Containerization and the Ports: The Load Center Concept
By Lieutenant (j.g.) Sidney W. Emery, Jr., U. S. Navy
With the advent of full container vessels, those ships built with cellular holds to accommodate containerized cargo, there has come a rude awakening to port authorities all over the world. Once the virtual dictators of the shore-side movement of seagoing liners, many ports now find themselves forced into legal action or grandiose economic overtures to the major containership operators in order to secure services to that port. For purely economic reasons, major containership service by the liner companies has proved a boon to centrally located ports, while at the same time cutting deeply into the traffic and hence the profits of the less-centrally located harbors.
Fully containerized vessels operate among a small group of selected ports in order to take maximum advantage of increased turnaround speed. Fewer port calls mean more time at sea and hence less dead time in the ship’s revenue-producing schedule. Like the giant tankers which now shuttle between the Persian Gulf and Japan, the Mediterranean, and Northern Europe, containerships require specialized port facilities. While the 300,000-plus dwt. tankers require deeper-dredged channels and docking facilities, the containerships need giant container cranes, dockside straddle carriers, or truck trailers and railroad flatbed cars, and extensive acreage for stacking the transient containers. Because of the large sums necessarily invested to support the full container service, only those ports with the largest current or expected traffic volume can afford to attract such vessels. The alternative method—shipboard crane facilities—is generally too costly in terms of lost topside stacking space, ship stability, and investment in the mobile shipborne crane itself. To date, only one major line has taken this route (the Swedish-based Johnson Line, serving the U. S. West Coast-Northern Europe-Scandinavia areas), and here, the decision was made, possibly in light of an intention to serve areas without such container handling facilities.
Thus it is that the giant containerships in the liner trade may be found only in major container ports, and most likely will never throw over a line in many of the ports to which the owners offer full container service. The indirectly-served ports are handled overland by contract carriers or through the use of smaller “feeder” ships that are able to operate economically by shuttling along the coast loading and discharging anywhere from one to several hundred containers in the smaller ports. This method of container service has been termed that of “load center” service because the major leg of the trip is carried between two or three major ports. As a result of this centering on the major ports, many of the smaller coastal cities that previously enjoyed an increasing use of their port facilities as overseas trade expanded, now are faced with extensive cutbacks in port employment and facility use.
That the load center concept is not a passing trend unique to several areas was established in a recent Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) hearing involving a foreign consortium of shipowners and the cities of Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington. In this case (Docket No. 70-24), the examiner upheld the previous decision to allow six Japanese lines to establish and maintain a three-vessel transpacific containership service between Japan and the states of Washington and Oregon, and British Columbia. In the preliminary negotiations, both Portland and Seattle fought for the distinction of becoming the load center for the entire Northwest, servicing both outbound cargo for the Far East and inbound “overland common point” traffic headed for inland cities. Failing this, they each desired to be the first city to be served by the Japanese consortium.
At the time when service was to be initiated (mid-1970), Seattle held a distinctive edge in Far East traffic. In 1969, consortium vessels carried over 500,000 tons to Seattle and 160,000 tons to Portland. Additionally, in 1969, the six lines carried 2,496 containers to Seattle, while shuttling only 36 containers to Portland. Comparable traffic to Vancouver, British Columbia was 1,069 containers. Citing economic factors, the six lines chose initially to serve Seattle and Vancouver and, based upon a review of the results of the three-vessel operation during the winter 1970-71 season, decide whether to serve Portland in early spring of 1971. Portland was so informed in early February 1970. Subsequently, the Commission of Public Docks of the City of Portland initiated legal action to force service to that city; charging, among other factors, unfair discrimination and clandestine determination to restrict service from Portland.
In the process of litigation, many subjects were covered, but one of the key points was that of upholding the load center concept. Apropos these proceedings was a statement by Robert Edwards, General Manager, Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, Liverpool, England, in a 1968 report entitled “Seminars on the Container Revolution:”
One has got to remember the commodities now are extremely expensive and therefore the importer wishes them to be as short a time as possible in the pipeline. . . . There has got to be a change . . . a change of attitude, a change of trading patterns, a change in methods of buying and selling, a giving up of a lot of old loyalties to ports, shipping lines, shipping companies, forwarding agents . . . The old personal loyalties will go out of it and the only thing that matters as I’ve said before, the only crux of the thing for its success, is whether the man at the end of the line gets what he wants, when he wants it, at the right price. In this respect, the ports have got to make a pretty courageous decision. We’ve got to decide whether we’re going to supply the services in the hope that we will make them sufficiently efficient and economical to attract people to use them, or we just throw up our hands and say we’re not going in for containers at all . . . many ports, not only in the United Kingdom, but in America and other countries, are going to find that they are going to lose a lot of trade to a small number of large ports who run container services.
