Politics has been described as “the art of the possible.” Today, in Britain, the same thing could be said of defense. What naval officers believe is necessary for national security may often bear little, if any, relation to what they know the politicians will approve.
The reductions that have been made in the strength of the Royal Navy since 1945, and particularly since 1964, during the six-year life of the second postwar Labor administration, have been made all too often with no regard for responsibilities and commitments. There has been a serious tendency, in recent years, to underestimate the extent of the threat which might be encountered, so that the potential threat is deliberately scaled down to the level at which it is politically and economically expedient to attempt to meet it.
Nowhere do such attitudes and the resulting policies strike home harder than in the Royal Navy.
After Napoleon’s downfall in 1815, the Royal Navy’s command of the seas effectively insulated Britain from involvement in the often disturbed conditions in Europe. Britons were content to take shelter behind their Navy and build up their Empire.
Since 1945, Britons have learned to accept disintegration of their colonial empire, and some would argue that trade has flourished thereby as newly independent countries seek to build up their economies and the industries to support them. But the decline of the Royal Navy’s size and influence was undoubtedly harder to accept.
The appointment of an American as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; the demonstrable numerical superiority of the U. S. Navy, followed by that of the Soviet Navy, and the resulting relegation of the Royal Navy to third place among navies were blows to national pride. Yet, it is no mere chauvinism to say that a Britain shorn of her empire in many places not only enhanced her trade but gained new respect. Certainly there were also many in former colonial territories who regretted the passing of British rule and law, but throughout most colonial empires the tide of nationalism was irresistible—and inevitable.
But, whether new friends who might once have been violent anticolonialists or old friends looking back to “the good old days of British rule,” there were many around the globe who valued Britain as an economic partner. She was valued because often her “customers” really meant something—not just a blob on the map of Africa or Asia.
Then, too, there were political, ethnic, and cultural differences which the Communists could fan into open clashes. Sometimes such clashes occurred anyway, as when Indonesia embarked on her “confrontation” policy against Malaysia in the early 1960s.
It would be tedious to give a comprehensive list of all those “incidents” up to open warfare in which British forces have been involved since 1945 and it will perhaps suffice to say that they range from a cruiser landing Royal Marines in British Honduras in the late 1940s to stem Guatemala’s aggressive intentions, to the Korean War of the 1950s, and the force of Marines helping quell East African army mutinies in 1964. Besides the Malayan emergency of the late 1940s and early 1950s, British forces operated in Anguilla; provided moral support in the face of Spanish threats to Gibraltar, hunted pirates off Borneo, and supported British fishermen in a protracted dispute with Iceland over fishing rights.
Two facts emerge. The majority of the more serious incidents have occurred East of Suez—and all but a tiny minority of these incidents have in one way or another involved the Royal Navy.
As the nation saw its Navy decline to third place in the world rankings, the commitments, to the irritation of the politicians, would not, like Lewis Carroll’s Cheshire Cat, “slowly fade away.” Trouble continually blew up.
As successive governments lurched from one economic crisis to the next, they tended to react rather than make contingency plans for each commitment as it arose. Yet, despite constant nibbling—and sometimes hacking—at the Armed Forces’ budgets, neither of the major political parties in Britain seriously questioned the need to uphold those commitments. The means to do so might be skeletal—but they still existed and the advent of long-range air transport for heavy equipment and troops gave comfort to politicians planning to reduce defense costs in overseas exchange.
Even Denis Healey, Defense Minister for six years during the second post-World War II Labor administration, in his earlier years in office admitted that the stabilizing influence of British forces was often vastly greater than that which their strength would seem to confer.
It was not until 1966, when Labor embarked on a program of drastic cuts in military expenditures, that the question of retaining commitments was seriously aired. That year, following cancellation of the new attack carrier CVA-01, the Navy Minister, Christopher Mayhew, resigned. He made himself clear on why: if the commitments are not cut, then the Navy is no longer adequate to meet them. Either the Navy must be built up or the commitments discarded. There is no doubt he favored the second move.
