“The Career Officer as Existential Hero”
(See D. G. Deininger, pp. 18-22, November 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain W. T. Holmes, U. S. Navy—A dispassionate side-by-side examination of Lieutenant (j.g.) Deininger’s article and Captain Hanks’s now notorious Prize Essay, will show quite clearly that the palm went to the wrong man. You have done a great service in printing this young officer’s sensible and sincere rebuttal to the bombast which preaches only to the older members of the choir.
It is refreshing and heartening to find such felicity of style, courage of conviction, and all-too-rarely-found acquaintance with literature outside trade journals and pedestrian historical files in your pages. My warm congratulations to the lieutenant.
Rear Admiral J. H. Nevins, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—It is to be hoped that as Lieutenant (j.g.) Deininger matures in his chosen profession, one of his heroes, Lord Jim, will have a diminishing appeal. Lord Jim did not exactly measure up when he abandoned ship.
Lieutenant (j.g.) John E. Bresch, Chaplain Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—If the mentality and attitude expressed by Lieutenant (j.g ) Deininger represents a majority opinion to the problems of military service among the Academy’s midshipmen, then I personally am relieved and encouraged for the future of the U. S. Navy and the quality of its commissioned officers.
In so many ways, this article integrates the finest traditions of naval patriotism and a respect for the diverse opinions that have always benefited American democracy. Whatever interpretation is given the toast of Stephen Decatur in 1816, there can be no doubt that it is used today by many to disguise a national conceit and falsity which, if allowed to spread, could be completely deleterious to national unity.
“Against All Enemies”
(See R. J. Hanks, pp. 22-29, March; pp. 97-101, June; pp. 89-96, July, pp. 95-96, August; p. 85, October; pp. 81-82, November; and pp. 79-82, December 1970; and pp. 81-82, January 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant (j.g.) Edward Rea, U. S. Naval Reserve—I read with interest Captain Cook’s comment in the December issue. As a member of the Concerned Officers’ Movement, I appreciate full well the dangers involved in military officers speaking out in public on any political issue. When, however, it becomes apparent, as Captain Cook notes, that senior officers are actively supporting the administration in purely political matters, then the conscientious officer must either try to ensure that such action is terminated—a neat trick for a lieutenant (j.g.)—or else attempt to provide some counterbalance to the views expressed. The latter course is being chosen by a number of junior officers at present. It is their contention that if the right to public political expression is to be tacitly granted to some officers, it must be extended to all, lest the public be lead to assume that the military is engaged in promoting partisan viewpoints.
It seems inevitable that if senior officers persist in their political actions, they must expect equal perseverance from dissenting junior officers. This is not an attractive solution to the problem of ensuring military neutrality in matters of public debate, but under present circumstances it seems the only viable solution.
Book Review—“Bathymetric Navigation and Charting”
(See S. E. Drummond, Jr., p. 91, February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Philip M. Cohen, Author of “Bathymetric Navigation and Charting”—Commander Drummond and I—and others like us—must be wrong about the importance of environmental data for a variety of urgent purposes. How else explain the relegation of geophysical surveys generally to an effort of relatively meager priority? Survey work will never compete with more exotic projects of which it seems there is no end in oceanography.
Let’s face it—a habitat experiment, work with man-eating sharks, extraction of precious metals from the sea, or the sex life of a mermaid under simulated conditions at various pressures—all of these things will make the news media more readily than drab, mundane, unexciting, systematic survey work.
We need to understand processes at work—we will need maps. We need to learn about living populations—we will need maps. We need to survey and report on non-living resources in the sea—we will need maps. We need to know about seabed jurisdictions, likely engineering sites, where to dispose of wastes, the significance of ecological relationships, where to navigate with confidence, decide where to expend many millions on specific locations. Again, we will need maps for all of these. Artists’ renditions of the seafloor are very nice, but try to locate a lost submarine in time to save lives, find an H-bomb, or attempt to make logical decisions on future work in the oceans—and everyone wants to know why we do not have the geophysical and other maps we need.
No one doubts the importance of food from the sea, environmental problems, boundary matters, or mining on or under the seafloor. The book is a pleas [sic] for a planned, rational, systematic approach towards collecting data, the lack of which may make these other worthwhile aspirations not worth a whit.
