In a relatively short time, the Navy will become smaller in size and, technically speaking, more sophisticated, at a rate limited only by the amount of new construction. The resulting compact, modern Navy must be led by officers and enlisted men who, first and foremost, are qualified in the art of naval warfare—otherwise, the accrued technical improvements will have been for nought.
Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee has stated: “It is apparent that we will not receive the funds to support a Navy as large as it has been in the past. The choice, therefore, is between quality and quantity, and we have chosen quality.” Certainly the quality of the leadership in any organization is a prime factor in the success of that organization. Therefore, let us examine the policies and programs that are used to develop the art of naval warfare in officers. Then we can propose some changes which should be made to meet the new needs.
The basic officer structure of the U. S. Navy consists of unrestricted line (URL), restricted line, staff corps, limited duty, and warrant officers. URL is the category established to provide the officers who will command at sea. The broad objectives of the URL officers are to plan and conduct naval warfare and to manage the ancillary systems which affect the combat readiness of the Navy. It is anticipated that an effective career plan will provide, through education and experience, an adequate number of officers in each year group to sustain an effective fighting Navy.
The URL officer, irrespective of source—be it the Naval Academy, NROTC, or OCS—is assumed to be capable of filling any billet not specifically designed for a restricted line or staff corps officer—and therein lies the greatest fallacy in the URL concept. Although proven invalid in both World War II and the Korean War, and currently under strong challenge by a burgeoning technology that requires an expertise never before demanded of the line officer, the URL concept has assumed, over the years, an aura of validity which, like the emperor’s new clothes, is chimerical. Yet, few naval officers dare to challenge the concept lest they, like the emperor’s ministers, be considered unfit or stupid. Unlike the emperor, however, we can no longer afford to ignore the facts.
One of the facts, and probably the most telling one, is that, except possibly for the three existing naval warfare specialties within the URL—aviation, submarine, and special warfare— there are no real career patterns for URL officers. This lack of specific career patterns in clearly delineated naval warfare specialties is denying the Navy the best use of its line officers, particularly those just embarking upon their careers.
Experience since World War II provides an almost prima facie case for warfare specialization, as can be noted in the following examples.
Mine Warfare. In October 1950, the Advance Force Commander at Wonsan, Korea, Rear Admiral A. E. Smith, U. S. Navy, informed the Chief of Naval Operations which stated, in part, that, “The U. S. Navy has lost control of the sea in Korean waters . . .” What had happened? In its simplest terms, the U. S. Navy had disregarded the mine warfare lessons of World War II. From 1945 to 1950, mine warfare was, for the most part, regarded as a task any line officer could take on when the time came. The minesweeper fleet was largely decommissioned and most of the officers and men who had served in them during World War II were discharged or assigned to other duty. In five years, the greatest seapower in the world had lost control of the sea in a combat area for want of a few minesweepers and the qualified crews to man them. To Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, U. S. Navy, this was a major lesson of the Korean War, “. . . no so-called subsidiary branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be neglected or relegated a minor role in the future.”
Antisubmarine Warfare. Recently, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer stated, “The Soviet submarine force today represents the main threat to Free World control of the seas in event of hostilities.” That force totals more than 350 submarines—entirely of post-World War II vintage—of which about 65 are nuclear powered, 42 can launch strategic missiles without warning, and 56 can launch cruise missiles.
In comparison, Germany began World War II with 57 submarines, only 39 of which were ready for action. None were snorkel-equipped, much less nuclear powered, and none were missile-armed. Nevertheless, early in that war, although faced by a threat which was only about one-sixth of the strength of the present Soviet submarine force, the U. S. Navy and the British Navy learned that normal training was not enough to qualify officers and men for antisubmarine warfare. Special training was required in tactics, sensors, and weapons. Of equal or greater significance is the fact that, notwithstanding this early recognition of the problem, it still took 45 months for the battle against the U-boats in the Atlantic to be won.
And yet, the U. S. Navy has disregarded this lesson and sought solutions to post-World War II ASW problems primarily in the areas of organizational changes and new technical management concepts. Although these changes and innovations were good and resulted in the introduction into the Fleet of improved sensors and ASW weapons, there has been no comparable improvement in ASW operations at sea. And there will not be until such time as the lessons of war are applied in peacetime, and ASW specialists, both officer and enlisted men are trained and retained in ASW.
