coastline.
An account published by newspapers in nearby Latina and in Rome said that the Soviet formation, consisting of a destroyer, a support vessel, and three submarines, appeared suddenly 25 miles off Gaeta on 26 November. Gaeta is about halfway between Rome and Naples.
According to the report, the Springfield sailed hurriedly out of the Bay of Gaeta, leaving some officers and men ashore, rendezvoused with two Italian vessels, the cruiser Caio Duilio and the destroyer Impavido, and confronted the Soviet warships.
The Soviet formation was said to have turned around and sailed toward the North African coast, followed by the Springfield and the two Italian vessels as far south as the Malta channel. The Springfield then returned to base.
In Naples, an American spokesman for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization said that heightened Soviet naval activity had recently been observed in the Tyrrhenian Sea west of Italy, but that “. . . the Russians have a perfect right to sail in those international waters.”
Eastern Bloc Diplomats Spy On Danish Maneuvers
(Die Welt, 30 November 1971)
A few days before the arrival of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin on 2 December on his visit to Denmark, an especially flagrant case of espionage startled both the public and the authorities, in which 11 accredited diplomats from the Eastern bloc were involved.
What interested the diplomats was a special exercise of the Danish naval forces, which was supposed to test the loading of mines from land depots in the Ore Sound, between Köge and Skovshoved.
According to the Copenhagen newspaper Berlingske Tidende, Polish and Soviet diplomats stood “shoulder to shoulder” along the coast of the maneuver area. Since the harbor of Skovshoved was closed because of the exercise, they had taken up observation posts along the shore road.
Shortly before the beginning of the manuever [sic], the Polish ship Domeyko ran into Köge’s harbor, as she had “suddenly” suffered damage to her motor. The captain anchored her in the harbor so as to give the best possible opportunity for observing the maneuvers. During the exercise, the Danish minelayers were eagerly photographed. Later, a ship outfitted with electronic gear anchored off the coast of Köge.
Soviet Navy Warships Patrol Off African State Of Guinea
(David B. Ottaway in The Washington Post, 9 February 1972)
The Soviet Union has been maintaining a “regular combat-patrol” off the coast of the West African state of Guinea for over a year now, according to a paper prepared for the Center for Naval Analyses, the U. S. Navy’s counterpart to the Air Force’s Rand Corporation.
The patrol has included at times a destroyer, three frigates, a landing craft, and a supply vessel, according to sources cited by Robert G. Weinland, author of the paper and a member of the Center.
Although reluctant to discuss the matter. State Department officials confirmed the report. One said that there had been a “continuous presence” of “one or more” Soviet warships off the coast or in the port of Conakry ever since the attempted invasion of Guinea by Portuguese-backed Guinean exiles in November 1970.
African specialists in the State Department seem to discount the possibility that the Soviet Union may be seeking to gain base rights in Conakry. They believe the Soviet task force is there primarily to protect President Sekou Toure’s regime from another invasion from neighboring Portuguese Guinea.
The Guinean situation is also an opportunity for the Soviet Union to champion African independence movements generally.
In his paper, Weinland cites the Soviet action in defense of Toure’s regime as a prime example of the changing character in the use of naval power by the Soviet Union—from mere defense of the homeland to politically motivated operations. Weinland argues that if the Soviets are willing to commit their own forces to combat in defense of a client such as Guinea, and he seems to believe they are increasingly prepared to do so, then there is the risk of NATO being dragged into a conflict by Portugal, a member of the Atlantic Alliance.
More likely, he suggests, is that Portugal may wind up facing the Soviets alone, should it attempt an attack on Guinea or back another invasion such as occurred in 1970. But he warns that such a Portuguese-Soviet confrontation still would provoke serious strains on NATO alliance and proposes that steps be taken to ensure that such a situation does not arise.