But it was not until 1968 that Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Defense Minister Healey accepted the truth of this and began a policy of withdrawal and further drastic cutting back in the three Services.
The rather vague 1966 Defense Review plans for a withdrawal from East of Suez in “the mid-1970s” became June 1971. Later, at the insistence of Singapore’s Premier Lee Kuan Yew, the date was put back to the end of 1971 and thus beyond the last possible date for a general election in Britain and a possible change of government.
It had taken the devaluation of the pound sterling in the autumn of 1967 and the consequent needs for cuts in government expenditure to bring about this “agonizing reappraisal”—but the plunge had been taken.
The government felt it had a number of factors on its side. There was, in Labor Party doctrine, something dubious about having overseas forces on other nations’ territory even if they might be welcome guests. Then, too, there was a resentment held by many Britons that other nations benefited by the stabilizing influence of these forces, yet paid not a penny toward their cost. A still larger number of Britons believed that as the nation no longer had sufficient Armed Forces it was pointless in continuing to pledge support to friends and allies in far distant places.
Mr. Healey calmed NATO uneasiness by pointing to plans to reinforce the Alliance and said, among other things, that the Royal Navy would be the largest in Western Europe. This prompted one London military commentator to remark: “Since when has it been intended we should fight Western Europe—have the Common Market negotiations deteriorated that far?”
Yet, despite the obvious support the government had from many Britons, labelled as “Little Englanders” by their opponents, there was growing disquiet among many more. Heath in his Conservative Party election manifesto in spring 1970 made it clear that the East of Suez withdrawal decision would be reversed.
Thus, when each time a Conservative gain was chalked up in the Royal Navy’s headquarters in Singapore on polling day there were cheers from the Malay, Chinese, and Indian sweepers, clerks, drivers, and other civilian workers who felt a Conservative victory meant security for their future. They were not alone.
As Conservative leaders saw it, their first task in defense was to give positive reassurance to both officers and enlisted men. Service recruiting, for example, had slumped severely over the preceding three years and was reaching crisis proportions.
Mid-career officers, lieutenant commanders and commanders particularly, saw little future in a Navy largely confined to a coast defense role around the NATO periphery. The romantic ubiquity of the Royal Navy was to be a thing of the past. Those who disagreed with Mr. Healey’s policy were accused of not doing their homework, and two retired Flag officers and former aviators had their comments censored out of a television movie history of the carriers.
Consequently, Prime Minister Heath and members of his Cabinet at once took pains to stress that “defense matters.” This new attitude was well put by the new Defense Minister, Lord Carrington, when he told the Royal United Services Institution in early fall 1970: “For no material prosperity, no social advance, no worthwhile achievement can be undertaken by this country unless it is secure in the knowledge that its independence is safeguarded by the Armed Forces of the Crown.”
Two steps were taken swiftly. A planned redundancy of some 2,000 officers and enlisted men in the Fleet Air Arm was “postponed.” It was then announced that an infantry battalion with supporting non-battalion weapons to a limited degree, five destroyers or frigates, R.A.F. Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and Whirlwind helicopters would remain in Singapore. What was more, no time limit was put on their stay. The Commonwealth nations concerned—Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore—would work out a new defense agreement and the old bilateral agreement with Malaysia would be junked.
Besides listing the forces to be retained in Singapore, the government’s Defense White Paper of October 1970 announced further immediate steps. The attack carrier Ark Royal would be retained in commission into “the late 1970s” and the French Exocet surface-to-surface missile would be bought for the Navy for fitting in ships in the mid 1970s. The R.A.F. would get more tactical strike fighters and new trainer aircraft to replace the fighters which had previously been ordered for use as trainers.
