“View from the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship”
(See I. C. Kidd, Jr., pp. 18-29, February 1972 Proceedings)
Captain Roy C. Goldman, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Suribachi (AE-21)—The vast increase in Soviet merchant shipping manifestly demonstrates those ever-increasing maritime capabilities which go hand-in-hand with the impressive new Navy which Admiral Kidd has described. Ten years ago, Soviet merchant ships were rarely met in the trade routes of the world. How different the situation is today, particularly in the Mediterranean. One sees them every day in all corners of the Mediterranean; ships of all types headed in all directions. One day in July 1971, in an eight-hour period, over 30 merchant ships passed the anchorage of Cannakkale, Turkey, just inside the Dardanelles. Two out of every three were flying the hammer and sickle. Wherever and whenever encountered, the Soviet ships were, to all outward appearances, uniformly modern, well-equipped, and well-maintained. Doubtless, they were equally shipshape inside. From this burgeoning maritime strength—a growing merchant fleet which is already the most modern in the world and which is fast becoming an economic trump card of very real importance, supported by powerful up-to-date naval forces—it can be inferred that the Russians have read and are putting into practice the ideas of Mahan.
To amplify Admiral Kidd’s point that our ships and those of the U.S.S.R. routinely follow one another in the Mediterranean, two recent, typical experiences might be of interest. Last June, a major concentration of Sixth Fleet ships anchored in Argostoli Bay, Greece, just after a major exercise which was quite successful in that the Russians had been unable to follow the exercise because of the manner in which it had been conducted. Shortly afterward, two Soviet missile ships arrived outside the harbor entrance and followed the carriers as they left the anchorage.
A few weeks later, on a Sunday evening, a Sixth Fleet ammunition ship was steaming just offshore outside the harbor of Soudha Bay, Crete, waiting to rendezvous with and rearm one of the carriers at nightfall. As the carrier approached the ammunition ship, so did two Soviet naval units—a guided missile destroyer and an intelligence collection ship—with the latter staying fairly close to try and observe the rearming evolution, which seemed to be futile because of the darkness. In these examples, the Russian ships were only minor irritants. Still, such incidents would have never happened a few years earlier.
In a 16 February 1971 article in The New York Times, Admiral Arthur Radford, U. S. Navy (Retired), the ex-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, equated the role of today’s Sixth Fleet as being parallel to that of the earliest U. S. Navy squadron. Like the earliest U. S. squadron, the Sixth Fleet has to face up to changing diplomatic, political, psychological, and economic conditions. Admiral Radford further characterized the Fleet as “. . . an almost indispensable tool for use in controlling and defusing tension situations. . . . The Sixth Fleet can be used to deter adversaries through raw power or mere presence—or both.” It seems safe to assume that the Soviets have an analogous concept of the role of their Mediterranean fleet.
It is evident that the Soviets are in the Mediterranean to stay. Their official position for world consumption remains fairly close to that which was published in their Military History Journal in mid-1970, which stated, “Soviet ships are now found where they are demanded by the security and interests of the Soviet Union . . . . They are there because the tense atmosphere in the Mediterranean, created and artificially supported by imperialists in the interests of powerful monopolies, represent a serious threat to all Mediterranean States including the Soviet Union.” There was no explanation of the statement describing the Soviet Union as a Mediterranean state.
In his article, Admiral Kidd explains that we must rely more on our NATO allies for help in the Mediterranean, advises in essence that the total NATO effort is a positive factor, and stresses the need for a higher quality of performance as well as the acquisition of more and better military hardware on the part of our allies. This writer must agree in toto with these assertions, particularly the latter two. In all honesty, the situation as seen from this writer’s own bridge was not particularly reassuring in the Mediterranean of 1971, where the U. S. Sixth Fleet was acting as a surrogate for the Alliance throughout its length and breadth. The other NATO navies were being held cautiously in check by their governments as a general rule—except for the little Greek Navy and, to a much lesser extent, the Italian Navy. I am not implying here that the Alliance could or should adopt a bellicose or aggressive position toward the Soviet Union. That would emphatically not be in the interests of peace and security. Rather, it would appear that the Alliance as a whole could be better served, as pointed out by Admiral Kidd, by more solidarity in the form of real and tangible contributions by our partners.
That an atmosphere of continuing reticence and caution continues to exist can be seen in examining the communiques issued after the last two meetings of the NATO Council of Ministers. The communique issued at Brussels on 4 December 1970 announced the adoption of a relatively modest program to upgrade the defensive capabilities of the Alliance in the 1970s. They took note of the situation in the Mediterranean as giving cause for concern and directed careful vigilance and continuing consultation, the review of which was to be reported fully at the next meeting. In the communique issued after that latter meeting in Lisbon on 4 June 1971, the Ministers “. . . took note of the situation in the Mediterranean prepared by the Council in Permanent Session. While welcoming the efforts currently undertaken to re-establish peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, they observed that developments in the area as a whole continue to give cause for concern . . . they instructed the Council in Permanent Session to continue consultations on this situation and to report thereon at their next meeting.” In other words, they decided to wait and see. Just prior to this last meeting and after a meeting of NATO Defense ministers which preceded that of the Council, on 29 May 1971, it was announced that the United States had increased the Sixth Fleet by one helicopter carrier, increased Mediterranean aircraft ASW patrols, and increased the number of operational days for the Sixth Fleet. Despite this greater effort by the United States—with its well-known defense-related economic problems—the Council of Ministers took no positive action on the relatively modest British proposal of two years standing (which was reintroduced at these meetings) to change the present Mediterranean “on call” force of surface warships of the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey to a Standing Naval Force with ships permanently assigned from the first three of the nations named, with regular and cyclic participation by the other two. It is difficult to second-guess what may or may not have gone on behind closed doors, since the provision of the Treaty requiring unanimity on the part of members prior to adoption of any resolution certainly creates difficulties. Nevertheless, the past years have seen demonstrable solidarity on the part of the Alliance in many instances. That solidarity was hardly in evidence insofar as the Mediterranean of 1971 was concerned. Outside of the operations of the Sixth Fleet and those of the Soviets, naval activity in the Mediterranean was very modest.
Lastly, there are a few factors of interest which could affect operations of the Sixth Fleet. The first of these is the position of France. Although it received little publicity, July 1971 saw the visit of four Toulon-based destroyer-types to Soviet and Romanian Black Sea ports. The French policy, vis-à-vis NATO, remains the anachronism decided upon by DeGaulle. It is not likely to change radically so long as the Pompidou-Chaban Delmas group, to whom the policies of their late mentor are a sacred trust, remains in office. Although the French Navy itself took part effectively and enthusiastically in exercises with the Sixth Fleet, and continues to do so, and although other contacts with the French at the Navy-to-Navy level remained as strong as ever, France continues to play a solo role in preference to joining the team. This premise is strengthened not only by the naval visits mentioned, but also by three reciprocal visits between French and Russian Air Force units which took place earlier in the year. Despite all of this, Sixth Fleet ships were as warmly received at Toulon as anywhere else in the Mediterranean.
Another point of transitory interest is the change in government in Malta this past year, and the problems that this has created. Although Dom Mintoff has apparently started to be more realistic in his attitude, the eviction of the NATO headquarters and personnel from Malta remains a fact, and the future use of various Maltese facilities by forces of the Alliance is not an immediate prospect. Even if Sixth Fleet visits resume once more, and even if Britain retains the right to use its bases there, Malta can no longer be regarded as a sure and friendly haven for NATO naval and air forces. Strategically, these problems are not insurmountable. Facilities, particularly airfields, on relatively nearby Italian and Greek real estate can serve as alternatives. Sixth Fleet operations have already been conditioned by the Maltese situation.