Soviets Censure U. S. Seamen For Behavior In Mediterranean
(Captain 1st Rank M. Korenevsky and Captain 1st Rank M. Novikov in the Soviet Military Review, December 1971)
. . . In the Mediterranean, the physical strain is complicated by the psychological strain. When Soviet ships began to make regular cruises between the Dardanelles and the Strait of Gibraltar, the ships of the U. S. Sixth Fleet resorted to various methods to scare the Soviet sailors. The Americans plagued the Soviet ships with buzzing at low altitude, they simulated attacks or simply got in the way of ships in violation of the Regulations for Prevention of Collision of Vessels at Sea. But soon they saw that their provocative actions were futile. It was then that the U. S. propaganda machine circulated the story about the “frightful danger of the Soviet presence” to the west of the Dardanelles.
It appears that in addition to obvious reasons causing Western propaganda to issue hysterical cries about the “frightful danger of the Soviet presence,” there is one special reason. What we have in mind is that the peoples of the Mediterranean zone have had an opportunity to compare two navies and the men of these navies through personal observation. They have seen and been able to compare the different attitudes displayed by the personnel of these navies to the land the sailor steps on and to the people he meets there.
The disgraceful behavior of American seamen in Mediterranean ports has been the talk of the town. Some of them have been guilty of holdups in shops and warehouses, as for instance in Naples, and of committing murder in broad daylight. The Command of the Sixth Fleet say that such behavior is in the nature of any seaman. After long spells at sea, he must relax.
Soviet ships have paid visits to ports previously visited by the Americans. And the people have seen with their own eyes that there are different ways of relaxing. The Soviet sailors relaxed by seeing the places of interest in towns they had not been to before, and acquainting themselves with the history of the country. They displayed good manners in contacts with the local inhabitants and were kind to children.
They would bring an atmosphere of goodwill and a spirit of festivity with them.
The people of Oran and some other ports on the African continent extended a hearty welcome to the Black Sea Song and Dance Ensemble known as “Cherno-morochka.” The concerts given by the Ensemble were recorded on tape and transmitted over the radio.
Of course, the destroyer in which the Ensemble was housed was no floating philharmonic society. It was a warship like any other.
Since ancient times, the waters of the Mediterranean have been open to free navigation, to economic and cultural exchange between peoples. The ships of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron are there to keep that sea a free sea, to prevent it from being controlled by an overseas police diktat, to prevent aggressive adventures and military provocations spearheaded against the peace-loving nations and democratic forces from gaining scope.
U. S. And Panama Stalled Over Terms Of New Treaty
(Ray Moseley in the Philadelphia Bulletin, 26 December 1971)
General Omar Torrijos Herrera, the Panamanian strongman, told his people recently that if he cannot get a new Panama Canal treaty with the United States, he will have two choices—crush a rebellion or lead it. “And I’m not going to crush it,” Torrijos said.
As he spoke, machetes were passed out to his listeners, who were told that an entire generation may have to sacrifice itself so another generation “. . . can live in a free society.”
All this can be dismissed for the moment as so much Yankee-baiting. No one is seriously worried that the 56,000 citizens of Panama are about to take on the United States, as happened in 1964 when riots in the Canal Zone cost the lives of 18 Panamanians and four American soldiers.
Rather, Torrijos is staking his hopes on negotiations that have been under way in the State Department since 29 June 1971. Three officials from each country are trying to thrash out terms of a new treaty that will safeguard United States interests in Panama, while stripping away some aspects of a relationship that has long been humiliating to Panamanians.
The Canal dispute brings out not merely intense Latin nationalism, but also some powerful emotional stirrings in the United States, particularly among conservatives and most especially among Southerners. Thousands of them have written their congressmen, and a number of U. S. lawmakers are wielding machetes of their own, threatening the political scalp of the Nixon administration if it bargains away United States “sovereignty” in the Canal Zone.
When the talks began, U. S. Ambassador John C. Mundt said he hoped for an agreement by the year’s end. But the talks are recessed until January and the negotiators have yet to agree on a single point.
State Department officials talk hopefully of an agreement “within the next few months.” But even if that is attained, there is no assurance the treaty can win Congressional approval. At this point, it appears that anything acceptable to the Panamanian government will be unacceptable to some lawmakers who may have the power to block a treaty.
