Problems and Developments in Arctic Alaskan Transportation

Our Alaskan Arctic is awakening from its long and deep slumber in a vast expanse of ice, soggy tundra, cold, and myth. Our oil companies are spending millions to get at the tremendous quantity of Arctic oil that their experts claim lies buried 10,000 feet below the frozen tundra and the offshore shallow waters. Including the Canadian Arctic islands, estimates are now running between 30 and 100 billion barrels. To exploit this huge amount of oil is a challenge to our technology. We are marshalling our industrial efforts and focusing our attention on the barren North Slope where our nation faces the Arctic Ocean. Canadian industry and government are equally optimistic and involved with parallel developments in their northland.

Although other mineral resources, such as iron, copper, and lead are being developed in northern Canada, there are almost no Arctic Alaskan mineral resources other than oil readily available for easy commercial exploitation. This should be no cause for concern because the oil potential of that state overshadows all other resource development considerations and should provide a sufficient engine to power a strong Arctic economy capable of developing these other mineral resources.

The federal government has other primary concerns as well. It is concerned about conservation and about pollution of the environment. It has concern for the welfare of our Arctic citizens. Our relationship with Canada and the Soviet Union—with all nations who have an interest in the Arctic, our scientific needs in the Alaskan Arctic and in the polar basin, all these concerns require deliberation and reassessment. The strategic impact of events in the Alaskan Arctic, the area’s natural resources, and its influence on global atmospheric and ocean circulation systems, require a federal presence, a comprehensive research program, and guidance for future activities. In short, we need a statement of national Arctic policy.

No great argument can be made for large expenditures of tax dollars for extensive development of vast empty Arctic areas. The problems in our population centers elsewhere in the United States will take priority Yet, we cannot stand still. We cannot fail to plan; neither can we afford an uncoordinated or a hasty federal program. Opportunities abound to increase our national prestige and potential with only a modest federal investment; and to do it without a massive, heavy hand from Washington, D. C. Our tax money must be spent carefully and wisely after the federal role is clearly evaluated, and after national Arctic objectives are put into perspective.

We will consider the associated problems of federal responsibilities and of transportation systems, and present some suggestions for their solution. We will also try to confront the problems we cannot yet solve with the hopefully useful questions which we think should be phrased at this stage.

Transportation will play the key role as an exploratory stage of developing the North American Arctic gives way to the use or exploitation stage. In August of 1968, the Secretary of Transportation, Alan S. Boyd, recognized in his policy statement on developing a transportation system for Arctic Alaska, transportation was needed to provide access for passengers, and for both bulk and general cargo. Public and private investing would have to be coordinated. He emphasized the need to investigate whether the shipping season could be lengthened so as to permit development of more than occasional oceanic transportation to and from Arctic Alaska. In April of 1969, his successor, John Volpe, pledged his support, “in every possible way to establish a modern, orderly, efficient and modally integrated system of transportation for the State of Alaska.” But, first, we need to know more about the Arctic.

What is the Arctic?

The Arctic is not just everything north of the Arctic Circle, but rather that area where the average mean daily temperature of the warmest month of the year does not exceed 50°F. In America, that is everything north of the Yukon drainage basin in Alaska and north of the continuous tree line in Canada. Its boundary skews from the Mackenzie River Delta southeastward to the mid-coast of Labrador on the Atlantic Ocean near Goose Bay, well south of the Arctic Circle.

Arctic Alaska, thus defined, includes the mountainous Seward Peninsula, the 8,000-foot Brooks Range stretching across Alaska at the 68th parallel, and a 60-mile wide coastal plain along the north coast. This 300-mile plain, the North Slope, contains the Naval Petroleum Reserve #4, and the 140-mile wide area near Prudhoe Bay where oil exploration is currently very active.

The Middle North is that portion of Canada and Alaska which lies between the Arctic and the major areas of current development. In the Middle North, Eskimo and Indian settlements and towns and cities such as Churchill, Yellowknife, Whitehorse, and Fairbanks are located. The Middle North can generally be considered as the sub-Arctic. The sub-Arctic has been defined as those lands where the mean temperature exceeds 50°F for not more than four months a year and where the mean temperature of the coldest month is more than 32°F.

To cover all marine transportation to Arctic Alaska, I will include the Alaskan continental shelf (extending north from Nunivak Island in the Bering Sea), because in winter it is covered over with sea ice, and has, therefore, prevented all-season Arctic shipping from taking place to this time.

The Environment

The main factor limiting commercial development of resources in the Arctic and Middle North is the fierce environment. This aspect has become better understood through a century of fairly intensive exploration. Rapid strides are being made to measure and predict environmental conditions. Progress in our knowledge will, to some degree, determine the pace of all development. Building with inadequate knowledge of the Arctic environment would lead to expensive mistakes.

The environment of the Arctic and Middle North affects transportation in a variety of ways, some of which are familiar to residents in the “lower 48.” The cold of a Montana winter, the fog of New England, the snow of the Kansas plains, and the ice in Lake Erie have as much impact on the local transportation systems as do similar conditions in the Arctic. On the other hand, the Arctic tundra, permafrost, and 100-foot sea ice pressure ridges, are unique.

The Arctic and Middle North are cold, harsh and unforgiving of those who are not prepared to deal with them. The mean annual air temperatures on the North Slope and in the northern Canadian islands are mostly below 20°F. In the center of the Arctic Ocean a mean low of minus 9°F has been estimated, with minimum temperatures over adjoining arctic coastal areas occasionally dropping to –55° or –60°F. Over land areas remote from the ocean’s influence temperatures vary from +70° to –70°F, with average conditions ranging between +40° and –40°F. The water temperatures of the Arctic Ocean are normally between 28.6° and 35 °F depending on salinity and density among other variables.

Even if one does not regard statistics, the North Slope is cold and miserable and requires special care by workmen for their equipment. At very low temperatures most metals become brittle. Bulldozers, graders, and similar equipment normally are not worked at temperatures below minus 30°F because exposed parts, such as bulldozer blades, which are subjected to severe strain crack very easily. Truck and heavy equipment engines cannot be shut down for any length of time without having special heaters available for restarting. At –50°F, a shutdown aircraft piston engine can require five hours to start.

The effect of low temperature is compounded by the critical nature of the Arctic heat balance. During the long period of winter darkness, from November to January, more heat is lost to the atmosphere than is received. The resulting cold, augmented by driving winds, steals heat rapidly from men and machines. These long periods of deep cold not only reduce the effectiveness of men and their machines, but also impose strong psychological stresses on men, as can be seen in Russian and Scandinavian legendary literature, and as confirmed by our own recent experience in the Arctic and Antarctic. In a similar manner, the low visibility during long periods of darkness not only hampers the operations of aircraft, ships, and land vehicles, but also imposes subtle psychological stresses on their operators.

Blowing snow during the winter months can obscure men’s vision near the ground and on the sea ice for days at a time. The wind can drive at 60 knots or higher for two to three days, requiring three to four days for men to dig out after the storm. In local areas near camps and communities during extreme cold weather, ice fog, caused by water vapor and air pollution, can reduce visibility to zero. “Whiteouts” caused by certain conditions of cloud cover are extremely hazardous to aircraft and require special indoctrination for their pilots. During summer, fog and long periods of low cloud cover and drizzle are commonplace. Summertime fog reduces flight operations by about 30 per cent.

