Equal Opportunity in the Navy
Rear Admiral Samuel L. Gravely, Jr., U. S. Navy—The Secretary of the Navy, John H. Chafee, in AlNav 51-70 set forth his views on equal opportunity in the Navy. In conclusion, Chafee stated:
Equal opportunity must become equality in fact so that equal results and true equal treatment become an unexceptional part of our daily lives.
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, U. S. Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, in his Z-gram 66, re-emphasized and reaffirmed the Navy’s policy on equal opportunity. In the final paragraph of this Z-gram, Admiral Zumwalt states:
It is evident that we need to maximize our efforts to improve the lot of our minority Navymen. I am convinced that there is no place for insensitivity. We are determined that we shall do better. Meanwhile, we are counting on your support to help put-out and eliminate those demeaning areas of discrimination that plague our minority shipmates. Ours must be a Navy family that recognizes no artificial barriers of race, color, and religion. No black navy, no white navy—just one Navy—The United States Navy.
Recently, the commanding officer of one of our destroyers wrote a letter with comments on various Z-grams. In his opening paragraph, he stated that on several occasions he has held open, relaxed discussions with his officers, chief petty officers, and other enlisted men to ascertain their true feelings on Z-grams and their implementation. He then commented on pertinent Z-grams and relayed the feelings of his ship’s personnel on each. It appeared as if he was saying, “This is the popular interpretation. Here is what I am implementing in my ship.” It was noted that the popular interpretation in many areas was at variance with the full intent of the Z-gram being commented on.
This approach to implementing Z-grams is of concern to all commanding officers since this is where the responsibility lies for implementation. Z-grams are orders and should be carried out as such. In addition, consistency in interpretation is paramount. All Z-grams require equal understanding and equal application, and nowhere is this more important than in understanding and in executing Z-66.
The comment of this commander to Z-66 is as follows:
All personnel seem to favor equal opportunity; but they feel that you can go too far in this direction with the result that fractionalization runs rampant.
The definition of equal opportunity in this case, I fear, is synonymous with “extra” or “special” opportunity. The Z-gram did not say that, but I am afraid that he is interpreting it as such. The idea that you “. . . can go too far in this direction . . .” utterly appalls me. Surely here again the phrase “equal opportunity” has been misinterpreted. What Admiral Zumwalt is saying here is—“If he has the GCT/ARI requirements for a school and meets the other eligibility requirements, then this man should be considered eligible for that school regardless of his race, religion, or color”. He is saying “. . . if this black petty officer is assigned as leading petty officer, then he should function as such if he is qualified.” However, here one must be alert to insure that no artificial barriers are set up by a junior in the chain of command to determine this qualification. He is also saying, “. . . if this petty officer is not performing properly, do not “carry him” just because he is black.” These are just some ideas that obviously this commanding officer does not equate to equality. And, finally, “. . . the result that fractionalization runs rampant . . .” is the very reason the Navy is again stressing equal opportunity. Fractionalization is the result of unequal opportunity. It might also be stated that in the case of this ship fractionalization will run rampant until the commanding officer discovers who is supposed to be in charge—whose responsibility it is to lead and to set policy.
In race relations, I personally have found the Human Relations Council a healthy medium for discussing and solving what might result in a potential racial problem. However, this council can be no more effective than the personnel assigned or the commander who leads. They must be able to clearly discuss and define the problem and preferrably [sic] before it becomes a problem.
I met a young black officer recently who is assigned to the Human Relations Council of a large shore activity in the Western Pacific. He is also their minority affairs officer. He discussed with me the most recent problem at his base which was the cause of a near riot. The problem was that two white sailors walked between two black sailors who were engaged in a Black Power salute. The blacks contended that they were shaking hands and the whites should not have walked between two men shaking hands. The whites contended that they saw clenched fists but did not understand what was taking place. An argument ensued; blows were passed; and, a near riot took place. After it was all over, it appeared that everyone agreed that it was simply a case of bad manners on the part of both parties. The blacks agreed that if a man tries to walk between two men shaking hands, you do not simply punch him in the nose. The whites agreed that you do not walk between two men when they are shaking hands. The only problem they have remaining is contained in the question, what is a hand shake?
L. Howard Bennett, in his article “Command Leadership and the Black Serviceman,” in the April 1971 Proceedings, refers to an answer he had previously given to the question: “What does the black serviceman want?” Basically, his answer related to respect, fairness, appreciation, and recognition—the same as every other Serviceman. He wants equal opportunity—no more and no less. Here, again, we have a two way street. Both parties must be willing to agree on a common definition of the terms.
