More than 80% of Navy surface line officers choose to return to civilian life at the end of their first tour of obligated service. The current rate of Navy enlisted retention is about the same as the Army’s retention of draftees. As late as 1965, naval aviators “shipped over” at the rate of 56%; they now make a second tour at a rate of only 26%. Retention of nuclear submarine officers has fallen from 84% to 45% in the same period.
Obviously, the Navy is not providing the sort of environment in which today’s young man wants to pursue a career.
There are two broad categories of problems which contribute to the retention gap: the tangibles and the intangibles. Let us begin where most studies seem to end—with that most tangible of incentives, money.
Pay scales. Military pay scales do need to be raised, but if bigger paychecks were the answer, why have retention rates been plummeting when there have been almost yearly pay raises during the last five years? The Navy has attracted a sufficient number of men for decades, despite the fact that it has always been an underpaid profession. The reasons for the reversal of this trend must lie outside the factor of remuneration.
“Benefits” and the junior officer. One of the selling points most heavily relied upon in the encouragement of a naval career (and one of the most frequent justifications for the low salaries) is the existence of numerous benefits, such as retirement plans, exchange and commissary privileges, and free medical and dental care. The Navy has failed to realize that these attractions, while important to older personnel with large families, are of minimal importance to junior officers, and especially unimportant to bachelor junior officers. The young officer is far more interested in getting settled into an interesting, challenging, and satisfying career, whatever its retirement plan, than in the hazy considerations of what will be taking place 20 to 30 years in the future.
Moreover, the commissary is, of course, useless without a family. The exchange also offers little to bachelor officers, except for the occasional purchase of such major items as watches, cameras, and uniforms. Many items (such as civilian clothing) are of such mediocre quality and in such poor selection that shopping in the civilian market is usually preferred.
Medical and dental services are another example of “somebody else’s” benefits. Having undergone exhaustive medical checks before entering the Navy, the junior officer, in almost all cases, is in excellent health. On a statistical basis, he is therefore quite unlikely to experience the real advantages of free medical care during the three-to-five year period of service prior to his “shipping over” decision. Additionally, the few experiences that he does have—the endless waiting and slapdash treatment usually associated with such common experiences as annual physicals—often deepen his doubts about the value of this benefit.
The not-so-carefree bachelor. By its official and unofficial policies, the Navy often places the bachelor officer in a less desirable status than his married colleague. The Basic Allowance for Quarters policy, for example, bears no relation to any traditional theory of economic remuneration. All other professions realize that a man’s salary should be determined by those factors which relate to his employment, namely his responsibilities, productivity, special qualifications, and seniority. It should not be affected by his marital status. When the services pay more money to married personnel, they are admitting that their pay scales are so low that married life is impossible without extra money. Most unfair is the fact that, as a result of the pay differential and other policies, the married officer himself (not just his family) can afford more comfortable living conditions.
At virtually all sea duty stations, the bachelor officer is expected to live on board his ship when in port. A crowded junior officer stateroom cannot even remotely be considered an adequate situation in which to live. A place to relax, entertain, and otherwise enjoy the occasional privacy needed by everyone should not be a luxury reserved for married personnel.
Other experiences, such as inadequate BOQ facilities and yard periods with no relief from shipboard conditions serve to make a mockery of the Navy’s professed concern for the welfare of its men. If housing, medical care, and other “benefits” are to be provided for naval personnel, the job should be done adequately, with equal privileges to married men and bachelors—or not at all. By maintaining the idea that such benefits should be provided for its men, and then doing a poor job of it, the Navy invites bitterness and ill will. The Hubbell Plan (i.e., eliminating most special allowances and then greatly increasing basic salaries) would make infinitely more sense.
Unofficial policies also cause minor problems at the command level. The married officer’s natural desire to maximize the time spent with his family often results in the juggling of in-port watch bills to the married officers’ benefit. Bachelors are consistently requested, frequently pressured, and occasionally ordered to standby situations to accommodate married officers’ family plans. Bachelor officers are repeatedly scheduled for those in-port watches which coincide with the evening meal and the wardroom movie, so that married officers in the duty section can have their wives on board for such occasions.
A little thing? Not when one considers the frequency and the discrimination involved. Bachelor officers recognize the serious disruption of family life experienced by married officers and do not mind making occasional concessions for the sake of their married colleagues; but, when taken advantage of, bad feelings occur.