Anti-air Warfare. Secretary of the Navy Chafee, testifying before the Senate’s committee of the Armed Services on 1 April 1969, stated, “. . . The wide scope and gravity of the missile threat to ships have lead [sic] to a requirement for the utmost responsiveness and coordination among defense systems . . . Cruise missile defense effort has been assigned a place of high priority alongside our ASW efforts.” Given this top Navy priority, coupled with the complexity of the AAW problem, there should be no doubt but that it should be a naval warfare specialty in which a percentage of unrestricted line officers would, in fact must, devote the majority of their careers, both afloat and ashore.
The Navy is long overdue in channeling unrestricted line officers into naval warfare specialties. Even a cursory look at the functional training required for URL officers in order to qualify for certain types of duty in the Fleet today is enlightening. For example, a young officer, just commissioned, who has been ordered to a guided missile ship for duty in the weapons department, normally will be sent to guided missile school for a minimum of 13 weeks prior to reporting for duty. This training is not of the boot-strap variety, i.e., on-the-job-training conducted on board ship, but is sophisticated training conducted ashore at complex training facilities. Officers who receive this type of highly technical training usually will remain in weapons, i.e., missiles, for all or most of their first sea tour—about three years. During that same period they will be required to qualify as officer of the deck, but will not rotate into other departments such as operations, navigation, and communications for primary duty—and for a valid reason. Commanding officers cannot afford to let these specially-trained officers go into other departments, because not all the other officers will have been specially trained in the missile field. Therefore, there would be no on-board replacements. In fact, some of the other officers will have received special training in other areas, such as communications, and also would be irreplaceable from within that particular wardroom. Hence, irrespective of the official position that URL officers are not supposed to specialize in any one particular field, necessity is channeling young officers into various naval warfare specialties. Failure to formalize these patterns at an early date not only can delay a more effective usage of our officer talents, but also could penalize before a selection board those officers who have been channeled into specialties by circumstance or exigencies of the service.
The foregoing presents but a few of the arguments for only some of the areas of naval operations which already are considered to be de facto naval warfare specialties. A full list would be as follows: Operations/Navigation, Command and Control, Anti-air Warfare, Antisubmarine Warfare, Weapons-Deck, Communications, Mine Warfare, Logistics & General Support, Submarines, Aviation, and Amphibious Warfare.
Figure 1 shows these naval warfare specialties if relation to currently accepted broad naval warfare areas, officer skill courses, Navy officer billet classifications (NOBC), and British Subspecialties.
The list could be modified, but the last thing required or desired is another ad hoc study group to do it. Between the Knox, King, Pye Board in 1920 and the Secretary of the Navy Study of Officer Career Management in 1966 there have been at least 12 major boards, committees, or groups that have directed their efforts toward improvement in naval officer career management practices and procedures. One of the most beneficial of the many recommendations made by these bodies and subsequently implemented, was the establishment of career planning board in the office of the Chief of Naval Personnel. This board should develop a valid list of naval warfare specialties and matching career patterns.
