The prospect of the West one day finding India on “the other side" should be a chilling thought—a turn of events that the West should make strenuous efforts to avoid.
The idea that India could have nuclear weapons by 1975, coupled with the fact that it is only 3,500 miles from South India to the southernmost reaches of the Indian Ocean—the range of an IRBM—merit more consideration than they have apparently received. Nor is consideration given to the fact that the Indian Army, with a strength approaching one million, is the fourth largest—and near that rating in effectiveness—in the world.
In any conflict, the denial to the West of the waters of the Indian Ocean by cutting the world in two, would mean the end of the West’s maritime supremacy, and maritime power is perhaps the only power in which the Soviets are decisively inferior; an inferiority, incidentally, which they are striving mightily to overcome. The Soviets undoubtedly realize the importance of the denial of Western ingress to the Indian Ocean. But the West, having used the Indian Ocean’s trade routes over a period of two centuries to attain their current affluence, appears to be taking for granted the control of the Indian Ocean.
Within 20 years of the transfer of governing power from British to Indian hands, and despite the unprecedented goodwill created by the Mountbatten Mission, India has been through the full cycle, from complete subjugation by a Western power, to dependence on the Soviet Union for the provision of essential weapon systems for the three military services. As we enter the 1970s, this dependence is increasing and India’s armed forces soon will have more aircraft, ships, and tanks of Soviet origin than those of the Western countries with whose weapons systems and tactical doctrine we have been so familiar. The Western powers are at least partially responsible for a situation wherein a potential friend has been forced to turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance, and to pay for it in scarce gold.
India has never made any request for military hardware to the Soviets without first approaching the West, and only after the West’s refusal to provide comparable defense hardware has India turned to the Soviet Union, which has only been too ready to oblige.
The inability of the United States or Britain to assist India on a large scale, especially after the mini-war with China in October 1962, stemmed from the U. S. commitment to Pakistan, which country, as a member of the CENTO and SEATO pacts, was ostensibly a full-fledged ally. Yet, for many years, Pakistan has been on the friendliest terms with the main Communist power against which SEATO was organized.
The reluctance of the United States to annoy a professed ally lost her much of the goodwill that should have accrued from the economic aid she had provided to India. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, does not appear to be perturbed by the possibility of India being irritated by the more recent Soviet decision to provide military aid to Pakistan, against whom a large part of their military aid provided to India was meant to be used. Soviet insensitivity, too, may cause them to lose whatever goodwill they might have built up in the past by providing assistance to India in defense and in many economic fields as well.
The Western powers have never been a match for the Soviets in political acrobatics or expediency and might have cause to regret this shortcoming should India fail to be able to maintain an independent policy in the face of indifference on the part of the West. For India is in a tight corner because of the Sino-Pakistan collusion—in spite of which, it should be noted, Pakistan still manages to acquire surplus U. S. hardware indirectly from various sources.
In order to counterbalance the acquisitions by Pakistan from all sources, Chinese, Western, and now Russian, India is forced to leap into Russia’s lap, because of the continuing Chinese threat, and Russia has become a quick source of supply—undoubtedly much of it is surplus to Russia’s own requirements.
Thus, there are real reasons for the complaint often made by Western diplomats: that India is neutral on the side of the Soviets.
The Royal Indian Navy, which had been established in September 1934, ended World War II with a nucleus of six 4-inch antiaircraft frigates, and other minor vessels such as minesweepers and LCAs. It had been British policy that the Royal Indian Navy was only to be given defensive ships. Even small destroyers that might be capable of taking part in offensive operations were denied to the R.I.N. And, when the partition of the country came in 1947, two of the six frigates were given to Pakistan.
Just prior to the sub-continent’s partition, the British had decided to transfer three of the old Leander-class cruisers constructed in 1927-1928, to the R.I.N. in order to reduce the Sterling balances accumulated by India during the war. This was the beginning of Britain’s attempts to dispose of obsolete defense hardware, which was fit only for national maritime museums, by transferring it to India.