The Panama Canal talks could become a debacle for the Nixon administration. However, Torrijos’s need for an agreement is such that this may be sufficient to save the situation. For one thing, Torrijos, hard pressed financially, needs the cash that a new agreement presumably will bring him. For another, he has called elections for next August looking toward re-establishment of constitutional government in Panama. A Canal agreement before that time would virtually assure his election as president—provided, of course, he can extract enough concessions from the United States to please his people.
The Panamanians have been unhappy over terms of the treaty since it was signed in 1903. For $10 million down and an annual payment of $250,000 (later raised to $1.93 million), the United States acquired the right to build the 50.7-mile-long Canal and obtained title to a 553-square-mile zone that extends five miles on either side of the Canal.
Although Panama retains titular sovereignty—a fact often misunderstood in this country—the United States has been able to act as if it were sovereign in the Canal Zone.
The Zone has its own government, with police and fire protection, education, and social services. The Zone government operates a number of commercial enterprises, ranging from bowling alleys to laundries, for the benefit of employees.
Even more upsetting to some Panamanians, the Zone is a haven for fugitives from Panamanian justice. Anyone fleeing arrest in Panama merely has to step across the Zone boundary. Then Panama is forced to go through lengthy extradition proceedings in order to recover him.
In 1959 and 1964, disorders broke out in the Canal Zone with Panamanians demanding revision of the treaty. New treaties were negotiated in 1967, providing among other things for shared jurisdiction in the Canal area, joint operation of the Canal, and ultimate possession of the Canal by Panama. But the Panamanian president refused to submit the treaties for ratification, and Torrijos formally rejected them in September 1970.
The current negotiations are secret, but reliable sources report that the two sides are far apart on all major issues.
Mundt, a businessman and educator who has been the most effective U. S. negotiator until recently, has offered to raise the U. S. annual payment to Panama from $1.93 million to $20 million, with the United States continuing to operate the Canal for 100 years. But the Panamanians have come back with demands ranging from $70 million to $100 million.
The United States, fearful that any abrupt abandonment of its jurisdiction would cause many Canal technicians to leave, has proposed that jurisdiction in various areas be gradually turned over to Panama, reportedly over a 15-year period. But Panamanian Ambassador Jose Antonio de la Ossa, who heads his country’s negotiators, said at a recent meeting: “We don’t want an imperceptible change. We want it all and we want it now.”
Panama wants the United States to turn over land in the Canal Zone that is not used and not needed by the United States, including two unused military installations.
The United States has offered to give back some land, but it reportedly amounts to only about 10% of the amount Panama seeks. It has refused to yield land near Panama City and Colon, which the Panamanians especially would like, and the Pentagon has refused to give up the unused military installations.
David H. Ward, deputy under secretary of the Army, caused an uproar in Panama recently when he testified before a House subcommittee that U. S. bases in Panama are “non-negotiable.”
The United States has 12,000 military personnel in the Canal Zone, most of them assigned to the defense of the Canal. Senator Frank Church (Dem., Idaho) has suggested that all the military installations be disbanded and the troops brought home, but Panama has not objected to the presence of troops needed for canal defense.
The United States has an option to build a second, sea-level canal in Panama, since the present canal is expected to reach its capacity by the end of the century. So far, Panama has neither said yes or no, but it is expected to agree if it gets satisfaction on other terms. But meanwhile, the Panamanians have become upset over a change in the American negotiating team which they fear will mean a stiffening in the U. S. position.
Former Treasury Secretary Robert B. Anderson nominally heads the U. S. team, but he has not been active. Mundt, who has directed the team in his absence, is highly regarded by the Panamanians and has indicated he is sympathetic to many of their demands.
A further complication comes from Representative John M. Murphy (Dem., N.Y.), chairman of the House subcommittee on the Panama Canal. He, with wide support from other House members, is insisting that any eventual treaties must be submitted not only to the Senate but to the House as well.
Although the Constitution delegates to the Senate authority to ratify treaties, Murphy argues that the United States cannot dispose of property rights without implementing legislation requiring action by both House and Senate.