From the Navy’s point of view these changes were significant but not startling and not entirely satisfactory. Lord Carrington made clear he was not prepared to reopen the carrier controversy and that the assumption of air-support responsibilities at sea by the R.A.F. would continue. The Exocet is basically a Western answer to the Soviet Styx, and, though more sophisticated with a marginally greater range, does not really fill “the missile gap” which Lord Carrington pointed out would have been left under Labor policies between the phaseout of the attack carriers in 1972 and the introduction of a long-range, surface-to-surface missile in the late 1970s. There would be no reintroduction of recruiting of fixed-wing aviators for the Navy since the last class left advanced training squadrons in the summer of 1970. Moreover, the Ark Royal basically would be deployed in support of NATO; indeed, it was officially hinted that her retention was largely due to SACLant’s wishes for an extra attack carrier in the Strike Fleet. The Eagle, her sister ship, would be decommissioned as planned by Healey in 1972, although she has more modern electronic equipment such as the British approximation of the U. S. Naval Tactical Data System, the Action Data Automation system, and the 984 Comprehensive display System radar.
Despite Conservative pre-election pledges, there was no indication that the construction rate of nuclear Fleet (attack) submarines would be restored to what it was before the pound’s devaluation—namely approximately one new order every 12 months. It is currently running at one every 15 months. Nor was any mention made of plans for a fifth FBM submarine, although Lord Barrington had been First Lord of the old Board of Admiralty in 1963 when the fifth boat was projected.
The Labor construction program: one DLG, one DDG, six DE-type ships (frigates), five SSNs, one prototype fiber glass MCM ship, one experimental vessel for use at the Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Center, and one nuclear waste disposal vessel was not, apparently, to be increased. Some ministers and officials privately said that no major increase in new construction could be expected, as the size of the Fleet would remain much the same as under the Labor government. As of December 1970, construction work in hand for the Royal Navy totalled some £180 million, though this total included a DLG and a DE still fitting out at that time.
Yet, there were some straws in the wind which, if interpreted correctly, may indicate the kind of reappraisal that must be made in force levels and type of equipment.
To quote again from Lord Carrington’s speech to the Royal United Services Institution mentioned earlier: “When there is danger, whether it be sewage, or pollution, or dock strikes, or Northern Ireland, or some disaster at sea, or a need to fly in relief to Jordan, everybody always expects the Forces to be there. And they are there; but we must have more men and we must have adequate money to do our job.”
When the Conservatives came to power in June 1970, there were many who did not believe the pre-election pledges on defense. And there were others who saw such pledges possible only at the expense of other government services such as the welfare state system for social security, highway and house construction, and similar problems.
Yet, in his Defense White Paper of October 1970, Lord Carrington claimed that the total annual cost of the forces to be retained in Singapore would be between £5 million and £10 million, whereas Labor had claimed a figure of £250 million would be more realistic for the maintenance of forces East of Suez. He also claimed that, in fiscal year 1971-72, there would be a saving of £28 million on Labor’s planned defense expenditure for that year and, by 1974-75, the saving on Labor’s forward planning figure would as much as £132 million that year. He went on to say that, had Labor plans been maintained, there would have been very serious cuts in the Armed Forces—yet the Conservatives propose no major program cuts but appear to be confining themselves to reducing expenditure on such things as the provision of new quarters.
The cynic will ask, with considerable justification, is it possible to provide the equipment needed to meet what the government—and presumably a majority of the electorate who voted them into office—consider to be Britain’s vital commitments? The clue would seem to lie in Lord Carrington’s remark quoted earlier: “. . . we must have adequate money to do our job.” Elsewhere in this speech there were other remarks which perhaps give further clues: “Men and boys are not going to join the Services if the emphasis is on reduction and retrenchment . . .” and then, in answer to a question: “I believe that no government should cut defense expenditure beyond a point which it believes will affect the ability of the government and the country to carry out the commitments it has undertaken . . . Defense expenditure should be related to need and I think that if we can get the economy growing again and if there is a prospect of more prosperity in this country then on the assumption that in the past our defenses have run down and that our defense expenditure has not been at a high enough rate, it would be reasonable to suppose that defense might share in the increasing prosperity of the nation.”
