All Pacific Fleet Carriers At Sea; First Time Since World War II
(Chinfo Weekly Newsgram 23-72, 17 June 1972)
All nine carriers in the Pacific Fleet were out of West Coast ports from 5 to 7 June. Officials believe it was the first time since World War II that all Pacific Fleet carriers were at sea or deployed at the same time. Seven of the nine, including the recently arrived USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14), were deployed with the U. S. Seventh Fleet off Southeast Asia and two were at sea in the eastern Pacific.
Pentagon Seeks Development Of New Sub-Launched Missile
(Michael Getler in The Washington Post, 7 June 1972).
The Pentagon disclosed that it wants to use $20 million of the money saved by cutting back the Safeguard ABM project to begin developing a different type of strategic submarine-based missile which, at this point, is not specifically barred in the U. S.-Soviet nuclear arms limitation agreements.
The portion of the agreements reached in Moscow on 26 May dealing with offensive weapons puts a ceiling on the number of submarine-launched “ballistic” missiles each nation can have in its arsenal. The new weapon the Pentagon now wants to start development work on is a “cruise” type missile.
Unlike ballistic missiles, which are toward the fringes of space en route to targets a few thousand miles away, cruise missiles fly more like jet planes through the atmosphere, coming in at slower speeds and lower altitudes.
The Pentagon has expressed renewed interest in cruise missiles over the past year, but primarily as tactical antishipping weapons that could be fired by submarines over relatively short distances to knock out enemy warships.
Pentagon sources said a cruise missile with a range of 1,000 to 1,500 miles, or even more, could probably be developed.
Defense Department spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said that the new missile would probably take more than five years to develop. He explained the Pentagon’s interest in it at this point as one of several possible future “hedges” should the arms agreement breakdown or should the two superpowers fail to eventually achieve a more permanent accord to succeed the current five-year interim agreement on offensive weapons.
The United States already has 41 submarines with 656 operational Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missiles—with ranges up to 3,000 miles and with the Poseidon version each carrying up to 14 MIRV warheads. Though these submarines are virtually invulnerable to attack, the United States has also begun the Trident project to build ten even better missile submarines to replace the older Polaris vessels.
The first Trident submarine, each of which will carry 24 missiles, will be available in about 1978 or 1979. Should there be no permanent SALT offensive agreement, the United States could keep all 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines in service and keep adding Trident vessels.
Pentagon officials says they are also still interested in cruise missiles for use as a more limited weapon against ships. The Russians have nearly 200 surface vessels and submarines armed with such anti-ship cruise missiles.
President Is Unable To Contact Submerged Subs In Emergency
(Philadelphia Inquirer, 27 May 1972)
President Nixon could not contact a submerged nuclear missile submarine* in an emergency, because the Navy’s radio communication is 15 years behind what it should be, says the Service's communications chief.
“We are trying to improve communications so that President Nixon can sit at his desk and call a submarine out there if it is underwater or a [spy] ship like the Pueblo,” Rear Admiral Samuel L Gravely, U. S. Navy, told a news conference. “He cannot do that now.”
U. S. Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines with long-range ballistic missiles now must break the surface with their antennas in order to communicate with U. S. strategic command centers or with the White House, Gravely said.
Gravely, touring the Naval Electronics Center in San Diego, said it may take ten years to make naval communications as effective as it should be, including five years of spending up to $40 million annually to make its radio network adequate.
Bureau Of Naval Personnel Faces 25% Reduction In Force
(Mike Causey in The Washington Post, 5 July 1972)
The Bureau of Naval Personnel will abolish one of every four military and civilian jobs in Washington in a gradual but steady streamlining operation.
The 25% reduction will take more than two years. Navy brass hope most of the cuts can be made through normal attrition, but concede that there will be civilian layoffs.
The Navy is the largest employer in the Washington metropolitan area with around 40,000 civilian workers. The Personnel Bureau is one of its major units, having several thousand workers at its Arlington headquarters.
Senior Navy leaders are concerned that the Bureau and other activities in Washington may be top-heavy with brass. The Bureau has seven admirals on board[;] one of them is the Navy’s Chief of Chaplains.