The bachelor, then, has reason to conclude that the Navy is a “married man’s outfit,” and he seriously doubts that sufficient attention is being given to this problem by those presently seeking to improve the retention picture. The vast majority of naval officers are married, but those at the age of choosing a career generally are not. When the time comes to “ship over” or return to civilian life, many of the officers making this decision have had three or four years of service in which their impressions of the Navy were adversely affected by their bachelor status.
Promotions. The current policy of providing virtually automatic promotions for junior officers removes what could be a great source of better performance and increased satisfaction in the naval career. The promotions from ensign to lieutenant (junior grade) and from lieutenant (junior grade) to lieutenant are not now based on the idea of a reward for outstanding service or recognition of the capability to assume greater responsibilities. Instead, they have become almost an incidental by-product of time-in-service.
The ensign to lieutenant (junior grade) promotion comes too soon, and does not permit time for an adequate evaluation of the ensign. The lieutenant (junior grade) to lieutenant promotion is an entirely different matter. The three years of service currently required before this advancement should serve as an adequate basis for greater selectivity and flexibility in selections for promotion. Some meaning might be restored to the practice of putting on new stripes if the promotion process resulted in 20% of the eligible candidates being promoted “early,” 40% “on time,” 20% “late,” and 20% not at all.
“The Navy way.” Whereas “Don’t Give Up the Ship” rings down through the years as a famous Navy slogan, “Don’t Rock the Boat” would be a far more appropriate motto to express the mood of the modern Navy. The key to success (at least to the level of captain) seems to be the ability to “stay out of trouble.” Every junior officer has had the frustrating experience of seeing an apparently worthwhile suggestion shot down because it did not meet currently accepted Navy dogma; a helpful alteration to one of his ship’s spaces disallowed because it did not meet a type commander’s arbitrary stamp of approval; a request to dispense with an outmoded reporting requirement or piece of equipment denied by an unresponsive bureaucracy.
Such unrewarded attempts to improve upon “the Navy Way” result either in bitterness or apathy. A junior officer who has any sense of pride in his innovative abilities soon sees that this may actually be a hindrance to his regular promotion in later years.
One of the most unfortunate by-products of all this is the homogenizing influence it exerts on the personalities involved. To the junior officer, most senior officers seem, at best, rather bland; at worst, mediocre. When he considers that the officer corps is supposedly representative of the top 5 to 10% of all naval personnel, the junior officer is surprised to discover that the engaging personality, the inspiring leader, and the pleasantly eccentric individual are rarities. Not enough senior officers display the excitement, enthusiasm, diversity of interests, and sense of humor that should reasonably be expected to accompany their rank and responsibilities, and, most importantly, that would make serving under them a continually interesting and exciting experience.
One would expect the naval environment to mold a very interesting group of men. The officer moves to a new job every two years and faces a great variety of assignments and locales. One of the possible explanations for this paradox is the fact that few officers take advantage of the many opportunities they have to expand their intellectual, cultural, and travel experiences. Such activities as a diverse reading program during off-duty hours underway, the mastering of a foreign language while on duty overseas, or the more constructive and adventurous use of leave periods are practiced by a bare minimum of naval officers.
One of the saddest aspects of my tour of duty in Gaeta, Italy, was the observation that not more than 10% of the officers stationed there made any effort to learn the Italian language. Despite numerous opportunities, a majority of the officers made nothing more than a few brief sight-seeing tours to Rome (only 90 miles away). Although the demands of work and family life were the usual justifications for such immobility, lack of interest seemed to be a much more plausible explanation.
As he looks about him, the junior officer too often reaches one of two conclusions: that life in the service must have a very narrowing effect on one’s interests, or that the people who choose to make the Navy a career are a rather uninteresting group of men.
Officer Candidate School. Most of the Navy’s junior officers receive their commissions as a result of their graduation from college and officer candidate school. The transition from university life to OCS can only be described as “cultural shock.” The crudest reality is not the acceptance of military discipline, but the transition from the vibrant atmosphere of a university to the cerebral void of OCS. The officer candidate suddenly finds himself at an institution in which rote memory replaces creativity as the key to “academic” success. The interesting discussions that could be conducted on such topics as leadership, morale, the world military situation, and seapower are almost completely absent from the curriculum. Instead, instructors usually present nothing more imaginative than the recital of an outline.