Further evidence that load centers will acquire more and more of the overseas container traffic, is given by the legal precedent established in a 1962 Federal Maritime Commission ruling between the San Diego Harbor Commission and Matson Navigation Company of San Francisco. It was therein stated that selection of ports is the prerogative of the carriers, and the FMC cannot compel a carrier to serve a particular port. Similarly, the six Japanese lines argued that no port has the vested right to demand the initiation of a new service.
The examiner ultimately upheld that the “. . . judgment of the Lines in this instance was and is based on nothing more than bona fide business factors. Under the facts and the law here in issue, the Commission should not, and legally speaking, cannot require otherwise.” It should be noted, however, that the consortium did eventually initiate service to Portland well before the stated decision time of spring 1971. The newly-launched 1,010-container capacity Beishu Maru sailed from Portland for the Far East on 23 January 1971.
Elsewhere in the United States, other small ports are encountering difficulties in maintaining port facilities for containers. New England is perhaps worst hit by the load center concept. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine in early 1970, Thomas Soules of the Massachusetts Port Authority stated that:
. . . The New England Ports have the water depth, the channels, the piers, the labor, and the land transportation for general cargo. They are, however, finding it difficult to stand up to the competition of the superport of New York . . . huge vessels, which by design are wedded to the “two-port concept,” require . . . huge volumes of cargo. Where in the 1950s, ships would make an outport call for 100 tons of cargo on regular service and 250 tons on regular calls and 500 tons for special calls, by 1970, the break-bulk general cargo ships needed 500 tons to break even at a regular call to outports and 750 tons or more for special calls. Containerships, lash ships, and the other superships are far more demanding.
These effects have been felt throughout the United States. In Waterborne Feeder Subsystems for Unitized Cargo Transportation, Arthur D. Little, Inc., stated that New York had been designated the express port for the North Atlantic Trade Area, while Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk were chosen as feeder ports. Similarly, in the Gulf, New Orleans was chosen as the express port and Corpus Christi, Galveston, Beaumont, Mobile, and Pensacola as feeder ports.
That such a load center practice is already prevalent may be noted in container volume statistics for various U. S. and foreign ports. Figure 1 indicates the relative advantage New York has over the so-called feeder ports in terms of traffic volume. Competition for load center in the Gulf is still waging, while Oakland and Los Angeles vie for the title in the Southwest. Seattle holds the edge in the Northwest.
Interestingly, the same concept appears to prevail over container flows to and from European ports. Figure 2 illustrates the competitive advantage held by the Rotterdam-Europort area. Of the five biggest in Western Europe, Rotterdam handled 44% of the container traffic, while Antwerp booked 25% in 1969.
[Figures 1 & 2: “Comparative container freight volumes, U. S. and European ports. (Expressed in standard 20-foot International Standards Organization units)”]
Typical among the modern lines that service the highly-containerized North Atlantic trade is the Dart Containerline. Composed of the Belgian Maritime Company, Clarke Traffic Services (a Canadian firm), and the Bristol City Line (British), the consortium operates three new 1,556 20-foot container capacity vessels between the U. S. East Coast and Northern Europe. The Dart America, the Dart Europe, and the soon-to-be-completed Dart Atlantic provide weekly service with port calls at Antwerp, Southampton, Halifax, New York, Norfolk, and Baltimore. However, the Dart Containerline advertises and accepts containerized cargo for feeder service to Amsterdam, Aarhus, Bilbao, Bordeaux, Bremen/Bremerhaven, Copenhagen, Göteborg, Hamburg, Le Havre, London, Rotterdam, and Stockholm.
Similarly, on the U. S. West Coast, Matson Lines, a major unsubsidized liner operator between Hawaii and the West Coast, directly enforces load center usage. In taking delivery of the biggest U. S. containership, Hawaiian Enterprise, in March 1970, the containership and bulk sugar carrier operator further underscored the load center concept on that trade. Matson vessels operate on, at most, a three-port schedule with some containerships shuttling directly between Los Angeles and Honolulu, or San Francisco (Oakland), and Honolulu. The Enterprise and her sister, the Hawaiian Progress, run triangle routes connecting Los Angeles and San Francisco with the islands on each 14-day circuit. Simultaneously, the Hawaiian Queen provides direct container service between Seattle, Portland, and Honolulu. Much of the cargo carried in these ships is overland common point with final destination a smaller port or some inland city.