On one ship, a young black petty officer (a gunner’s mate) applied for a course of instruction in basic electricity. A letter was prepared for the commanding officer’s signature recommending approval to the Chief of Naval Personnel and requesting a waiver for this young man to attend the school. The waiver required was 30 point of required GCT/ARI/MECH total. Obviously, the commanding officer could not recommend to the Chief of Naval Personnel approval of this request.
About this same time, AlNav 51-70, “Race Relations and Equal Opportunity,” and Z-66, “Equal Opportunity in the Navy,” were received. As a result, additional pressure was initiated to get the commanding officer to sign the letter. One argument was that these documents directed special consideration for a black man. The feeling then, as now, was that this young man was not qualified for the school and could not be recommended regardless of race, religion, or color. The commanding officer did relent to the extent that he stated that if this petty officer completed some extra instruction in basic electricity, satisfactorily completed a shipboard prepared examination on the subject, and made some basic preparations for the course he desired, he might reconsider the case. The initial reaction was that the black petty officer probably felt that he was being discriminated against. However, when he was questioned as to why he would not take the extra time to study, he stated that he did not desire to use his liberty time for studying. The commanding officer then disapproved the request and forwarded it to higher authority with an appropriate endorsement. This black petty officer cannot possibly say he was not given fair treatment.
I fear that the commanding officer whose popular approach was questioned earlier could not have handled a problem of this nature. Extra or special consideration for this young man could have brought on fractionalization in that command and the commanding officer would have gone too far if he had recommended him. However, this black petty officer did not qualify for the school he claimed he sought. He received no more and no less than his contemporaries.
It is only human nature that each of us interpret for ourselves the various instructions put out by our superiors. Usually, we come out with fairly close to the same answers. In the case of equal opportunity, I fear, our commanders will continue to be split on just what is meant by the term. This will continue to exist despite the fact that equal opportunity in the Armed Services was decreed by former President Truman in 1948. Twenty-three years later, our commanding officers continue to read between the lines, failing to recognize a basic tenet of our Constitution—“All men are Created Equal.”
Equal opportunity can become equality in fact with the result that equal results and true equal treatment can become an unexceptional part of our everyday lives. However, we must recognize that equal opportunity means just that and not something special where races, colors, and religions are concerned.
Secondly, commanding officers are the people Secretary Chafee and Admiral Zumwalt are relying on to implement equal opportunity, just like we are the ones to implement the other Z-grams. We must quit pussyfooting. I say read them, understand them, and implement them.
Lastly, equal opportunity in the Navy is not new. It is a problem that the Navy became acutely aware of in World War II. In 1948, the entire structure of the Armed Forces became aware of the problem when President Truman laid down some basic rules for solving the problems. Twenty-three years later SecNav and CNO re-emphasized and reaffirmed the importance of solving the problem. Let us get on with the job.
“A United States Navy for the Future”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 18-25, March; pp. 81-90, June; and pp. 89-93, July 1971 Proceedings)
Captain Arthur Winslow, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The fact that Captain Smith’s approach is essentially critical is appreciated. When criticizing the DD-963 class and particularly the DE-1052 class, however, he seems to become negative. With his background of a number of years service with the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OpTEvFor) and the Key West detachment, it is understandable that he would carry over some of the “doubting-Thomas, I’m-from-Missouri”-type thinking that is a built-in feature of the OpTEvFor operation. With good reason, they must be tough on new equipment and systems to make sure what goes to the Fleet is working and can be useful. However, this OpTEvFor syndrome, when applied to an overall view of new classes of ships, can be biasing.
In regard to the 963-class destroyer, Captain Smith makes the rather sweeping (and unsupported) statement that “. . . the 963-class, even on paper, is inferior to competitive Soviet ships already alive on the sea.” I would say, different from, rather than inferior to, since there are considerable differences in weapons, ASW and AA capabilities, and engineering plants. It is not clear to me, at least, that the 963s are inferior rather than just different; in fact, they may be more suitable to the complex threat they face.
Regarding the DE-1052 class, the OpTEvFor syndrome seems to have taken charge of Captain Smith’s thinking, as he has almost nothing good to say about this class. The more even evaluation of this class of ship by Commander Landersman, commanding officer of one of the first of the class, appears in the same issue of the Proceedings, on pages 99 to 102. Although he is reasonably critical, his overall evaluation is decidedly “thumbs up.”