“Project WAGON”
(See C. E. White, pp. 121-123, August 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander William T. Pendley, U. S. Navy—Commander White has indeed done the patrol squadron (VP) community a service by advancing a brief summary of Project WAGON, where it may now receive the attention it deserves. Various similar proposals for reorganization, including Project WAGON, have been advanced, studied, and restudied—or simply staffed to death. Most of these proposals have sought the same basic objectives, obviously necessary now, and so reasonably attainable within present limited resources that many of us cannot understand the hesitation and indecision. It is as if everyone were trying to find out what that anonymous “they” at the next higher level wanted prior to supporting any new proposal.
The first objective of any VP reorganization should be the consolidation of limited maintenance and administrative talent. “Early cuts” and other personnel policies have reduced talent levels immeasurably, even when manning levels have been maintained. This reduced talent level, coupled with the increased sophistication of ASW equipment and no real reduction in operational commitments, makes maintenance consolidation essential. Personnel, educational, legal, and general welfare services, to all ranks, suffer from limited administrative talent spread thin and constantly turning over. The self-contained, self-supporting VP squadron is becoming a myth and an anachronism in this age of sophisticated electronic packages, complicated test equipment, automated supply system, and computerized personnel management. Reorganization could move us toward the consolidation of talent.
A second major objective should be the elimination of dual chains of command and control. Training and intermediate maintenance activities should be brought directly under the operational commander and, consequently, made more responsive to his requirements. Dual chains only complicate operations and increase paperwork while limiting responsiveness. Reorganization could bring those organizations critical to VP operations into a single chain of command, and thus increase responsiveness.
A third objective should be a decrease in family separations and increased stability in squadron scheduling. Both of these are important retention factors. Replacement and refresher training conducted at the home base locations of squadrons would eliminate the present temporary additional duty (TAD) expenses and inherent family separations or trailer hopping. A cyclic approach to training, readiness buildup, deployment, and leave similar to the fleet ballistic missile (FBM) program could increase stability as well as professional capability.
Unnecessary forces overseas could be cut back by recognition of the mobility and speed of the P-3 aircraft, and this should result in reduced deployment cycles with ready squadrons maintained in the continental United States. Reorganization could thus move toward less family separation, decreased TAD expenditures, and firmer schedules, taking advantage of increased mobility and readiness.
The fourth and primary objective of any reorganization must be increased capability and professionalism. The answer to the search for real air ASW capability is no secret, and is widely recognized as the ability to place well-trained, stabilized crews in the best maintained and equipped aircraft possible on-station. The cyclic approach to training, readiness buildup, deployment, and leave could increase both capability and ASW professionalism. A further improvement would be the assignment to each wing of responsibility for specific deployment sites on a continuing basis, so that its squadrons would become expert in the operating environment, available facilities, area intelligence, and the like, of their individual geographic areas of responsibilities. Increased capability and professionalism can be advanced by reorganization.
Few deny that the objectives outlined are desirable goals now, but there are some who deny reorganization will aid in their attainment. To this, one can only answer that the present organization is certainly not attaining these objectives. Others want a gradual approach going only a small way and avoiding any major reorganization. Past experience seems to indicate, however, that half measures give less than half results. Some say there are flaws in all of these new reorganization plans, and undoubtedly there are. These flaws, however, seem insignificant compared to those of the present organization, and it is against that criteria, and not some vague utopia, that the new proposals must be matched.
One must hope that the article may trigger action on Project WAGON and related proposals. Study is always necessary, but study and restudy should never become a convenient substitute for decision and responsible action. Let us hope, too, that the CNO project study recommended by Commander White will be convened, and that it will be directed by personnel current in P-3 squadron operations, who understand today’s capabilities and limitations. Most of all, let us further hope that this study will result in clear recommendations and not serve merely as still another study convened to postpone difficult decisions.
“Our Crowded Skies”
(See R. J. Koch, Jr., pp. 26-33, September 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Anatole Browde, Director, CNI Systems, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Eastern Division—As a manufacturer and operator of the time/frequency collision avoidance system, we would like to clarify one comment regarding the possibility of achieving an economical collision avoidance system.