It would seem safe to predict, therefore, that defense spending will no longer be decided on a basis whereby the likely commitments are reduced to that point at which money can be provided for forces to meet them, and it is also politically expedient to meet them.
In the autumn of 1970, the Navy was threatened with a £500,000 cut in the £2.5 million annual budget on its principal reserve. It was pointed out to the Treasury Department that this would mean decommissioning two of the reserve’s most important divisions of the 11 around Britain. This was accepted as too high a price to pay—and the cut was reduced to one of £25,000.
In November 1970, Lord Mottistone, a Navy captain who had retired in protest over the Labor policy on carriers, questioned Lord Carrington about the wisdom of relying on only one carrier after 1972. He urged the retention of the Eagle. Lord Carrington, after outlining cost and manpower problems that would be involved, promised to “look more closely” into this suggestion.
The matter of the Eagle’s retention after 1972 is interesting. In the summer of 1969, when deck landing and launching trials were being made with the first F-4s delivered from the United States, the captain stated to the press that the ship’s modernization to enable her to operate F-4s at all times like her sister ship Ark Royal would cost only £5 million ($12.5 million) and of this half would be in labor costs. This figure is still supported by ship’s technical officers—but the Defense Ministry figure is now £20 million ($50 million) and some officials “forgot” that the ship has ever had the F-4 embarked. To admit that such a figure would only be attainable if such things as a lengthened catapult was fitted and numerous other improvements made which would not be essential would be something Ministry spokesmen could not do lest they incur the wrath from above. The White Paper in October 1970 said the Eagle’s retention after 1972 would not be entertained because of the cost and manpower factors.
As far as the Ministry is concerned, this is the last word. Yet, Lord Carrington by his Parliamentary reply quoted earlier has shown that his verdict is not final when he believes a case has been made against it. In the Ministry, such an attitude of the Secretary of State for Defense is hard to contemplate—but is one that is being welcomed in the Fleet.
What are the likely moves in the provision of new construction and equipment for the Fleet? There are indications that the fifth FBM submarine will be ordered, but much will depend on progress made on refueling and overhauling the first, HMS Resolution, upon which work started at Rosyth Navy Yard in late spring 1970 and is scheduled to take 18 months. If the overhaul is delayed more than a month or two, a fifth FBM submarine’s construction will almost certainly be authorized. As recently as December 1970, Vice Admiral Sir Hugh Mackenzie, chairman of the Navy League and former Chief Polaris Executive, said publicly that his team in the CPE in the Defense Ministry would not be disbanded and that overhauling these submarines was almost as complex as constructing them. In 1968, at the time of the Resolution’s commissioning, Admiral Mackenzie was criticized by some Labor Parliamentarians for saying that, with only four FBM submarines, the Navy would be hard-pressed to maintain two on patrol and thus give Britain a credible deterrent.
The acceleration of the SSN construction rate, to what it was before the pound’s devaluation, probably hangs on the decision over the fifth FBM submarine. Although there is the yard and technical capacity to accelerate the program, some senior Navy officers say that to do so would mean risking upsetting the balance of the Fleet.
There are encouraging signs that the Mark 24 torpedo for the SSNs and SSBNs is at last making progress. This weapon, which probably approximates the U. S. Mark 48, has had to be redeveloped following the discovery of major design faults some two years ago. It is likely that the redesigned Mark 24s will start coming off the production line in 1973. Without them, the SSNs have been likened to a tank armed with a spear.
The Type-42 Sheffield class of DDG currently has only one ship in the class but more orders are likely to be placed fairly soon. The earlier Type-82, of which the Type-42 is a scaled down version, has only one ship in the class, the Bristol, which will start shakedown trials this year. These will be extensive as it will be necessary to check out both the Sea Dart SAM system and the Ikara A/S missile system since both are new. The Sea Dart has a limited surface-to-surface capability missile while the Ikara weapon is being built in Britain under Australian license.