The engineering plant cannot be as bad as Captain Smith indicates. The plant has a degree of redundancy, desirable for battle efficiency, having both high and low pressure turbines and two boilers, and can be operated split plant. Moreover, Commander Landersman notes that all important engineering deficiencies have been, or are about to be ironed out. Lack of redundancy of the single-screw design is obviously a battle efficiency weakness; however, there are pluses, too—economical steaming and long-range capability. Reduced maneuverability of the single-screw vessel is no longer important in ASW when equipped with stand-off type weapons systems antisubmarine rocket (AsRoc) and light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS), since close-in radical maneuvering disappears as an ASW requirement.
Going alongside or away from a dock or nest will require extra care in view of the ship’s large underhanging, bow- mounted sonar dome and limitation of single-screw maneuvering qualities. This class of ship will probably not back into the wind as readily as other destroyer types, since her rather large sail area of bridge, “mack,” and hangar is located further aft than in other classes. The tendency of (righthand) single-screw ships to back to port will likely be dominant, although just how the ship will behave under varying conditions of wind and tide will be a matter of fine judgment based on experience, and poses a challenge to skilled seamanship rather than a real design deficiency.
The weapons suit seems the best available with most up-to-date ASW weapons, including AsRoc, LAMPS, and provision for the latest torpedo, when available (presumably the MK 48). The rapid-firing and extremely reliable 5-inch, 54-caliber* is effective versus both low-flying aircraft and missiles—certainly a giant step over the 5-inch, 38-caliber and the rapid-fire 3-inch, 50-caliber.
This ship has limitations, true, but we should remember, despite all her capabilities, she is still only classed as a destroyer escort, not as some super ASW missile frigate. If Commander Landersman’s evaluation is as credible as it seems, then this class should prove effective. The concept of designing to hardware requirements is not necessarily irreconcilable with providing habitability as well, as noted in our nuclear submarines, particularly fleet ballistic missile types. So why not in DEs, too?
Commander J. A. Baldwin, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Meyerkord (DE-1058)—Captain Smith’s article reached the Meyerkord in the Western Pacific somewhat after the publicity in the newspapers. On reading the article, I found that the 1052-class was mentioned in a rather off-hand manner in an otherwise provocative, if over-written article. Having been the commissioning commanding officer of the Meyerkord, and having seen her through three hunter-killer antisubmarine exercises, two major Fleet exercises, and part of a U. S. Seventh Fleet deployment, I should like to comment on some of the points raised by the author.
* See D. O’Neil, III, “Gun Systems? For Air Defense?”, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1971, pp. 44-55.
As regards a 1052’s sonar capability, no sonar yet devised has been as good as we would want it. The 26CX sonar is, however, a significant improvement over the 26AX, AXR, and BX, and when used in conjunction with the independent variable depth sonar (IVDS), is probably as good a surface ship sonar as there is, particularly with its passive capability. I should like to have a third, higher frequency sonar for shallow water work and to aid in Cold War classification, but I am not sure the return warrants the expense. The 26CX is no more tactically self-defeating than any other active sonar, and, in addition, it has a significant passive capability which should be further exploited.
With respect to her defense capability, the 1052 can defend herself and others against the submarine threat as well as any ship, which is to say not very well. The threat, as all of us involved in ASW know, is formidable. When the 1052-class is fully fitted with light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopters, the MK-48 torpedo, and IVDS, it will be the most capable ASW surface platform around. Even so, to defeat the submarine threat, coordinated tactics with patrol/antisubmarine warfare (VP/VS) aircraft and ASW-dedicated submarines will still be required, along with good intelligence and a large measure of luck. The single, 5-inch, 54-caliber gun mount has proven versatile and reliable, and when used in conjunction with the point defense missile system programmed for installation, provides the ship with a reasonable AAW and surface defense.
The engineering plant not only is reliable, but also extremely responsive. Since completion of fitting-out availability, we have never lost the load or lacked for any speed called for by any operational commander. I know that other 1052-class ships have experienced the same performance. Twin-screw ships are inherently more reliable; but this is not to say that the 1052s are unreliable.
That there were mistakes made in building the 1052-class is evident to anyone familiar with them; but, taken all-in-all, the mistakes are relatively minor. One point in our favor is that sailors can do anything, even to surmounting the cumulative mistakes of the Ships’ Characteristics Board, Gibbs and Cox, and the Naval Material Command. That the 1052-class is today successfully filling many of the roles of a general-purpose destroyer, when it was designed as a single-purpose ship, should give evidence of what is right with the class and the men who man them. In fact, I suspect that their performance over the years will provide an effective defense against Captain Smith’s rather Jeffersonian conclusions.
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The Prize Essay will certainly be met by angry denial by some and complete praise by others. The truth will be between the extremes. The fact that you published this essay is to your credit. For many months you proclaimed the desire for controversial articles. You have such an article now.
