Our eyes are drawn to the headline, “NEW NAVY WARSHIPS HIT BY FIRES,” and the story which states that “The Navy’s new 1052-class destroyer escorts may be floating firetraps.” Cited in support of the reporter’s contention are the serious fires that occurred on board the USS Roark (DE-1053) and USS Knox (DE-1052) in early 1971. Quoting from a report on the Roark fire, the article gives several detailed examples of poor design and inoperative equipment which contributed to the seriousness of the fires.
The article is significant because it places the spotlight on Damage Control, which the Navy has not adequately emphasized or supported since World War II.
What has caused this neglect? Part of the problem is the indifference of many past and present commanding officers who, seeing little possibility of shipboard disaster in modern times, view Damage Control as a waste of time, money, and manpower. Such COs probably regarded the 1966 and 1967 fires in the carriers Oriskany (CVA-34) and Forrestal (CVA-59) as two tragic exceptions. Others, however, regard as the real tragedy of these carrier accidents the fact that, while they did trigger some re-ordering of Damage Control priorities, the impact was barely measurable after it had been filtered through many layers of command.
Regardless of the cause, long-term neglect has resulted in poorly organized Damage Control administrative management. The present organization is inadequate to meet a growing host of actuarial problems and equipment systems deficiencies.
Naval Damage Control is administered by an undefined organization comprised of Fleet staffs, training commands, and NavShips personnel. Although Naval Ships Systems Command organization recognizes Damage Control through a ship safety, damage prevention and control code, the code’s influence on ship design, construction, and operation appears to be slight. At the Fleet operational level, there is no formal, Navywide Damage Control organization.
Officer Damage Control training facilities are staffed largely by nonprofessional, inexperienced junior officers and “twilight tour” senior officers—most of whom are on their way out of the Navy. Enlisted training facilities are equally mediocre. Curriculum management appears to be governed by BuPers and funding allocations, rather than by Fleet requirements for highly-trained shipboard Damage Control organizations.
Fleet Training Group inspections are unrealistic and inconsistent. Inspection criteria emphasize ship’s material condition, tending to exalt documentary training records rather than emphasizing the practical ability of a ship’s company to carry out the Damage Control mission. East and West Coast Fleet Training Groups differ in inspection criteria and interpretation. Operational readiness inspections do little more than test the crew’s ability to follow a script.
On board ship, Damage Control receives only perfunctory command attention and is administered by transient junior officers on their promotion route to engineering department head—or by the unpromotable career engineer. The former are almost always grossly inexperienced; the latter are usually experienced, but generally not well-trained in Damage Control. If the Damage Control Assistant (DCA) is, by chance, both experienced and well-trained, he is still in no position to train the entire ship’s company. He does not have control over ship’s systems nor over funds, time, and personnel with which to maintain them. And yet, while almost literally tieing the DCA’s hands, the existing shipboard Damage Control organization relies heavily on the DCA’s personal ability to muster the support necessary to discharge his responsibilities.
There are, then, severe human shortcomings in the administration of Damage Control. And these human failings, manifest themselves in some frightening examples of Damage Control deficiencies. For example:
► Some fire mains cannot be operated at designed pressure (with all pumps on the line) because of the presence of line taps for air conditioning units, ice cream coolers, water coolers, and additional commodes. Such fire mains cannot be segregated owing to unauthorized line taps and unequalization of load, e.g., port loop 175 psig., starboard loop 40 psig.
► Some false bulkheads and overheads (habitability changes) conceal system cutout valves, electrical junction boxes, and overboard discharges. Many concealed systems are not accessible.
► Some compartment closure identification labels have been changed to facilitate habitability or ease of movement, making it impossible to set prescribed material condition of readiness.
► Some unauthorized items of flammable furniture, tile, and curtains, have been introduced in the name of habitability. In one heavy cruiser, the weight of multilayer deck tile on the second deck exceeded 30 tons, with corresponding reductions in stability and reserve buoyancy.
► Some cable and pipe runs pierce watertight bulkheads. rendering compartments non-watertight.
► Some alterations have been made by removing “troublesome” valves, watertight doors, and ladders. Few shipboard systems alterations are recorded in pertinent diagrams when the alteration is unauthorized and accomplished by ships’ companies. The result is a functionally altered system; and the alteration is unknown to succeeding generations of manning personnel.
Shipboard organization provides for auxiliary, electrical, and repair divisions to maintain systems. Frequently, these divisions are used for alterations and new construction at the expense of systems maintenance. Construction of barber shops, soda fountains, wardroom bookshelves, and crew’s lounges are not the function of these divisions and results in fewer hours spent on maintenance—with a corresponding reduction in maintenance level and systems reliability.
Availability of personnel for training is often affected by both personality and politics; the result is a haphazard shipboard Damage Control training program, regardless of elaborate training plans and records. And because the DCA probably is not qualified to instruct, his Damage Control rated personnel reflect their leader’s inadequacy. He and they become bored participants in an unpopular training program, made dull by “canned” instruction and the inability of instructors to cope with pertinent issues which are outside the realm of classroom doctrine.
The shortcomings outlined in this discussion are well known to those associated with Damage Control. The decline of Damage Control, nevertheless, continues.
Perhaps what is lacking is a proper definition. Simplistic textbook definitions are inadequate to describe what Damage Control is all about.
Damage Control, a science, is based upon the premise that consideration and action before damage will permit us to limit the extent of damage when it occurs. Its objectives, then, are to prepare for, to limit, and to combat damage. Damage Control is nominally 98% anticipation of—and 2% confrontation with—shipboard damage.