Finally, and while not of the immediate degree of importance as the Maltese affair, the situation in North Africa in 1971 was one which is of concern to the Sixth Fleet. The attempted coup d’état against King Hassan II in Morocco, where the U. S. Navy has important communications installations, and the announcement of Tunisian president Bourguiba that he will retire from public life at the end of his term in 1974 cannot be looked upon as good news. The prospect that all of the southern shores of the Mediterranean might be unfriendly to NATO in the foreseeable future is frightening, particularly in view of the character of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.
“A United States Navy for the Future”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 18-25, March; pp. 81-90. June; pp. 89-93, July; pp. 93-96, August; pp. 93-95, September; pp. 93-95, October; and pp. 93-95, December 1971; p. 94, January; pp. 105-106, February; and pp. 102-105, 1972 Proceedings)
G. Philip Woodruff—Much has been made of Captain Smith’s critical evaluation of the 1052-class destroyer escorts. An important, but hitherto unexpressed, question which these ships have brought up is, can this nation and its Navy afford single-purpose ships? I think not. The probability of a large scale authorization for multipurpose fleet escorts is low, especially if the ships requested are the Spruance-class white elephants. Furthermore, the proposed PF type escorts[*] are only a nebulous design not yet on the drawing board. Therefore, the 1052-class ships may well become the Navy’s general purpose fleet escorts for lack of anything else. With this in mind, we must consider expanding their capabilities to meet a wider variety of tasks than just ASW.
Specifically, they should be outfitted with either the French 23-mile-range Exocet, or the Israeli Gabriel, surface-to-surface missile system. A quadruple pepperbox launcher would be placed on the fantail, over the space currently designated for the Mk. 48 torpedo. This space would be used as a missile storage and handling room. Such an installation would displace not only the Mk. 48, but the Sea Sparrow point defense missile launcher currently planned for the fantail. The latter problem is easily remedied by modifying the forward octuple pepperbox launcher and its reloading system under the bridge to handle both ASRoc and the Sea Sparrow. Some would argue that deletion of the Mk. 48 torpedo from the ship’s inventory of weapons would weaken her ASW capability. It is this writer’s contention that, on a multipurpose destroyer, AsRoc, a manned helicopter system such as Lamps, and the four ASW torpedo tubes existent on board the Knox and her sisters is a large enough suite of antisubmarine weapons.
Finally, and most important, the 1052-class ships should be re-engined with gas turbines. This is not a radical suggestion—before her cancellation, the last ship of the 1098-class was scheduled to be powered by gas turbines. Two General Electric LM-2500 gas turbines could be fitted into the existing boiler and turbine spaces. The engines would be coupled to the single shaft in a COGAG configuration, raising the total shaft horsepower 50,000, and the speed into the 35-knot range. This tremendous increase in horsepower would necessitate new reduction gears and a new shaft to handle the load. A variable-pitch propeller would also be necessary, as well as a smokestack abaft the mack to vent the turbine exhaust. The former boiler uptakes inside the mack could be converted into air intakes for the large volume of air that gas turbines consume.
This writer estimates that this entire conversion, from single-purpose to multipurpose warship, would cost no more than $15 million per unit, and would take no more than 18 months to complete. All 46 of the 1052-class destroyer escorts could be so converted for the cost of eight Spruance-class vessels.
The Navy faces a critical shortage of general-purpose destroyers in this decade. If the class conversion herein proposed is undertaken, that shortage would be greatly relieved, at the lowest possible cost, and in the shortest period of time.
Mrs. Nalini Das, Cochin, India—Much of what the author has to say is applicable, in large or small measure, to most navies of the Free World. While matters concerning weaponry and ship design and construction must necessarily remain closely and particularly related to the subject of the writing, i.e., the U. S. Navy, several other points raised by Captain Smith evoke comment.
There is no denying the fact that all over the world today, and I am inclined to include the Soviets in this definition, expediency is indeed overtaking professionalism. This is, however, particularly true of democracies where the military establishment has to function under a constant and close civilian supervision and where the temptation to resort to expedience is forever present. The shortage of officers who are able to sift fact from fancy is, I am sure, widely and universally felt, and is going from bad to worse. More and more are training, and operating ability and technical support/maintenance being ignored, to be taken care of later, once the hardware is in hand. This is true of most navies today. What has caused such a decline in standards and professionalism is a subject worthy of debate.
Quite obviously, a major factor contributing towards this decline is the manner in which governmental control is planned and exercised. The budgeting procedure, which bases future allocations of funds on past use, is largely responsible for many hasty and compromising decisions which have as their main basis the fear that funds not spent are funds no longer available. Such procedure also, inevitably, ensures that the military will always be behind the problem, reacting rather than being ready for the event. Effective planning can, to some extent overcome this drawback, but the process itself depends upon assessment of prospective threats; the moment this assessment is disputed, the whole process falls. Rich or poor, no country can afford to allocate a substantial part of its resources towards its defense, which implies planning for a contingency which is at best vague and at worst, may not happen at all. The expenditure is entirely non-productive in real terms and the tight budgetary control must, therefore, be viewed in this light.
Shortage of funds, coupled with the fact that the defense expenditure tends to be regarded as non-productive, is responsible for the next factor, i.e., the conditioning of the civilian mind. Every allocation to military expenditure is reluctantly made, with suspicion and ill will, for every cent spent on military hardware is a cent denied to economic prosperity and welfare, or so it is believed. This, in turn, conditions the military mind; as every cent has to be fought for, against sustained and occasionally bitter opposition, facts become fancy and over-emphasis and overassessment result. The attitude then becomes that if a claim is made for ten cents, five are sure to be given. The exaggerations then tend to become lies. The more the military lies, the more the civilians express doubts. The greater the doubts, the bigger become the lies and, as a result, we have on our hands a real “credibility gap.”
The military, which finds itself fighting against these odds must necessarily present a united front as any indication of conflict within Service headquarters can effectively wreck any proposal before the government. This apparent unity is, in effect, the stifling of disagreements and the subordination of individual views to a so-called agreement and the subordination of individual views to a so-called “party line.” This, by itself is, perhaps, not a bad thing so long as it does not involve a compromise of fundamental differences. It is, however, unlikely that military leadership will go hell-for-leather for a project which has any great degree of criticism attached to it from within.
The military must, of course, act in such a manner as to be believed. This is essential. There has been of late, a growing tendency on the part of the civilian hierarchy and the people, to disbelieve the military point of view, which as has been stated earlier, is exaggerated, and deliberately so, in order that some gains might accrue. This criticism appears to be valid. Departments of defense all over the world are guilty of over-emphasis and over-assessment. Significantly, a problem is never de-magnified. The military must guard against a situation where, rather than fooling others, they start fooling themselves. As Captain Smith has stated, repetition of one’s own distorted arguments leads one to believe in what one is saying. When that happens, superficiality replaces substance and one is on the road to becoming “horse trader, compromiser, or the nimble-footed politician.”
There is no dispute with the author’s contention that nothing can allow the Navy either the freedom or the authority to go in for “ill-conceived and ill-pursued programs. . . .” This is where the military man must think militarily so that, within resources available, every penny is fruitfully and gainfully spent. He must, however, still continue to think not like a civilian, I agree, but certainly with the comprehension of a civilian as well as that of a military man. This dual responsibility, remaining entirely loyal to the Service, and, at the same time, retaining a vivid grasp of the entire national panorama is what makes the military man’s job in the 1970s a challenging and difficult one.
