In 1946, the U. S. armed forces were receiving the full blast of the anti-military criticism that has followed the ending of every American war.
In response to the clamor to “bring the boys home,” more than six million men had been discharged in the nine months following VJ-day, but criticism of the military was increasing in the press and on the radio. In the past, the complaints had ended as wartime forces were demobilized and the country returned to its normal isolationism with professional volunteer forces reduced to a minimum.
The post-World War II situation was entirely new and disturbingly different. It was obvious that there could be no return to isolationism and that an army of at least a million men would be needed to provide occupation forces in Germany and Japan. It was also apparent that, with the prevailing mood of the American people, any attempt to put the Selective Service Act of 1945 into effect would be political suicide.
People wanted to forget the draft and the war. A volunteer army was the only answer. And so, with the tide of anti-military complaints still rising, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson appointed a six-member board, in a memorandum dated 18 March 1946, instructed to study officer/enlisted man relationships and to make recommendations for changes in existing practices, laws, and regulations to the Secretary of War.
The Board was instructed to concern itself with an examination of complaints of lack of democracy in the Army, instances of incompetent leadership, and the abuse of privileges. Information was to be obtained from former soldiers’ written statements, from recorded interviews of witnesses appearing before the Board, magazine and newspaper articles and letters received by the Board, and radio commentary. In addition, the War Department furnished the Board detailed information on the differential treatment accorded officers and enlisted men.
All six members of the Board were former enlisted men, including Lieutenant General James H. (“Jimmy”) Doolittle, the Chairman, and hero of the first bomber raid over Tokyo, and Lieutenant General (Retired) Troy H. Middleton, former commander of the Army’s 45th Division and VIII Corps. It was noted by the skeptical that no graduate of the U. S. Military Academy was included. Other members were:
Robert Neville, former lieutenant colonel, who had been on the staff of Yank magazine as an enlisted man and later served as editor of Stars and Stripes in Italy.
Adna H. Underhill, a former platoon sergeant and captain, who had been commissioned from Officer Candidate School, and had been awarded the Silver Star for combat at Anzio.
Jake W. Lindsey, former technical sergeant, who was the hundredth infantryman to win the Medal of Honor in World War II.
Meryl M. Frost, former sergeant, who had been seriously wounded in Italy. After 18 months recuperating in Army hospitals, he returned to Dartmouth College to win the Philadelphia Sportswriters’ Award as the most courageous athlete of 1945.
The report begins with a statement of the Board’s purpose, followed by a historical note to the effect that, although the American military system is derived from the Prussian and the British armies, the phrase “caste system” cannot be appropriately applied to it, since the selection of individuals for commissioned rank is based on democratic principles. Nevertheless, the Board cited instances of strained relationships during the Revolutionary War, Civil War, and World War I. The causes were alleged to be resentment of “aristocratic” rank and privileges that had no significance or value, and the officers’ lack of interest in the welfare of enlisted men.
After World War II, the complaints reflected the higher educational levels of the enlisted men, which made them much more critical of both their officers and noncommissioned officers. This attitude had also been commented upon after World War I, in a report by the Secretary of War and, in the wake of World War II, the Board’s report stated, “similar reaction to the military establishment is appearing. Concurrently with widespread discussions of demobilization, enlistment and re-enlistment in the armed services, the extension of the Draft Act, universal military training, unification of the military services, and a host of other problems, involving both Army and Navy and their relation to international issues, much is being written and spoken on the subject of officer/enlisted man relationships.”
Commenting on complaints of lack of democracy in the Army, the report explained, and to some extent defended, rank and privilege.
Those ... who understood the mission or objective of an Army whether in peacetime or in an emergency, did not argue for the abolition of rank or privileges in the military service.
A review of the Russian experience with their own military system during and after the Revolution in the winter of 1917-1918, when the Red Army abolished rank and privileges, brings to light the fact recognition was not given by the Russians at that time to the essentials referred to in the preceeding [sic] paragraph. In subsequent revamping of their military system in terms of these basic principles, the pendulum swung in the other direction and the Russian officer corps now has greater prestige and privileges than before the reorganization was attempted and far more than is accorded officers in our Army.