The truth is, few people believed you, particularly with the peculiar tradition you have of having the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) the president. He is a busy man, and why do we subject him to such a hazard? I am sure you saw the article of what he thought of the 1052 destroyer escorts just a short while ago. I am also sure he does not review every article to be published. The Proceedings is not supported by public funds. Isn’t it possible to have a professional magazine without the CNO being president of the Naval Institute? I believe serious consideration should be given to changing this “tradition.”
Now for the article, for there are some things one must talk about, now that Pandora’s box is opened. His charge that the blame for lack of confidence in the Navy lies at the Navy’s own doorstep and is “. . . the result of decades of mismanagement and inefficiency in a sluggish and ill-organized bureaucracy . . .” is a very broad indictment that is not borne out by specific facts.
His lack of professionalism shows when he hails the emerging nuclear submarine force as “. . . a shining enclave of professionalism.” Thanks to Admiral Rickover we have a good vehicle.
Weapons are a laugh for this modern submarine. Does he call the Mark-37 or the old Mark-14 torpedoes suitable systems to exploit the capabilities of this submarine? Where are their anti-ship missiles, perfectly feasible in today’s technology? Do not tell me about the Mark-48 torpedo, for it certainly is not the answer. Rickover has succeeded in spite of the submariners and not because of them. He selects them, trains them, and does a professional job of administering the building of the submarines.
Having been involved in many facets of the technical side of the Navy over these “decades of mismanagement,” I must comment on some of the positive sides of accomplishments by this “bureaucracy.” The large grain, solid propellant rocket came from the research by these people. It made or was one of the keys to the success of Polaris. A little known but outstanding program was the development of our modern mines. It was just unfortunate that our civilian masters would not employ them off Haiphong. They would have been more effective in stopping supplies than any bombing, and less subject to the criticism of the world.
Our conventional weapons from the low-drag bomb family to the Sidewinder are now copied world-wide. Our inertial navigation systems as well as our missile guidance systems are unmatched. We have an atomic depth charge as well as a subsurface launched atomic weapons system, SubRoc. There are many more of such things that came out of the system. This is not to say that Captain Smith is not right in many of his allegations, and I must say I agree with many of them.
The record should be set straight on the 1052, however, and perhaps I can help. The ill-fated Sea Hawk project in the late 1950s and early 1960s was really the beginning. This was a gas turbine ship and would have been a big step forward. The Assistant Secretary for Research and Development at the time was convinced we had to develop new sensors before we should build a ship. Like many things, it died in those years. The 1052 was borne out of the ashes of this program. The SQS-26 sonar was bought by the Bureau of Ships without any real background of experience about its operation, and matched to this hull. It was the classical approach of brute power to attempt to solve a problem. The power plant of this ship was completely a dog. There were ten items in this plant which, if any one of them failed, the ship was dead in the water. The overall reliability was certainly short of normal Navy requirements.
We gave the enemy submarine a speed advantage and thought nothing of it. As Captain Smith says, the World War II syndrome of classical ASW prevailed. The record will show that Admiral Thomas Moorer, CinCPacFlt; Admiral Page Smith, CinClantFlt; Vice Admiral Charles Weakley and myself as Fleet ASW Force commanders were violently opposed to these ships. We preferred the DDG-2 (Adams class) and specifically asked for this ship. If they were going to insist on the 1052, we said we would need at least one DDG-2 for every two 1052s bought. Needless to say, we did not win the argument, and so today we have the 1052-class in sizable numbers. This was during the McNamara reign when we were “labor” and he was “management.” As I have often said, that is one of the weaknesses of the system where the professional naval officers have to live with the sins of now long-gone civilian managers. Like Captain Smith, I have no easy answer to that problem. It will be interesting to see the Navy’s reaction to this article. It certainly is a challenge to all hands. May we have many more such articles!
Pictorial—“The Odd Ones”
(See pp. 71-81, September 1970; and pp. 91-92, June 1971 Proceedings)
Warren M. Bodie—The introductory statement of this Pictorial invited readers to submit candidates for consideration. Being hopeful that you will continue the feature, I am submitting these photographs. . . .
Long before Grumman’s “Wildcatfish” flew, the Royal Air Force rushed two different versions of the Supermarine Spitfire into test as floatplane fighters. Mk-IX was intended for the Norwegian campaign against the Germans.
The Army Air Forces experimented with caterpillar-tread landing gear during and after World War II. The first known installation was on this Douglas A-20H. The idea was to permit operations from unimproved fields.
Likely, not many people ever saw the versatile P-51 Mustang fitted with two Marquardt C-30 ramjet engines at the wingtips for tests at Wright Field in 1947.