So, between the two extremities, one of total projection of the military without any recognition of national priorities, and the other of toeing the party line blindly and completely must be a compromise, and it is this compromise which military leadership must endeavor to find. With the required understanding between the civilian “whiz-kids” and the military man, it will no longer be necessary for the former to view with suspicion the assessments of the latter—and for the latter to project anything other than his honest and forthright opinion. In India, we have had a situation not very different from that which Captain Smith has so vividly described, but it is becoming better. It is still far short of what we expect and demand, but it is becoming better. And, perhaps, someday, therefore, it will become possible for the military man to be believed.
“The Naval Officer’s Career—‘Exigencies of the Service’”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 18-26, October 1971 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander W. Spencer Johnson, U. S. Navy—Captain Smith’s noteworthy article goes somewhat astray when he charges Professors John Kenneth Galbraith and Hans Morgenthau with trying to “. . . convince us that the so-called Cold War has long been a myth, the fictional creation of an emotional reaction of Communism. . . .” The sense of Captain Smith’s statement would lead the reader to believe that Professors Galbraith and Morgenthau are each arch-villains seeking to downgrade the roles of both our political and military leaders charged with our national security. I would submit that nothing could be further from the true state of affairs.
Hans Morgenthau, in concluding his recent book, A New Foreign Policy for the United States, outlines seven principles of American foreign policy which he deems basic as guidance for national foreign policy formulation. The first of these principles clearly refutes Captain Smith’s allegations:
The United States has one primary national interest in its relations: the security of its territory and institutions. The United States has a number of secondary interests in the world, such as peace and security everywhere, the protection and promotion of democratic governments, the containment of Communist governments and movements, the relief of poverty and disease. The pursuit of these secondary interests is subject to two limitations. They are not to be pursued at the expense of the primary interest of national security, and they can be pursued only within the rather narrow limits of available wisdom and power.
John Kenneth Galbraith has long been a critic of the vast amounts of money allocated annually in the defense budget. His criticism, however, has largely been pointed at mismanagement of funds and the tremendous costs of modern weapons systems. He feels that some costly items seeking funding are really not necessary for our true defense needs, signalling perhaps that the military has done a relatively poor job in justifying certain new weapons projects or procurement to Professor Galbraith and others. In a talk given at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy two years ago, Professor Galbraith, in answer to a question posed by a student naval officer, stated that he favored a strong shipbuilding program to replace our ageing and obsolete Fleet units to the extent that our seaborne defenses are adequate to our interests and needs. On the other hand, he felt that the Air force requests for funding for the B-1 bomber and certain phases of ABM systems were poorly justified in the light of defense needs—particularly at a time when so many other demands are being made on Federal tax resources. Professor Galbraith has written extensively with regard to the military-industrial complex. He has suggested a system of turning large defense contractors into public corporations similar, to some extent, to those in the United Kingdom. In so doing, armament industries may be streamlined and reorganized along more cost-effective lines. Glaring cost overruns in research, development, and procurement may be eliminated to a large degree, and a better system of contract awarding may be achieved in such a system. Needed military-industrial complexes will be maintained, while other elements may be turned to consumer production or capital goods production. Recent necessary Federal aid to the aircraft industry leads one to believe that there may be something in Professor Galbraith’s arguments. Surely Captain Smith cannot condemn men like Professors Galbraith and Morgenthau for realizing that the world is greatly changed from the Cold War bi-polar system to the current polycentric, multipolar one.[†] Clearly, he must realize that more precise, in-depth thinking, coupled with insight and experience in world affairs, is needed in order to cope with the fast-changing problems of defense, and economic reality of today’s world. The simplicities of Cold War thinking will no longer suffice. Far too many other factors and intricacies are involved.
Many of our finest leaders, both military and civilian, have been nurtured intellectually on the campuses of our country and those abroad, both as undergraduates and later as graduate students. Journalists, professors, and others play a strong role in forming our national public opinion and our understanding of events and their causative roots, both at home and abroad. Rather than describe them as “comedians” invited to our war colleges to “. . . jibe amusingly at our foibles and prick at our always vulnerable balloons . . . ,” perhaps we should give them a more attentive ear, establish a mutuality of understanding and concern for national security affairs through a frank exchange of views, and challenge them on the factual basis of their views and analysis when they are perceived to be in error. Through diligent study of world and national affairs and a close relationship with the civilian community, the professional naval officer may better present his views on the needs of our national defense, and be better received in all circles.
Captain Smith is correct in stating earlier in his article that the professional naval officer must attain the “. . . imagination, foresight, judgment, skepticism (of [his] own data base, among other things), and the indispensable leaven of maturity, wisdom, and resiliency of mind which a man must acquire if he is to be able to adjust continually to the vagaries of human existence. . . .” Perhaps then our “balloons” may not be so “vulnerable” to pricking, and the voice of the military officer will carry greater weight in the needed policy formulations and arms programs so vital to our adequate defense. The voices of military officers must be well informed, cogent, and capable of putting ideological pronouncements in their proper perspective, thus clearing the mists surrounding many important issues. Above all, the image of the “military mind” must be eradicated from the consciousness of the general public. Far too many civilians are ready to accept H. G. Wells’ remark in his Outline of History that, “The professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual quality would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling.”
Captain Smith is in error in criticizing Professor Galbraith for asking, how much is enough? Or pointing out cases of mismanagement in both our military and defense industries. He does so in the public interest. Neither should Professor Morgenthau be painted as one who would decrease our security below the needed requirements. His plea is for just the opposite. In this fast-paced world of political and technological change, responsible officers must have a weather eye on every change in the international climate, and prepare in timely and adequate fashion to defend their country and its interests wherever or whenever they are threatened. In order to do this, it is necessary to attune attennae [sic] to every source of information—no matter what its origin—to listen, evaluate, study, and act on the findings.
“The Frustration Factor”
(See F. B. Shemanski, pp. 27-33, April; and pp. 91-92, September 1971; and p. 110, March 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Thomas J. Morgan, U. S. Naval Reserve—After less than a year and a half of commissioned service, my ship—an LST of the Newport class—has lost more than two-thirds of her original crew. And, if projected losses and transfers take effect, on the second anniversary of the ship’s commissioning, she will have seen the following come and go: three commanding officers, four supply officers, three engineer officers, three damage control assistants, and four gunnery officers. Only one plankowner will remain in the wardroom to celebrate her second birthday. It is difficult to conceive of a greater handicap to impose on a brand new ship of an entirely new class.
“The Only Option?”
(See G. E. Lowe, pp. 18-26, April; pp. 86-88, November; and pp. 88-89, December 1971; and p. 94, January 1972 Proceedings)
Robert I. Widder—I am afraid that Mr. Lowe does his cause harm by the one-sided arguments he uses. This is a pity, for the arguments in favor of a sea-based deterrent seem to me sufficiently compelling to prevail on balance even when their weak points are conceded. Ignoring the negative aspects of strategic concepts has become increasingly widespread in much that is written today—whether in Congressional testimony, professional journals, or in the news media. While it may be presumed that this is done in order to strengthen the case being presented, it often results in the impression that the case is too weak to sustain critical examination.
A number of arguments—some of them specious—can be made against deploying a force consisting of surface ships carrying Minuteman III (or missiles specifically designed for shipboard deployment). Among the genuine arguments are those posed by the vulnerability of such a force to a variety of countermeasures, and the cost which would be incurred by both the deployment and the protection of such a force. A thorough analysis which considers the pros and cons is required to establish the viability of such an option.