Figure 1
BROAD
WARFARE | NAVAL WARFARE | OFFICER SKILL COURSES** | NOBCs | BRITISH |
AREAS* | SPECIALTIES | (NAVPERS 91769) | (NAVPERS 15839) | SUB-SPECIALTIES |
| OPERATIONS—NAVIGATION | CIC Officers (12 wks), Electronics | 9042, 9216, 9043 | NAVIGATION |
| Skills: CIC, EW, NAV | Warfare Officer (3 wks), SSBN | 9220, 9274, 9284 |
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| Navigation Officer (13 wks), SSBN | 9285, 9213, 9282 |
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| Officer Inertial Navigation SINS (4 wks) | 9065, 9040, 8502 8632, 8507 |
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| COMMAND & CONTROL | NTDS Operations (19 wks), ATDS | 9275, 9085, 9067 | AIRCRAFT |
| Skills: NTDS, ATDS, Plans, | Computer Programming (6 mo.), | 9046, 9217, 9225 | DIRECTION |
| Emergency Action Procedures, | NTDS Evaluator/Supervisor (4 wks), | 9226, 9227, 9705 |
|
| OPS Analyst, ADP. Advanced skills beyond OPS-NAV. | Air Traffic Control (9 wks). | 9085, 8505, 9086 9087, 8687 |
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| ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW) | Fleet Anti-air Warfare Training | 9066, 8687, 9213 |
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| Skills: AAW Doctrine, CIC (AAW), EW (AAW), Advanced skills | Center (FAAWTC) AAW Doctrine and Procedures Courses (Var.), Air |
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| beyond OPS-NAV | Intercepts Control (6 wks). |
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ASW | ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) | ASW Officer (8 wks), ASW | 9040, 8515, 9076 | ANTISUBMARINE |
| Skills: ASW Doctrine, CIC (ASW). | Operations (2 wks), ASW Command | 8604, 9044, 9050 | WARFARE |
| Advanced skills beyond OPS-NAV | (2 wks), ASW Tactical Commander | 9424, 8508, 8606 |
|
| WEAPONS—DECK | Tartar/Talos/Terrier Fire Control | 9057, 9206, 9296 | GUNNERY |
| Skills: Weapons & Associated | Battery Officers (13 wks), | 9202, 9230, 9237 |
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| Fire Control Systems. Fields of | Tartar/Talos/Terrier Telemetering | 9238, 9246, 9258 |
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| Concentration would be | Data Reduction (3 wks), SSBN | 9259, 9296, 9272 |
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| primarily in doctrine and tactical | Weapons Officer (15 wks), Basic | 9053, 9080, 8608 |
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| employment with concurrent strong emphasis on technical knowledge. | Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Nuclear Weapons Disposal (30 wks). | 8654, 9071, 9242 |
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| SUBMARINES*** | Officer Basic Submarine Course (24 wks), Submarine Officers Indoctrination Course (5 wks). Submarine Officers Advanced Course (24 wks), Nuclear Power School/ Nuclear Power Training Unit (6/6 mo.) | 1120, 9084, 9322 | SUBMARINES |
STRIKE | AVIATION*** | Flight Training (2 yrs), Test Pilot (36 | 1300, 8618, 8621 | AVIATION |
WARFARE |
| wks), Naval Aviation Safety Officer (10 wks) | 8620, 8588 |
|
| COMMUNICATIONS | Communications Officers Fleet Course | 9582, 9510, 9520 | COMMUNICATIONS |
|
| (17 wks), Communications Officers Ashore Course (4 wks). | 9515, 9560, 9590 |
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AMPHIBIOUS | AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE | Amphibious Warfare Indoctrination (2 | 9062, 9279, 9293 |
|
| Includes SPECIAL WARFARE*** | wks), Amphibious Planning (2 wks), Boat Group Officers (2 wks), Landing Craft Control (1 wk), Amphibious Tactical Air Control Party (3 wks), Amphibious Air Control Doctrine (2 wks), UDT/SCUBA Diver (6 wks), |
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|
MINE | MINE WARFARE | Mine Countermeasures Officer (7wks), | 9268, 9270, 8602 | MINE WARFARE & |
WARFARE |
| Mine Warfare Staff Officer (25 wks), Ranging and Deperming Officer (8 wks). | 9064 | CLEARANCE DIVING |
LOGISTIC | LOGISTICS & GENERAL SUPPORT | Ship Loading & Stowage (2 wks), | 9051, 9312, 9473 |
|
SUPPORT | Skills: Cargo Handling, Underway Replenishment, Diving, Ship Salvage | Transportation and Stowage of Ammunition, Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles (2 wks), Deep Sea Diving Officer (21 wks), Ship Salvage Diving Officer (14 wks). | 9467, 9478 |
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| ||||
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| SURVEYING |
* Career Planning Information for Surface Junior Officers
** Not all inclusive; examples only
*** Currently designated a Warfare Specialty
The criteria for the development of such a list should be that each specialty will support the fundamental concept that the ultimate goal of every Unrestricted Line Officer should be command at sea.