Some no-nonsense top officers complain that it takes days or weeks for a piece of paper to move up, or down, or around the Bureau. They feel the only way to eliminate names on the “chop list” (a document that must be read and initialed by all concerned) is to eliminate bodies that do the reading and memo-writing.
Other Defense units will also make job cuts over the next couple of years, as part of the Vietnam draw-down. But the Navy is expected to bear the brunt of the economizing because it has the biggest operation.
Soviet Forces Strengthened In Northern Peninsula Area
(Joseph R. L. Sterne in the Baltimore Sun, 30 April 1972)
As the long Arctic nights give way to the midnight sun in the northern reaches of Europe, the Soviet Union is again flexing its naval power.
Already the Russians are engaged in fairly large-scale amphibious landing exercises on the Kola peninsula, which has 40 airfields, encampments for two battle-ready divisions, extensive naval installations, and bases for intercontinental missile launchers. It is one of the most heavily fortified pieces of real estate in existence.
The Kola maneuvers have a special meaning for Norwegian authorities: they display a Soviet capability to seize Finnmark and other parts of the northern Norwegian coast in the event of a limited power probe or all-out hostilities.
For the Western alliance as a whole, and the United States in particular, the Arctic springtime is a period to reconnoiter even more ominous Soviet undertakings.
In 1968 and again in 1970, the Soviet northern fleet moved out of its mighty base at Murmansk and sailed through the Norwegian Sea into the North Atlantic to link up with units deployed from the Mediterranean and the Baltic.
According to latest unofficial tabulations in Oslo, some 500 surface ships are assigned to the Soviet northern fleet, an armada which in strategic punch far exceeds the combined fleets stationed in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and also the Pacific Ocean.
In addition, there are 160 to 170 submarines in the northern fleet, including the bulk of the Soviet Union’s nuclear-powered craft armed with long-range missiles.
Informed Western specialists believe that the Soviet Union has drawn a crucial military line across the North Atlantic from Iceland through the Faroe islands to the northern tip of Scotland.
Only by getting nuclear submarines with their 1,500-mile missiles past this line can the Soviet Union hope to have a sea-based strike force capable of reaching targets in the eastern half of the United States. And only by holding this line can the Russians thwart NATO forces in their dual task of blocking the Murmansk-Kola complex and keeping Allied sea lanes open to Norway in event of war.
This offensive-defensive description of Soviet intentions has a parallel in the Baltic Sea, which in the past decade has become a “Russian lake” in a military sense for the first time in history.
By turning out an array of fast, modern patrol boats armed with missiles having up to a 200-mile range, the Russians and their Polish and East German allies have established a Baltic superiority of four-to-one in numbers of ships, and perhaps ten-to-one in quality and striking power. But domination of the bulk of the Baltic Sea itself is not enough. If the Baltic is to serve as an offensive springboard for operations on the high seas, or if its numerous shipyards are to service and repair oceangoing warships, the Soviet Union will have to control the neck of the bottle—the narrow Denmark Strait and the Kattegat and Skagerrak channels to the North Sea. Thus, geography confronts the Russians with serious problems in the Baltic as it does elsewhere.
Up north in the Murmansk-Kola area, Soviet strategists either must break through ice in the winter, or seize all-weather northern Norwegian fjords, or both, if they are to guarantee constant access to the high seas in the event of future war.
Down south in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea fleet can get out into the open waters of the Atlantic only by securing Turkey’s Dardanelles and Britain’s Gibraltar.
To provide themselves with sufficient power to make naval plans credible in the Baltic, the Russians have built a 532-ship fleet of far greater strength than purely defensive needs would require.
While most of these craft are small patrol boats, there are missile-armed vessels, minesweepers, landing vessels, and other units that make it obvious what the Russians probably will do if fighting breaks out. They could be expected to try to seize the Danish Zealand island group which includes Copenhagen, plus coastal strong-points along the channels to the North Sea. Amphibious units have ostentatiously trained for this task in mock landings on the Polish and East German coasts.
The greater the range of U. S. submarine-launched missiles or carrier-based aircraft, the farther the Russians will want to push their naval and air presence into the Atlantic.