More orders for Type-21 DEs (frigates), in addition to the four now under construction are likely, probably after additional Type-42 orders have been placed. The Type-21 will have the new Sea Wolf short range SAM system and both she and the Type-42 will be gas-turbine-powered and equipped with the Lynx light ASW helicopter.
Another new DE (frigate), Type-22, which was to have succeeded the Leander-class frigates—of which the last two of the 26 ships in the class are due for completion this year—has been delayed indefinitely. The first Type-22 was scheduled for shipyard tendering in November 1969, but there is no official indication of progress except that “development work is continuing.”
In 1972, the new fiber glass mine countermeasures vessel built to the design of the existing coastal minesweepers/hunters is due for completion. This vessel is expected to cost around £2.5 million and will be a prototype for a new class of MCM vessels replacing the present MCM force of some 50 vessels completed in the late 1950s. The prototype is expected to be considerably more expensive than subsequent ships.
Major modernization work in hand includes converting the cruiser Tiger—like her sister ship the Blake—to carry four Sea King ASW helicopters; converting the attack carrier Hermes into an LPH to replace the Bulwark in the mid-1970s; modernizing the earlier Leander-class frigates by fitting a second SAM close-range system and Ikara, and converting the old destroyer Matapan into an ASW trials ship. The four earlier ships of the County-class DLGs have suffered from technical and manpower problems during their first overhauls, and for these reasons (and that of cost), it has been decided not to retrofit them with the Seaslug II SAM system, which has a limited surface-to-surface capability. They retain the Seaslug I which has only a surface-to-air capability.
Modernization of the dock yards at Chatham and Rosyth, which has included provision of an SSN/SSBN overhaul complex, has been completed. A new program to include a similar complex and another for Leander-class frigates is starting at Devonport Dock Yard, while Portsmouth is to get a complex for overhauling DLGs. The yards’ labor force was cut from 31,000 in 1964 to 28,000 in 1970, and will drop to 25,000 by 1974.
In the equipment field, the new medium-range sonar working in conjunction with an automatic flight control system is in service in Sea Kings operating from the carriers Eagle and Ark Royal. Further research is continuing with nuclear propulsion and gas turbines. A 48-ton hovercraft is currently being evaluated.
Trials with the Mark 31 A/S torpedo and in underwater hull design configurations are being carried out in the trials frigate Penelope, but the former has run into severe difficulties and a replacement may be ordered from the United States. Considerable progress is being made in the development of communications and data-handling systems particularly for small ships. These include work on Action Data Automation System and Computer Assisted Action Information System for DEs and smaller ships. The Navy’s Surface Weapons Establishment at Portsmouth is also watching commercial development of antihelicopter/antihovercraft missile systems for submarines, such as SLAM, which is expected to undergo sea evaluation in 1971-1972.
But with the exception of the SSNs, all the ships currently under construction are essentially defensive in role. It is the lack of offensive capability in the Fleet (officially termed “retaliatory capability” in the Defense Ministry) that is worrying many naval officers. Virtually every ship in the Fleet, with the exception of submarines and MCM vessels, has been designed to work with air support.
Labor claims that by the time the carriers were phased out in 1972 there would be an effective surface-to-surface missile system in service simply did not stand up to investigation. Consequently, Lord Carrington, after being warned of this gap in the Fleet’s defenses, ordered the Ark Royal’s retention and purchase of Exocet. Yet this is only a partial answer to the problem of air support that leaves yawning gaps.
He claimed that the retention of the Ark Royal would allow for a slightly slower tempo in the assumption of responsibilities for maritime air support by the R.A.F. Yet, even this reduced tempo is causing problems. In January 1971, the squadrons embarked in HMS Eagle included 28 R.A.F. navigators undergoing familiarization into the problems of oversea navigation Fleet support.