The precipitation in the high Arctic is so low it is comparable to a desert. Much that does fall comes in the form of a drizzle during the short summer months. In most of the Arctic, snow begins to accumulate in September and lasts until June. Even though there may be only 5 to 15 inches of it during the whole year, it is blown back and forth across the ice covered ocean and the frozen tundra, continually being picked up and forming new drifts. Blowing snow buries equipment, endangers the movement of men and machines, and requires continual plowing if there are to be round-the-clock air operations. It takes only inches of wet snow on sea ice to cut the effectiveness of icebreakers because snow considerably increases the side friction between the ice and the vessel’s hull.

Wind chill is another factor that compounds the effect of cold. A temperature of 10°F with a wind of 20 mph is equivalent so far as human beings are concerned to –30°F with no wind. In open Arctic spaces, on the sea ice or on the tundra, complete calms are rare, so high wind chill factors will commonly affect any operation.

Again, these conditions are similar to those found outside the Arctic. In the Arctic, however, the frequency of their occurrence and the persistence of these conditions at levels serious enough to cause critical stress to men can seriously encumber their operations. A commonly used rule of thumb estimates that the efficiency of an individual workman is reduced two per cent with each degree that the temperature drops below zero.

Perhaps the most challenging environmental conditions are associated with permafrost, Arctic Ocean ice, and pressure ridges.

Permafrost is the term used for ground that has a perennially frozen layer. This frozen layer extends downward below an “active layer” to depths as great as 15,000 feet. The active layer, which thaws each summer, varies in thickness between a few inches to 10 or 15 feet. Because permafrost is sensitive to thermal changes, removal of any natural insulating cover, such as muskeg or tundra, will increase the depth of the active layer and in summer will produce a quagmire. Airstrips and roadways will slump and foundations will settle. However, if about six feet of gravel is placed on the tundra, it will provide sufficient insulation to keep the active layer frozen during the summer thaw period. Structures and pipelines, if elevated, will form an air space and keep the heat from the ground. Foam insulation around oil and utility pipelines can provide the same protection.

The Arctic Ocean and its approaches through the Canadian islands and along the coast of Alaska are ice covered most of the year. Even in summer 70 per cent of the ocean is covered with ice of six- to nine-foot thickness, and in winter much of the remainder freezes. The ice in the Arctic Ocean north of Alaska moves in a slow clockwise direction, moving west along the north Alaskan coast. This movement grinds large floes together, forming pressure ridges between floes and along fast ice that freezes to the shoreline in the winter. Multi-year pressure ridges, which can extend 20 feet into the air and 120 feet into the ocean, are the biggest challenge to the all-season marine transportation systems under consideration.

Sea ice along the north coast generally moves offshore, perhaps 10 or even 200 miles between mid-July and late September. However, in some years the ice comes back on shore, endangering vessels and barges attempting to deliver cargo.

In summary, the environment dominates Arctic operations. The permafrost is the principal factor affecting pipeline, roadway, and airstrip construction. Sea ice with rugged pressure ridges is the main problem afloat. Caterpillar trains operate freely in the winter when the tundra is frozen, but must halt when thawing commences to prevent cutting through the fragile tundra vegetation, for that would expose the underlying permafrost to too much thawing. High winds, low visibility, and long periods of darkness hamper air operations. And summertime thawing adds too much melt water for safe operations on runways built on the ice.

These conditions must be understood and predicted. Greater scientific knowledge and understanding of specific environmental factors are being sought through federal, state, and industry supported programs.

Resources

Arctic transportation improvements are related primarily to resources that can be developed. We know there is a vast oil potential on Alaska’s North Slope, in Canada’s northern islands, and offshore on the continental shelf extending from the Mackenzie River delta westward around the coast of Alaska.

Other Arctic resource potential must be included in northern development plans. These are divided into renewable and non-renewable resources. Renewable sources include fisheries, fur-bearing and other animals, forests, potential grazing and arable land, and hydro-electric power. Development of non-renewable resources (oil and minerals) is totally dependent on improvements in transportation. The development of renewable Arctic resources is much less dependent. So transportation planning needs to be focused on oil and mineral development.

The following oil and mineral activities are presently taking place in the Alaskan and Canadian Arctic.

Northern Mineral Potential

Mineral	Location	Reserves	Remarks
IRON ORE	Mary River, N.E. Baffin Island, Northwest Territories	Billions of tons	1,000,000 tons/year production feasible
COPPER	Coppermine, Northwest Territories	Millions of tons	25,000 tons concentrate/year feasible
	Bornite, Alaska	100 million tons	125,000 to 200,000 tons concentrate/year estimated
LEAD-ZINC	Pine Point, Northwest Territories	100 million tons	215,000 tons concentrate/year in production
	Ross River, Yukon Territory	Millions of tons	370,000 tons concentrate/year in production
COAL	Pt. Lay, Alaska	80 billion tons	No present market potential
BERYLLIUM	Seward Peninsula, Alaska	2 million tons	Good market potential
TIN	Seward Peninsula, Alaska	Millions of tons	Good market potential
OIL	Prudhoe Bay, Alaska	1-7 billion tons	Active development
	Norman Wells, Yukon Territory	100 million tons	Produces 700,000 barrels/year (6.63 barrels per ton)
	Sverdrup Basin, Northwest Territory	Over one billion tons	Exploratory drilling is active. No successful wells have been reported—several dry holes drilled on Melville Island.
	Alaskan Continental Shelf	Over one billion tons	No activity at this time.
NATURAL GAS	North Slope, Alaska	300 billion cubic feet	There is no market for this gas in foreseeable future.

The production of these “non-petroleum” mineral resources in the Arctic depends, perhaps more than any other thing, on the availability of economical transportation.

This development is important because the United States now imports three-quarters of our requirements for 20 key minerals and over half of our needs for 30 others, and our needs for minerals are expected to double by the year 2000. Through this development, it is argued by some people, our economy will benefit by having these materials available under the American flag.

In spite of our needs, there are other knowledgeable individuals who believe that northern mineral development is not necessary now, because these minerals are not required on the world market. These people believe that a gradual developmental approach over the next 30 to 50 years is more reasonable. Because of these conflicting viewpoints, the need for extensive transportation improvements requires careful analysis.

What is the mineral potential of the Arctic in the light of world market conditions?

Mary River on the Northeast Part of Baffin Island, N. W. T.—Iron Ore. This ore in Canada is extremely high grade (68 per cent iron) and is close to the Northwest Passage sea route. However, despite the abundance of this ore deposit, there is some question in the foreseeable future that the ore can compete on the U. S. or Japanese markets because both countries have many other sources of supply.

North Slope—Coal. The projected world demand of coal can be met by mines currently in operation and, therefore, there is no urgency to develop these fields. Yet, with Japan importing approximately 20 million tons of coking coal annually, the possibility of exporting coking grade coal to Japan for steel making cannot be dismissed. All season shipping between Japan and the northwest coast of Alaska might, if feasible, change the economics of the world coal trade.