The importance of this poor initial impression of the Navy cannot be overemphasized. The task of officer retention must start at the beginning of an officer’s experience in the Navy. By failing to discover an interesting and challenging environment at OCS, many new ensigns leave that institution with a skeptical view of the naval career, which may not be overcome by even the best of later experiences.
When one considers (a) the inadvisability of greatly expanding the Naval Academy, (b) the uncertain future of NROTC units on many university campuses, and (c) the considerably smaller cost to the Navy of an OCS commission, the upgrading of OCS should be assigned a high priority. Every effort should be made to see that only the best personnel are assigned to the OCS faculty and staff, and that a tour at OCS be regarded as something other than a prelude to being passed-over.
Personnel Management. Wasted manhours, poor morale, and disrespect for the “system” are the results of the chaotic state of personnel management presently existing throughout the Navy. Since this problem is representative of gross inefficiencies and a lack of consideration for the personal well-being of the men involved, it must be recognized as an important factor in the retention problem. The “hurry up and wait” atmosphere should be treated as something other than an unavoidable concomitant of life in the Navy. In an era in which American management techniques are the model for the world, it seems ridiculous that the military is unable to apply enough of this expertise to our crushing personnel problems.
Perhaps the most lamentable manifestation of this problem is the poor level of staffing apparent at many commands. Personal experience in the USS Little Rock provided an excellent example. The ship would have functioned more efficiently, and with far higher morale, had the officer complement been cut in half. With a complement of about 75 officers, few junior officers held a position of real responsibility, either in their billets or in their watch-standing duties. Few ensigns had anything more than an assistant division officer job, and the officer watch bill was necessarily so overloaded that no one was able to assume a meaningful share of responsibility on watch. Such situations as five officers on the bridge and three in CIC, during even a routine transit operation, were the unfortunate result. Everyone suffers from such arrangements. Officers do not receive a sufficient depth of experience, and enlisted men too often have their normal responsibilities usurped in a most demeaning way.
Rather than investing the time, trust, and patience in producing a small but highly efficient team at every command, naval policy provides an abundant supply of bodies as the answer to many personnel problems. The usual excuses given for this policy are the rapid turnover problem and, ironically, the poor retention rate. This explanation reveals a rather cloudy conception of which is cause and which is effect. One of the causes of poor retention rates (and hence the turnover dilemma) is the existence of mundane jobs resulting from poor management practices.
To increase the professional satisfaction of the officer corps, the biggest single first step must be to provide a challenging and responsible position for every officer. An officer did not attend four years of university and undergo the rigors of the Naval Academy, NROTC or OCS to end up performing such jobs as publication inventories and corrections or supervisor of fantail sweepdowns. Contrary to popular opinion, what the junior officer really wants is a demanding schedule of relevant work.
The “big picture.” Although the formulation of plans and policies is necessarily a job for senior officers, too many opportunities are missed to acquaint the junior officer with this process. As long as this oversight continues, junior officers’ impressions of the Navy will be formed by the personalities, policies, and working relationships particular to their own isolated experience.
In most cases this failure to provide for familiarization with the Navy beyond the command level is the fault of the command itself. There is simply not enough communication and cross-fertilization of ideas between commands. The establishment of regular discussions, familiarization visits, and conferences between commands would help the officer make up his mind about continuing a naval career. The lead in establishing such policies must be taken by senior officers who view the subject of officer retention as something more than one of the mundane chores to be accomplished by an occasional training film or “shipping over” lecture.
Priorities. Much of the retention crisis must be attributed to the feelings of inferiority which many naval personnel feel in relation to the technical gadgetry that surrounds them daily. One continually witnesses a tragic system of priorities which places the design and maintenance of machines above the needs of the men who operate them. Electronics spaces are air conditioned to keep equipment cool, but the men in staterooms and berthing compartments continue to swelter in all but the most modern ships. Millions of dollars were spent in programs which modernized the weapons and electronics systems of ships, but did virtually nothing to improve their habitability.