The point raised about the vulnerability of fixed bomber bases is correct in a narrow sense. It does not appear to matter, however, that the base is vulnerable if the bombers are launched prior to the attack. If it is possible to empty the base in time—and there seem to be ways to accomplish this—then its vulnerability should be of no more concern than the vulnerability of fixed naval installations servicing SSBNs, carriers, or missile-carrying surface vessels which are advocated to overcome the bomber base vulnerability. This procedure can also be applied to fixed land-based missiles if they are capable of being launched on warning of attack. If the would-be attacker perceives this maneuver as a possible counter to a first strike which must be considered in planning the attack, the value of fixed missiles as a deterrent is not necessarily erased. Launch on warning has certain ominous aspects, but so does the whole concept of deterrence based on the threat of retaliation. Nevertheless, we have not found a satisfactory substitute for it.
The proposal for increasing the strategic delivery capability of the CVAs seems to be answered to a large extent by the author’s own statements about the Soviet naval buildup. Certainly if he expresses concern over the American Fleet being “. . . frozen out of the Eastern Mediterranean . . . ,” then adding strategic capabilities to it does not seem to rectify the situation. It might even provide the Soviets with added incentives for the “freeze.” The cost of protection of the CVAs (and of ICBM-carrying surface ships) will increase—and probably quite significantly—in light of the Soviet naval buildup, and to state that the alternatives proposed are “. . . immensely cheaper than the Minuteman III, B-1, ABM fortress land-based option . . . ,” appears to be an oversimplification, unless supported by analysis.
There are other facets of a sea-based force that require examination. One of these concerns the very aspect which makes missile-carrying submarines an attractive option—the difficulty of their location and identification. At least four of the five nuclear powers possess, or will soon possess, such weapons systems. The possibility of an SLBM attack by an unidentified power is perhaps not likely, but nevertheless such weapons provide a means for initiating catalytic war. Not being able to identify the attacker may seriously challenge our concept of deterrence based on the threat of retaliation.
Another aspect of the sea-based deterrent concerns its credibility. Sea-based strategic forces, whether submarines or surface ships, are vulnerable to nonnuclear attack, as well as to accidents. The cases of the Pueblo, Thresher, and Scorpion indicate that events may occur which could impair our sea-based capabilities, and which we may not view sufficiently vital to cause us to respond with a nuclear strike (nor should we in such instances). This could be perceived by an opponent as indicative of a lack of determination and therefore an inducement to a partially disarming (possibly even non-nuclear) first strike. Our land-based systems may be thought of as ensuring a determined response by requiring a nuclear attack on U. S. territory if they are to be disarmed. By some calculations of deterrence this may be the most desirable attribute of land-based systems.
Let me repeat that the argument for augmenting sea-based strategic deterrent forces is sufficiently strong to stand up under critical examination. When the presentation of the argument ignores unfavorable aspects, it only weakens the author’s case.
Harlan K. Ullman, Britannia Royal Naval College—Certainly the requirement, posthaste, for ships of multi-purpose capabilities, and minimal cost is critical and finds the full support of anyone claiming even token knowledge of seapower. Where one finds considerable fault with the essay, however, is first, with Mr. Lowe’s recommendation to deploy immediately Minuteman III missiles to sea in surface ships and, second, the implied importance of the Indian Ocean and hence perhaps, an “Eighth Fleet” to protect it. The prospect of shipborne ICBMs is frightening at best. To be effective, a deterrent must be able to carry out its task, be virtually safe from attack and must not, because of either strength or weakness, force the other side into a cul-de-sac extricable only by pre-emptive strike. The Polaris/FBM system provides the two superpowers with mutually accepted deterrent/retaliatory capabilities and in a perverse sense a status quo. But will deploying ICBMs to sea in detectable and vulnerable vessels meet even on short term the parameters of an effective deterrent?
Perhaps shore-based ICBM sites could be removed, lessening the probability of pre-emptive strike and increased nuclear damage to the homeland—but what then of the population centers? Ships at sea, although vulnerable, are less vulnerable than fixed bases, and afford at least a modicum of response time while greatly increasing the size of the opposition’s efforts necessary to localize and destroy the shipborne ICBMs in a preemptive strike. However, will not detectable ships at sea merely serve to escalate the current arms race and bring a potential Armageddon closer to reality? As we did not tolerate Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, would not the Soviets take fearful exception to our shipborne ICBMs? Surveillance would be of little problem unless the government used utmost secrecy and expended enormous sums on outfitting decoys as well as warshot-fitted ships, and then, because of satellites, aircraft, ships, and the AGI fleet, would the missile carriers be able to evade surveillance? And then what of needless confrontation and the question of flexible rules of engagement? Whereas the FBM has the ability to escape detection and gain for itself both survival and time, can its surface counterpart do the same?
What would constitute a hostile act, and would an attack on an ICBM ship be construed as an attack on the homeland? If so, then the recent historical perspective of incidents, such as the Panay, Maddox, and Pueblo, give us false hopes. In no way can the shipborne ICBM satisfactorily fill the criteria of an effective deterrent/retaliatory system particularly the last and, further, the added ante in the arms race of escalation would be purposeless as well as foolhardy.
Likewise, the Indian Ocean syndrome, with the prospects of cruises into that area, is quite likely to drive out those of us still in the service. Does Mr. Lowe honestly believe that by maintaining a force in the Indian Ocean the U.S.S.R. will complete the encirclement of China, outflank Western Europe, challenge America globally, increase the resupply capability to North Vietnam, and facilitate the penetration of the Southern Hemisphere? What strategic importance does the Indian Ocean hold and in what part of history has it ever portended a significant role? I think we would do well to allow the Soviets their own mare nostrum, particularly if it is in reality a pond, and concern ourselves with the true merits of the essay, namely building a modern, well-equipped, well-manned, and well-trained Navy, instead of leaping from crisis to crisis without overall plan, purpose, or goal.
Leo J. Clifford, Attorney at Law—There is little accomplished in removing the missile bases if we continue to permit the construction of nuclear power plants within the country.
It has been reported that the Brookhaven Study, also known by its A.E.C. Document No., Wash-740, attempted to predict the damage that would be done to the public if a major reactor accident should occur. It postulated a typical nuclear plant situated on a body of water about thirty miles from a major city. Listing the possible factors which might lead to a major accident, the study gave potential damage figures: 3,400 people killed; 43,000 injured; and seven billion dollars in property damage; radioactive fall-out could contaminate as much as 150,000 square miles.
This report was made in 1956, when the Price-Anderson Bill was passed, which bill essentially removed all financial responsibility from a public utility for damage caused by a mishap in the operation of a nuclear plant.
It has been reported that the original Wash-740 report has been updated, but the report has not been released to the public, and certainly the number and size of nuclear power plants, either constructed or in the process of being constructed, has greatly increased since the 1956 report.
“The Bear That Swims Like a Fish”
(See K. Tolley, pp. 41-45, June 1971 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Eugene P. Sullivan, Supply Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—Although no one can deny that the Soviet Union has scored important successes in the Middle East, I feel that Admiral Tolley’s article tends to exaggerate the nature of these successes by omitting certain key factors, thus giving us a somewhat distorted picture.