Once a list of specialties is agreed upon, it then would be necessary to determine the number of billets to assign to each warfare specialty. These quantities can and should be based upon both long-range and short-range force levels. This can be done by establishing, through a line of balance or similar technique, a specialist billet structure based upon the long-range—2 to 10 years—force levels as reflected in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), or the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), modified by the short-range—one-year—actual force levels as reflected in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
This billet structure, and therefore the career patterns of the unrestricted line officers involved, would be reviewed annually upon promulgation of force level documents. In this manner, timely changes in the billet structure could be made in response to the introduction of new weapon systems, the phasing out of old systems, changes in tactical concepts, or revisions in national goals. Of equal importance, it would permit orderly changes in career patterns as necessary to accommodate to changes in size and composition of naval force levels. This, in turn, should preclude, in large measure, those sudden changes in career patterns which are so detrimental to efficiency and morale.
Having approved the naval warfare specialist concept and developed a list of specialties, the term unrestricted line officer, with its connotation of universality, should then be replaced by the term general line officer (GLO).
Next it would be necessary to develop the broad objectives for GLO career planning. An excellent broad career philosophy for the GLO is that of Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee: “Recognizing that the Navy exists to fight at sea, it is fundamental that the line officer be qualified in the art of naval warfare. Thus, his career pattern should show the acquisition of operational experience at sea and broader application thereof in each grade. Concurrently, the officer should have acquired and demonstrated excellence in technical, management, or planning jobs in the shore establishment.”
An adjunct might be that the officer’s professional development must provide him with the broad base of operational experience necessary for command of naval ships or aircraft and for command of several types of complex naval operations to which he may be ordered as a senior or flag officer. Based upon these objectives, detailed career patterns then could be formulated and implemented. In so doing, a major fault in the current URL concept should be corrected. That is the assignment of URL officers to engineering duty as a primary duty.
The problems associated with and the rationale for assigning URL officers to primary duty in engineering are complex, primarily because the practice has the strong argument of precedent in its favor.
Figure 2
NON
YRS. ENG. ENG.
RANK SERV. DUTIES (MONTHS) REMARKS
| 18 | COMMAND |
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| 17 |
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| PCO TRAINING |
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| 16 | SHORE/STAFF |
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CDR | 15 |
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| 14 | EXEC |
| 24 |
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| 13 |
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| 12 |
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| 11 | SHORE/STAFF |
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| 10 | 3rd SUBMARINE TOUR |
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| Qualifies for Command. |
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| Head of Engineering Dept. | 36* |
| Normal path to command is via Head of Engineering Department. |
LCDR | 8 | Head of Weapons |
| 36* | If not assigned Engineering. |
| 7 | or Navigation Dept. |
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| Some officers will get Head of Department |
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| assignments in both Engineering and Others. Not common. |
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| SHORE/STAFF/PG or |
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| Engineering Course (9 wks.) at beginning of |
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| SERVICE COLLEGE |
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| tour to prepare for Nuclear Reactor board |
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| exams. |
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| 5 | 2nd SUBMARINE TOUR Eng. Division Off. | 12 |
| Qualifies as Engineering Officer |
LT | 4 | Other Division Off. |
| 12 | Rotates into other department, e. g. NAV, OPS, WPNS after 1 yr., Engineering |
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| SUBMARINE | 2 | 4 | SOAC (6 mo.) —11 wks. |
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| ADVANCE COURSE |
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| of Tactics |
| 3 | 1st SUBMARINE TOUR Assigned to Engineering Department. | 18 |
| Completes qualification as/for: Engineering |
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| Officer-of-the Watch |
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| (EOOW) Officer-of-the Deck, Diving Officer and Submarines |
LTJG | 2 |
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| SUBMARINE |
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| INDOCTRINATION |
| 1 | Basic shore indoctrination |
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| 12 |
| Direct inputs from USNA ROTC, OCS. Nuclear Power School (6 mo.), |
| 1 | NPS/NPTU |
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| followed by Nuclear power Training Unit |
ENS |
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|
| (6 mo.) |
*Either, usually not both.