If the administration refuses to bow to Murphy’s demand, the House could balk later at acting on enabling legislation that will be needed to carry out the treaties.
Representative Daniel Flood (Dem., Pa.), has voiced dire predictions of a Soviet takeover in Panama if the United States withdraws.
Many Southerners and conservatives regard the Canal Zone as the southernmost border of the United States. Their influence on administration policy in an election year is likely to be considerable.
New Canal Could Produce Many Ecological Problems
(Francis B. Kent in The Washington Post, 15 January 1972)
Within a relatively short time, possibly before the end of the decade, U. S. engineers are expected to begin blasting a sea-level canal here from the Atlantic to the Pacific—without really knowing exactly what the ecological consequences will be.
Guesses have been set forth. Engineers with little or no knowledge of biology tend to insist that nothing will happen. A number of scientists have responded with dire predictions that the interchange of marine life will have far-reaching and disastrous effects. No one, however, really knows. The hard information gathered here to date has established only that facts are in short supply, that the subject warrants much more intensive research.
Dr. Ira Rubinoff, a marine biologist at the Smithsonian Institute’s Marine Research Laboratory at Panama, has probably examined the problem more carefully than any other scientist. Years of collecting, mixing, and observing species from both oceans have convinced him that providing free access from Atlantic to Pacific will indeed produce significant change. “Some will suffer,” he observes cautiously, “others will benefit. To what extent, we simply do not know.”
J. C. Briggs of the University of Miami is one of those with a pessimistic outlook. In a paper published by the periodical, Science, he predicts the irrevocable extinction of thousands of species of marine life if there is access.
This point of view has been echoed in the U. S. Congress, notably Representative Daniel J. Flood, (Dem., Pa.), “Why,” he demanded to know in a recent hearing before a House subcommittee, “does the State Department ignore the marine ecological angle involved in constructing a salt water channel between the oceans, which recognized scientists predict would result in infesting the Atlantic with the poisonous Pacific sea snake and a predatory Crown of Thorns starfish, and have international repercussions? ”
Dr. Rubinoff, an articulate, Harvard-trained New Yorker, concedes that the two predators would probably migrate to the Atlantic and would probably stir up some mischief. How much, he does not know, and he thinks no one else really knows. The Crown of Thorns starfish, he told an interviewer, could cause extensive damage to the Atlantic coral reefs that support much of the commercially valuable shellfish in the area.
The reptile, commonly known as the yellow-bellied sea snake, preys on young fish, is eaten by virtually nothing and could, according to some experts, wreak havoc in the breeding grounds of scores of varieties of marine life.
Because high tide on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus of Panama rarely exceeds one and a half feet above the mean level, as opposed to 18 feet and more on the Pacific side, the migration would be largely from the Pacific to the Atlantic. In effect, Rubinoff said, creatures migrating to the Atlantic would thus get a free ride through the canal. Once in the Atlantic, he said, the sea snake could be expected to move as far east as the English Channel, where the warm water of the Gulf Stream would permit it to survive. Roughly three feet long at maturity and about one inch in diameter, the sea snake has few equals in virulence. Its venom, Rubinoff estimates, is 50 times as potent as that of the fer-de-lance. Fish that make the mistake of eating the snake die immediately, presumably from internal wounds.
In connection with the project under consideration at the Smithsonian Laboratory, Rubinoff cites as a parallel the construction of Welland Canal, which links the western Great Lakes with the Eastern Great Lakes and the Atlantic. This canal he says, gave the Atlantic lamprey access to Lakes Huron and Michigan. In time, the lamprey all but exterminated the lakes’ whitefish and trout. The lamprey has forced the U. S. and Canadian governments to spend upward of $12 million a year in joint efforts to control it, he adds.
To discourage interocean migration, Rubinoff is recommending the construction of a barrier, somewhat similar to the fresh water Gatun Lake that effectively controls the migration of most species in the existing canal. But since a sea-level channel would permit no lake, Rubinoff suggests an artificial barrier of superheated water.
