In the continuing controversy over the future of carrier aviation a recurring theme is the great mobility of the carrier, her ability to move several hundred miles a day and to remain at sea almost indefinitely. The carrier can shift location and remain at sea because of the Navy’s Service Forces which assure that there will be beans, bullets, Bombs, and black oil wherever she steams.
The shooting war in Southeast Asia, the continued hostile acts of North Korea, and the explosive atmosphere of the Middle East have increased demands on the Service Force commands in the Western Pacific (Service Force Seventh Fleet) and in the Mediterranean (Service Force Sixth Fleet). Because the Sixth Fleet is not in a shooting war, Service Force Sixth Fleet may serve as the better example of the support requirements and operations in the Cold War arena of the coming decade.
The Service Force Sixth Fleet, known tactically as Task Force 63, provides logistic support for the Fleet’s Carrier Attack Force (TF-60) usually comprised of two attack carriers, two missile cruisers, and 16 frigates and destroyers; the Amphibious Force (TF-61) consisting of six “amphibs” with a reinforced Marine battalion embarked, and several ocean minesweepers; the conventional and nuclear attack submarines (TF-69); and the hunter-killer group (TF-67) which periodically enters the Mediterranean, and which consists of an ASW carrier and about eight destroyers and escorts.
Task Force 63 is made up of Fleet oilers (AO), ammunition ships (AE), and an auxiliary gasoline oiler (AOG), a combat stores ship (AFS), a store ship (AF), a destroyer tender (AD), and a fleet tug (ATF) or salvage ship (ARS). During a normal year this force conducts more than 2,500 underway replenishments (UnReps) with about 10% being helicopter-delivered vertical replenishment (VertRep) operations. This intensity of operations is carried out despite the fact that the average age of TF-63 ships is about 20 years, with most of the ships now well into their third decade of service.
The Service Force is generally an unsung participant in Fleet operations today—up until the moment that one of the auxiliaries is unable to meet a rendezvous for one reason or another. It is only then that some of our “operational types” become aware of how dependent the fleet is on the Service Force for sustained operations.
Great care is taken to standardize logistic support functions and underway replenishment procedures throughout the Fleet. NWP-38 is the Bible here, and logistic support commanders from all fleets exchange information and critiques of UnReps conducted in their areas of operation. It is expected that all combatant ships will be equally well prepared to replenish from Service Force ships in the Atlantic, the Pacific, or the Mediterranean, and that the auxiliaries will also be effective and efficient providers wherever encountered.
Since NATO countries have agreed that “logistics is a national responsibility,” TF-63 units never “chop” to a NATO commander. Service Force ships, however, are called upon to provide limited logistic support to certain foreign forces during NATO or bilateral exercises. The doctrine for provisioning within NATO forces is found in ATP-16 and although there are certain basic differences in equipment, replenishment techniques and procedures closely follow U. S. Navy practices. The seamanship and ship handling performance of NATO allies are outstanding, and they are capable of all-weather UnRep evolutions, provided they have had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the rigs, couplings, telephone connections and other paraphernalia.
There is some agitation among the NATO allies today for greater use of U. S. Navy support forces during times when NATO units are working together.
In the Mediterranean, the Service Force commander promulgates a monthly replenishment plan, providing detailed instructions to all deployed units as to how they will be provisioned throughout the month. This plan is based on the Sixth Fleet Commander’s long-range schedule of where the various task groups and task forces will be operating. This plan deals primarily with the reprovision of monthly requirements for foodstuffs such as frozen, dry, and chilled items, as well as the major expendable housekeeping items—e. g., toilet paper, paint, brooms, swabs—but further includes essential repair parts for inoperative equipment. It also provides an opportunity to fuel and rearm, and to deliver mail and men to ships that have been on detached duty.