The reversal of this philosophy must be assigned a high priority. Present economy measures dictate a choice between a smaller Navy which emphasizes quality, or a Navy of today’s size which will continue to operate with the marginal level of combat readiness and poor living conditions now afflicting many units. From the standpoint of the retention picture (admittedly, only one of the factors to be considered), the present budget squeeze should work a reduction in the size of the Navy rather than a reduction in quality.
A second group of reasons behind the decision of many junior officers to leave the Navy is, at the same time, the most important and most difficult to define.
“Life style” of the military profession. The military community, as a social unit, projects an almost cloistered impression to the junior officer.
Social life within the Navy seems to consist of little more than the repeated grouping of the same personalities at the typical command cocktail party. The officer who actively and purposefully cultivates a diverse circle of friends outside the military is a rarity, and is occasionally looked upon by his associates as something of an iconoclast.
Surrounding oneself with people of like-minded views is an activity all too common in the social life of most senior naval officers. The resulting insularity and lack of contact with the non-military world detract greatly from the ability of most military personnel to assess objectively or understand the social and political forces at work in the modern world. One of the most unfortunate results of this insularity is the almost uniformly conservative nature of political opinion within the military, and, more important, the fervent belief that such views are the only ones consistent with the patriotism expected of the military officer. The resulting gulf between the liberal and military communities is not surprising.
Additionally, political discussion of any ideological hue is looked upon as a subject unfit for intelligent conversation in the military. “Politics,” for example, is still one of those taboo subjects (along with religion and women) which is officially certified (OCS curriculum) as being unworthy of utterance at the wardroom table. No one is more aware than the junior officer that, whether we like it or not, we are living in a political age. Having recently left a university, where political bull sessions were probably a major pastime, the junior officer cannot help but feel quite isolated from the mainstream of American intellectual activity when confronted with the policy of political monasticism.
Nowhere is the insularity of military life more apparent than at the typical overseas duty station. During a tour of duty in Italy, this observer was continually aware of the existence of virtually separate American and Italian communities within the small town of Gaeta, despite the fact that the American families lived among the local population, and not on a base. The fact that only a handful of the officers felt a genuine obligation actively to further good relations between the two communities was a sad testimony to the level of concern with the American image overseas now held by the average naval officer. The spectacle of Navy wives complaining that the Italians in a small provincial town did not speak English made one almost embarrassed to be an American.
In the interests of reducing the clumsiness of the American military presence overseas and the corresponding irritation it frequently has on nationalistic sensitivities, and in the interest of providing a much more rewarding tour of duty for the Americans involved, language instruction and cultural briefings should be compulsory for all personnel (or, at least, for all officers) assigned to overseas duty or homeports.
The American military overseas is too often an eyesore and source of embarrassment in America’s efforts to walk softly through the thickets of international opinion. Although the Navy constantly emphasizes the importance of its people-to-people efforts, it does almost nothing to prepare its personnel for this vital task.
The military image. Presently, the public image of the military perhaps is at its lowest level in our nation’s history. The criticism now being directed at the “military-industrial complex,” the war in Vietnam, and the level of military spending is indicative of this trend. Whether or not this criticism is deserved is of little importance to the retention effort. The fact must be faced that it exists, and it exists disproportionately among young people. It must be recognized that this current image is an important factor, perhaps even the key factor, in the falling retention rates of the past five years. The diminishing public respect for the military profession has seriously tarnished the status and attractiveness of a career which exists for public service.
What to do about this state of affairs is perhaps the most important question facing those who will be charged with the responsibility of improving the retention picture. One avenue was suggested in last year’s PROCEEDINGS prize essay, in which a semi-active entry into the political arena by military officers was advocated by the author. This “Damn the Torpedoes” approach would play into the hands of those who are presently using the military as a scapegoat for all that is wrong with U. S. foreign policy. Such a departure from the military’s time-honored position “above” politics would simply be seized upon by the critics as fresh evidence that the military is assuming too much political influence, which, after all, is the heart of their argument.
On an earlier page a more active acquaintance with political ideas and opinions by military officers was urged. But, the line between political literacy and political activity should not be crossed.
In many ways, the restoration of the public’s respect for the military can only come about through the passage of time, after the bitter divisiveness of the Vietnam question dies away. Although it is difficult to foresee the new role to be defined for the military in our nation’s future foreign policy, it does seem safe to say that public respect for the military profession can only improve, provided that its leaders resist the understandable temptation to jump into the current fray. To attempt a sudden and unprecedented entry into the currently vitriolic political arena would be nothing less than a dangerous flirtation with grave Constitutional questions, which would merely fan the fires of antimilitary sentiment and extend the adverse image of the military to later generations.