Having considered the testimony of the 61 witnesses who appeared in person and the more than a thousand letters received, the Board reported that the official gap, established by regulations and tradition, between officers and enlisted men was the basis of the majority of complaints and unfavorable criticism. In this connection, a report of the American Institute of Public Opinion, published 3 May 1946, was quoted, stating that 72 per cent of a cross-section of the nation said “good idea” in answer to the question, “Do you think it would be a good idea if Army officers and enlisted men had the same food, clubs and social privileges?” Officers were reported to be about equally divided on the question, but 80 per cent of former enlisted men favored eliminating special privileges for officers. Also quoted was an Army survey, made after VJ-day, which had reported that 79 per cent of the enlisted men questioned agreed with the following statement: “An officer will not lose the respect of his men if he pals around with them off duty.”
With such evidence at hand, and apparently accepted without question, the Doolittle Board set about the task of planning a new type of democratic army, attractive to volunteers and in some respects similar to the proletarian Red army criticized in its own report.
Under the heading, “An Advanced Concept,” it was stated that both the testimony of witnesses and letters received recommended a new system of personnel organization that would erase the line between officers and enlisted men. The new plan called for a gradual rise from the lowest to the highest rank in the Army, with each step up the scale involving an increase in duties, responsibilities, and authority. Selection of individuals for any position in the scale would be made only by competitive examinations. Promotions would also depend on the passing of examinations.
“Under the proposed plan, it was stated, “the pay scale would correspond to that which now prevails in the most advanced personnel management systems in the field of business and industry. Monetary allowances would be on a graduated basis but factors other than rank will govern the amounts granted at each level in the scale.”
This new pay-as-you-grow plan would not only provide incentive for advancement, and motivation to follow the military service as a career, it would also prevent any possibility of incompetents getting into positions of responsibility. It was admitted that the new approach would require a complete revision of Army regulations, “and a breakdown of many customs and traditions.”
In its conclusions the Board admitted that there had been complaints against the military establishment after other American wars, and attributed them to the “distaste of citizens in our democracy for a regimented life in which an individual to some extent loses his identity.” And, because the majority who served were drafted—many against their will—much of the general criticism could have been expected.
“Americans look with disfavor,” the report continued, “upon any system which grants unearned privileges to a particular class of individuals and find distasteful any tendency to make arbitrary social distinctions between two parts of the Army.” To the skeptical, this seemed a curiously illogical statement in view of such highly prized American status symbols as membership in exclusive college fraternities, residence in an exclusive and expensive community, and membership in an exclusive country club. However, the Doolittle Board’s all-out aim to please was indicated in its recommendations. After two paragraphs, of one sentence each, stating that we must have an Army “modern, economical, efficient and effective” maintaining “the control and discipline, which are essential to the success of any military institution;” the first objective mentioned was maintenance of morale so that “people returning from combat duty or service in the military establishment return in the best possible mental, moral, physical, and spiritual condition. Conditions must be such as to create in the mind of the soldier a favorable impression of the military service and of the government.” It was further stated that the Army of the future should provide “improvement of the character, the knowledge, and the competence of its members.”
And, what, if any, would be the role of the officer in this new and improved Army? Repeating the vague phrase, “conditions must be such,” the Board stated that the officer corps must be improved so that it would merit the respect of soldiers and civilians alike. To achieve this goal, emphasis was again placed on competitive examinations, much closer supervision by commanders, and “measures to assure freedom from individual prejudice, favoritism and political pressure.”
The democratic nature of the New Army was indicated in paragraph 12 of the recommendations which provided that:
The hand salute be abandoned off all Army installations and off duty, except in occupied territories and under conditions where the procedure might be deemed necessary to properly convey military dignity to local populations, but be employed in all official greetings in the line of duty and continue to be manifest at ceremonial occasions and when the national anthem is played or the colors pass by. That necessary steps be taken to eliminate the terms and concepts, “enlisted men” and “officers,” that suitable substitutes by employed—e.g., members of the commissioned corps, members of the noncommissioned corps, etc.—and that all military personnel be referred to as ‘soldiers’.
Warning that length of military service seems to divorce military personnel from the civilian outlook, and that close contact and association with civilians must be maintained, paragraph 13 states that a maximum of military personnel living in civilian communities, rather than on Army posts, would aid in maintaining “the mutual exchange of information necessary in a citizens’ Army.”
The report also called for the abolishment of all statutes, regulations, customs, and traditions which discourage or forbid social associations of soldiers of similar likes and tastes because of military rank.
The Doolittle Board’s report concluded with the suggestion that further study be made of accumulated materials for the purpose of extracting additional ideas worthy of acceptance.