In particular, a distinction should be made between control and influence. The Russians have certainly increased their influence among the Arab states by supporting them in their opposition to Israel, but they by no means control them in the same sense that they controlled the East European satellites during Stalin’s lifetime or that Britain and France controlled their colonies prior to World War II. The Arab states remain essentially independent and are strongly determined to preserve that independence. The strongest force in the Middle East is Arab nationalism, a force which eventually drove the European colonial powers out and which is now trying to drive Israel out. Soviet influence has increased precisely because it has encouraged and supported this nationalism. When such influence is felt to be jeopardizing the interests of nationalism, steps are taken to reduce it, such as Nasser’s vigorous persecution of the Egyptian Communist party. The history of past Soviet efforts to cope with the force of nationalism in Eastern Europe, China, and such Third World countries as Indonesia and Ghana, does not reveal any spectacular success in converting it into an instrument of Soviet control. The Middle East is not likely to prove an exception.
Admiral Tolley’s analysis of the Soviet position in the Middle East is also incomplete in that it treats the existence of the state of Israel only from the standpoint of the opportunity it provides for the increase of Soviet influence with the Arabs. While this aspect is certainly valid, it must also be pointed out that trial by combat in three wars has shown Israel to be the strongest military power in that part of the world and more than a match for the combined Arab states. Moreover, the U.S.S.R.’s support for the Arabs and policies of domestic anti-Semitism have resulted in Israel becoming a bitter enemy of Soviet ambitions. This fact is particularly important when we realize that it is Israel, not the Soviet Union or its Egyptian ally, which exercises real control over the Suez Canal by virtue of her occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. The statement made in the article that “Suez is Russian” hardly seems to fit a situation in which Israel has effectively closed the canal to all traffic for the past four years.
It certainly cannot be denied that the Soviet presence in the Middle East poses a serious threat to our interests, but the gloomy picture of complete Soviet domination of the area painted by Admiral Tolley must be modified somewhat if we are to assess the danger accurately and deal with it effectively.
“The Quiet Crisis in the Silent Service”
(See T. B. Thamm, pp. 50-58, August 1971; and p. 85, January 1972 Proceedings)
Edward C. Farrell—As a former Submarine Force officer, I thought that perhaps Captain Thamm and the cognizant officers in the Submarine Force should study not the difference between Captain Thamm’s “Old Force” and “New Force,” but the differences in attitude taken by the Submarine Force toward the “Old Force” and the “New Force.” For example, the number and frequency of inspections, required reports, procedures, guides, rules, and the like, imposed on the Submarine Force of today is manyfold that of the “Old Force,” particularly with respect to the operation of a nuclear power plant.
The need for exceptional care in the operation of a nuclear power plant and the immense responsibility for the safe maintenance of a Polaris weapons system are certainly not argued. I believe, however, that the extremely rigid requirements imposed on the officers and men operating the nuclear power plants and the weapons systems have led directly to many of the retention problems referred to by Captain Thamm.
“Merchant Marine Licenses: Tickets Worth Having”
(See W. B. Hayler, pp. 53-56, July 1971 Proceedings)
Commander D. G. Robinson, Jr., U.S, Navy—It is unfortunate that Captain Hayler chose to limit his discussion to the license requirements for the deck specialty only, since the corresponding list of prerequisite knowledge expected of engineers is equally impressive and demanding. Of related interest, is the fact that the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, offers an unusual Dual License program, in which a limited number of midshipmen pursue a curriculum leading to examinations and licenses in both deck and engine specialties.
Captain Hayler’s point about “lots of high-priced help” in Navy ships is essentially valid; we in the Navy often tend to forget that the crew of a typical merchant ship is only about one-tenth the size of a destroyer’s. For this reason, a merchant marine officer may be called upon to apply some very practical knowledge of his specialty, be it a mate’s marlinspike seamanship or an engineer officer’s operation of a lathe.
Today, it is almost fashionable to criticize much of the education offered by the maritime schools. “Trade school,” “rote learning,” “applied,” “practical,” and “nuts-and-bolts” are the favorite terms of derision. Yet, the license examinations continue to test the candidates on a wide range of maritime minutiae, presumably because this working knowledge will still be required of merchant marine officers, even with the advent of increasingly automated ships.
My personal experience with merchant marine officers has convinced me that these officers are valuable assets of our national seapower, whether they are sailing on their licenses or serving on active duty in the Navy. They are real professionals who know their stuff.
“Navy Medicine: A New Prescription”
(See P. A. Flynn, pp. 42-47, February; p. 98, June; p. 95, August; and pp. 96-97, October 1971; p. 104, February; and pp. 107-108, March 1972 Proceedings)
Commander Peter A. Flynn, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy—In response to Mr. Barr’s comment in the October 1971 Proceedings, the military medical system is, and will remain, inextricably bound up with the civilian medical community. It now contributes regularly to the nation’s body of medical knowledge, with obvious predilection to areas of military medical relevance. Consider the contributions to high and low pressure medicine, to the care of the burned patient, and to the care and resuscitation of the severely injured patient as just a few examples. It is not clear why increased academic pursuits, as embodied in the medical school, would be expected to subvert this in the future. There will be, no doubt, differences in approach and viewpoint, but there are also widely divergent opinions between civilian medical schools. The term “schools of thought” aptly describes just such legitimate differences of opinion.
The two-year medical Reservist will continue to be a necessity, and a welcome one at that, on the military medical scene. He contributes by his hard work, his fresh viewpoint and divergent opinion, and even by his skepticism concerning military medicine. He serves to keep the system on its toes. There is presently a healthy relationship between the civilian and military medical worlds, and there is no reason for it to change.
It would be patently impossible to create a medical school large enough to provide the thousands of doctors that presently enter the Services each year. It is a fine and desirable goal to say that the civilian medical schools should be expanded to provide the teaching, but the Services need career medical officers. It is a present fact that less than 1% of those doctors completely trained in civilian medical institutions remain on active duty beyond their obligated two years. Clearly, if the medical schools of the nation are not providing what the Services need now, can they reasonably be expected to do so in the future? The anti-military attitudes of the academic world hold little promise of significant change.
Certainly the attractiveness of a military medical career will be determined in open competition with civilian medical careers and this is a healthy thing for both. Just as certainly a Federal Medical School will permit the military to compete on an even footing for the first time. While Mr. Barr is entitled to his misgivings, he presents no clear evidence that the military and civilian medical worlds have anything to fear in the creation of a Federal Medical School.
Commander James Vorosmarti, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy—As a career medical officer, I agree wholeheartedly with Commander Flynn’s original article, but would like to add some additional comments.
The tactic of charging a small “nuisance fee” for emergency room visits was tried in the early days of the Kaiser medical plan for the very same reasons as those discussed in the Navy. In short, this system did not work and so it was dropped. I have also had experience working as an emergency room physician in a civilian hospital. There, the fee, which was much higher than any ever thought of for a naval medical facility, did not seem to discourage patients with minor or imagined ailments, showing up at all odd hours. If this system does not work in civilian medical practice, it is not going to work in the Navy and should be forgotten about immediately.
The other point that has distressed me for years is the greeting the Navy gives most of its new physicians. The changeover from civilian to military life is an upsetting one at times, particularly to those who are not enthusiastic about military service, and the Navy does a terrible job of handling this transition.
Even after reporting in, there is little, if any formal indoctrination into the Navy or the Navy Medical Corps. Obviously this creates confusion which, in turn, causes dislike for the situation and dislike for the Service which, in many cases, carries over for the entire tour of duty. When the Navy commissions someone a lieutenant, it really ought to make some attempt to teach him things that a lieutenant is supposed to know.
I am certain that an indoctrination course at a larger naval medical facility prior to actual duty assignment would pay dividends in the attitude of new medical officers toward the Navy and its dependents, making life nicer for everyone concerned.