Lead and Zinc. A serious scarcity is predicted by 1980 if no new reserves are found. However, because known reserves are scattered extensively throughout the world, supply should respond fairly rapidly to a new rise in price. Experts predict that there is considerable profit potential for the large, high grade deposits in sub-Arctic Canada.

Copper. Development of more efficient processes, new discoveries elsewhere in the world, and increased production plans in South America and Africa indicate there is ample supply to meet the five per cent annual increase in world demand. However, world politics outside of North America, an attractive Japanese market, and recent price increases, make Arctic copper developments at Bornite, Alaska, and at Coppermine, in the Canadian Northwest Territories, more promising.

North Slope Natural Gas. Production in the Cook Inlet area of southern Alaska is sufficient to meet the demands of Alaska and export requirements of liquified gas to Japan through 1980. Therefore, there is no present need to develop North Slope gas fields.

In spite of this somewhat gloomy forecast of the marketability of Arctic minerals, there is the possibility that Alaskan mineral resources, if developed, could support a production level 100 times that of the present $83 million value, or $8.3 billion per year in Alaska. This estimate is based on the assumption that Alaska’s mineral deposits should occur in roughly the same distribution as the geologically similar areas of the western United States, British Columbia, the Yukon Territory, Korea, and Japan.

The Seward Peninsula and the south slope of the Brooks Range are the most highly mineralized areas in Alaska. The offshore mineral potential along the Seward Peninsula is also very promising. Indeed, the entire Alaskan continental shelf is believed to be rich in petroleum as well as minerals. The development of the continental shelf of Alaska can be related to the developments in other U. S. continental shelf areas. In those areas the United States mineral production, excluding oil, from I960 to 1966, in contiguous U. S. waters increased from $115 to $165 million. This “other” continental shelf area of the “lower 48” states comprises 300,000 acres out to the 100 fathom curve. Relating all this to the Arctic Alaskan shelf of some 250,000 acres contributes to a strong justification for the need to understand and develop the capability to operate in the Arctic Alaskan offshore areas 12 months of the year.

The Seward Peninsula, the south slope of the Brooks Range, and the continental shelf are the areas where future Arctic Alaskan transportation systems can have the greatest impact.

The Existing Alaskan Arctic Transportation System

Arctic Alaska is now being served by an improvised transportation system, including all conventional systems except rail.

Aviation is the tried and true carrier to the North Slope. Into the airstrips at Prudhoe, Deadhorse, and Sagwon, cargo aircraft are delivering an estimated 150,000 tons of cargo annually, at an average cost of $175 per ton for the carriage from Fairbanks in central Alaska, 400 miles to the south. Some cargo is flown direct from Anchorage, on the south coast. Wien Airlines and Interior Airways are flying scheduled flights to the North Slope. During the massive airlift in the winter of 1969, Wien’s new 737s flew scheduled passenger and light freight from Fairbanks during the days, and after removal of passenger seats, drilling mud was loaded and flown to the North Slope at night.

Regular cargo aircraft, mostly the Hercules C-130 type capable of carrying 20 tons, are booked solidly to haul oil field supplies for months in advance. At many oil installations in the North Slope area, everything has been flown in, including prefabricated buildings, bulldozers, drilling mud, and in several cases, entire drilling rigs. Sixty-two 20-ton loads were used to set up one such drilling operation. During the winter the Hercules aircraft are flown four round trips in a 24-hour period. During the summer the flights are increased to five.

On the Slope the helicopter is the transportation workhorse. Skycrane helicopters costing $2,700 per hour, but capable of carrying a 10-ton load, haul specially designed drilling rigs between sites. Smaller helicopters are used to haul freight, men, and instrumentation for drilling rigs and exploration activity.

As a result of the increased air activity, half a dozen permanent gravel fields have been constructed several old fields were reactivated. The busier strips have their own air controllers and over 30 additional navigational aids have been installed. A radar facility was recently added.

Hovercraft may be effective carriers on the North Slope. Bell Aerosystems, Inc., is proposing adaptation of the British-designed SK-5 for the movement of heavy cargoes to the drilling site. One slope operator is using an SK-5 to ferry men and freight. Bell is also evaluating a hovercraft capable of carrying 50 tons of cargo between Fairbanks and the North Slope. British Hovercraft Corporation has been commissioned by British Petroleum, now operating several drill rigs on the North Slope, to study the feasibility of a hovercraft big enough to ferry drilling rigs on the Slope. This would require a payload of 200 tons and a lift-off total weight of 600 tons. The resulting ground pressure of about 140 psf would compare with 1,600 lbs. per square foot of a conventional tracked vehicle with the same payload. However, hovercraft have trouble with winds, uneven terrain, and high operating costs. British Hovercraft project one cent per ton-mile costs on a proposed 4,000-ton ocean freighter hovercraft. Although exact costs are not available, the effectiveness and the competitive position of hovercraft cannot be ruled out for the near future.

A 470-mile winter road connecting the North Slope with Fairbanks was completed in March of 1969. Although 8,000 tons of heavy cargo were hauled by 340 heavy duty trucks in round trips which took three weeks each during the short operating season, the success of the venture is seriously questioned. This road is now considered by many to be more trouble than it is worth and might result in an environmental disaster. When warm weather came, the scar left by the bulldozers gouging out the rough road turned into a mire of mud and in some cases, a rushing torrent.

Construction of this road began late in November 1968, after ice had formed on the rivers. A 1,500-foot ice bridge across the Yukon was formed by laying logs on the ice and pumping water over them, which froze and formed a highway crossing. For various reasons, including an exceedingly cold winter, the road’s construction took longer than planned. Truckers charged $240 per ton to haul the cargo to the North Slope, compared to air freight’s $175 per ton.

The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System is applying for permission to construct a 390-mile all weather road north from Fairbanks which will run adjacent to the proposed trans-Alaska oil pipeline. Pipe will be carried over this road in heavy duty, oil field type trucks with 20-30 ton payloads. Although the construction of this road is planned to permit the hauling of materials 12 months of the year, the road will not be maintained by industry after they have completed the pipeline in 1973. The first 54 miles are under construction between Livengood and Yukon and they will conform to state secondary road standards. The road envisioned between the North Slope and the Yukon River will probably be of less quality or just sufficient to build the pipeline. Road work is being coordinated with the Alaska Department of Highways to avoid duplication of facilities. It appears likely that government support for maintenance of this roadway connecting Fairbanks and the North Slope will be arranged.

During the summer of 1969, sixty thousand tons of cargo were delivered 2,000 miles to the North Slope by the Northern Transportation Company operating on the Mackenzie River. An additional 70,000 tons of freight and 20,000 tons of petroleum products were barged 3,500 miles from Seattle by Arctic Marine Freighters, Inc., using 19 tugs and 38 cargo barges. Although cargo operations were hampered by heavy ice on the beach, four specially-built barges were interlocked and sunk along the beach to provide mooring facilities. Cranes on this “barge dock” emptied four lightering craft at one time. Because of shallow water, the lighters had to ferry the cargo six miles from the ocean going barges. Unusually severe summer ice conditions were encountered by this barge operation.