The career pattern for nuclear-trained submarine officers provides a good example of how technology has changed engineering to the point that some URL officers are spending a disproportionate percentage of their formative years in engineering areas, to the detriment of their professional development in the art of naval warfare. Note in Figure 2 that, after 10 years in submarines, the nuclear-trained officer, now a lieutenant commander, will have spent well over half of his commissioned service in engineering billets or training programs. Of greater significance is the consensus among submariners that the front runners among the officers, that is, those who will most likely be screened for command, will spend their 36-month head of department tour as engineering officers rather than as operations, weapons, or navigation officers. This exaggeration in the nuclear-trained submarine officer field is indicative of a similar trend in the non-nuclear engineering field. For example, line officers assigned to duty in engineering in 600/1,200 psi steam-driven ships attend a 12-week course in order to acquire the technical and operational knowledge required to perform their duties. The officers who receive this training spend most, if not all, of their first and most formative sea tour in engineering. To say that these officers concurrently qualify as OODs and CIC watch officers may be true, mainly because as line officers they are required to do so on their first sea tour. However, given the steam leaks alone in a 600/1,200 psi plant, it is safe to conclude that these qualifications, of necessity acquired on a collateral basis, are based on meeting minimum requirements only; and therefore, the development of professionalism in operations, weapons, seamanship, and the like, is subordinated to the performance of engineering duties.
This is not logical. An officer preparing for command at sea should devote the majority of his early career to developing expertise in operational matters rather than to becoming proficient in the operation of a nuclear, conventional, steam, gas turbine, or diesel engineering plant. Every day spent by a URL officer in engineering as a primary duty is a day not spent in pursuit of his primary goal—professional development in the art of naval warfare and preparing for command at sea.
Given the few years available in which to inculcate in naval officers the art of naval warfare, there can be but one logical solution to the disruption of line officer career patterns caused by disproportionate time spent in engineering—divorce the URL officer from the engineering field except for indoctrination courses in the capabilities, limitations, and safety precautions pertaining to the plant installed in the command in which he is serving. In such an environment, all line officers would be assigned primary duties strictly in naval warfare areas with collateral duties, as necessary, in engineering.
Implementation of this concept would not be as difficult as it appears if we would develop viable limited duty officer and warrant officer programs to meet the technical requirements of the Navy. Failure to do so in the past has denied the Navy the best use of the dedicated, highly motivated, technically oriented LDOs, warrant officers, and senior enlisted men. One consequence has been that the professionalism of URL officers has suffered by their having to divert their time and talents to engineering duties which could and should have been filled by technicians.
The complexities of modern engineering demand specialists the same as does the tactical employment of modern weapons systems. The general line officer, in pursuit of his primary goal, should devote the majority of his time to becoming a specialist in naval warfare and leave engineering to those who are specialists in that area.
Actual implementation of the naval warfare specialist program would start before the commissioning of an officer in the general line, when he would be offered his choice of warfare specialty, dependent upon the availability of billets. Having chosen or having been assigned a specialty and having received his commission, the officer would be ordered to proceed to an appropriate training facility to receive functional training in his specialty, and such other training, e.g., rules of the road, in subjects or areas that a review of his background might indicate he is weak in. Upon completion of this training phase, he would go to sea.
When, in due course, the time comes to rotate ashore, the officer would be detailed to a billet where he could continue in his warfare specialty while at the same time he could participate in the subspecialty program. For example, an ASW specialist would transfer from a billet in a destroyer to one in the ASW systems project office ashore, where he could develop an expertise in the technical or management fields of his specialty. Upon completion of shore duty, the officer would return to sea, again in an ASW billet for at least half of his tour. He then could enter another closely related warfare specialty, such as operations-navigation, for the remainder of his tour. This general pattern would be followed in order to provide the opportunity to qualify in at least two naval warfare specialties by the time an officer is eligible for selection to the rank of commander.
The commander selection boards, in addition to selecting those for promotion, would compile a list of the top 20 to 30% who have exhibited a capacity for greater diversification and broader responsibilities outside of their warfare specialties. This list, in essence, would be the first screening for flag rank.
Subsequent tours of duty based on this list would not necessarily be in a particular officer’s warfare specialty. However, it could be expected that, through changes in the number of billets assigned each warfare specialty determined by annual reviews of the force level documents and natural attrition of officers through resignation and promotions, the number of officers in each grade for each specialty would nearly equal the overall Navy requirement. Therefore, officers would continue to be detailed to billets related to one of their warfare specialties, although their duties and responsibilities would expand in scope with rank. This would provide not only officers well qualified in at least two naval warfare specialties, but also men who should have developed a broad, general knowledge of the art of naval warfare and a wide range of managerial experience by the time they are eligible for selection to flag rank.