Such is the pressure on the Navy’s flying training organization with R.A.F. crews on conversion training to fly the Buccaneer S-2, which the R.A.F. is taking over from the Navy in accordance with Labor plans, that, the obsolescent Buccaneer S-1, which has been out of service in front-line Navy squadrons for about five years, is being used.
The Navy’s attitude towards the Buccaneer is that it is a tactical aircraft. But many of the R.A.F. crews are former Vulcan aviators and still have a subconscious tendency to regard their new aircraft more as strategic aircraft—as were the Vulcans until the FBM submarines took over the deterrent role from the R.A.F. Consequently, more senior naval aviators believe that, as their own numbers dwindle and the R.A.F. is increasingly training its own Buccaneer crews, there will be a tendency to use Buccaneers in ones and twos as was done with the strategic bombers.
Among younger R.A.F. officers there is a profound appreciation of the importance of their Buccaneers’ role in providing maritime air support. But it seems doubtful if the message has yet reached more senior officers. At the first demonstration to the press of the new Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft in fall 1970 a very senior R.A.F. officer emphasized the aircraft’s versatility. He pointed out the other roles for which it could be used, such as transporting troops and tactical bombing of land targets.
Moreover, he emphasized that there would be no hesitation in using it in such roles if the need arose. Such an attitude does not provide good omens for the employment in the Fleet support role of R.A.F. Buccaneer and F-4 aircraft in view of the shortage of tactical aircraft in Germany, for example, where squadrons of these aircraft are already employed.
Some senior naval officers derive comfort from the problems the Soviet Navy is evidently having with in-flight control of long-range, surface-to-surface missiles targeted to points beyond the launching ship’s radar horizon—and the consequent decrease in the range of more recent missiles. On a longer term, the Navy has hopes for its policy of closer cooperation with the R.A.F. and is trying to increase the number of officers appointed to R.A.F. headquarters staffs for coordination, liaison, and joint operational planning.
Taking the really long view, say .10 to 12 years, the Navy hopes to supplement R.A.F. shore-based air support with three ships, each costing £40 million and equipped with perhaps 12 VTOL aircraft each. Known as “through-deck cruisers” these ships will each cost more than the alternate £30 million conventional carrier design offered to—and swiftly rejected by—Defense Minister Healey by the Department of the Director of Naval Air Warfare in the Ministry of Defense when CVA-01 was cancelled in 1966.
Senior naval officers stress that these ships may operate fixed-wing VTOL aircraft, presumably depending on the feasibility of using such aircraft without detriment to other design features of the ships, but add that they would be ordered regardless, in view of their command and communications facilities, for example. The current thinking in the Defense Ministry is that the Harrier is “better than nothing” for these ships, but even the uprated engine version is likely to lack the range and payload the Navy wants. Even assuming the money being available, it seems doubtful that a totally new VTOL design could be developed and produced to be on hand when the first of these “through-deck cruisers” joins the Fleet probably around 1980.
Still another problem that will arise with putting the Harrier, or any other fixed-wing aircraft, to sea in these ships is that of providing air and ground crews. The former, judging from past experience with R.A.F. aircrews on exchange in carriers, may welcome a tour of duty at sea providing more opportunities for travel overseas for rather more than a few hours. But enlisted men are more likely to object, pointing out that, if they had wanted to go to sea, they would have joined the Navy to start with. Their objections are likely to be equalled or even surpassed by their wives, since, with few exceptions, it has long been R.A.F. policy to provide quarters at overseas air bases. It is therefore somewhat surprising that an “early out” policy is still continuing among many senior skilled naval aviation maintenance ratings. One possible solution to the problem of getting R.A.F. enlisted men to sea might be to warn them of this possibility when they arrive at the recruiting station. But whether there is mentioned today, for example, the chance of a tour without wife and family on Gan, in the Maldive Islands, and one or two other remote R.A.F. stations when a man steps into the recruiting station, is not clear.