Although the fleet commander’s basic schedule may simply say “Replenish T. G. 60.2 in the Ionian on 12 March,” liaison between the commander of that task group and the Service Force commander pinpoints a rendezvous time and place, and establishes a replenishment course and speed. The Service Force commander then develops a detailed replenishment plan for the forces involved, indicating how the underway replenishment group (URG) will be formed, the assigned times of each combatant alongside a specified auxiliary, which ships will be vertically replenished and when, and other details of particular interest to the supported task group. This replenishment plan is, of course, based on previously determined logistical requirements, with some factors being provided by the ships themselves, others being computed by the Service Force staff. Logistical planning factors, pertaining to required times for pumping of various petroleum products, times for transferring provisions or ammunition alongside, and for VertRep of each ship in the task group are used to determine the most propitious alongside schedule. Ships are made available for screening and/or lifeguard duties, and care is taken to avoid excessive movement of the combatants through the body of the URG. The entire plan is devoted to the completion of the replenishment evolution safely and in the shortest possible time, with due regard for weather, geography, ships’ capabilities, and any unanticipated developments. When this plan is approved by the task group commander, the screen commander is able to develop his screening plan, and the monthly UnRep is ready to roll.
Ships that are deployed on special operations, surveillance, or other types of detached duties, must also receive their monthly provisions, and auxiliaries frequently are diverted to meet them on station to provide logistic support as required. During the recent deployment of a hunter-killer group to the Mediterranean, a high-speed combat stores ship such as the Sylvania (AFS-2) accumulated all the provisions for the ASW carrier and her escorts, sought them out in their area of operation, and resupplied each ship in less than an hour’s time—generally by VertRep. The ASW carrier received the provisions for those escorts not in company when the AFS arrived and delivered them to the units upon their return to the task group.
Fuel expenditures are routinely monitored by the Service Force commander, so that oilers or other Service Force ships can be directed to rendezvous with detached ships before their fuel levels become critical. Mail, personnel, and essential repair parts are either handled in this fashion, or are delivered by frequent carrier-onboard delivery (COD) flights to the carrier for further distribution.
In this way, the tactical commander is relieved of much of his concern regarding logistical matters and, is provided considerable flexibility in the performance of his assigned tasks.
Logistic support for the Sixth Fleet is based on “'topping-off” each ship in consumables, foodstuffs, and housekeeping items, and in providing fuel and ammunition as they are required, plus such fleet freight as the tempo of operations permits. In the Mediterranean, an oiler and an ammunition ship must be in close support of each of the two attack aircraft carriers at all times.
Provision support for the Sixth Fleet is provided almost exclusively from the continental United States. Each month a store ship (AF) departs Norfolk carrying sufficient frozen, dry, and chilled items to support 25,000 men for 30 days. This amounts to approximately 1,700 short tons; in addition, she carries 300 tons of repair parts and basic housekeeping items required to “top off” the combat stores ship. Shortly after the AF enters the Mediterranean, she and the AFS rendezvous at sea and spend 10 to 12 hours passing approximately 500 tons of stores and provisions from the AF to the AFS. After another few days—during which the AFS must sort out, identify, enter into the supply system, and bin all material received—the first of the major monthly underway replenishments for a task group or task force is held. Following this, the two auxiliaries rendezvous once again for another cargo consolidation, after which they meet with the other two task force/task groups in the Mediterranean and complete their monthly replenishments. The AF is now routed into port for maintenance and upkeep such as boiler and fireside cleanings, for the loading on board of over 100 tons of cargo for return to the United States, and for a brief recreational visit before she returns home. When the AF finally departs the Mediterranean, she has transferred all but about 10% of her cargo. Normally, three AFs rotate on this duty; when not so engaged, these ships supply Fleet units on various exercises, in the Caribbean, on NASA space shots, or, hopefully, simply catch their breath in homeport.
In addition to provisions received from the AF, deployed units are permitted to buy fresh provisions overseas, but flow-of-gold restrictions keep these purchases small. Milk products are obtained under U. S. Army contracts in France and Italy, while recombined milk and milk products are procured from U. S.-controlled facilities in Spain, Malta, Greece, and Turkey. No other foodstuffs need be procured abroad.
Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) for the Sixth Fleet are procured and positioned in depots throughout the Mediterranean by Commander Fleet Air Mediterranean (ComFAirMed). Requirements for them are predicted on experience and estimates of projected operations. The fleet oilers in the Mediterranean carry, collectively, about 24 million gallons of POL, and although this appears adequate to support the Fleet, the need for the Service Force to be ready for any contingency with a safe margin for flexibility requires that the oilers be topped off almost on a biweekly basis. Fuel used by the Sixth Fleet comes from two sources: European refineries and MSTS tanker deliveries from the United States. We could conceivably consolidate cargoes with U. S.-flag commercial tankers, about 75 of which are capable of transferring fuel underway, but this process is slow and fraught with danger because only a few of these ships are familiar with, or have attempted, UnRep procedures, and none are configured for such an operation at this time. Thus, although our petroleum product supply to the Fleet is from Navy oilers, the Sixth Fleet must depend upon the depots within the Mediterranean for sustained operations.
Normal ammunition requirements of the Sixth Fleet are met by the two deployed ammunition ships. In addition, there are NATO and U. S. ammunition depots in the area, stocked with sufficient ammunition to support naval combatant forces in wartime for a considerable period of time.
Present depot ammunition levels have been reduced considerably by Vietnam requirements and by occasional purging of out-of-date or in-excess components. Fortunately, this has had minimal impact on the Fleet, because withdrawals from the depots are seldom made by the Sixth Fleet. Another ammunition source available within the Mediterranean is found in the deployed destroyer tender, which provides ASW torpedoes and 5-inch training rounds for the “small boys.” To conserve these supplies, each departing Sixth Fleet destroyer turns whatever she has on hand over to her relief.
Provision of essential repair parts to ships within the Mediterranean is handled in several ways; probably the fastest means is by obtaining the needed item from ships in company. If this is not possible, the ship requests assistance from the supply officer of a designated major combatant within his task group. If this procedure does not quickly locate the item, a request is made to the “Material Control Officer of the Sixth Fleet,” who is also the Supply Officer of the AFS, with a duplicate request to the Naval Supply Center, Norfolk. MatConOffSixFlt checks his inventory, also that of all units within the Sixth Fleet, and if the item is available, he directs its delivery to the ship in question by the most expeditious means.
It is interesting to note that 75% of all material breakdowns today require repair parts to get equipment back on line. It has been found that approximately 50% of all the items needed to effect repairs within the Sixth Fleet are provided from within the Fleet itself, about half of which are provided by the well stocked AFS. Time required to effect delivery in this manner is generally less than seven days; however, considerably longer time is required to obtain those repair parts not readily available in the Fleet.
If the desired item is within the supply system, it is flown from wherever it may be located by Military Airlift Command or Quicktrans to Norfolk, thence by MAC to one of the Navy’s Overseas Air Cargo Terminals (NOACT) at Rota, Spain, or Naples, Italy. ComFAirMed serves as the Naval Air Logistic Control Officer, Europe, Representative (or NALCOEuRep), with headquarters in Naples, and the Commanding Officer Fleet Tactical Support Squadron 24 (VR-24) is designated the Officer-in-Charge NALCOEuRep. This command has established Naval Air Logistic Co-ordinating Offices (or NALCOs) at the Naval Air Facility Naples and the Naval Station Rota to carry out support functions. The basic policy of this support squadron is to provide and to maintain a safe, efficient, and responsive tactical air logistics system in support of the Sixth Fleet and the naval European shore establishment. In effect, the Navy has its own private airline for logistic support within the Mediterranean—an airline service that would be prohibitive to obtain on any other basis. All flights directed by NALCOs are classified as “Special” flights—there is no fixed flight schedule. Individual flight itineraries are planned on the basis of “need.” Flights are scheduled as far in advance as practicable (normally one week) in order to give all concerned sufficient notice for planning and proper execution. The flights generally originate in Rota or Sigonella, Sicily, and fly wherever the need exists in the Mediterranean for men or material to be delivered. Aircraft used in this program include COD (C-1A and C-2A), C-117 and C-118, C-130, and even several of the old C-47s.
Replacement aircraft requirements for the Sixth Fleet, plus critical aviation materials, are closely monitored by ComNavAirLant who schedules these items into the fleet, normally using MAC flights or MSTS shipping to air or ocean terminals respectively. During 1968, approximately 9,000 tons of high priority (TP1/TP2) cargo were handled by the NOACTs for airlift. Once the material reaches a terminal, the ComFAirMed support organization takes charge, and either CODs the material aboard, flies it to an airfield near a port of call, or requests Service Force ships to make a delivery when next in company. About 250 tons of material are lifted to the carriers by COD each month. Thus, delivery can be completed within a few days, or take as long as three weeks, depending upon the mode of transportation.