The damage may be intentionally inflicted or accidental; it may be caused by internal or external forces, or it may be the result of circumstance, or even the consequence of other events. The exact cause, classification, and extent of damage is frequently undetermined until after the damage is controlled.
Since damage cannot even be predicted precisely, it is logical to direct attention to the system environment in which the event must take place. System design, operation, and function can be controlled, and can provide indirect control over the damage by permitting shipboard personnel to manipulate the environment.
An electrical switchboard fire, for example, can be controlled by securing the switchboard (electrical system) and extinguishing the burning insulation with C02 (firefighting system). A ruptured fire main system may be restored to limited operation by isolating and bypassing the damaged section with isolation/cutout valves built into the system. A damaged fire control director may be secured and another fire control system used as an alternate.
None of these things can be done if personnel are unaware of system capabilities—or if the systems have been altered to reduce their flexibility.
Constructive criticism of the present Damage Control organization could be endless. It is sufficient to recognize that the present system has serious shortcomings which may be classified as follows:
► Navy-wide administration of Damage Control is uncoordinated, resulting in inconsistent policy and doctrine.
► Command emphasis on Damage Control is, in most cases, politically motivated, resulting in lack of sustained support by Command.
► Facilities tasked with training personnel in Damage Control are manned largely by nonprofessionals, resulting in the production of inferior damage control graduates.
► Facilities tasked with examining and testing shipboard Damage Control organizations do not realistically determine whether a ship is effectively organized to cope with shipboard damage.
► Shipboard administrative organization does not provide adequate recognition to the DCA, with a resulting lack of funds, personnel, cross-departmental influence, and independent (of department heads) discharge of the Damage Control task.
The DCA must ensure systems maintenance and personnel training, and he must organize for command coordination of all systems in the event of damage. He cannot do this under the present administrative organization.
Existing shipboard command organization appears to provide communication channels, chain of command relationships, and personnel allowances capable of supporting a workable Damage Control organization. For example, standard general quarters Damage Control organization (outlined by the type commander) fits well into the total scheme of shipboard operation. No significant change is advocated in this area.
On the other hand, administrative organizations do not adequately support the command Damage Control organization and should be modified to do so.
In the past, attempts have been made to alter the shipboard administrative organization in order to place the DCA on a level with department heads. Although this was a step in the right direction, it created more problems than it resolved because the DCA had nothing more than the title. He boasted no independently allocated funds, no constant command support, and exercised no authority over his area of responsibility. The only thing he gained was a platform from which he could speak and be heard, which is not to say that others listened.
What is needed, then, is a general plan for the creation of a supportive administrative organization which will boost Damage Control to the position it deserves, and to do this without massive reorganization and expense. The changes advocated below will provide a base for effective administration.
First, the Navy should establish a “Damage Control Coordinator” (DCC) in the office of DCNO Op-03 (Fleet Operation and Readiness). The DCC will provide high level command accent on Damage Control science through establishment of standard organizational, training, and performance policies. He will develop requirements for personnel, training, material, and performance, ensuring that these requirements are met by cognizant administrative commands. He will implement policies through existing commands previously assigned these tasks, such as BuPers, Navships, Fleet Training Groups, Damage Control schools, and type commanders.
Secondly, the shipboard administrative organization should be altered to include a Damage Control department. The DCA will then become the Damage Control officer. The engineer officer (formerly the Damage Control officer) will assume some damage control duties in keeping with his position as head of department.
The Damage Control department would include the repair division with its shipfitters, pipefitters, damage controlmen, and one senior electrician’s mate. The staff of this department should include the Damage Control officer, (with rank equal to his peers), preventive maintenance system coordinator, repair division officer, and the ship’s warrant carpenter, if one is assigned.
The department responsibilities should include:
► Coordination of the ship’s preventive maintenance system.
► Maintenance of the ship's Damage Control equipment and systems previously assigned to the repair division.
► Coordination and screening of work requests and maintenance of ship alteration files.
► Training ship’s company in Damage Control and organizing on effective Damage Control command organization.
The department’s operating funds would be budgeted in keeping with assigned tasks. Control over department funds, time, and personnel will permit an effective manager to maintain assigned systems and to freely select training instructors from within the department. Unilateral control over the preventive maintenance system, work requests, and ship alterations will result in coordinated ship systems management. Responsibility would fairly be placed on one man with resources and authority to execute assigned tasks. The Damage Control officer would be able to rely on some degree of support and consistent direction from the Damage Control Coordinator located at Naval Ship Systems Command, although he will work for his commanding officer as do the other heads of departments.
Paper proposals tend toward over-simplification, and this proposal is no exception. It is offered with limited knowledge of possible complications and full awareness of the ingrained resistance which can be expected to be encountered as implementation begins.
Perhaps the best incentive for the adoption of this or some similar program of Damage Control reform is to personalize the questions implicit in the opening paragraphs of this paper. Do we—each of us—believe or disbelieve that the Roark and Knox fires were caused only by poor design and inoperative equipment? Or is it possible that other major causative factors were involved?
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A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1960, Lieutenant Commander Fischer served in the USS Yorktown (CVS-10) from 1960 to 1962, in the USS Guadalupe (AO-32) from 1962 to 1964, and in the USS Canberra (CA-70) from 1966 to 1969. He was Department Head and Senior Damage Control Instructor at the Philadelphia Naval Damage Control Training Center Officers School from 1964 to 1966 and served as DCA in both the Guadalupe and the Canberra. He is currently Marine Products Marketing Specialist for the Raychem Corporation of Menlo Park, California.