Even if the Harrier does go to sea, will this answer the unalterable fact that without integral air support for reconnaissance, strike, and CAP, the role of the Royal Navy on a world-wide basis will be increasingly circumscribed as the reliance on shore-based air support increases? The purpose of such integral air support has been well summed up by Rear Admiral Morgan Giles, one of the leading Conservative Parliamentary naval spokesmen, although not a member of Mr. Heath’s administration, who has written: “Without aircraft carriers the Royal Navy will not be able to operate effectively outside the range of shore-based fighters, and it will not be able to protect our merchant shipping world-wide—which is and has always been its primary task: it will be reduced to little more than a coast defense force.
“In particular, carrier aircraft are essential for the surveillance role which is needed in conditions short of declared war—in fact for the prevention of war . . . But without air reconnaissance, and air support ‘on the spot and on the dot’, the Navy will be as naked and as impotent as a blind eunuch.”
If the answer does not lie in R.A.F. aircraft flying from the few bases left to them outside Europe and supplemented by a number—at best three dozen—aircraft which the Navy already considers “second best,” what other solution is there? The first is to convince the R.A.F. that the doctrine of the “indivisibility of air power” was proved disastrous in the days of the Naval Air Wing of the R.A.F. between the wars, and should not be repeated when, in the future, there may be no “phoney war” period in which to make good the neglect of “the locust years.” After that, the importance of partnership with the Navy should be emphasized, since the R.A.F., too, will benefit by not having to disperse its resources of men and aircraft to meet a host of commitments. Given such a sense of partnership, it should be possible to win R.A.F. acceptance for greater responsibility than in the past for basic training of naval aircrews up to operational type familiarization training. In this way, the cost of reopening recruiting for fixed-wing naval aviators could be reduced further.
Finally, a new type of carrier should be planned as a logical successor to the Ark Royal and the Eagle. This might cost as little as £30 million—rather less by some £10 million than the new “through-deck cruisers”—if the design is based on the hull configurations of some large mercantile tanker-bulk-carrier designs with a flight deck superimposed for STOL, rather than VTOL, planes. Much of the electronic equipment which today adds so much to an attack carrier’s cost could be carried in other ships. Is there, for example, a need for comprehensive data analysis and display systems when these already exist in DLGs and could be passed to the carrier if a reliable data link system is provided? Must extensive command and communication facilities, electronic countermeasures, and radar early warning systems be put in the carrier? Obviously, it is advantageous to have all these in the one “package,” but, in peacetime, the Royal Navy has long had to accept compromises.
By retaining the Ark Royal and buying the Exocet, the government has shown it is aware of the grave gaps in Labor’s naval defense policy. But the fundamental change that still must be made is to demonstrate that its acceptance of a continuing worldwide role for Britain, even at a token level, is meaningless unless there is increased reliance upon a maritime-based defense policy. And, for the Royal Navy to carry out such a policy it must be equipped to do so. In an age of air-launched, long-range, stand-off missiles, shore-based aircraft cannot provide the answer. It is how, in the next few years, the government appreciates the importance of having a truly “blue water Navy” that its defense policy must be judged. Confidence in the future has much improved in the Royal Navy in recent months. That confidence will have been misplaced if, in the words of the Naval Prayer, the Royal Navy effectively ceases to be “a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions.”
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Educated at Winchester College, Mr. Wettern joined the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and subsequently served in the Royal Navy and Royal Naval Reserve until 1970. He was Naval Correspondent for the London Sunday Graphic from 1958 to I960, when he was appointed London Editor of The Nato Journal. He has been Naval Correspondent of the London Sunday Telegraph since 1961. He is also Defense Correspondent of The Yorkshire Post, as well as Naval Correspondent of the Liverpool Daily Post and the Glasgow Herald.