With Soviet seapower on the rise, Norwegian and Danish military authorities would be loath to have any East-West agreement on mutual troop reductions limited to Central Europe where land armies are massed. At a minimum, they would want a guarantee that the Communists would not shift troops and armor from the central front to the northern flank. Even more, they would want the “collateral restraints” envisaged in a troop-reduction arrangement applied to their area.
Soviet Navy Building New Sub To Carry Longer-Range Missiles
(Orr Kelly in The Evening Star, Washington, D.C., 31 May 1972)
The Soviet Union is building a new class of missile-carrying submarine. The new submarine, known to American authorities as the Yankee II, will carry 12 rather than the 16 missiles of the Yankee I class, which is comparable to the American Polaris submarine. But the missiles have a longer range than those used on the older Yankee class.
The Russians have been testing, and have even displayed in a Moscow parade, a new submarine-launched missile with a range greater than the missile carried by the older Yankee class. But, by U. S calculations, the missile appears to be too big to be fitted into the original Yankee-class submarines.
Pentagon press spokesman Jerry W Friedheim said existence of the new class of submarines—at least one of which is under construction—was discovered by the United States and was not revealed as a surprise by the Russians during the negotiations. But he described the discovery as a relatively new development.
He said it appears the new submarine, which may be a modification of the Yankee class or a distinctively new class, seems to have a larger-diameter hole to accommodate the larger, Sawfly missiles.
Recent tests monitored by the United States have indicated that the new missile might have a range of as much as 3,500 miles. This would be farther than any missile now deployed at sea by the United States, but substantially less than other new missiles still under development.
The advantage to the Russians in deploying a new submarine with a longer-range missile will be added protection for their submarine fleet. The longer the range of a missile carried by a submarine, the greater area in which the submarine can operate and therefore, the greater area which must be searched by an enemy.
Three Large Missile Cruisers Under Construction In Russia
(William Beecher in The New York Times, 30 April 1972)
The Soviet Union is building three missile cruisers that are about twice as large as its current modern cruisers, according to Pentagon officials.
It has also reportedly taken three large, old Sverdlov-class gun cruisers out of mothballs and is installing missiles and advanced communications and radar equipment on them.
Military analysts are frankly puzzled over why the Soviet Union feels it needs to equip itself with six huge missile cruisers instead of continuing to build more of the 5,000- to 7,000-ton Kresta and Kynda-class cruisers.
The three cruisers in construction are in the 12,000- to 15,000-ton class, analysts say. The old Sverdlovs range from 15,000 to 20,000 tons.
Some military analysts believe that the current construction of still another Russian warship, a 20,000- to 30,000-ton vessel that is believed destined to be either the Soviet’s first aircraft carrier or a new type of helicopter carrier, may provide a clue to the purpose of the large missile carriers.
Under this theory, the cruisers may form the nucleus of one or two carrier task forces. “It’s still a little too early to tell,” one admiral said. “Conceivably, the larger cruisers are considered more impressive in showing the flag in ports all over the world than their smaller warships. Or maybe they want the larger platforms as command ships to put more admirals and their staffs at sea. That requires more space for communications, for protection for quarters. But many of us have expected the Russians, as they push farther and farther from their home waters, to realize the value of aircraft carriers, both to protect their fleets and to project power ashore.” He added, “I’m not at all sure that’s where they’re headed, but I wouldn’t be at all surprised if they are.”
Some officials say that if the large warship being built at the Nikolayev shipyard in the Black Sea is indeed a carrier, they believe that initially she will carry vertical-takeoff jets rather than conventional jets. The Soviet has been experimenting with such aircraft since 1967.
One of the medium-tonnage Soviet cruisers is armed with eight surface-to-surface missiles and four surface-to-air missiles. Knowledgeable sources say the new larger cruisers and the Sverdlovs all will carry larger numbers of advanced missiles.
Soviet Missile Submarines Patrolling South China Sea
(Philadelphia Inquirer, 27 May 1972)
Four Russian missile-firing submarines have been reported in the South China Sea.
The E-class nuclear-powered submarines were located some 700 miles east of the Vietnamese coast, Defense Department sources said. That would put them well out of range of most of the American warships patrolling off North Vietnam’s mined ports.
But these Soviet submarines could sail close enough in about a day’s time to bring their 200-mile-range Shaddock missiles to bear.