Compared to the hectic pace of the North Slope oil fields, supply of ordinary communities and government stations in the Alaskan Arctic is low keyed, relying on air transportation for people and small amounts of cargo throughout the year, with their major resupply coming by water during the ice-free summer months. This major resupply consists of some 40,000 tons of freight moved in barges and freighters to native villages. Less than 3,000 tons of dry cargo and 2,500 tons of fuel are required for federal government installations. In the Arctic Basin, T-3 ice island, supplied by air, requires only 250 tons of dry cargo and 625 tons of fuel annually.

Approximately 15,000 air passengers and 500 tons of air freight enter and leave Kotzebue each year. Nome maintains the same level of traffic, and Barrow Village handles less than half that amount.

Native villagers travel by air, small boat, snowmobile, and dog team. Dog teams are losing trail space rapidly to the snowmobile which has been widely adopted. Many villages are supplied by small, single-engine aircraft fitted with floats for water landings in summer and skis on wheels for landing in winter. But dependence on these float planes leaves them completely isolated during the spring break-up and fall freeze-up of rivers and lakes. Although there is no road network serving native villages, the Bureau of Indian Affairs is constructing local support roads, and over the next five years approximately 100 miles of roadways will be built for use between homes, schools, stores, and airstrips. This is certainly essential but definitely not a part of any highway program. For that matter, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has been limited to access road construction and restricted from intermodal transportation developments in the northern area. It has been argued that this agency (BIA) should be given increased authority to plan and construct additional roadways, airports, docks, terminal facilities and winter trails. Others now believe it is time for the federal government to curtail BIA’s activities and turn them over to the state. Perhaps with the influx of state funds from oil lease sales and oil production, an improvement to native village transportation systems will be realized with programs funded and directed by the State of Alaska.

Sub-Arctic Alaskan Transportation

Central Alaska’s “middle north” is served by a modern transportation network consisting of highway, rail, and air modes. This transportation is primarily available in a “corridor” centered on a line connecting Anchorage and Fairbanks. Southeastern Alaska, the panhandle containing the capital city of Juneau, is served by a modern ferry system of small, coastal passenger ships, regular cargo shipping, and air.

These systems will form the base from which Arctic transportation will branch out, be it on the rivers, by sea, by land, or by air.

Air. The air system is now, and will continue to be, the principal means for extending transportation into Arctic Alaska. Indeed aviation plays a more important role in the economic, social, and political developments of Alaska than in any other state. Virtually all passenger traffic moves by air on scheduled flights from Anchorage and Fairbanks to most outlying cities and towns. Daily flights serve Barrow, Kotzebue, Nome, and Unalakleet, with feeder service available on schedule and charter aircraft available to fly to all other communities. Versatile light aircraft can be chartered at reasonable prices to fly people or cargo to remote locations where landings are made on rivers and lakes, small strips at mining camps, or on the frozen Arctic Ocean and the Bering Sea.

There are over 330 air fields, air strips, and seadromes serving Alaska. They include the international airports at Fairbanks and Anchorage, six municipal airports, 20 military air fields, and over 250 facilities owned and supplied by the state. Certainly with huge oil revenue available, these facilities can be developed with maximum benefit to the state.

Roads. The road network serves only the central portion of Alaska, with approximately 7,000 miles of roads connecting to the Alcan Highway, which runs through Canada, and thence to the “lower 48.” Only about one-third of the roads are paved, and many are not maintained during winter months. This roadlessness can be blamed on federal neglect during territorial days, the sparse population, (only a quarter of a million people), and adverse construction and maintenance conditions stemming from the climate and terrain. The first federal highway funds available after statehood came in 1959 were spent on upgrading existing roadways, many which were built for military purposes in World War II. Construction of new roads, however, has been undertaken sparingly because the state has not been able to handle the maintenance required. There are 110,000 motor vehicles registered in Alaska, including 35,000 trucks and buses. These vehicles move in central Alaska on the road network and throughout southeastern Alaska on the modern ferry system, connecting Prince Rupert, British Columbia, and the Alcan Highway. In a similar manner, many vehicles, especially trucks and truck vans, are piggy-backed on the Alaskan railroad.

Rail. Indeed the Alaska railroad, a short, single-track system, is a multimodal transportation system which also carries Sea-Land containers from Anchorage and interchanges with hydrotrains at Whittier. One such interchange is with the Alaska Trainship Corporation’s Japanese-built, Liberian flag M.S. Alaska, operating weekly from New Westminister [sic], B.C., just above the U. S. border, with a capacity of about 50 rail cars. The cargoes are loaded in Canada rather than Seattle because the Jones Act forbids use of foreign-built, foreign-flag vessels in the U. S. coastal trade.

The Alaska Railroad also interchanges with ocean freighters at Seward where a new terminal was constructed following the destruction of facilities in the 1964 earthquake. In January 1969, Alaska Steam ceased their van container operation in Seward, leaving that port without a scheduled water carrier. The Alaska Railroad also connects with its own river carriers at Nenana, 40 miles west of Fairbanks, for distribution of cargoes along the Tanana-Yukon river system. On the Yukon, cargo is barged upstream to Fort Yukon and down to Marshall where interchange is made with private carriers that operate to the Bering Sea.

The railroad currently is carrying Trans-Alaska pipeline construction equipment and materials in addition to the bulk of the cargo moving by air and by winter road to the North Slope oil field.

The federal government has invested 192 million dollars in the railroad since 1914. The current net worth is estimated to be in excess of 130 million dollars. There are 480 miles of standard gauge single track mainline between Seward and Fairbanks, via Whittier and Anchorage, used by 2,000 freight cars and 42 locomotives. Before World War II, less than 2,000 tons of freight were hauled annually compared with 1.5 million tons in 1968. From World War II and until the great earthquake on “Good Friday” of 1964, the railroad generally realized a net income from its operations. The earthquake destroyed track, roadway, bridges, buildings and equipment valued at more than $27,000,000. However, the plucky railroad fought back and within three weeks was operating sea train and car barge freight service through the port of Whittier.

Unfortunately the railroad lost a great deal because of the earthquake and floods, and because the availability of locally produced natural gas has reduced cargo revenue. More than one million dollars of gross revenues was permanently lost because the oil companies built their new petroleum tank farm in Anchorage, rather than rebuild the facilities destroyed in Seward. In August 1967, $500,000 damages were sustained at the north end of the line because of severe flooding conditions in the Fairbanks area, and in 1968, $700,000 in coal revenue was lost when the Anchorage military installation power plants shifted to natural gas. However, in spite of these hardships and large increases in wages and salaries, a net profit was expected in 1969, partly because of good management but primarily because of the increased freight for the North Slope.

Sea and River. For years freight to and from Alaska has been carried mainly by sea. Through competition and coordination of services, among ships, trucks, and the railroad, common carriers in the southeast and south central portions of the state, where nearly all Alaskans live, have provided efficient, low cost services. However, in the remote areas of western and northern Alaska there has been no such effort, for there has been no economic incentive. The Alaska Steamship Company is the only significant common carrier serving western Alaska, and that company uses Liberty or “Cimavi” class vessels of World War II vintage with maximum speeds of only 10 knots. Because of ice, access to the northwest has been limited to summer months only. Traffic to and from this region consists of approximately 75,000 tons annually, which is less than 10 per cent of all Alaskan waterborne freight traffic. Three-quarters of this small amount is handled by Alaska Steam, with the remainder carried by the SS Northstar III, a Victory type freighter which is operated by the U. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs. The most notable thing about this ship is her power plant, which is diesel.