Not only would the barrier reduce and possibly eliminate the odds for a disastrous interchange, he contends, it would provide science with the opportunity to make a thorough study of marine life as it exists on both sides of the isthmus. If the canal is put through without such a barrier, the opportunity would be lost forever.
Time is a factor. Although men have dreamed of a sea-level canal here since the Spanish first came ashore in the early 16th century, the pressure is now mounting rapidly to get one built. The present Panama Canal, which was opened to traffic in 1914, is rapidly becoming obsolete. Spokesmen for the Canal company say it will probably be adequate through the end of the century, but others question this estimate. Already some 1,400 huge bulk carriers are too long or too wide to fit into the Canal’s locks.
U. S. and Panamanian negotiators are described as nearing agreement on arrangements for the new canal, and Rubinoff said the National Academy of Sciences has appointed a committee to evaluate the ecological problems.
East European Leaders Say Baltic Should Be Sea Of Peace
(Lothar Ruehl in Die Welt, 10 December 1971)
The demands of the east European Countries for a part in the deciding of questions of European security are increasing with the approach of a conference on this matter.
Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu, on an official visit to the Turkish government in Ankara, spoke on a “Denuclearization of the Balkans” as a contribution to the easing of military tension in Europe. The suggestion is not new, and has been renewed with an eye to the awaited conference.
In Bonn, Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz, of Poland, suggested that the European countries try to arrange regional disarmament agreements. As an example, he gave the “transformation of the Baltic into a sea of peace.” Winiewicz made this suggestion in the perspective of cooperation between countries bordering on the Baltic in preventing pollution and in the wider picture of the European economic and technical infrastructure as a basis of European security. But he also indicated a clear reference to military defense policies when he said that the Baltic could become a ground for international strife if the NATO nations would not give up their intentions to demonstrate the strength of their Atlantic fleet there. This warning was followed by the formula that the Baltic could be “. . . a sea of peace and an example of peaceful coexistence between nations of diverse political governments, which belong to different political-military systems.”
The purpose of this speech is clear: the Polish government is speaking for the Soviets in demanding the retreat of NATO naval forces from the Baltic and consequently from the Baltic coast of two member states—Denmark and West Germany—neither of which commands a fleet or coastal defenses of any consequence.
The Soviet Union regards the Baltic like the Black Sea and the White Sea, as a strategic inland sea that it must control militarily in order to assure its own security. According to the Soviet ideas of security, the passages from the Baltic to the North Sea and to the Atlantic should be free only for the Soviet fleet, just as the Soviet Union demands also to be a Mediterranean power with a fleet present in there, while “foreign powers” like the United States and Great Britain are not allowed to keep any naval groups in the Black Sea and should not even be allowed to have warships cruising in the Mediterranean.
Moscow’s goal, to achieve a position of power on the world’s oceans, may be ascribed to the traditional historical push going back to Peter the Great, certainly to Catherine II. But this motivation would point only toward an unbroken continuity of power philosophy reaching far beyond Russia’s coasts and back through the centuries, and should therefore be taken all the more seriously.
In this case, the historical drive seems to be based not only on tradition or the conventional rules of naval politics alone, however, but also on a historical vision of the future: the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence to Europe as a whole and to all parts of the world, which, to be sure, could not be ruled by seapower, but which could be made less secure for the maritime purposes of other nations and alliances.
The Soviet “design” for Europe and the European coastal waters is clear enough: the U.S.S.R. gives its national security needs extremely broad definition; if possible there should be no military power concentrated against it. The land that adjoins the Soviet Union or that is geographically exposed to attack by Soviet forces is supposed to subordinate its own defense measures and alliances to this demand.
In pursuing its goal, which can only be described as a one-sided arms reduction and weakening of the forces and defenses of the West European lands, the Soviet Union employs its own allies in East Europe, whose territories, military forces, and governments it controls. These countries are encouraged to propose regional agreements for Western European states and groups of states. This seems all the more attractive politically, since the Eastern European governments are all intent on gaining more diplomatic contacts with the West and more elbow room. This striving toward independence has been figured into the Soviets’ calculations. The pressure put on Romania shows that. The political control of the Warsaw Pact and the bilateral alliance agreements serves to limit the independence of these countries in a European security agreement, too.