Another in the increasing list of look-alike canard designs, such as those appearing in the June 1971 Comment and Discussion section, is this Italian Amborsini SS.4 built in 1940.
The unusual double-tail version of the Lockheed T-33A that was evaluated in the 1950s might move some to conclude that the T-33/TV jet-trainer production line had inadvertently become intertwined with a “Connie” assembly line.
Demands from the VO/VS/VR et al set for equal representation, are herewith answered with the Great Lakes XSG-1 of 1932; the Sikorsky XSS-2 of the early 1930s; and the Columbia XJL-1 built toward the end of World War II by the company then building the J2F-6 under license from Grumman.
“Junior Officer Retention, A Lot of Little Things”
(See M. S. Harris, pp. 26-31, March 1971 Proceedings)
Mrs. Kathleen D. Dur, Former Secretary, Gaeta Officers’ Club—Lieutenant Harris leaves his readers with a most unfortunate image of the American dependent wife living abroad. Having lived in Gaeta, Italy, for 19 months as a dependent wife, I feel his views do not present an accurate or fair image.
One of the most ideal aspects of living in Gaeta was the conspicuous absence of a “compound” so sorely evident in Army and Air Force installations elsewhere in Europe. Therefore, there was a continuous exchange between Italian and American families, as most apartment buildings in this small resort village were largely occupied by Italian families.
Lieutenant Harris does not mention the many social and cultural exchanges promoted by the wives’ clubs. Anyone visiting the Wednesday morning “open market” could not help but feel the close comradeship between the Italian wife and her American counterpart as they bargained for the best price on local produce. Well remembered, too, are the many typically American dinners served to Italian neighbors, the exchange of gifts on holidays, the welcome invitation to spend an Italian-style New Year’s in a landlord’s home, the joint art festivals, and exchange of recipes and culinary arts. And, of course, many of these friendships endure through the mails.
No one could exist long in Gaeta without learning some Italian. Few of us returned fluent—but some did. This was due in great part to the fact that in Europe, the local merchants, of necessity, speak several languages. Gaeta was a summer resort town of 20,000 gracious provincials in winter. In summer, it blossomed into a cosmopolitan city of 70,000 because of the influx of summer residents and tourists. Many a resident of Gaeta was required to express himself in several foreign languages in order to secure a living.
Granted there were American families that were not happy in Gaeta, but they did not take advantage of the many enjoyable and educational opportunities of living abroad. These are the same people who complain of life in Norfolk, Newport, and San Diego. It is an unfortunate fact of life that the malcontents often cry the loudest. I know I express the sentiments of the majority of American wives when I say that living in Gaeta, Italy, was one of the most precious experiences of a lifetime. It sold me personally on the Navy. I would pack my bags in ten minutes to return.
The Dignity of the Individual
Lieutenant Stephen M. Andres, U. S. Navy—At every level of responsibility, two questions should be asked daily—“Why?” and “Why not?” Why must bachelor junior officers reside in “adequate” Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ), while their married counterparts may opt for a quarters allowance? Why shouldn’t the basic quarters allowance be a realistic figure compatible with current rental figures? Why weren’t enlisted personnel allowed to wear their working uniforms home, off-base, long before Admiral Zumwalt, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations finally abolished this silly restriction? Why not permit motorcycles to be driven and parked on every Navy base if properly registered and insured? Why shouldn’t service at the base hospital, Navy Exchange, commissary, and laundry be prompt and cheerful? Why should a Serviceman have to take his uniform to a private tailor for proper service? Why not permit Servicemen to wear their hair longer if it is neatly trimmed?
Trivia? A myriad of insignificant items? Perhaps, but the summation of these “insignificant” items is what is driving highly-motivated young people out of the Navy.
The commanding officer must institute these new policies and ensure complete continuity of discipline. None of his authority has been removed by Admiral Zumwalt’s new privileges for Servicemen; the CNO has merely established guidelines for action and made an impassioned appeal for sound, positive, leadership—leadership that evokes performance because the sailor wants to do it, not because he fears retribution.
In December 1969, the Department of Defense Human Goals Credo was drafted. It stated, in part:
Our nation was founded on the principle that the individual has infinite dignity and worth. The Department of Defense, which exists to keep the nation secure and at peace, must always be guided by this principle. In all that we do, we must show respect for the Serviceman and civilian employee as a person recognizing his individual needs, aspirations, and capabilities.
This remarkable statement is signed by the Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unfortunately, the spirit of this Credo must be implemented by the local unit commanders. Inspired leadership is the crux of the new dignity of the individual. When the spirit of this Credo has pervaded every level of the chain of command, then retention problems will cease forever.