Sea-Land Service, Inc., instituted services to Alaska in 1964 with weekly sailings from Seattle to Anchorage and Kodiak, using 20-knot, fully containerized ships, each capable of transporting 375 35-foot containers. Sea-Land was the first water carrier to establish successful year-around service to Anchorage. The ice in Cook Inlet is overcome by ballasting the vessels by the stern and providing protective ice belts and reinforced bows. In competition with Sea-Land, Puget Sound-Alaska Van Lines, Inc., operates seven hydrotrain barges between Seattle and Whittier, carrying over 130,000 tons of cargo annually in approximately 75 voyages having a three-week turn around. Alaska Trainship’s 20-knot Alaska averages three days to cover the 1,350 mile northbound voyage between New Westminister [sic] and Whittier. She handles 60,000 tons of cargo annually. Also, Canadian National Railway operates rail car barges between Prince Rupert, British Columbia, and Whittier. Other waterborne commerce in southern Alaska is handled by tugs and barges and five coastal ferries owned and operated by the state.

As touched on earlier, the Alaska Railroad operates barge service four months of the year on most of the Yukon river. In addition, there is considerable commercial activity along other rivers, though none is deep. Very shallow draft vessels carry general cargo, equipment, supplies, minerals, and furs in amounts varying from 30,000 to 50,000 tons annually. Four-thousand tons of cargo will move the 465 miles along the Kuskokwin [sic] River, between Bethel and Medfra. During occasional high riverflows, craft drawing three feet can navigate the Koyukuk for 350 miles to Betties. The Kobuk is navigable under similar conditions for 200 miles to the vicinity of Bornite. The Noatak is only navigable about 40 miles by shallow draft vessels and the Colville on the North Slope is too shallow for economical use.

With the exception of Port Clarence, there are no natural harbors on the west and north coasts of Alaska. Beyond Port Clarence the next natural harbor is in Canada, on the south coast of Herschel Island east of the North Slope. The ports of Nome and Kotzebue are plagued with expensive lighterage costs necessitated by transferring cargo in an open roadstead from the ocean carrier to the shallow draft harbor lighters. Seagoing ships can come within a mile of the harbor at Nome but must remain 14 miles off Kotzebue. Lighterage rates at both ports are approximately 26 per cent of the total transportation charges made by Alaska Steamship Company, even including wharfage in Seattle. These transportation charges have a direct impact on prices of many commodities. For example, transportation charges increase the wholesale price of lumber 100 per cent of the retail price. The reason for this appears to be related to the merchants’ pricing policies. On the average the merchant’s markup is 60 per cent of the landed cost which, of course, includes transportation. This markup is necessitated for many businessmen by unusually high labor costs, the need to maintain large inventories during winter months, including the high cost of borrowing money to purchase, house, and heat this inventory and such other factors as spoilage and breakage. Obviously this situation can be vastly improved with more frequent service and a better break on transportation costs.

Pipelines. The trans-Alaskan pipeline activity in Alaska is a billion dollar venture vastly overshadowing operating pipelines. Prior to the Prudhoe oil strike there were two eight-inch multiproduct lines in Alaska, the 626-mile line connecting Haines and Fairbanks through Canadian territory, and the 60-mile pipeline between Whittier and Anchorage. On both sides of Cook Inlet the oil industry has installed 40 mile long, 20 inch pipelines between their drilling platforms and their terminals. The Anchorage natural gas 12 inch pipeline connects the Kenai Peninsula gas fields with the Anchorage area, providing heat and power to the city and nearby military installations. Future pipelines in Alaska could play a significant role, including the movement of ores, wood chips, and other materials (propelled by liquid, in a form called slurry) in addition to crude oil.

Future Arctic Alaskan Transportation Considerations

The future transportation system needed for Alaska in the 1970s must take into account the needs of the state, a state recently made affluent by a 900 million dollar oil lease sale. Alaska can now think in terms of making its own transportation improvements with a minimum of federal assistance. Industry will fund the costs of their pipelines and even developments for an Arctic tanker operation if judged feasible.

To keep our conceptual mid-1970s transportation system simple for present purposes when considering Arctic Alaska, I will assume that 300,000 tons of crude oil must be shipped out each day and that 200,000 tons of cargo must be moved into the Alaskan Arctic each year. This is a highly unbalanced trade, both in tonnage and in type of cargo carried. The 200,000 tons of inbound cargo includes 50,000 tons of cargo needed to support activities sponsored by more than 12 federal agencies and more than 30 private or state organizations, as well as 75 native villages. For the oil field development, an estimated 40 wells per year will be drilled by 20 drill rigs, requiring approximately 3,000 tons of cargo per rig.

In 1975 approximately 200 wells will be in operation with 2,000 wells a possibility by the year 2000. Each operating well requires 500 tons of supplies annually. The tonnages for constructing the 48-inch pipeline, possible North Slope harbor facilities, and possible North Slope cities, would be on top of these tonnage figures.

Elements of Arctic Alaskan Transportation are Expensive:

	$ Million
250,000 ton Icebreaker Tanker, each	70
48-inch Trans-Alaska Pipeline, each	1,800
3,000 mile Trans-Canada Pipeline, each	2,200
Highway—Fairbanks to North Slope	65
Railroad to North Slope	275
North Slope Tanker Terminal	500
45,000 H.P. Icebreaker, each	60
60,000 H.P. Icebreaker, each	85

We do have estimates for the construction transportation requirements for the pipeline itself. In 1970-71, pipeline tonnages will be shipped to three locations: 100,000 tons by sea through the Bering Strait to Prudhoe Bay; 185,000 tons by sea to Valdez; and 250,000 tons to Seward and Anchorage by sea and thereafter by rail to Fairbanks.

The estimates on this and the opposite page show a number of cost comparisons and other practical financing considerations.

Alternatives for a future transportation system available for the government and industry decision makers to choose from include: whether to extend the Alaska Railroad from Fairbanks to the north or build a highway; whether to move oil by icebreaker tanker, or by pipeline, or both, from the North Slope to the East Coast market; whether to extend transportation to Bornite, and whether to improve transportation in general to the northwest Alaskan region. Actually most experts agree that some of each is necessary. I suggest three intermodal transportation systems that will satisfy the key Arctic requirements: That is,

a. ship out 300,000 tons of crude oil every day.

b. ship in 200,000 tons supplies and equipment every year.