McDonnell Douglas has recognized from the beginning that the sophisticated air transport system must be scaled to the needs of general aviation. Our time/frequency collision avoidance system for the airlines is actually scaled upward in capability from the EROS I, which has protected Navy and Air Force F-4 aircraft in over 15,000 flights in the St. Louis area. This was done to simplify general aviation systems, in effect, enabling small aircraft to be synchronized by the airlines. We are certain that a much simplified version for general aviation could be marketed in the $2,000 to $3,000 range. Of course, much of the sophistication of the airline system would be omitted, and power budgets would be greatly reduced. Full protection, however, would be provided between all equipped aircraft on a cockpit-to-cockpit basis.
The small aircraft collision avoidance system was the subject of a McDonnell Douglas study contract sponsored by NASA. The results of this analysis are in public print. Cost figures near those derived by us have also been confirmed by other electronics manufacturers.
We see airline implementation of cockpit-to-cockpit collision avoidance taking place in the next two years. General aviation equipment should be available in the same time period.
“A Wetter, Better NROTC”
(See J. W. Corey, Jr., pp. 64-67, June 1970; pp. 82-83, February; and p. 94, March 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Ensign Bruce B. Byron, U. S. Navy—The midshipman’s concern while in school is his college experience (e.g., classes, papers, tests, parties, and sports). To place an active ROTC program in competition with these school year activities, places a severe strain on a student’s prime resources—time and money.
A questionnaire given to the University of Texas NROTC unit in the spring of 1970, showed great dissatisfaction, not with the ideal of the program, but with the conflicting demands and the lack of monetary compensation for the great amount of time required during both the school year and summer vacation.
The cruise, for example, virtually rules out the possibility of obtaining a good job during the summer, and full-time summer jobs generally pay midshipmen much more in three months, than the Navy pays him all year. As a consequence, 43% of University of Texas midshipmen had part-time jobs during the year, and, even with the proposed raise to $100.00 a month subsistence, 33% of these midshipmen said they would have to continue to work. Meanwhile, universities like Texas are placing greater academic demands on their students. In this tenuous position, it is not surprising to find that 84% of the University of Texas midshipmen considered themselves inadequately compensated for their time and efforts.
The questionnaire revealed that if summer cruises were made optional, 50% of those who replied would not go on the third class cruise; over 50% would not go on the aviation/amphibious cruise; while over 62% of the midshipmen replied that they would go on the more educational and glamorous first class cruise—solid support for Lieutenant Commander Corey’s proposal of more work and play for the summer cruises.
The proposed program would allow the midshipmen to participate fully in their college or university. They would also have enough contact with their parent unit through administration so as to feel a part of the program, and to have a constructive summer program that would be worth the loss of income.
Elimination of drill and lab, which attempt to accomplish military training in a civilian education environment, would do much to eliminate the criticism of “Mickey Mouse” activities and the ironic situation of a midshipman failing academic courses because of his participation in unit activities. Under this new approach, civilian and military would remain united within the individual, but separated into their appropriate environments. It does not require too much insight to see that, while carrying an M-14 rifle around the hills of Camp Pendleton is quite appropriate, having masses of armed men parading around college campuses tends to conflict with the image of free and peaceful higher education.
The NROTC program achieves its success by allowing the gradual infusion of the Navy way of life into men who are obtaining a high-quality civilian education. This scheme, by combining the high quality and broad education of the college graduate inherent in officer candidate school with the thorough training and indoctrination inherent in the Naval Academy, creates a desirable hybrid.
“And the Walls Came Tumblin’ Down”
(See C. K. Ferguson, pp. 70-75, August 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Robert E. Bassler, Civil Engineers Corps, U. S. Navy (Retired)—In the article on the passing of the old Navy (temporary) building, it might have been noted that then Commander Arch Parsons, Civil Engineers Corps, U. S. Navy, and then Lieutenant Ben Moreell, Civil Engineers Corps, U. S. Navy, were, I understand, responsible for the rapid construction of that building. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was duly impressed and remembered. Admiral Parsons was later Chief of Bureau of Docks (BuDocks) in 1929-1933. Later, in 1937, F.D.R. had his attention called to Ben Moreell, with the result that outstanding professional ability was available when war broke out. And most important, the drydock program at Pearl Harbor, started by Admiral Moreell, was ready for the 7 December 1941 disaster.
Looking back, we were most fortunate to have had Admiral Moreell at the BuDocks helm during World War II. In addition to fathering the Seabees, he was, beyond any doubt, the greatest driving force for construction in the Navy.