One of the 5,000-ton, long-range Soviet submarines in the South China Sea carries six surface-to-surface missiles. The other three submarines are somewhat more advanced models of the same class, armed with eight missiles each. All four submarines can also fire torpedoes.
Russian submarines have been in that general position for days, between the Paracel Islands and the Philippines.
As did another group of at least six Soviet surface naval vessels to the southwest of them, the submarines appeared to be in a kind of watch-and-wait holding position.
U. S. officials appear unworried about the presence of the Russian submarines, a light cruiser, a guided-missile frigate, and several destroyers in those waters.
Future Of Containerization Forecast In Study For MarAd
(U. S. Department of Commerce News Release MA NR 72-25, 30 June 1972)
U. S.-flag container operators, despite the inroads made by their foreign competitors, will still be carrying at least 40% of U. S. container cargoes at the end of this decade. This conclusion is one of many drawn in a study of containerization’s impact performed for the Maritime Administration and announced by Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs Robert J. Blackwell.
Prepared by Manalytics, Inc., a San Francisco research firm, the study indicates that the present 50% U. S.-flag share of this trade will decline to 40% by 1975, but will maintain this level through the remainder of the decade.
The report forecasts that the 2.4-million container equivalents (20-foot) of containerizable export and import trade crossing U. S. piers in 1968 will rise to 3.0 million in 1975 and 3.6 million in 1980, an increase of 53% over the 1968 level. The study also discusses possible solutions to the problems raised by containerization and presents a series of six recommendations to overcome them. These range from setting limits to the amount of concentration to be allowed in the marine industry to compete effectively with foreign consortia to easing the impediments to the efficient inland movement of marine containers.
Despite this growth, however, overcapacity in both containerships and container terminals will be a major problem in this decade, according to the study. Container trip capacity will rise to 200% of forecasted demand by 1975, Manalytics reports, and container crane capacity—a measure of the number and size of container terminals—will reach 250% of demand.
Navy Considers Additional Use Of Merchantmen For Logistics
(Alan F. Schoedel in The Journal of Commerce, 9 May 1972)
Greater dependence on the merchant marine** as an arm of the U. S. Navy and an instrument of foreign policy is under active consideration in federal governmental departments in Washington. So is the controversial question of how much reliance can be placed on American-owned vessels flying foreign “flags of convenience.”
This was disclosed at the all-day seminar of maritime management and labor executives and Navy officials held on 5 May 1972 at the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, Long Island.
There was apparent unanimity of support for the position now being taken by Andrew E. Gibson, U. S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs, in favor of bilateral cargo preference pacts as the best hope of American-flag merchant ships. Such agreements would divide cargo between ships of this country and its respective trading partners overseas.
The Navy, in a position where all its building funds can best be spent for actual fighting ships, is now leaning more to the concept of using merchant vessels for logistic purposes, such as fueling of its ships, said Rear Admiral George H. Miller, U. S. Navy, naval deputy to Gibson.
The Soviet Union, whose rapidly growing competitive presence on the high seas was a subject of considerable concern at the Kings Point conference, is carefully coordinating all its maritime elements—Navy, cargo ships, fishing fleet—the seminar was told. In some ports of the less developed countries, such as some small nations in Africa, Soviet merchant ships are calling ten times as often as those flying the American-flag, said Norman Polmar, Washington naval writer.
Admiral Miller and Vice Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Training, emphasized that the effectiveness of the so-called “Nixon doctrine” in foreign policy depends on cargo-carrying capacity at sea. The doctrine pledges the United States to keep its treaty commitments to nations threatened by aggression, more than 40 of which are overseas; promises a “nuclear shield,” if need be; and assures victims of aggression that they will receive U. S. financial and material assistance.
One of the attitudes which Admiral Miller said is essential is willingness of the Navy to think in terms of using privately-owned ships designed for commercial rather than military purposes as supply vessels. For example, he said, the preference for comparatively small “handy-sized” tankers must give way to 200,000-ton commercial supertankers if the latter is what the industry can provide.
The admiral said the Navy had acted contrary to long tradition when, a few years ago, it decided to build its own “inhouse” fleet of supply ships, rather than continue its historic reliance on the merchant fleet. Coordination of naval and mercantile development should be maintained in furtherance of peacetime national policy just as it is in times of war, he declared.