The naval warfare specialist concept could be implemented in three phases:
Phase I—Concept Formulation. The Chief of Naval Personnel, through the Career Planning Board, would establish naval warfare specialties using as the primary source information NOBCs, training manuals, the JSOP, JSCP, and FYDP to establish areas of concentration, functional training requirements, and billets in each specialty. In approving the concept, the Chief of Naval Operations would support the funding necessary to manage the concept through computer data processing- This last would be mandatory in order to provide adequate stowage and processing of required personnel data.
Phase II—Career Planning. The Chief of Naval Personnel, through the Career Planning Board, would make changes to current officer programs and develop new career patterns as follows:
► Change the name of “unrestricted line officer” to “general line officer.”
► Increase the number of warfare specialties within the GLO category to reflect those established in Phase I
► Divorce general line officer primary duty career patterns from engineering duties.
► Increase the number of LDOs and warrant officers in accordance with technical needs.
► Establish an LDO program with promotion opportunity to captain (and, in special cases, to flag rank).
► Establish a warrant officer program with equitable pay for length of service.
► Establish engineering billets in all ships to be filled by EDO, LDO, WO, or senior enlisted men.
► Recommend to the Congress such changes in law as necessary to implement the plan. (Do not, however, delay implementation in areas not requiring Congressional approval.)
Phase III— Implementation. Upon commissioning in the general line, officers would be categorized as naval warfare specialists. Crossovers or shifts in specialties at predetermined points would be provided for. General line officers would be detailed in their warfare specialty, both afloat and ashore up to the grade of commander. Selection boards for commander would be required to submit a list of the top 20 to 30% of those selected who have shown recognized ability to manage.
Naval officers of the general line can no longer afford to dissipate their energies in attempting to become proficient in all areas of naval warfare and some areas of marine engineering, e.g., nuclear power, while concurrently attempting to develop expertise as subspecialist in technical and management fields. The career pattern for general line officers must provide first for their professional development in the art of naval warfare. Concurrently, they should develop skill in technical management and planning ashore.
The Navy exists to fight at sea, and it is men, not machines, who perform valiant deeds in battle and win victories in war. So, if the new Navy is to be led and, if need be, fought by officers as well qualified as possible in the art of naval warfare and specially trained in the tactical application of advanced weapons systems, the current patterns for URL officers must be corrected.
__________
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1945 (having served as an enlisted man in the U. S. Navy from 1940 to 1942), Captain Bowling successively commanded the USS YMS-419, the USS YMS-463, and the USS Magpie (AMS-25). Since his graduation from submarine school in 1947, he has served in three submarines and commanded another, the USS Cutlass (SS-428), from 1957 to 1959. He also commanded the USS Tringa (ASR-16), from 1954 to 1956; served on the Staff of ASWGRU3, from 1962 to 1964; served as ASW Officer, Staff, ComFirstFlt, 1965-1966; and commanded the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7) from 1966 to 1968. He is now assigned to the General Operations Division (J-3) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
________________________________________________________________________________
Sword Play
On board the Spanish royal yacht, several midshipmen stood watch along the passage leading to the royal wardroom. The midshipman nearest the door could see and smell the delectable food set out on the table. The temptation proved irresistible, but just as his sword impaled a tender chicken, the command came: “Attention! Their Royal Majesties!”
The Queen beheld a very mortified midshipman standing rigidly at attention, the chicken precariously perched on the tip of his sword, which he held in a vertical salute. Graciously, she invited the unfortunate boy to lunch.
—Contributed by Lieutenant Commander Carlos Conejero, SC, Spanish Navy
And the Band Played on . . .
Some years ago, in a certain Chinese port, a British warship lay, dressed over-all, her captain and officers in No. 1 uniforms, the guard and band paraded, and the side manned awaiting the arrival of the local dignitaries to pay their courtesy calls.
“Boat approaching, starboard beam, sir,” called the chief quartermaster.
A very smart motor boat made fast to the quarterdeck gangway and an elegant figure, resplendent in whites, was piped over the side and greeted by the captain, while the band played and the guard presented arms.
“Welcome aboard, sir,” said the captain, saluting smartly.
“Velly much thank you, sir,” replied the visitor, “Have you any dirty laundry, pliz?”
—Contributed by F. F. Hamblin
(The U. S. Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)