The Japanese, too, are no exception to the gravity laws of the load center concept. More and more cargoes are being concentrated at the three ports of Kobe, Nagoya, and Yokohama as the key container terminals in the islands.
With all indicators pointing toward a fuller use of load center ports in liner cargo traffic, a change in attitude of port authorities throughout the world is in order. No longer will it be sufficient merely to service the ships that call, but rather, there must be an active program of attracting back some of the traffic volume lost to larger, more aggressive ports. In many instances, such as the ports of Northern New England, even this policy will be useless. In such cases, the only means for survival in the container trade will be the advancement of frequent and efficient feeder service to load centers. More attention should be given to the smaller containerships such as the Merrimac class proposed by Bath Iron Works in the recent Maritime Administration standard ship proposals. Such vessels are better suited to feeder service than the “superships.” It is time some of the smaller ports weighed anchor and changed course. Servicing the big boys is not for everyone.
They Are Not Expendable
By Commander Allen E. Weseleskey, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Six
The radical changes in the weapons of war that began in 1945 and are still in process today strongly imply that military experience relevant to large-scale war may no longer provide adequate guidance. Nations—particularly the United States and its major potential enemies—are vulnerable in totally new ways, and military preparations can never again be put off until after hostilities have started. (E. S. Quade and W. I. Boucher, Systems Analysis and Policy Planning, 1968).
Honed to a sharp degree of readiness through competitive and stimulating training exercises, the carrier pilot and his naval flight officer teammate are a valuable asset within the precise workings of the attack carrier weapons system (CVWS). Their value is one which cannot be discounted. But, a careful look beyond the carrier striking force at the role of these aviators, suggests that they must be expendable.
To fulfill their role as a component within the system that supports them, these men are committed to deploy and carry out their part of the Navy mission: “. . . train for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.” In Southeast Asia, when those flight crews became victims of enemy defensive fire, they essentially began a painful exit from the attack carrier weapons system. The cost and value of their aircraft immediately became a statistic, written off the inventories of our accounts. However, the crew’s usefulness, freedom, and knowledge were valuable elements we could reclaim and recycle into the system. What was needed was some other unit from the weapons system to rapidly locate, defend, and extract the men. And beyond the accounting loss of these men, a third loss is incurred—a psychological loss that affects not only families, but shipmates and fellow aviators. Each loss takes a silent and unquantifiable toll that in some way must affect the very weapons system itself.
The funds and efforts concentrated to develop these men and their aircraft into a precision system of man and machine have by-passed an important element in the carrier weapons system: the Crew Recovery Element.
With the continuing withdrawal from U. S. overseas bases and staging areas, the commitment for combat rescue, on land as well as at sea, becomes an increasing responsibility of the Navy’s operations. In that respect, we found ourselves unprepared for a rescue contingency in the initial operations of Southeast Asia. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, responded by providing the initial, logical solution of search and rescue (SAR) detachments composed of SH-3 and UH-2 helicopters that gave heroic assistance to numerous downed Navy pilots, inland as well as at sea. These helicopter squadrons and crews were not specifically organized, trained, or equipped to perform a combat SAR role. They were trained to provide close aboard CVA “angel” jobs and to perform utility, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and vertical replenishment (VertRep) tasks so necessary to operations at sea. In Vietnam, the helicopters faced the multiple tasks of search, overland navigation, aircraft and personal self-defense and, hopefully, the ultimate recovery of downed survivors. With the protection afforded by what this author terms “unarmed aluminum-foil wrap,” these gallant crews accomplished some of the most daring rescues recorded in the pages of combat history.
Initially, the helicopter crews’ swift, bold actions caught the enemy by surprise, unaware and unprepared to cope with the embarrassing rescues of our men. But as time elapsed, the enemy adjusted his posture and the helicopters found rescue attempts frustrated and thwarted. Enemy fire and quick reaction by ground forces to capture our air crews overcame our relatively slow and often delayed recovery system. Then, as air action over enemy territory tapered off, so did our willingness to commit and expose the virtually unarmed helicopters to rescue situations. Unfortunately, interest in further development of the crew recovery element appears to have diminished, also.