“The Career Officer as Existential Hero”
(See D. G. Deininger, pp. 18-22, November 1970; p. 91, April; pp. 99-100, June; p. 98, July; pp. 96-97, September; and p. 96, October 1971; p. 91, January; and p. 104, February 1972 Proceedings)
Captain J. Caldwell, U. S. Navy—The article stated that the student activist of today is not at the opposite pole from the patriots of other generations. I disagree.
Lieutenant (j.g.) Deininger based his statement on the thesis that changing the definition of patriotism to make it fit the student activists’ ideas of patriotism makes them patriots. Not likely. Patriotism properly defined is love of country. The student activist has engaged in activities which show no love for our country. These activities have taken many forms ranging from burning draft cards to making statements on television calling the United States a racist, imperialistic, war-mongering nation. I see very little in the words and deeds of the student activists which can be called patriotic.
It is interesting to note that Lieutenant Deininger demands that others not try to motivate him, but reserves the right to influence others. This is a familiar theme from the student activists and betrays their basically dogmatic viewpoint.
Lieutenant Deininger considers technological progress as the most important change affecting a young American’s attitude toward the military. Every generation has faced the challenge of technological progress since man invented the hand ax. He alludes to the romanticism of Decatur’s generation with the implication that Decatur had no technology with which to cope. It takes a rather superficial reading of history to conclude that Decatur achieved success as a naval officer through romantic flag-waving.
None will deny that modern naval officers must understand the capabilities and limitations of modern weapons. But a scientific understanding of the implements of war does not alone win battles. No nation with a will to survive has ever considered placing professors of physics in command of troops.
The article refers to Thomas á [sic] Becket as a prime example of existential commitment and a man internally motivated who resisted motivation imposed or required by higher authority. In his analysis of Becket’s motivation, the author falls victim to the romantic legend resulting from Becket’s martyrdom. Becket was refusing to accept civil jurisdiction rather than refusing to let the King motivate him.
Let us examine Becket as an existential hero to determine if we, as a nation, would benefit from our naval officers following his example of morality. Becket became Archbishop during the reign of Henry II of England. When Henry came to the throne, England was suffering a state of near anarchy as a result of his predecessor’s inept rule. Contributing to the lawlessness was a situation called “benefit of clergy.” Simply defined, this was a church-inspired law which permitted clerics to claim benefit of clergy to avoid civil prosecution for criminal acts. In Henry II’s time, benefit of clergy included homicide.
Henry instituted a series of reforms. He could, by today’s standards, be considered a liberal reformer in the mold of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Among the reforms he proposed was elimination of benefit of clergy. He proposed that members of the church accused of crimes should first be tried by the church, and if found guilty, turned over to civil jurisdiction for criminal prosecution. The peasants of England, who suffered under the rule of benefit of clergy, were for Henry’s reforms. The church, of course, was not.
This was the basis for the conflict between Becket and Henry II. Becket opposed the King’s attempts to diminish church authority even though they were clearly intended to benefit the people of England. As this personal conflict progressed, Becket turned increasingly inward and showed little concern for the damage he was doing to the church and to England.
Viewed historically, and stripped of literary romanticism, Becket proves to be an egotist primarily interested in preserving his prerogatives. He was so preoccupied with attempting to understand, and justify his own motives, that he utterly failed to understand the King’s motives He repeatedly rebuffed the King’s efforts to achieve a compromise. (The modern student activist displays the same contempt for the “immorality” of compromise.) Throughout, Becket showed little concern for the welfare of England, but ironically his death united England against the King and in support of church. Can we conclude that Becket acted nobly as a patriot who loved his country and zealously supported its authority and interests? I think not. He supported the church and opposed the lawful ruler of the country.
Can we conclude that our Navy needs officers who, like Becket, are dedicated to endless battle with lawful authority over the “rightness” of national policy? I think not. Lieutenant Deininger views Becket’s motives through the rosy glassed of literary romanticism, and perceives great morality and lofty inspiration.
I look at Becket’s motives with a pragmatic eye and see egotistical self-interest coupled with religious fanaticism.
The philosophical nuances of existential heroism are interesting subjects for literary themes and provide apt moral guidance for perceptive individuals in the humanities field. I do not believe existentialism should be the primary motivational force for professional naval officers. The citizens of this nation have a right to expect that naval officers be primarily motivated by simple patriotism.
Those naval officers who cannot aspire to that ageless motivation, and who feel more comfortable as existential heroes, may have chosen the wrong profession.
“Authority: The Weakened Link”
(See B. C. Dean, pp. 48-52, July 1971 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Steen K. Jessen, Canadian Navy—Finally the finger has been pointed at one of the major problems of not only the U. S. Navy, but also the Canadian Navy. Lieutenant Commander Dean has managed to pinpoint, with remarkable accuracy, just what is wrong in our Service in matters of discipline and authority. Short of changing division officer to read divisional officer, this article could, and should have been written by a Canadian naval officer.
Certain points are particularly applicable to the Canadian Navy. The “conference syndrome” is the most common of all the faults listed by the author. I agree, wholeheartedly, with Commander Dean’s assessment of the extreme shortcomings of this approach to leadership. It leads directly to reducing the authority of the first lieutenant and department heads. I believe that his suggestions for overcoming this “syndrome” should be followed whenever possible.
The “overdirection syndrome” is another area of misdirected effort in the Canadian Navy. All too often, leaders at all levels forget that it is not their personal responsibility to direct lower echelon officers or seamen and, as a result, bypass many levels in the chain of command. The inevitable resentment of the leader on the part of those bypassed does not lead to happy and efficient ships or establishments. The cure for this is very simple—make use of the junior officers and men in all possible ways, and then insist that the chain of command never be by-passed.
I could continue to adapt points in the article to the Canadian naval service. Rather than do that, I will categorically state that all of the remaining shortcomings discussed by Commander Dean apply to our Navy. I would like to think that our senior officers will read and contemplate the implications of this timely analysis, and that leadership schools will begin to take up the slack in these areas.
“Early Russian Shipboard Aviation”
(See R. D. Layman and B. V. Drashpil, pp. 56-65, April 1971 Proceedings)
Donald W. Mitchell, Chairman, Political Science Department, N.E. Missouri State College—Both the Russian Navy and its successor, the Soviet Navy, have large bibliographies as well as numerous creditable achievements. But because nearly all the written material dealing with them is in Russian, these achievements have been largely unknown to Western readers.
Mr. Layman and Mr. Drashpil have raised the curtain on one of the main areas of Russian naval progress in their well-researched article. Commander Tyrone Martin, U. S. Navy, in his December 1970 Proceedings article, “A Soviet Carrier on the Horizon?” also makes several references to World War I activities of Russian naval aviation, and concludes that the Russians, with the exception of the British, were the leading pioneers in this field.
Actually, there is more to the World War I naval aviation record than either article reveals. By November 1916, Russian naval aviation had received official recognition with the creation of two aviation divisions, one for the Baltic and the other for the Black Sea. Provided the organization was complete, each fleet was assigned about 100 planes as well as the seaplanes on board the carriers. Some of the approximately 15 to 20 dirigibles available were also allotted to the navy. Planes were at first used solely for scouting, but later, as their offensive qualities developed, they were given occasional bombing and strafing missions as well.
Though Russian aviation suffered from an under-supply of planes, engines, and spare parts and later, as the Revolution approached, from low morale on the part of its officers and men, it does, nevertheless, have a number of “firsts” for which it can claim credit. Two mentioned in the April article were the first four-motored plane and the first battleship to be damaged by bombing or attacked by aerial torpedoes. Others include the first anti-aircraft cruisers and very sophisticated use of planes in combined operations, especially minelaying.