Jesse Calhoun, president of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, raised the question of the “flags of convenience” or “flags of necessity” ships—American-owned ships, usually bulk carriers, registered under the flags of such countries as Liberia, Panama, and Honduras and manned by foreign crews. He referred to them as an obstacle to expansion of the American-flag fleet.
Admiral Miller announced that he has initiated a review of the extent to which this country can count on such ships in times of national emergency. The crews of tankers and other cargo carriers upon which the Navy may have to depend must be familiar with a number of defense features installed on board their ships and must also be trained in serving Navy requirements, he observed.
He told the parley that, while he felt it was not possible to rely on the crews of another nation in times of emergency, the Maritime Administration study would not contemplate any changed requirements for all “flag of convenience” ships, but only some of them.
Steamship executives zeroed in on the rift which has existed ever since, under former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the military imposed a system of competitive bidding for carriage of defense cargo by privately-owned ships. Air transport, on the other hand, is dealt with basically on a cost-plus basis, according to Washington authorities. The rift has not been healed, but the seminar was assured that efforts to remedy the situation are in progress.
Royal Fleet Auxiliary: Behind The Men Of War
(Royal Navy News Feature, March 1972)
Without the tankers and stores ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), the Royal Navy would be in an almost impossible position. It would be unable to make long passages in the South Atlantic and Pacific and exercises could be undertaken only on a limited scale. Such were the emphatic views of a normally taciturn naval captain, never given to overstatements, when discussing the importance to the white ensign fleet of the Navy Department’s organization of supply vessels.
These ships, manned by some 1,400 merchant navy officers (including over 250 cadets) and about 2,300 seamen and administered by the Supply and Transport Service of the Ministry of Defence, have indeed been intergrated [sic] into the operations of the Royal Navy to an extent unimagined when the RFA service was established by an Order in Council 60 years ago.
An RFA master has compared the relationship between the two Services, each fiercely proud of its own traditions, as “. . . a shotgun marriage between the hunter and the provider.” And, as so often is the case under such circumstances, the union has endured and prospered.
Elsewhere—in the United States and Australia, for example—naval supply ships are manned by uniformed personnel, but in Britain the worth of merchant navy men in a task as old as the Royal Navy has long been recognized.
At the beginning of the last century, none less than Lord St. Vincent, then First Lord of the Admiralty, insisted on a civilian master being in charge at sea of naval stores. They were he wrote, “. . . better preserved by such trusty men than by commanders and lieutenants, who are not of the same stamp.”
Today, the role of “such trusty men” has become increasingly vital with the reduced number of overseas bases. Their ships are still the Navy’s floating filling stations and supermarkets with a wide range of technical stores, provisions, and also ammunition, but in the 1970s they are filling some new roles.
Some 40 sophisticated and specially constructed ships make up the modern RFA fleet ranging in size from the large—the biggest has a displacement of 42,500 tons gross—Dale-class mobile reserve tankers to the Robert Middleton, a coastal store carrier of 1,100 tons. All form part in the complex chain of the never-ending movement of fuel and stores which has continued in every theater of operations from the Arctic to the Pacific during the past half century.
Now under RFA command are six 6,390 tons logistic landing ships which can back up the amphibious functions of the Royal Navy’s commando and assault ships. Troops and vehicles can be disembarked on to beaches and quays through roll/on-roll/off, bow and stern doors and ramps.
These highly-specialized vessels, all bearing the names of Knights of the Round Table, can each carry battle tanks, 25 three-ton and six smaller trucks, and 340 men. There are heavy cranes for loading and unloading landing craft, and helicopters can be flown on an all-weather basis from a small flight deck.
Their peacetime versatility has been proved by the Sir Galahad, which carried 195 tons of stores, 20,000 sandbags, and equipment ranging from bulldozers to baby’s feeding bottles, when she sailed to East Pakistan during the disastrous 1970 flooding. Early in 1971, she again sailed from Singapore during a similar emergency on the east coast of Malaysia. She then had on board sufficient food for 150,000 refugees for two weeks.