Now, during the period of austere funding and development, a new “mechanical palm tree” embryo is in the offing. The light airborne multi-purpose system (LAMPS) will extend the search and attack capabilities of destroyers and escort vessels by deploying helicopters directly from the decks of these ships. While the two primary missions to be performed by LAMPS are ASW and Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD), there would also appear to be a potential SAR vehicle added to our Fleet capabilities, in relatively large numbers.
Coincident with LAMPS is the concept of the aviation-capable ship, the ship with a major flight deck platform and the associated aircraft maintenance facilities. An amphibious transport, dock (LPD), as an example, could embark a helicopter unit and/or a Harrier-type fixed-wing component, which would permit the projection of “over-the-horizon-response” in either the offensive or defensive roles. The formulation of these valuable assets not only could, but should, include in the mission, a capability for SAR reponse [sic] in support of our Fleet pilots.
Every helicopter has the potential to be used in numerous roles, but the crews are not necessarily trained or equipped to execute each potential capability. And, the crews certainly are not adept at low-level, overland mountainous or jungle rescue flying procedures. Of prime concern here is the combat SAR role, but apparently, only one West Coast squadron has given substantial consideration to combat rescue in its training. The program of this squadron is extensive, and includes air-to-ground gunnery, weapons check-outs, and crew self-defense.
With an effective combat SAR, there comes a vast increase in factors of confidence, morale, esprit de corps, and pride, both to the carrier pilots, who may need a brief assist, and to the helicopter crews. With properly trained and designated aircrews, with appropriate aircraft modifications incorporated, and with adequate planning and use, the cost of initial entry into a conflict will be greatly reduced simply by the recovery of airmen we would otherwise lose. And, quite obviously, that morale factor projects beyond the system, beyond the Navy, and goes into the nation, to encompass the families, relatives, and the entire national community. Certainly, we cannot be so confident of our military and political posture that a policy of apparent indifference prevails and that the aspect of combat SAR may be shrugged off.
Our helicopter crews, utility or ASW, can effectively perform the basic rescue mission under combat conditions anywhere in the world. But, they need the priority, the training, and the equipment to be able to perform that SAR mission. For this future rescue capability to become a reality, to provide a combat SAR capability to our carrier aircrews, we must:
(1) Obtain a clearer conception of essential needs for operations today and a sound appraisal of future requirements.
(2) Train our helicopter aircrews in low-level, overland, evasive flying techniques, in proper weapons use, in inland rescue as well as sea rescue procedures and techniques, and thoroughly indoctrinate and test them in personal survival and self-defense techniques.
(3) Properly designate the individuals so trained for reference in training assignments and future operational tours.
(4) Provide proper personal and avionics equipment necessary to execute the mission. This includes such things as weapons, body armor, seats, and other protective devices, as well as an inertial navigation system and improved communications equipment.
(5) Increase the helicopter weapons armament to include rockets and cannon, in addition to machine guns, for employment in the ASW, as well as the combat SAR environment. (20-mm. and armor-piercing rockets can be devastating to a submarine hull.)
(6) Establish type commander criteria and machinery for a thorough evaluation and administration of SAR training and standards.
In the intermediate and long-range future we must:
(1) Begin vigorous planning for the development of rotary-wing and vertical take-off and landing (V/TOL), Harrier-type aircraft more capable of performing all missions in a hostile environment. These should be high-speed vehicles with armor shielding in critical component areas.
(2) Initiate an aggressive weapons improvement program that will provide weapons kits to enhance the capabilities of Navy helicopters and V/TOL aircraft to meet the SAR missions when assigned or required.
(3) Provide for the communications equipment, as well command and control networks, to reduce the vital time element essential in SAR.
(4) Initiate a study of the present and potential capabilities of the helicopter as a modern offensive weapons platform.
(5) Provide funding, guidance, and direction to upgrade the use and capabilities of all helicopters employed at sea.
As a basic tenet of military helicopter operations, it is suggested that any helicopter that may be subjected to operations in a hostile environment should be given the ability to defend itself as well as to project an offensive threat to an enemy. This is within the present state of the art, and, as demonstrated in Vietnam, the helicopter of today is a weapons platform of proven value. Properly developed and exploited, it can make an even more significant contribution to naval air operations, thereby ensuring that, just as our airmen believe, they are not expendable.