Instead of the Indian Navy taking the three cruisers, it decided on one cruiser, the Delhi, and three “R”-class destroyers which had been built during the war. The acquisition of these four ships in 1948 marked an important stage in the development of the Indian Fleet, for they were the first ships that could take part in offensive fleet actions.
For a number of years after independence, India continued to retain the services of admirals from Britain’s Royal Navy for such tenures as Flag Officer Commanding the Royal Indian Navy—one of whom became the Chief of Naval Staff when the country became a Republic—and Flag Officer Indian Fleet. While some of these officers undoubtedly had the interests of India at heart, generally they were unable to overcome the pressures brought to bear by their former—and perhaps future—Admiralty superiors to dispose of aging, no longer essential ships. Thus, three Hunt-class destroyers, minus their torpedo tubes, were first taken on loan and then transferred from the Royal to the Indian Navy some five years after being mothballed in Britain.
The Indian Navy soon realized that reconditioned old ships were unsatisfactory. Plans were made to acquire 12 new frigates to replace the existing ships. It was also considered that the offensive capability of the Navy should be enhanced by the acquisition of one more cruiser and by an aircraft carrier. But the costs of new capital ships proved prohibitive and, once again, it was decided, upon the advice of senior British officers, to acquire older ships that were to be decommissioned by the Royal Navy. This time, however, the warships would be modernized with electronic equipment that had been removed from Britain’s secret list.
Financial stringency finally reduced the number of new frigates to eight, but allowed the acquisition of the Nigeria, a Colony-class cruiser which was renamed the Mysore in 1957. The uncompleted Hermes, a light fleet carrier that had languished for over a decade in Portsmouth harbor, was received as the Vikrant in 1961. These ships made the Indian Navy the strongest fleet in the Indian Ocean, notwithstanding the aid lavished by the Soviets on Indonesia during Sukarno’s regime which provided him a Sverdlov-class cruiser and 14 “W”-class submarines, most of which remained non-operational, amongst myriad other craft.
Under the first Indian Air Chief, the Indian Air Force found that Britain was not the only country that could supply India the type of aircraft she required. The French Auragon was giving good service in the Air Force, and it was known that the French were using two good carrier aircraft in the light fleet carrier they had taken on loan from the British. Both the Étendard I-V [sic] and the Alize were superior to the British reconditioned Seahawks and their Gannets for strike and air defense, and reconnaissance respectively. The French aircraft also had superior radar and missiles, which were all offered to India along with training facilities at French bases. The only objection to the French aircraft was that the single catapult originally ordered for the Vikrant could not launch the Étendard IV and in [sic] improved version of the steam catapult which was in operational use in the new carriers would be required The British refused to install the new steam catapult for various technical reasons, but it was clear to the Indian Navy that the reason was that they would like to “palm off” the Seahawk aircraft which were at that time being replaced in the Royal Navy carriers by the Sea Vixen and the Buccaneer. The result was that the Vikrant's operational capability was limited throughout her lifetime because of her obsolete catapult and, as a result, the Navy has had to continue to replace old Seahawks with still older Seahawks through various countries which have been using them for training their air forces. The Navy has been trying, but without success, to get the U. S. Navy’s A-4 Skyhawk, which is in service in the Royal Australian Navy.
About the time these discussions were taking place between the Admiralty and Naval Headquarters, a Soviet Military Mission led by Marshal Georgi Zhukov, arrived on a tour of Indian Defense establishments in February 1957. At Visakhapatnam, over a glass of cold nimbupani, he was asked if he would like to address the officers assembled in the wardroom. He did not have very much to say, but what he did say impressed the officers, even those who realized that he was merely making a point against the West. He remarked that those who invaded India through the northern passes centuries ago had settled down and had become assimilated in the mainstream of Indian culture—but those who came by sea remained as conquerors. His point was clear enough to the naval officers. Whoever controls the Indian Ocean has India at its mercy, for our entire import and export trade is carried over the Indian Ocean trade routes.