System A
	$ Million
a. 30 Icebreaker Tankers	2,100
b. Deepwater Arctic Port	500
c. Highway, Fairbanks to Prudhoe	65
System B
a. Trans-Alaska Pipeline	1,800
b. Railroad, Fairbanks to Prudhoe	275
c. 10 Conventional Tankers	450
d. Trans-U. S. Pipeline	1,300
System C
a. 20 Icebreaker Tankers	1,600
b. Deepwater Arctic Port	300
c. Railroad, Fairbanks to Prudhoe	275
d. Pipeline, Prudhoe to Valdez	1,800
e. 20 Conventional Tankers	900

System “A” assumes fully successful testing of the Manhattan in fall and winter ice conditions in the Arctic and the construction of a harbor on the north Alaskan shore or at Herschel Island. A highway to the North Slope is proposed because deck load capacity on icebreaker tankers will reduce the volume requirement for heavy freight to such a low figure that railroad construction could not be justified. Federal highway funds could be required to assist with this construction if the trans-Alaskan pipeline roadway proves to be inadequate.

System “B” assumes that reliable shipment of oil through the Northwest Passage is impractical for even part of the year, thus requiring a pipeline across Alaska and from the U. S. West Coast to the East Coast. The pipeline across Alaska may soon be constructed. Tankers will haul the oil between Valdez and West Coast refineries.

In System “C” I have assumed partial success of Arctic tanker operations to the North Slope for nine months of the year, with 12 month operations feasible to the Northern Canadian islands. Additional tankers are added to operate out of Valdez to the West Coast or to a possible Central American pipeline facility or around South America.

Estimated Comparative Ton Mile Costs of Transportation:

		Cost Per Ton Mile
Mode	Oil	Ore	Equipment
	(from Alaska)		(to Alaska)
300,000 dwt tanker (Prudhoe to Phila.)1	$.0011	—	.0010*
300,000 dwt tanker (Valdez to Seattle)	.0011	—	—
C-130 Aircraft	—	—	—
Pipeline (48” Prudhoe to Valdez)	.0015	—	—
Railroad (Fairbanks to Prudhoe)	.0300	.0300	.0300
Highway (Bornite to Port Clarence)	—	.0540	—
Highway (Fairbanks to Prudhoe)	—	—	.0210
Barge/Ship (Between Prudhoe & Seattle)	—	.0018	.0340**
Hovercraft	—	—	5.00

^__________

* Using a deck load on the large icebreaker tanker.     ** Seasonal to the North Slope at this time.

Alaskan oil will be needed on the East Coast and midcontinental USA after 1980, because that is where the oil shortage in our market will exist. To move this oil to the East Coast via System “A” will deliver crude oil at an estimated transportation cost of $3.50 per ton compared to $5.00 via system “B” and $4.00 in System “C”. These are pretty wild estimates. But even though oil economics are difficult to pin down and the $20.00 per ton selling price on the Chicago market is also made up of refining, exploration, and producing expenses, it is easy to see the pivotal position of the Manhattan tanker test. At the time of writing, the variables in the oil transportation picture and in market projections are just about endless, and they make estimates and cost comparisons impractical, but not entirely meaningless.

Consider, for example, the oil companies’ position with respect to important decisions now before Congress: foremost of these is the question of oil import quota changes, second perhaps, the oil depletion allowance and other tax questions. Consider the interests of steel suppliers and of shipbuilding companies who would profit from American law, which requires those who wish to engage in coastal trade to construct their ships in the United States and to fly the American flag over those ships. One may also apply the benefits of such laws to the American merchant marine as at least 75 per cent of the crew of a U. S. flag ship are required to be American citizens.

The strong influence of conservation needs will also affect decisions on whether it is economical, not to say permissible, to build pipelines across the fragile tundra, dig nuclear harbors, or construct offshore terminals for supertankers. Again we would have to evaluate the international benefits and costs, particularly in our relationships with the Middle East, Canada, and Japan resulting from exploitation of Arctic minerals. For example, if a number of related decisions should cause cost estimates of delivering a ton of oil to the East Coast to rise far above $3.50, and if the Manhattan’s tests are not conclusively favorable, an icebreaker tanker system would no longer be as competitive as other systems.

The Arctic Icebreaker Tanker System

The icebreaker tanker of the future will be huge. General specification will be on the order of 250,000 to 300,000 deadweight tons, with an 80-foot draft, 170 to 200 foot beam, and length of 1,200 feet. Her engines will have to deliver 80,000 to 200,000 shaft horsepower. Plenty of horsepower should be available for backing down. This requirement became quite evident on the test voyage of the Manhattan. She has insufficient backing power. Special high strength steels and unusual design criteria must be employed. Multiple high strength propellers, rudders, and shafting and quick disengaging clutches may well be needed. With special refineries at a North Slope terminal assuring the availability of fuels, consideration may be given to the use of gas turbines to provide the high horsepower that may be necessary to push the huge vessels through the heavy winter and spring ice conditions. Even if we have a successful tanker route between Philadelphia and Arctic Alaska, that does not mean the icebreaker tanker will not be faced with special problems.

One such problem that will be encountered prior to entering the Parry Channel of the Northwest Passage concerns the iceberg menace along the west coast of Greenland. The big hazards are the “growler” and the “bergy bit”—small portions of icebergs that have no appreciable surface extending above the water. During winter darkness and periods of low visibility aggravated by heavy weather, a collision with one of these huge chunks of ice could possibly hole the sturdiest tanker, thereby, dumping huge amounts of oil into the seas. Consideration will have to be given to an ice detection system.

As the tanker proceeds further and enters the Parry Channel, the thickness of ice should present no problems. The ice in this area seldom exceeds six to eight feet, and development of ice pressure ridges will be minor because of the ice movement patterns. Unlike the ice movement in the Arctic Ocean, ice in the Parry Channel stops moving about the beginning of October. With only minor movement, the heavy pressures caused by wind and current are not acting here to heave the ice into huge pressure ridges. However, as the icebreaker tanker of the future moves into western Viscount Melville Sound, heavy ice several years old, and hardened accordingly, will be encountered. Although the favored tanker route will continue to be south through Prince of Wales strait, during winter months, a large ice bridge forms at the northerly end of this strait. More information is needed to fully understand this “ice bridge” phenomenon and to make certain that year-round passage can be assured. If heavy duty icebreaker service were to be particularly needed on any portion of the route, this particular area between Melville Island and Prince of Wales strait, should receive consideration. The Manhattan was stopped in this general area several times by ridges 40 feet in depth and old ice as thick as 14 feet.

Once the tanker enters Prince of Wales strait, continuing on to the north coast of Alaska should not be too difficult except in the heavy ice of winter and spring off the north Alaskan coast. This heavy ice can be avoided by constructing a deep water port on Canada’s Herschel Island. On the south coast of this island is a natural harbor that can be developed relatively easily. A two hundred mile pipeline connecting the oil field and this harbor would be necessary and would probably cost over $150 million. This is costly, but the alternative is to go forty to fifty miles into the Arctic Ocean north of Prudhoe bay and develop an offshore terminal that could cost $300 to $500 million.

About thirty-five miles north of Prudhoe a huge chunk of an ice island grounded in 85 feet of water in the late fall of 1968. Two of these large islands were surcharged by spraying them with salt water, which built an additional fifteen feet of ice to provide the extra weight to ground them securely through the summer. Although much valuable information was obtained, the dream of using salt water ice to build harbors was not completely successful. The primary problem is associated with the brine drainage in the ice. Salt water ice forms with salt solution concentrated at the edge of ice crystals. In time the salt gradually drains out through brine channels. The long periods of summer daylight accelerate this process, making work on the ice island surface very difficult. Special protection, including refrigeration, may be necessary to protect the ice surface. However, because of the difficulties encountered, further research and evaluation is necessary before serious consideration can be given to using sea ice as a harbor construction material.