Following the War Department’s publication of the report of the Doolittle Board, an intensive recruiting campaign for the “New Army” was launched with the slogan “Make It A Million.” One unforgetable [sic] poster showed a young man smiling happily and bore the message “In the New Army your son’s personality will be respected.” Other posters stressed pleasures of free travel overseas and the chance to learn a trade.
The Board having directed that the soldier’s morale was to be maintained by improving him mentally, morally, physically, and spiritually, training schedules soon indicated that more time was being spent at lectures and in class rooms than on the drill field.
For mental improvement there were troop information and education lectures on prescribed subjects such as “The Soviet Constitution,” "The New England States,” and “Mexico, Our Southern Neighbor.” The value of this information to riflemen was not explained.
As this was to be an Army of specialists, there was increased emphasis on special schools to which soldiers were sent to learn skills previously learned by on-the-job training in their own units. Instead of reporting to the company supply sergeant to learn to be a supply clerk, the New Army soldier would attend a six weeks course in Administration and Supply at the Quartermaster School. Upon completion of the course, he would return to his unit with an official document verifying his new status and—if he was an eager beaver—notes on the latest theories on supply procedure for the edification of his supply sergeant.
There were schools for clerk-typists, bakers, cooks, warehouse clerks, and chaplains’ assistants, to name only a few. Soon there were soldiers who had a number of schools on their record, some because they found classroom life more attractive than winter maneuvers in Germany and others because their company commanders could get rid of them for from four to eight weeks by sending them to school.
The Articles of War defining military offenses and the penalties for them, formerly read to the troops, were completely revised and superceded [sic] by The Uniform Code of Military Justice. The new code provided for enlisted men on a court-martial board when the accused was an enlisted man and requested them. This seemingly democratic gesture backfired as it soon became apparent that professional noncommissioned officers on court-martial boards were frequently more severe than the officers. It was also soon apparent that the standards of conduct of the code are not as high as those of the Old Articles of War. Among officers, there was discussion of the old A.W. 95, reading: “Any officer, cadet or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service.” This was now modified to “...shall be punished as a court-martial shall direct.” No longer would a false official statement or his signature on a false report result in inevitable dismissal. Nor would the officer’s word of honor, in the form of a certificate, be accepted without question as it had been in the past.
For officers and noncommissioned officers long accustomed to accepting a way of life in which every individual’s status was clearly defined, adjustment to the new democratic Army was difficult and, for many, impossible. Disciplinary authority was taken away from junior officers and company commanders. No longer was the “Old Man,” the company commander, the unchallenged leader with the right to promote and demote, and to reward and punish. Such matters now had to be approved by higher authority. At some posts company commanders were required to provide a suggestion box in the orderly room for the convenience of soldiers who had ideas for the improvement of the unit. There were also forms to be signed stating that the individual accepted company punishment and waived his right to demand a court-martial instead.
Hardest hit of all by the new concept of lecture-oriented training and relaxed standards of discipline were the older noncommissioned officers who, in the past, had been known as the backbone of the Regular Army. In order to create a favorable impression of the Army, as prescribed by the Doolittle Board, the traditional tough sergeant must now learn how to deal with the new type of soldiers whose personalities were to be respected. The sergeant must be a kindly father image who never used harsh or profane language. In refusing his company commander’s plea to re-enlist, one old Army sergeant expressed the opinion of many of his kind: “No Sir! Uncle Sam can have my 18 years. I’ve been a sergeant too damn long to learn how to be a den mother.”
At higher command levels attitudes towards the new doctrine of closer command supervision varied considerably. Some troop commanders still followed the old Army custom of not interfering with company, troop, and battery commanders whose units met required standards of performance. Others, anxious to show their enthusiasm for the “new approach,” held company commanders’ meetings at which recommendations ranged from advocating the democratic practice of calling cadre noncommissioned officers by their first names to holding regular “bull sessions,” with noncommissioned officers not present, so that the men would feel free to make complaints and offer suggestions to the company commander.
No Army in history had ever been as well fed or as lavishly provided with recreational facilities and equipment. Feeding the troops was no longer entrusted to mess sergeants who now received detailed instructions for preparing the menus created by professional civilian nutrition experts. Special Service Officers procured and distributed athletic equipment of all kinds and supervised athletic activities. Overseas, young American ladies, recruited by Special Services, operated hobby shops offering instruction in leather working (“Make Mom a pocketbook”), guitar-playing, table tennis, and sponsoring bingo tournaments. If the young soldier did not return stateside a worthy bridegroom for the girl next door, it would not be for want of effort by Special Services. In spite of an intensive recruiting campaign and the best efforts of teachers, preachers, sociologists and psychologists to build an all-volunteer Army, there were less than 200,000 volunteers.