During the tour, Marshal Zhukov was entertained by Rear Admiral R. D. Katari, the senior Indian in the Navy, at a dinner in Cochin on board the Flagship Delhi. Zhukov is reported to have been snubbed by Katari when Zhukov suggested that the British were taking the Indians for a ride and that the Soviet Union could supply India with much better ships and in larger numbers. The incident underscores the general antipathy that existed amongst officers in the Navy towards the Russians. This did not deter the Marshal from making it known in political quarters in New Delhi that the Soviet Union would be prepared to offer India favorable terms for building up her navy and other services against the threat from American-aided Pakistan.
With the arrival of the Vikrant in 1961, the Indian Navy possessed perhaps the most balanced fleet in the Indian Ocean, lacking only a submarine arm. The reported U. S. decision to provide a submarine to the Pakistan Navy acted as a catalyst, and the decision to add submarines to the fleet was made in principle. As usual, inquiries were first made with the British Admiralty which agreed to provide training facilities for a nucleus submarine arm and, eventually, a submarine.
When the time came to discuss the type of submarine, the Indian Navy pressed for the Porpoise class. The British were only willing to part with a museum piece which was on loan to the Australian Navy and which the Australians were returning because she was unfit for further service. The news from Australia did not endear the British to the Indian Navy. Any inhibitions the Indian Navy might have had in the acquisition of Soviet warships were swept away with the Western refusal to aid India to any appreciable extent after her humiliation by the Chinese in October 1962.
When the Russians offered a submarine comparable to the Porpoise class—at nearly half the cost—together with training facilities and a depot ship, as well as other ships to be selected by the Indian Navy, the Royal Navy Was nearly forgotten. At this time negotiations for the instruction of Leander-class frigates in India with British collaboration were being stalled by the British government. Simultaneously, India’s request for modern Daring-class destroyers resulted in the offer of the aging Battle and Weapon class, which were due to be scrapped between 1964 and 1968.
A high-ranking Indian delegation visited the Soviet Union and was given a good look at the Russian fleet, perhaps a better look than any non-Communist naval delegation had been given previously. Upon the delegation’s return, a long-term plan was formulated to acquire a number of submarines and ships from the Soviet Union in order to build up an Eastern fleet and to provide base facilities for them at Visakhapatnam on the east central coast of India. The construction of warships of Soviet design was also considered.
These negotiations took place after the deal for the construction of MiG-21 aircraft for the Air Force had been finalized. This was another project, essential to India’s defense requirements, for which the West had been approached for assistance and which they declined to provide.
The numerous reports concerning the leasing of a naval base by India to the Soviet Union in return for this aid are simply not true. No Indian government could survive for more than a few days if it even contemplated such a course. The feeling in India against foreign pacts is too strong. In this sense, at least, India’s non-alignment is consistent.
After the usual attempts in naval circles to get as many ships of different types as possible, good sense prevailed and choice was narrowed down to four F-class submarines, six “Petya”-class frigates, a few small “Polnocny” type LSMRs and a number of recent-construction SDBs which were required urgently for duties in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. The latest report indicated that there are plans to acquire half a dozen light missile boats, of the “Osa” class.
The first task the Navy had to undertake was to arrange Russian-language classes for officers and men, for only a handful of officers spoke Russian. There was some uneasiness amongst the officers as the Russians were insisting on including the most rudimentary instructions in the syllabus and were going to bill the Indian government for it. Nor was an extended stay under Soviet conditions looked forward to. At Vladivostok, the training center was situated on a remote island so that there would not be too much uncontrolled fraternization with the local population. On the other hand, local Communist belles were encouraged to fraternize with the sailors in an effort to impress them with the benefits of Communist rule. The officers were practically barred from fraternization because the results might well be the opposite.
While the Russians agreed to translate all the technical books required for operating equipment, they were not going to let the Indian Navy have their tactical doctrine for the employment of the weapon systems installed on board. This, of course, will be a major drawback in the efficient employment of the Russian ships, and the Indian Navy will have to buckle down to the serious study and evolution of tactical doctrine for these ships operating both separately and in cooperation with ships of British origin.