If some needed repair part is not in the supply system, the Fleet is faced with either cannibalization, or with a long wait for the item to be delivered from the manufacturer. Material requirements to satisfy lower priority (TP3/TP4) needs are shipped in MSTS bottoms or by space-chartered vessels. This material is delivered to ocean terminals at Naples or Rota for onward movement, most frequently by Service Force ships. During 1968, over 7,000 tons of Sixth Fleet ocean cargo were handled at these two ports. Each month about 300 tons of cargo are delivered at sea from the auxiliaries to the Fleet, while over 150 tons are returned to ConUS. In addition to the aviation material flown in or out of the Mediterranean, a large portion of the cargo carried by shipping includes items scheduled by ComNavAirLant to support the attack carriers. Included here are such items as non-flyable “dud,” aircraft tail assemblies, aircraft engines, and other high-value materials. Repair part support for the Fleet today is good for those items available in the supply system, but very poor for items no longer “on-the-shelf.”
As briefly touched upon earlier, resupply support for the Fleet Issue Load List (FILL) items carried in the AFS also comes from ConUS, via the AF. Careful planning and close attention to usage data is required here, since a requisition from the AFS which is received at Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, too late to be loaded aboard a departing AF, and is of too low a priority for an air shipment, often takes another 50 to 60 days to reach the AFS.
During 1968, the AFS was able to maintain a net supply effectiveness of over 95%. This meant that an average of only five items out of every hundred requested from material carried in stock on board the AFS were not available upon demand at any given time
The job of the Service Force command is considerably complicated by responsibilities concerning the material condition of the deployed forces. All casualty reports (CasRepts) from ships in the Sixth Fleet include the Commander of the Service Force as an information addressee. Normally, all other addressees wait for the Service Force to take action as required before getting into the act. In the Sixth Fleet, the material officer directly concerned with the condition of the fleet is an EDO captain, and he is “dual-hatted,” to both the staffs of the Commander of the Sixth Fleet and the Commander of the Service Force. This makes it most fortuitous when it is necessary to divert the flagship of a task group commander from a choice liberty port into the port where the deployed destroyer tender may be located so that some essential repair job may be accomplished.
Today, the material condition of the Navy is not good for several reasons, the most apparent of which are: overage, lack of expertise in technical and operational personnel, lack of sufficient repair parts, inadequate shipyard overhauls, and heavy operational commitments. More men, money, and material would help. However, ships are being kept operational through judicious use of available resources.
As the years go by, the same old casualties are found throughout the Fleet. During 1968, the “Best Sellers” in the Sixth Fleet, by order of frequency of recurrence of breakdown, were in diesel engines, boat engines, electronic gear, boilers, and radio equipment. Casualties were also reported in Drone Antisubmarine Helicopters, special types of radars and detection equipment. But, by and large, it was the mundane items that caused the most problems, primarily because of difficulties in finding replacement spares and repair parts. The lack of adequate support for the new sophisticated equipment only lowered the threshold and frustration of the fleet logistician. Despite new contractual Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) requirements, the Navy’s Systems Commands (the old technical bureaus), and certain provisioning activities are too often guilty of failing to provide adequate range and depth in spares and in repair part support for new equipment now arriving in the Fleet.
On the average, in 1968, the Sixth Fleet had about 180 outstanding material casualties at any given time. Numerically, this worked out to about four per ship, but it was curious that some ships would never have a CasRept, while one carrier never had less than 25. As can be imagined, the destroyer tender is almost continuously knee-deep in job orders, and in 1968 the tenders bandied more than 16,000 individual work requests. Several foreign naval and civilian shipyards were also given work from time to time; however, such yards are used only for major hull repairs, and certain engineering or electronic problems which are too big or complex for the tenders.