There had been very few draft calls in 1946, and in some months none at all. In March 1947, President Harry S. Truman, in his message to Congress, stated that he thoroughly desired to see the armed forces on an all-volunteer basis at the earliest possible moment and he did not recommend an extension of the Selective Training and Service Act expiring on March 31 of that year. The draft law was not renewed and volunteer enlistments declined sharply. The era of postwar prosperity had arrived. Wages were high and jobs plentiful. Because of reductions in their authorized strength, the Navy and the Marine Corps had the advantage of being able to depend on voluntary enlistments, but the Army was in trouble.
A year after his recommendation that the draft law be allowed to expire, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress requesting restoration of the draft and, in addition, the establishment of a system of “universal military training.” All youth, at the age of 18, would serve a year on active duty in the armed forces followed by a period in the reserve forces. Congress turned down this proposal, but restored the draft. Volunteer enlistments increased immediately.
Although the Army had failed in its recruiting campaign for volunteers, the inducements offered to make Army life pleasant and comfortable remained in force. The relaxed standards of discipline, resulting from the “new approach” recommended by the Doolittle Board, together with the new emphasis on the rights and privileges of enlisted personnel produced results far different from those predicted by the Board. Inspector General officers were now available to hear all complaints and they were kept busy. With resumption of the draft a new type of complaint had to be dealt with. Instead of going to the Inspector General with their grievances, the disgruntled soldier soon discovered that a letter from a Congressman could be depended upon to get quick action. This was particularly effective when written by “Mom” on information furnished by her boy. The Congressman’s letter, demanding an explanation, would be promptly answered by the commanding officer of the post where the complaining soldier was serving.
Restoration of the draft also resulted in a marked increase in the number of college students enrolled in the Reserve Officers Training Corps. Upon graduation from college they would be commissioned as second lieutenants in the Reserve and required to serve either six months or two years, on active duty, depending on the existing need for officers. But ROTC cadets were not subject to the draft. It was not long before the vast majority of lieutenants came from the ROTC, and their status as temporary officers was not always enviable. Career NCOs regarded them skeptically as amateurs who would complete their required service before they learned how to be officers. Understandably, they were not popular with college graduates who had been drafted.
For four years the Army seemed to be functioning effectively with many, but not all, of the Doolittle Board’s recommendations in effect. Never before had so many soldiers been trained as cooks, bakers, clerk-typists, radio repair men, stock clerks, and chaplains’ assistants.
The effort to recruit volunteers for the Regular Army was now concentrated on draftees who were urged to “Go R.A.” for a guaranteed choice of assignment and increased opportunities for specialized training.
Public information and troop information activities were increased at the same time that tactical formations were being reduced for reasons of economy. Infantry regiments were reduced from three battalions to two, with one rifle company dropped from each regiment and one battery eliminated from each unit of division artillery. Worn-out World War II equipment was not being replaced. There were many field radios that would not work, vehicles that would have to be towed to the LSTs when the time came to move out to Pusan, mortars for which there was no ammunition and bazooka missiles that would splatter harmlessly against the armor of Russian-built tanks.
When, on 25 June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army attacked across the 38th Parallel, routing the American trained South Korean Army, hastily assembled American units could not stop them. By the end of August, U. S. forces had retreated to the “Pusan Perimeter” at the southeast tip of the Korean peninsula.
Ejected suddenly from the soft life of the occupation army in Japan the troops had not been adequately prepared mentally or physically for war in Korea or anywhere else. They were not to blame when they did not live up to the combat traditions of the Regular Army. As one skeptic remarked, “They were trained for everything but war.” There were many instances of individual bravery which were played up by the press, with less frequent references to a new term, “bug out.”
While the Army had been experimenting with troop information lectures and the new psychological approach to disciplinary problems, the Marines continued to maintain their traditional standards based on strict discipline and rigorous combat training. The reduction in their authorized strength had proved to be a blessing in disguise, for they were again an all-volunteer force with a simple message for the recruit: “Shape up or ship out. We didn’t ask you to join us.”
After Korea, the pendulum of Army policy began to swing back in the direction of traditional concepts of discipline and leadership. In due time, there appeared a new type of “Specialist” who wore a campaign hat as the distinctive insignia of the group of experts to which he belonged. The first members of the group had been trained by Marines, who wore the same hat and had been known for years as Drill Instructors. They were all volunteers.