In the interest of Western security, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact must be brought to a discussion of the total security situation, not only in middle Europe, but also in northern Europe and in the Baltic and North Sea areas, in the Mediterranean and along the Turkish border. The political and strategic criteria of the Soviet security concept must not be made the basis for discussion. The European security question must be considered objectively and for the good of the whole continent, because security is indivisible, given the present military and technical situation, as the discussion on “mutual force reduction” and on controls for major weapons systems will soon show.
Australian Defense Program Watched Closely By Industry
(Flight International, 23 December 1971)
The Australian naval construction program, upon which the Australian defense authorities are now placing emphasis at the expense of the Royal Australian Air Force (R.A.A.F.), is being followed closely by European and U. S. aerospace firms because of its missile and aircraft content. There are a number of orders to be secured for helicopters to equip a hydrographic ship, an oceanographic vessel, a logistic cargo ship, and a fast combat support ship, all of which are being designed, developed, and built in Australia. Each of these ships will need one or more helicopters, which will most likely be of a fairly small type.
Aiming at that sector of the market, the Germans are proposing the Bö105, which was demonstrated in Australia. They say that this machine would be ideal for service on the varying types of non-fighting vessels, and would also be an attractive trainer for the Royal Australian Navy. Construction of the fast combat support ship HMAS Protector will begin in May.
There is a strong pressure on Canberra from American, French, and British industries for a decision on missile procurement. The three U. S.-built, guided-missile destroyers now in service with the 1st Australian Destroyer Squadron are armed with Tartar, updated with General Dynamics kits. The R.A.N. respects the Tartar, but feels that it will date too much for a new class of ships (DDLs), to be introduced from the end of this decade for service throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. General Dynamics has already approached Canberra with a proposal to produce, or at least to assemble, the Standard missile at the Department of Supply’s factory at St. Mary’s near Sydney, where all Service-guided weapons are now maintained, repaired, or modified.
The DDLs will have at least two helicopters each; the Lynx is thought to be about the right size, the Bö105 being rather too small. This helicopter decision will be taken in isolation from any decision about a Wessex replacement, for which the Sea King is highly regarded.
What Hawker de Havilland, the local representatives for Westland, as well as for Hawker Siddeley Aviation, and the experts in general are not clear about is the naval staff’s attitude towards the Harrier. A majority view in certain circles is that Harriers could be accommodated on the DDLS for the VTOL role only, perhaps with a penalty on helicopter size, but doing that would not seem very sensible.
The Harrier is generally considered certain to sell to the Royal Australian Navy in the long term. The politicians still have to decide about a replacement for HMAS Melbourne; meanwhile, a committee has been investigating the carrier situation.
Pass-Down-The-Line-Notes
A one-week Maintenance Management Orientation Course (242), is being conducted by the Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, just north of Dayton, Ohio. The Department of Defense-sponsored course is specifically designed to provide meaningful orientation to equipment maintenance for senior military and civilian personnel who are not maintenance managers. The program is outlined, in detail, as are application instructions, in DoD catalog 5010.16C, Defense Management Education and Training.
By the summer of 1973, the Naval Aviation Museum may well be able to move into its new building. The cost of the building is estimated at $4 million; the first increment, estimated at $1.5 million is scheduled for construction as soon as sufficient pledges are received. Pledges totaling almost $1 million have already been raised, but in order to raise the balance, the Naval Aviation Museum Association, Inc., is encouraging tax deductible donations from naval aviation personnel and aviation-minded citizens. Donors receive membership in the association. Donations should be made payable to and forwarded to the Naval Aviation Museum Association, Inc., Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida 32508.
Professor William N. Still, Jr., is working on a book concerning American naval activities in European waters between 1919 and 1940. He would like to hear from anyone who served on board ships in the Adriatic, Mediterranean, or Near East after World War I, or in Squadron 40T in the 1930s. Anyone having personal notes, diaries, letters, and anecdotes should contact Professor William N. Still, Jr. Associate Professor in History, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of History, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina 27834.