In addition to the deployed destroyer tender, the Sixth Fleet makes occasional use of the Polaris submarine tender in Rota, for voyage repairs of “in-chopper” arriving units and for submarines. Also available are 12 to 14 electronic and ordnance specialists on assignment from ConUS-based mobile technical units. These experts are routed from one end of the Mediterranean to the other, and as far away as such places as Karachi, Pakistan, to handle complex material problems in our ships. Not only do they provide technical assistance to our deployed units, but they also conduct on-the-job training, inspections, and schooling for our Fleet technicians and operators.
Replenishment-at-sea procedures and techniques have become standardized today, with new ideas being generated primarily in the use of the replenishment helicopters. Refueling is still done using the span wire, or the close-in method, although small craft like mine-sweeps do fuel by the astern method. Some destroyers are still stuffing the hose down open trunks, while other destroyers and many larger ships are employing the Robb fittings. One new application, both in our Navy and in foreign navies, has been the probe method of fueling, and this has been proven to be a most safe, expeditious, and highly satisfactory procedure.* Today, probe fittings are carried on most oilers, and the receivers are installed on some combatants. Admittedly, the probe rigs are costly ($2,500 for the sender and $1,000 for the receiver), and a bit complicated; but they are rugged, and with reasonable care, they pay for themselves many times over during heavy weather fuelings. By early 1969, 20% of the Fleet had been equipped with the probe fueling system; it is planned that all of the aircraft carriers and surface combatants, and some large auxiliaries will be so equipped within the next few years. In addition to U. S. Navy procurement of this system, six NATO countries have already made firm contractual arrangements for various items of probe equipment. On 11 April 1969, the Chief of Naval Operations granted approval for service use of the double probe system, and has now authorized purchase of the hardware. So, despite the misgivings of some die-hards, it looks as if the probe rig will soon become an accepted way of life.
Another encouraging sign for improvement in the underway replenishment world was the establishment in August 1967 of a new office in the Naval Ship Systems Command. This is now known as the Underway Replenishment Project Office (PMS 390); it was created to provide the Navy with standardized, simplified, and reliable underway replenishment equipment. The PMS-390 budget for FY 69 approached eight million dollars so there is hope for further progress in this important area.
Recent actions under the guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Material, and the Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command have been devoted to simplifying missile-handling equipment in the new ammunition-carrying class of ships. Additionally, attention has been given to building replenishment-at-sea mockups for brief periods of realistic training of operators ashore under controlled conditions. And starting 1 July 1969, an UnRep equipment maintenance course of nine weeks duration was offered to enlisted men at the Transportation Management School in Oakland. The course includes basic indoctrination in hydraulics, electronics and electricity, as well as care and use of test equipment.
Within the next two years, the Bureau of Naval Personnel will inaugurate expanded UnRep equipment operator courses on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. UnRep equipment scheduled for installation in the four ships of the AE-32 class has been standardized, and other replenishment at sea items are now scheduled for operational evaluation before further buys are made. Finally, a team of experts in UnRep procedures has begun visits to auxiliary ships for special assistance and indoctrination purposes, and to uncover and correct deficiencies in UnRep equipment.
New shipboard cargo-handling devices are now finding their way on board auxiliaries. These include the hand-driven hydraulic jack, the electric fork lift, and conveyor tracks. Some of these items are delivered by the auxiliary to receiver ships prior to large scale transfers of cargo, but unfortunately most of our fleet freight is still being manhandled. As more of these devices become available, transfer capabilities of our ships will improve.
Provisions are transferred alongside by single and double Burton and by modified house falls. Cargo transfer rates of ships newly arrived overseas generally are poor, but they quickly become higher after several months of practice. Despite this, receiving ships continue to find their decks and hatches jammed with incoming supplies faster than they can be struck below. Ammunition is normally transferred by span wire and skip box, and can be a long, involved process. There are several new transfer methods under development, including the STREAM (Standard Tensioned Replenishment Alongside Method) procedures, but the system needs improvement. Some experimenting has been done with ammunition transfer by helicopters, and this promises to be a fruitful area. The field remains wide open here for further developments.