In the meantime, it seems vital that the military must strive as never before to halt wasteful spending. Such “bills of goods” as the F-111, C-5A, DASH, and some of our new DEs must not again find their way into the military arsenal. The ever-greater urgency of America’s domestic ills demands that such luxuries become a thing of the past. Wasteful practices, if allowed to continue, will only provide excuses to cut into legitimate military expenditures.
Public service. The Navy must recognize that today’s younger generation is, more than any previous American generation, presented with a very broad range of possible careers in public service. The military profession is, more than ever before, in competition with other careers in the search for young men who are looking for a career of service to their country.
At the risk of beating to death a phrase that has been greatly overused in recent years, the “generation gap” seems to be an important factor in the officer retention problem. The differences in political persuasion play a part, but the more important aspects of “the gap” are the vastly different values placed by the younger generation upon such behavioral matters as the approach to problem-solving, the frankness of social and political expression, and a healthy skepticism toward any policy which is the result of nothing more than bureaucratic inertia.
Unfortunately, the junior officer finds himself in an environment in which these attitudes, methods, and values show little evidence of consistent application. Even more disturbing, the military gives the impression that it will resist the adoption of these criteria more fervently than any other American institution. In short, the younger generation see little chance of finding a meaningful outlet in a military career. They see an organization which is satisfied with sweeping its internal problems under the rug instead of forcefully attacking them—a way of life in which diversity, inventiveness, and individualism are rarely rewarded or encouraged—a career pitch which consists of retirement plans, fringe benefits, and other aspects of a womb-like security, father than a well-reasoned delineation of the Navy’s opportunities and future relevance.
A new profession. Any constructive critique should end with what is right about the Navy and what should be emphasized in a revitalized career of the future.
To begin with, the Navy should constantly remind junior officers that it has some unique experiences to offer the young man. The fantastic responsibilities of the OOD underway are perhaps the greatest trust bestowed upon 23-year old men anywhere. Qualification for this duty is a deeply satisfying experience which should be made available to as many junior officers as possible. The old recruiting slogan, “Join the Navy and see the World,” should be dusted off and divested of its cliché status. The travel opportunities offered by the Navy should be constantly emphasized. Other less tangible, but very important, factors include the matchless camaraderie of men at sea, the opportunity to change locales every two years (which does appeal to many people), the future challenge of command at sea, and, of course, the chance to serve one’s country. These unique opportunities are mentioned in current retention efforts but usually are only secondary, poorly-expressed afterthoughts to the rather dreary recital of “benefits.” Future retention efforts should break away from the BuPers “shipping over” approach of the past and take place in a much more personal atmosphere between senior and junior officers. The best salesman for a career is a sophisticated and articulate senior officer who loves his job.
The beginnings of reform in the Navy must, of course, start at the top. The most urgently needed quantity is a handful of leaders who have the imagination, compassion, and moral courage to undertake a dramatic and convincing shake-up of the Navy. This must be undertaken with a commitment to make the Navy a more rewarding and more challenging environment. It must be executed by leaders who are not afraid to stick out their necks and stake their careers on needed reforms. One sees this sort of personal commitment when such subjects as interservice budget allotments and alternative weapons systems are being debated, but rarely does it come to the fore when the real needs of people in the Navy are being considered.
Finally, the planning and execution of these reforms must be undertaken with a clean sheet of paper. A patchwork pattern of cosmetic touch-ups can no longer suffice in dealing with the immense retention problem now facing the Navy. Anything less than a completely fresh attitude seems doomed to be defeated by the very system it is trying to improve.
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A graduate of Yale University in 1965, Lieutenant Harris was commissioned in the U. S. Naval Reserve in October 1965, and served in the USS Richard B. Anderson (DD-786) from November 1965 to December 1967, making two deployments to WestPac. He then served in the USS Little Rock (CLG-4) from January 1968 until his release to inactive duty in July 1969. Now a second-year law student at the University of Michigan Law School, he is operations officer of Naval Reserve Surface Division 9-13 (S), Ann Arbor, Michigan.