The first four-motored bombers built by any country were ten planes of the Ilya Mouromets type. Though most of the 330-plane 1913 program was of no particular note, the ten bombers were the aerial dreadnoughts of their day. In dimensions, they were comparable to the American Flying Fortresses of the 1930s. Performance of course was much less impressive. These Russian pioneers were strong and ruggedly built, could carry 16 men or half a ton of bombs, but had only an 80-mile radius and a ceiling of about 10,000 feet. In combat with the Germans, only one of these planes was destroyed, but it had shot down three enemy planes first. Scouting, bombing, strafing, and occasional aerial minelaying were, however, the principal missions. These preceded by several years any similar planes by any nation.
The doubtful honor of being the first battleship to be hit by planes belongs to the 13,566-ton Russian battleship Slava. This ship had escaped Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s ill-fated voyage in 1904 only because her builders were too far behind schedule. She was made part of the Baltic Fleet, but because of the newer dreadnoughts, was considered dispensable and was detailed to the defense of the Gulf of Riga. She was attacked by a German seaplane on 27 April 1915, and struck by a bomb which killed five crewmen and wounded two others. During her wartime career, she was hit repeatedly and finally sunk by naval gunfire.
In the early days of the war, naval air conflicts were rarely deadly. Bombs were small, often hand-thrown, and generally went wide of the mark. The early anti-aircraft guns were equally harmless. Yet, as in World War II, flyers invariably exaggerated their successes. One German pilot, fished from the Baltic when his plane crashed, believed his squadron had seriously damaged seven Russian destroyers when not one had been hit. Few planes fell to antiaircraft fire. Airships made better targets and two German zeppelins were lost in 1915 during German raids on Riga.
During the winter of 1915 and 1916, both the Germans and Russians prepared better weapons. Heavier and more lethal bombs came into use while anti-aircraft guns were increased in numbers, and to some degree, in accuracy. One remarkably far-sighted step on the part of the Russians was conversion of three old protected cruisers—Oleg, Diana, and Bogatyr—to play a new role. These vessels had their old batteries of six-inch guns removed and replaced by heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns. Thus, the Russian Navy predated others by several decades in producing what were in effect the first anti-aircraft cruisers.
As both articles have rightly noted, the Russians were pioneers in using seaplanes in combined operations. The main type of combat operation by the Russians in World War I was minelaying. At times, this involved the use of planes. Vice Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak was probably the ablest practitioner of this type of warfare within the Russian Navy, and, during the period of his command of the Black Sea Fleet, developed highly sophisticated means for carrying on offensive minelaying. Ordinarily, Kolchak used naval units comprising two to four destroyers, one or more submarines, and at times, seaplanes operating from Nikolai I or Aleksandr I. The submarines arrived first and planted buoys in pre-determined positions. They were then followed by destroyers which rapidly laid mines. Shallow draft motorboats carried on board their mother ship, Pamyat Merkuria, were employed to replenish existing minefields. For laying mines inshore, a 500-ton shallow draft ship was used. The seaplanes never laid mines, but were often employed as decoys, attacking the enemy to divert attention from the minelaying.
One of the most interesting combined operations (and one not mentioned in either article) occurred on 25 August 1916. On that date, Admiral Kolchak in the new dreadnought Imperatritsa Maria with a cruiser, eight destroyers, and the two seaplane carriers with 19 seaplanes on board, attempted to bomb the German submarine base at Varna, Bulgaria. This particular attempt was a failure. The Germans were alert and attacked the Russian task force with their own seaplanes. They “got the jump” on the Russians and prevented the seaplanes from taking off from the carriers. The fact that both sides relied on naval aviation rather than gunfire as their principal weapon, and that the Russians were combining several forms of seapower makes this particular naval operation extremely prophetic of World War II.
“Modernization of the Midway”
(See J. E. Kaune, pp. 27-33, February; and pp. 93-94, July 1971 Proceedings)
P. C. Farr—The article seems to cover the Midway story from the date of Captain Kaune’s assignment as project officer to the successful completion of the availability. It means that all of these new management techniques were apparently used from September 1968 through June 1970, during only 21 months of a 52-month availability. The figures give an idea of the management techniques used, yet, they do not cover the crucial 31-month period when the ship was being torn to pieces and later being put together again. I am inclined to believe that Captain Kaune arrived on the scene at a time when undocking the ship was four months away, leading the parade of events which turn a sad looking mess of rust, welding cables, temporary shacks on deck, and the like, into a proud, beautiful, seagoing aircraft carrier.
The article gave me false expectations of finding answers to nagging questions which have sometimes made my life less than enjoyable. The last part of Captain Kaune’s article is a classic primer in command, and hence management. Undoubtedly, any organization whether naval, industrial, or charitable can profit from their application. They sum up to one word—morale. Captain Kaune was, no doubt, able to instill enthusiasm and team spirit into the men readying the Midway for sea. In his task, he was clearly assisted by the fact that each milestone in his network was a step towards the goal of returning the Midway to her natural element. During the 31 months prior to his taking command, however, there were no sea trials in sight, no compartment closures which could be plotted, no commissioning ceremonies, and no boilers sending clouds of steam through the safety valves in test.
“Vital Interests and Volunteer Forces”
(See L P. Brooks, pp. 18-23, January; and pp. 91-92, October 1971 Proceedings)
Captain S. Dombroff, U. S. Navy—To begin with, Lieutenant Brooks’ definition of national security is suspect. He says, “National security may be defined as that irreducible minimum which diplomacy must defend without compromise; it is essentially the integrity of the national territory and its institutions.” I assume that Lieutenant Brooks would never have sanctioned the deployment of the U. S. Sixth Fleet to the Mediterranean.
Next Lieutenant Brooks blames all major foreign policy defeats in the post-war decades on the contravention of Hans J. Morgenthau’s four basic rules.
However, with the exception of Southeast Asia, the other so-called major foreign policy defeats are never named. With regard to Southeast Asia, the book on U. S. foreign policy is not ready for filing under defeats—and, in fact, a fairly sanguine case can be presented for our efforts in that area—specifically, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Bur let us take another look at Morgenthau’s rules. If I read Lieutenant Brooks correctly, we invite defeat if we violate any of them. The Cuban missile crisis certainly was not one of our foreign policy defeats—and we definitely put ourselves in a position from which we would “have to advance with grave risk” during that confrontation. And while it is not the intent of this letter to take exception to Hans Morgenthau’s thesis, the basic rule that “. . . the government is the leader of public opinion, not its slave. . . .” requires some further explanation. As it now stands, Joseph Stalin would have given that rule an enthusiastic “da.”
The nature of the military in the United States is changing because of technological and sociological advances—its role, as generally understood by our responsible leaders, remains unaltered. It is but one element in our inventory to be used by civilian leaders in the execution of foreign policy. Only when that role is prostituted either by the politicians or by the military hierarchy are we in trouble.