Some consideration has been given to the development of a deep water harbor along the Arctic coast of Alaska using a nuclear device. Project Chariot was undertaken in the late 1950s to excavate a harbor in the Cape Thompson area of the northwest coast of Alaska. This project, part of the Plowshare program to develop potential peaceful application for the use of nuclear explosives, was intended to develop the safety and engineering technology considered essential before nuclear excavation technology could become widely used. Initially the plan was to detonate simultaneously two one megaton and two 200 kiloton devices to form a harbor to be used in mineral development in the Cape Thompson area. But geological and engineering surveys were unable to substantiate the economic advantage of exploitating [sic] the minerals sufficient to support a harbor development. Thus, a key ingredient to the project was missing: the economic necessity for the harbor.

Today, of course, we have the economic justification for a deep water port. We also have a much “cleaner” nuclear device. However, we still have the opposition to the use of nuclear devices and the fear of radiation hazard and damage to the environment. During Project Chariot, and in 1969 at Amchitka, in the Aleutians, we did learn a great deal about how to plan a similar project and the necessity for the cooperation of numerous public agencies at the local, state, and federal levels on complex technical, economical, sociological, environmental, and political issues.

There appears to be a need for proper application of nuclear devices to construct an ice-free harbor with a natural earth barrier some 30 to 50 miles offshore, opposite Prudhoe Bay. (A similar use of nuclear devices was considered for a site on Australia’s northwest coast last year. For that harbor, consideration was given to the simultaneous detonation of five 200 kiloton devices to provide a suitable offshore harbor. But the plan was dropped.) Because the oil comes out of the ground at about +170°F., this heat source could be used to warm the harbor and its entrance sufficiently to keep the harbor ice free.

The oil industry and our government thus have a choice either to develop a Canadian harbor at Herschel Island, or an offshore harbor near Prudhoe Bay. The complexities of U. S. and Canadian relations are great regarding both such harbor developments and the full development of the Canadian Northwest Passage, with the associated Canadian shipping services (aids to navigation and icebreaker services). It will demand both countries’ best diplomatic skills to solve them to mutual advantage.

Even if the icebreaker tanker appears feasible on a run between the U. S. East Coast and the vicinity of the North Slope oil fields for twelve months of the year, we still do not have a new shipping route between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The ice of the Arctic Ocean, especially around Point Barrow and through the Bering Strait, must be confronted. This is a separate, though associated, effort. The huge icebreaker tankers should be equally capable of negotiating this western leg of our northern sea route. Of course, in these Alaskan waters the United States must provide icebreaker assistance, aids to navigation, and ice prediction services.

Indeed, considerable attention is currently being given to shipping in these Alaskan waters. The Coast Guard, Navy, and Environmental Science Services Administration are developing programs for sea ice reconnaissance and prediction. These were tested and evaluated jointly with Canadian and U. S. participation in the Manhattan tanker test. Laser profiler and side scanning radar instrumentation was installed in various aircraft flying reconnaissance for the Manhattan. Ice engineers and scientists sampled and analyzed the sea ice along the Manhattan’s trackline. All the information collected will be correlated with data gathered from a complex instrumentation package installed throughout Manhattan. The results of the analyses will tell industry what is necessary for not only the design and construction of the future icebreaker tanker, but also what system of ice reconnaissance and ice prediction will be needed for the Canadian and U. S. portions of the Northwest Passage and the northern sea route around Alaska.

Attention must be given to the friction between a tanker’s hull and the ice. To minimize this friction the Manhattan had a sloping ice belt added to her side and broad shoulders at the after edge of the bow extending several feet beyond the beam of the ship. The future tanker will most likely have a hull tapering toward the stern. Of course, the rolling capability to free herself when stuck will be required. Bubblers and other means to reduce the friction of the ice on the hull plating may be essential. In general there is room for much more research on these problems.

The Pipeline System

Assuming that the icebreaker tanker system is successful, will we still need the pipeline? I believe pipeline construction will certainly continue and that the pipeline will be used to remove at least a third, and perhaps even half of the oil from the North Slope.

Trans-Alaska Pipeline Systems will connect Valdez and Prudhoe Bay with a 48-inch pipeline by 1973, once permission is obtained. Initial pumping rates of 500,000 barrels per day are planned at that time with 2,000,000 barrels per day capacity attainable by 1980. Twelve pumping stations will be located along the route that will follow the Sag River south to a 4,700-foot elevation pass through the Brooks range and then southeastward to Fairbanks crossing the Yukon at Stevens Village. From Fairbanks the pipeline will follow the Alaskan highway system to Valdez. One of the worst obstacles on the southern leg of the route is 2,770-foot Thompson pass just outside of Valdez.

Over ninety per cent of the pipeline will be buried. The 60 miles constructed above ground will have wildlife crossings constructed every half mile. This above ground portion will be supported on piles and will be covered with four inches of polyurethane foam. The easterly route selected will avoid high ice content permafrost. Soils in this location have been determined, even when in the thawed condition, to have sufficient bearing capacity to support the pipe and its contents. Great care has been taken to route the pipeline through areas of stable ground and to avoid disturbing natural drainage patterns or exposing the pipeline to erosion. Sites selected for the twelve pumping stations and the southern terminal at Valdez are considered to be safe from ground failure in the event of earthquake.

Indeed, protection of the environment has been planned carefully. Oily ballast water arriving in tankers at Valdez will be pumped ashore for processing to extract the oil, thereby ensuring that ballast will not contaminate waters adjacent to the terminal. All river crossings, including the Yukon, will be underwater crossings. Where danger of scour exists as in the Yukon, the pipe will be buried in a trench in the bedrock.

Automatic equipment will safeguard both human and wild life. The crude oil pumping and flow will be controlled remotely from a central supervisory control center, backed up by operators at each of the twelve pumping stations. The control center operator will be capable of isolating the line into sections by closing motorized gates. Fail-safe shutdown equipment will add further protection against pollution in case of a break in the pipeline system. The line is so insulated that it can be shut down for repairs in –65 ° Fahrenheit temperatures, for 21 days, without having to use special measures to resume pumping. At +3°F., the coldest temperature the oil is expected to reach during a shutdown, the crude oil will still be liquid and pumpable.

Storage at the northern terminal will be 400,000 barrels, but at Valdez eleven tanks having a combined capacity of five million barrels is planned. Ultimately this storage capacity may expand to twenty million barrels in 46 tanks.

Atlantic Richfield is constructing a 100,000-barrel, $100 million refinery near Bellingham, Washington, to be ready in time for the pipeline completion in 1972.

They have ordered three 120,000 deadweight ton tankers for the run to the refinery from Valdez. These tankers are to be 883 feet in length, have a 138-foot beam, a 68-foot draft and will cruise at 16 knots. Their costs will be about $25 to $30 million each.