The 8,000-ton Engadine, a helicopter support ship, also forms part of the RFA. With a merchant navy crew and small Royal Navy complement for controlling flying and servicing aircraft, her primary purpose is to provide deck experience for pilots, but the ship can also operate as a floating base for antisubmarine helicopters during convoy and other exercises.
In other ships, however, RFA officers will themselves control the flying of Fleet Air Arm helicopters. The three Olwen-class fleet tankers are fitted to carry them, while the Ness-class support ships and the new Rover-class multipurpose ships also have flight decks for “vertical replenishment.”
The Regent and Resource, 18,000-ton fleet replenishment ships, each carry their own Wessex helicopter with a Royal Navy crew, and in five hours it is possible to transfer enough food to last an average family of four for approximately 17 years.
The resupply of warships at sea still remains the basic—and certainly the most necessary in the eyes of the Royal Navy—task of the RFA, and it is one that is centuries old. Spare canvas and spars were transported by supply ships, essential in any major maritime enterprise, in the days of sail. Coal was carried for the stokeholds of World War I ships, although attempts to transfer it at sea were not a resounding success.
Experiments in passing oil fuel between ships were being carried out by the Royal Navy more than 60 years ago, and by the beginning of World War II much of the necessary know-how had been acquired, although the techniques and equipment were far from perfected.
Useful knowledge was gained when rubber hoses used by the German Navy fell into British hands after the capture of two of the Bismarck’s tankers. Information was gained, too, from the U. S. Navy, and when it became necessary to maintain a large number of ships at sea for long periods in the Pacific during the war against Japan, the RFA was able to undertake their regular refueling far from any port.
A landmark may be in the history of naval operations, but another supply job carried out by the RFA at the same time certainly made a greater impression on sailors in the Far East. Lager brought from Australia was issued in ships in the Leyte Gulf, probably the first time that beer was made available afloat in this way.
Storing at sea—dry stores and ammunition—was a short step from supplying fuel and developments in this direction have been both speedy and remarkable.
When the support ship Tarbatness sailed on her maiden voyage, she had over 40,000 different items on board from Cornish pasties to electronic spares, together with sufficient food to feed 15,000 men for a month and clothing as well. She and her sister ship can store up to three warships at a time, two by jackstay, and a third by helicopter from the resources of their huge air conditioned holds. A sophisticated control system ensures that any particular stores item demanded is immediately available.
Fleet tankers, stores ships, and cargo freighters—large and small—they all go to make up the highly efficient and surprising flexible Royal Fleet Auxiliary organization.
Pass-Down-The-Line Notes
The author of a book in progress, dealing with Admiral Harry E. Yarnell and the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, during the time period of October 1936 to July 1939, requests assistance from anyone who was assigned to Asiatic Fleet duty at that time while Admiral Yarnell was CinCAF, in the way of recollections and anecdotes about life on the station. This includes Yangtze Patrol, South China Patrol, or any other related activities, such as destroyers, submarines, aircraft, and the like. Whatever can be offered will be gratefully appreciated, and people with such information are requested to contact Robert J. Cressman at 12500 Feldon Street, Wheaton, Maryland 20906.
A former crewmember of the USS Lansdowne (DD-486) is planning to publish a short souvenir history of this ship during and after World War II. It will be distributed to surviving shipmates when completed. The author would appreciate any photographs (which will be returned), current addresses of any shipmates, and a brief resume of military or civilian activities since detachment. Material should be sent to: Thomas F. Wright, 3335 Decatur Avenue, Bronx, New York, New York 10467, or telephone 212-TU 1-1541.
Associate member Thomas F. Gates wishes to correspond with former members of Navy aviation squadrons—Observation Squadron (VO) 67 and Heavy Attack Squadron (VAH) 21—which served in Vietnam. He also wishes to correspond with Navymen who have served in patrol squadrons m Vietnam. The information is urgently required for his forthcoming book, U. S Air Navy Units/Vietnam War Era. Direct all correspondence to him at 25 Sunset Drive, Berkeley, California 94707.
* See P. Cohen, “New Roles for the Submarine,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, this issue, pp 31-37.
** See M. G. Nottingham and J. L. Crawford, “U. S. Navy and Foreign Merchant Shipping,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, this issue, pp. 86-88.