“The Vulnerable Homelands”
(See P. H. Backus, pp. 18-22, December 1970 Proceedings)
Carl H. Builder—Commander Backus discusses only two possible U. S. objections to an international agreement outlawing land[-]based ICBMs and bombers—economic dislocations in the U. S. and cheating by the U.S.S.R. Surely there are more crucial problems than these to be discussed. If the proposal for an all-sea-based deterrent is to be advanced to a more serious stage of consideration, we must face squarely, even if we cannot answer, such tough questions as:
Do we want to rely entirely upon a deterrent force that can be attacked with conventional weapons and without violating national boundaries? It is not enough to answer that such attacks would be irrational and risky; is it any less rational or risky than a massive nuclear attack on our homeland? Might we find that there is a deterrent value to land-based strategic arms that cannot be attacked unless the enemy is willing to take the awesome step of a nuclear attack upon our “vulnerable homeland?” Have we overlooked the first-strike incentives posed by the large fraction of our sea-based deterrent force that is in port? Life magazine reporter R. B. Stolley, who was permitted to visit Holy Loch, observed that four of the ten Polaris submarines stationed at Holy Loch were alongside the tender USS Simon Lake (AS-33), and he was very much awed at the “gathering of nuclear firepower” in one spot. A single nuclear weapon on this spot could claim 64 missiles. And this situation will be aggravated by the introduction of the Poseidon missile, with its MIRV capability, when a significantly greater number of warheads may lie at the risk of a single enemy weapon. Could the enemy find any more lucrative first-strike targets than our SSBN operating bases at Holy Loch, Rota, Guam, and Charleston? Worse, the vulnerabilities are not symmetrical: an aggressor could arrange to have all of his sea-based forces at sea for the moment of his planned attack.
If, as Commander Backus says, “The land mass of each nation would no longer be a target for the other’s strategic forces . . .” what will these forces be targeting? The connotation is that neither side will be aiming his missiles at the other’s homeland. But, how do we propose to deter, except by threatening destruction of the other’s homeland? If the all-sea-based deterrent is to be viable, we must presume that our sea-based forces will remain untargetable (for targetable sea forces will make vulnerable deterrent forces). What else could these sea-based forces target but the land mass of the other nation? In the absence of any land-based forces to target, the destructive potentials of both sides must, I presume, be focused solely upon the cities, which are still a part of the land mass. Do we wish to make a nuclear attack upon cities the only option for the use of deterrent forces? If this is so, why not then be direct about it and put our missile forces in our city centers?
Are we now confident enough of the performance of ballistic missiles in war and against all countermeasures that we are willing to relinquish a strategic bomber capability? An affirmative answer to this tough question should reflect sober consideration of such factors as: (a) our limited experience with ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles under wartime conditions, (b) the potential for exotic countermeasures to any weapon, and (c) the effect of releasing the substantial Soviet resources now devoted to air defense.
Are we likely to encounter awkward situations if our deterrent forces reside entirely at sea where they must remain silent to avoid being targeted? In a crisis, with enemy boasts about what he can, will or has done, would the President like to verify the status of our forces without blowing their cover? Could the President ever ask for a single missile launch from a sea-based force without sealing the fate of the rest of the missiles on the launching vessel? If we rely entirely upon sea-based strategic forces, the command and control problems would appear to become more severe at a time when command and control capabilities are of increasing importance.
These are not all of the serious questions; they may not even be the most important ones. An all-sea-based deterrent is certainly an interesting, if not particularly new, point of departure for thinking about strategic concepts and policy. But if the idea is to become more than an abstraction, some hard thinking is necessary. What we need now, more than the marshaling of old arguments, is to be sure that we have isolated the crucial issues. If we can do that, many able minds can be expected to join to help us sort them out.
“A Doctrine for Limited War”
(See R. Beavers, pp. 26-34, October 1970 Proceedings)
Lieutenant David G. Parent, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—Commander Beavers’ fifth point, i.e., our forces for limited war must be professional, seems to be a departure from the good common political sense which characterizes the remainder of the article.
It is true that the draft and the Vietnamese war are separate issues. Ever since the establishment of the draft law, there has been a continual debate as to the necessity of the draft, who should serve, and how those who should serve are to be chosen. During the relatively peaceful period, following the Korean War and ending with the troop build up in Vietnam in 1965, the debate was merely academic. While some young men were called, in an arbitrary and somewhat confusing manner, to serve in the Armed Forces, there were few, if any, fatalities as a result of combat. It was only when casualties began to mount in an endless and apparently purposeless war, that opposition to the draft and demands for its reform become serious. It is probably safe to say that had the Vietnamese conflict been resolved quickly and successfully, the recent draft reforms would most likely have never been made. It is probably also safe to say that, given a limited war, in which a successful conclusion can be reached in a relatively short period of time, the draft army is adequate.
The Vietnamese experience should have taught us that unless participation will be short and successful, there should be no participation at all. The resulting economic and social dislocations simply outweigh whatever possible benefits might result from a long, inconclusive war. However, let us assume that conditions were such that the United States could involve itself in a long inconclusive war, without raising much domestic opposition as long as only professional armed forces were employed. The question would then become whether or not a professional armed force is desirable or possible. There are several reasons why a professional armed force is not desirable. The drafted or draft-induced volunteer serviceman would be entitled to substantial pension benefits if he were to complete 20 years of service. However, because he usually leaves at the end of his obligated time, he loses his pension rights and the government is saved a considerable amount of money. The pension costs for a professional armed force could be staggering. It is true that experienced and technically qualified personnel are particularly desired in most organizations.
In the Armed Forces, the situation is somewhat different. As those who are greatly and directly concerned with the results of selection boards well know, the need for senior officers with many years experience is not nearly so severe as the need for junior officers with only a few years experience. Or again, while we admire the chief petty officer who has made it to the top of the enlisted ranks, many of us prefer to have the ambitious, hardworking second class petty officer on his way to the top. A professional armed force would soon become an elderly armed force. Moreover, in the present draft Armed Forces, most of those serving do not intend to stay and thus have little vested interests in the organization. A professional armed force, like any other group of organized labor, would soon evolve into a powerful pressure group. The political impact of such a group could very well not be in the national interest. Finally, Major John Alger, U. S. Army, (Retired), in his article[‡] strongly suggests that a professional armed force would not be capable of engaging in war. The value of an expensive, elderly, politically self-serving, ineffective force is questionable.
The possibility of a professional force is even more questionable. Commander Beavers rather offhandedly assumes that additional pay will induce enough Servicemen to put up with the rigors of service life, and that the civilian populace can be persuaded to provide the pay. Both assumptions are in error. The simple fact is that service life often entails hard and long work, separation from family, personal discomfort, and when the guns begin to shoot—as often happens during limited war—a great amount of danger. No matter how generous the pay, only a few will be lured away from their homes. As proof, the merchant marine offers better pay, better working and living conditions, and less work than does the Navy. Yet, it, too, is plagued by high turnover. Additionally, there is evidence that the Naval Reserve, which offers its members a very high rate of pay for a minimum of nonarduous work, is having a difficult time in retaining personnel. If high pay will not bring men to the drill hall, it will not send them to sea.
As to civilian support, let us consider the fact that many of us are Reserve officers on inactive duty. We participate actively in the Reserve, return to the Fleet every year for two weeks, and engage in part time professional naval studies. How many of us ever think about the plight of those who chose to remain on active duty? Of those who ever think, how many have ever taken any positive action to correct the situation? Unfortunately, the answer is very few. Now if this more dedicated and concerned group often fails to come to the professional’s aid, it is highly unlikely that the general public, which knows little of and cares less for the plight of the Serviceman, is going to do much more. In conclusion, Commander Beavers has the makings of a sound doctrine, but more thought and work is going to be required before it become workable.
[*] See E. E. Johnston, “Common Purpose—Common Ship?,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, this issue, pp. 25-33.
[†] See R. J. Barrett, “The Balance of Power-Again,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, this issue, pp. 18-24.
[‡] See J. A. Alger, “The Objective Was a Volunteer Army,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1970, pp. 62-68.