Other Transportation is Needed in Alaskan Arctic

Looking at Systems “A,” “B,” and “C” discussed above does not cover all the needs of the State of Alaska. Much else needs to be done. For example a highway or railroad to the North Slope will be a necessity if that area north of Fairbanks is to be fully developed. When this is accomplished, a spur from Alatna on the Koyukuk River to Bornite some 130 miles west of it in the Kobuk area would make sense. From Bornite, water transportation to Kotzebue would be a possibility. This scheme would provide lower cost transportation than now offered. Transportation to Kotzebue is so costly primarily because of the aforementioned high freight rates and lighterage charges on the sea route to Kotzebue. This scheme would provide not only a closed circuit from Anchorage to Kotzebue but also an alternate approach to that city, or a remarkably more flexible access to the west coast, and to the mineral reserves of Alaska.

This idea also assumes that through rates on the Alaska Railroad between Anchorage and Bornite will not exceed $30.00 a ton. Unitized or containerized cargo with well designed terminals would be required. The Kobuk River also requires dredging. To the present we have ignored our western Arctic coast; we have not done anything with the large continental shelf; and we have not opened the Northwest Passage connecting the Atlantic and Pacific. The mineral rich Seward Peninsula remains undeveloped and the western Alaskan resident remains at the edge of poverty. This condition has been and will continue to be a problem area because, in the harshness of cost effective decision-making, it is extremely difficult to gain legislative support for improved transportation to the lightly populated and politically impotent western half of Alaska.

The resource potential of the area, the proximity to the Soviet Union, and the closeness of the western leg of the Northwest Passage, with its direct access from the Pacific to the Arctic Ocean, will all affect our decision on whether to extend an intermodal transportation system to western Alaska.² The key to such development should be centered on the development of Port Clarence, near the tip of the Seward Peninsula, the only natural harbor on Alaska’s west coast. The harbor work, plus a highway connecting Port Clarence and Bornite would cost $40,000,000. The harbor freezes in winter, but the use of bubblers and icebreakers and ice strengthened vessels could extend the present shipping season to six, nine, and possibly twelve months. Development j of the Northwest Passage may bring large container ships nearby on scheduled runs so that ship-based “Skycrane” helicopters could make freight deliveries here and elsewhere along the coast.

A highway and lower Yukon ferry system has also been proposed as a means to provide east-west transportation, connecting Fairbanks and ultimately Anchorage to the west coast.

Containerized air freight should also receive increasing attention as a means of providing economical transportation. Air transportation to this region would receive a tremendous boost if tourism were extended into Siberia. However, even if Siberia’s tourism never develops, winter tourism is becoming increasingly popular so that year around passenger traffic should continue to expand. Thus, a sound basis would be provided for air transportation to the area.

The Federal Role

Can we provide good, reliable Arctic transportation with a minimum federal investment? Perhaps not. In any event, the federal government should undertake the following programs jointly with the State of Alaska and private interests during the mid-1970s. Federal funding estimates are intended only to show the scope of the projects.

a.Make improvements to airport and airway facilities necessary to assure safety of aircraft operations. 

$50,000,000

b. Develop deep-water harbor facilities at Port Clarence on the Seward Peninsula so that a transportation terminal for rail and/or highway and air will be available on the west coast of Alaska. This transportation terminal will enhance development of the Seward Peninsula, the western slope of the Brooks range, and the broad continental shelf in the Bering and Chuckchi [sic] seas, all rich in minerals. The same shipping center could be a staging and receiving area for Arctic construction equipment. If a demonstration city were to be built, this would be a prime location. 

$20,000,000

c. Assist in the development of a deep-water port on the North Alaskan coast jointly with industry and the State of Alaska.

$100,000,000

d. Using tax incentives, low interest loans, and appropriate operating subsidies, turn the Alaska Railroad over to state or private ownership so that extensions can be principally funded without federal money, if necessary, use state and federal funds to build the right of way. Although initial engineering surveys are currently funded, the future federal dollar outlay should not exceed $100,000,000 for extension to the Beaufort Sea and Port Clarence via Bornite.

$100,000,000

e. Construct a highway network from the rail extension so that rail and highway services complement each other. In this manner roads and trails can be extended to remote areas as resources are identified and developers’ plans are received and approved in a manner similar to the “resource road” program in Canada.

$50,000,000

f. Subsidize as necessary Arctic shipping interests, including shipyards, to foster construction of special vessels, including transport submersibles. Provide low cost marine insurance, and conduct necessary research on vessel requirements.

$100,000,000

g. Construct icebreakers to support polar marine science and polar commercial shipping; encourage through leasing or subsidies the private ownership of icebreakers used in support of Arctic commercial shipping; and coordinate the use of icebreakers with our Canadian, Japanese, Soviet, and Danish neighbors as appropriate.

$110,000,000

h. Undertake a comprehensive environmental protection, prediction, and research program aimed at the preservation and understanding of the Arctic environment on the land, the deep ocean, and the extensive continental shelf.

$70,000,000

We Need a National Arctic Program

Dollars for Arctic transportation are not sufficient. Such a program needs to be coordinated with other Arctic programs and the activities of other federal agencies, the State of Alaska, industry, and educational institutions. Close liaison with the Canadian government is necessary to assure continued cooperation. We must take great care in the conduct of all operations and in the planning of Arctic programs to respect Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Indeed, our international relationships with respect to the entire Arctic must be reassessed. Because of the North Slope oil potential, our scientific undertakings in the Arctic Ocean and on Alaska’s continental shelf will now have more significance, and our federal presence in these areas on a large scale will now take on a new meaning. We are now an Arctic power with vital commercial interests bordering the Arctic Ocean. No longer can we afford to consider the Arctic as an area of only limited strategic importance.

Arctic Policy Statement

Therefore, as our councils of government look anew at the impact of North Slope development, they would be materially assisted with a national arctic policy statement. Any such statement concerning objectives of the United States should include the following:

• a. Our political, economic, and technological status as a leading Arctic power must be assured.
• b. Our relationship with all our Arctic neighbors must be stable and cooperative. We will promote cooperation in exploration, research, social programs, transportation services, and other activities. For our national security the Arctic should be a region of peaceful endeavor only mutually assured and agreed upon. We will seek a continuing free exchange of Arctic data.
• c. The orderly economic development of Arctic Alaska, including the adjacent continental shelf, shall be supported by public investment sufficient to encourage growth of private investment.
• d. Through federal, state, and private investment, responsible agencies and authorities will be encouraged to develop an intermodal transportation system for Arctic Alaska which will provide access to all Arctic land and sea areas, transporting passengers as well as general and bulk cargoes efficiently and economically.
• e. Conservation of Arctic resources, protection of the fragile Arctic ecology, and avoidance of pollution of all forms in the Arctic will be guaranteed.
• f. Opportunities for social advancement and economic gains as well as training and education for a role in Arctic achievement as participants in current activities will be provided the native residents of Arctic Alaska.

The federal presence should be felt but should not carry the thrust of Arctic development beyond the capacity of private capital to sustain, or the state’s economy to absorb, without disjointed inflation. Whatever we help build, let us make certain there will be a continuity of growth, maintaining an appropriate balance with our capabilities and with the natural bounty of this northland.

[signed] J. W. Moreau