As mentioned earlier, the possibilities of VertRep are just now being realized. The UH-46 series of helicopters now in the Fleet can carry 22 passengers or up to 6,000 pounds in one load, with a flight endurance of 2½ hours. They are now being used for carrying men and for handling such items as mixed pallets of provisions, loads of ammunition, missiles in specially configured rigs, and mail. The beauty of this particular helo includes its reliability, its ruggedness, and its ability to fly in winds up to 60 knots with scant regard for the direction from which the wind comes. Thus, the helicopter has become one of the most versatile and valuable tools of the Fleet logistician. It became standard practice in the Sixth Fleet to use the two helicopters carried by the AFS to VertRep all provisions from the AF as well as from AFS to all ships except the attack carrier. The aircraft carrier was excluded, since it was found that overall time to replenish the task force could be reduced by having the carrier make but two stops, one to the AF and one to the oiler, with helicopters bringing all provisions from the AFS while she was alongside the AF.
*See S. P. Weintraub, “Ship-to-Ship Probe Fueling,” U. S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, October 1967, pp. 133-135.
The Sixth Fleet is fortunate to have so many fuel and ammunition depots available in the Mediterranean; however, even these proved inadequate when the Fleet moved eastward to position itself better during the Arab-Israeli Conflict in 1967. It was necessary to establish an advanced base at Souda Bay, Crete, complete with destroyer tender, and air support, as well as to inaugurate continuous shuttle runs for the oilers and combat stores ship. Instead of scheduling monthly major UnReps, the replenishment ships conducted “UnReps of Opportunity,” topping off the combatants with consumable items whenever they fell into company. The auxiliaries made their position and intended movement known to the Fleet, and then simply steamed from point to point. This is quite similar to the procedures followed today in the Western Pacific to support the ships deployed to Southeast Asia.
In far distant bodies of water, such as the Indian Ocean or even in the Western Pacific, the role of the logistician becomes even more important than it is where support is more readily available. The time-distance factor emphasizes the need for detailed, long-range supply and support planning. The 50-to-60-day delay mentioned earlier in regard to an item failing to make the “once per month” trip in the AF to the Mediterranean can be greatly extended, perhaps even to twice that delay. Lack of advanced bases in such areas means that lines of communication have to be extended, and the logistical umbilical cord becomes stretched perilously thin. The flexibility of the Fleet is weakened, as is the capability of the Fleet as a whole. The material condition of the ships deteriorates, and when equipment becomes CasRept, it remains CasRept for longer periods of time. It is during times such as these that the logistical commander must maintain exquisite operational control over his ships so that no commitment will be missed.
The Service Force commander must also be a skillful and effective manager of the deteriorating resources available to him. His ships keep getting older, his human resources continue to diminish, his repair part support has been weakened—yet, his operational commitments remain high. It is true that new and better auxiliaries are starting to join the Fleet, and older ones are being retired. Until all the “bugs” have been discovered and corrected, however, the support forces will be a mixture of the weary old and the untried new.
There has been much discussion recently in Congress, in DoD, and in other high places concerning the mobility, the flexibility, and the survivability of the aircraft carrier—of her ability to roam the seas almost at will, and of her long staying power, particularly if nuclear-powered. All of these attributes are there, but it must not be forgotten that all ships, including the carrier, suffer from a recurring, persistent need for replacement personnel, fresh provisions, ammunition, repair parts, Fleet freight, mail and all the other essentials carried by the Service Force ships. Our national struggle to preserve our supremacy on the high seas, will continue to be supported, in every sense of the word, by the aging but able ships of the Service Force.
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A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1942, Captain Karcher had an extensive career in the surface Navy, including three assignments as a destroyer executive officer, two in destroyer commands, one as a destroyer division commander, plus a tour as chief of staff to a cruiser destroyer flotilla commander. He served two years in the Plans and Policy Directorate (Op-60) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Karcher commenced his logistics experience with a tour in the Bureau of Ordnance, followed by two years as Ordnance Officer in the Shipbuilding Liaison Office, France, a tour as Logistics Officer Second Fleet Staff, and a year at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He was Commander of the Service Force, Sixth Fleet, Commander Service Squadron Six, and Commander Task Force Sixty-three from June 1967 to March 1969. Prior to his retirement in May 1970, he was Director of the Fleet Support Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Material. This article is based on Captain Karcher’s experience as Commander Service Force Sixth Fleet from 1967 to 1969.