The N-1 seaplane, shown on page 78 of the September 1970 issue of the PROCEEDINGS, was being designed when I first was employed in the Bureau of Construction and Repair (C&R) (aviation). The picture shows a machine gun mounted on the non-recoil gun. The idea was to start firing the machine gun at the submerged submarine, and when the splashes arrived at the submarine, then the trigger of the non-recoil was activated. One pilot told me that he was very lucky because the recoil charge (which fired rearward to offset the recoil of the cannon) fortunately missed hitting the leading edge of the upper wing. As might be noted from the picture, it would seem that the gun would almost have to be fired at the horizon for the recoil charge to hit the wing.
“The Helicopter: Hazardous at Any Height?”
(See W. H. Baker, pp. 56-61, October 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Major Howard W. Whitfield, U. S. Marine Corps—I agree that very little has been done to improve the survivability of helicopter crews in a crash. But after flying Marine UH-34s and CH-46s in combat in Vietnam, I definitely feel that the encapsulation system is the wrong direction to go. It is a case of all or nothing, we either get the system or we do not (and it is expensive). In operation, if one phased element fails, you have had it.
U. S. Marine Corps helicopters should be retrofitted for better crash worthiness. Other than running into mountains at night or in bad weather, relatively few Marines that have been killed in helicopters were lost falling out of the sky uncontrollably, as a result of their aircraft having a blade failure or a mid-air collision. A number were killed or injured from crashes going in and out of rough area landing zones or following forced autorotations, because of subsequent fires or pilots’ seats coming loose.
Only because we got involved in the Vietnam war are safety officers, pilots, and others now asking why we did not specify that aircraft bought for future combat use be designed for combat. You may remember the fixed-wing “jocks” having their problems over North Vietnam, with aircraft systems having high peacetime reliability and poor combat survivability.
Old Navy—“The Cruise of the Neversink”
(See T. K. Thomas, pp. 151-153, October 1969; and p. 97, April 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Vice Admiral F. M. Trapnell. U. S. Navy (Retired)—This discussion raises some technical points which cast doubt on the judgment, to say nothing of ethics, of the officer of the deck in countermanding the captain.
A square-rigged sailing vessel, in contrast to a fore-and-after, is designed to live with the wind aft—specifically in the manner in which her rig is braced. Above the lower masts, her forestays are comparatively weak. When turned into the wind with helm down, she is taken aback, is tacked only with difficulty; and, in a breeze, is in danger of losing her foretopmast and topgallant mast—unless in extremis her sheets and/or halyards are let go.
When the helm is put up, the wind goes off, revealing no inherent weakness in the rig; the relative wind decreases with ship’s speed; and sail may be shortened in an orderly fashion. Thus, at first glance, the captain’s command to “Hard up the helm!” would appear to be logical and correct. The alternative, “Hard down,” would seem to be justified only if parts of the rig were deliberately sacrificed—presumably to avoid the vessel’s going over on her beam ends.
The inference is clear that the squall or sudden gust was critical in severity; and the loss of topsails in this maneuver (with topmasts) was inevitable. But there is nothing to prove that the captain’s judgment was wrong or that countermanding his order was justified. We have only the author’s somewhat emotional judgment that this emergency required special handling.
“Terror”
(See H. R. Simpson, pp. 64-69, April; and pp. 89-90, February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Howard R. Simpson—Lieutenant Commander Brooks poses some valid questions in his letter that deserve a thoughtful answer. When I speak of the negative effects of counter-terrorism carried out by established authority or a government, I am talking about the dangers of developing the “If-you-can’t-lick-’em-join-’em” syndrome in such operations.
I do not class the elimination of enemy couriers, propaganda cadre, and political officers as counter-terrorism. These are acts of war in the context of guerrilla operations. But nothing is easy in this business, and we skate close to thin ice when it comes to identifying who these people are, obtaining information from others, questioning or holding members of their families, and the like. One can get further and further into the use of terror to the point where the “kidnapping” and “intensive interrogation” mentioned by Lieutenant Commander Brooks become synonymous with illegal detention (of possibly innocent men or women) and torture.
From the practical viewpoint, such counter-productive methods have shaken governments, undermined armies, and alienated important segments of the population. As one who has witnessed “intensive interrogations” during the old Indo-China War, I hope that the use of counter-terror does remain “distasteful” to the American mind.