For many years, junior officers have been urging their superiors on with proposals for the development of a tactical doctrine expressly formulated for and by the Indian fleet. The senior officers, being more efficient diplomats than professional sailors, and unsure of the ability of their subordinates, continued to use the doctrine handed down by the British togetherness doctrine that had become obsolete for the NATO powers. This is a task which will have to be undertaken in earnest if the Navy is to obtain any benefits from the acquisition of so many ships and submarines from the Soviet Union within a few years, for during no comparable period of four years (1967-1970) has the Indian Navy expanded so rapidly.
The Navy has always been very quick to place orders for ships once the government is willing to foot the bill. It is regrettable that the planning for the maintenance and operation of these ships has received less attention. Many of the older frigates and destroyers are over 25 years old and scarcely fit for sea. They are not decommissioned because that will interfere with career prospects and might result in the Navy being unable to justify the number of admirals they plan for the future. Currently the number of ships that are available to fight in defense of the country at any time does not equal the number of admirals in the service. The morale of the ships’ companies of the older ships is low and the service would be more efficient if these vessels were decommissioned. As the expansion of the dockyards has not kept ahead of acquisitions, the considerable load of the older ships being removed would enable proper attention being given to the refits of the newer ships.
This lack of adequate maintenance is reflected in the Navy’s poor performance during the 22-day war with Pakistan in September 1965. The war found the fleet in the Bay of Bengal. It should have been cruising at its war station in the Arabian Sea, ready in case the Pakistani Kashmir trouble had escalated into war. When it finally arrived in the Arabian Sea, its six-to-one paper superiority was not employed to carry out any offensive operations. Since the Pakistani Navy had sent two of its ships on a raid to bombard Dwarka on the Saurashtra coast, a retaliatory attack was the minimum that should have been undertaken if the Pakistani fleet could not be found at sea. Subsequently, the Navy actually commended itself for this lack of foresight and initiative even as several senior Army and Air Force officers were being replaced for failure to accept responsibility.
The Russian acquisition program is intended to meet two commitments. The more important one is the improvement of the Fleet’s antisubmarine capabilities. But nearly on par in peacetime is the requirement for minor craft for patrol duties in the area of Andaman and Nicobar islands, where foreign submarines are occasionally sighted. Reported, too, is poaching by Chinese-origin crews in fishing boats registered in Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, which are often intercepted in territorial waters. All this could well be the beginning of more serious moves since the Chinese claim that their “Inner Kingdom” once included the Andaman and Nicobar islands.
Indonesia was the first Asian country, whose shores are washed by the Indian Ocean, to acquire submarines. As part of a billion-dollar loan from the Soviet Union, she received 14 W-class submarines during the heyday of Sukarno’s dreams for a “Greater Indonesia.” While she had intended to keep only six of these operational, it is unlikely that even this figure is being maintained. In 1964, Pakistan acquired a Tench-class submarine under the U. S. aid agreement of 1954. Because she was a new element in the balance of maritime power between India and Pakistan, this submarine was given far more attention than she deserved by the Indian Navy. Since then, Pakistan has acquired ten midget submarines (X-craft) from Italy. When Pakistani Air Marshal Nur Khan visited Peking in August 1969, he was offered two or three submarines by the Chinese.
The Pakistan Navy is also to acquire three Daphne-class submarines from France in 1970-71. With one light fleet carrier and two cruisers, the Indian Navy is unlikely to be challenged to a surface action by any Asian power in the Indian Ocean. But the increasing underwater threat, both in harbor and at sea, is becoming obvious. It is in meeting this threat that India’s Russian Navy is likely to play a crucial role.
Of the submarines Pakistan will have during the 1970s, the Daphne class will pose the gravest threat to India’s big ships, the Vikrant, Mysore and Delhi. It will therefore be the major task of India’s Russian submarines to locate and destroy the Pakistani submarines before they can attack the carrier and cruisers. Unfortunately, in spite of having gained experience in the construction of helicopter hangars and platforms while constructing the survey vessel Darshak at Visakhapatnam, the Indian Navy has given little thought to the conversion of her cruisers to helicopter carriers by removal of the after gun turrets, which serve little purpose today. The construction of a helipad and hangar would enable the cruisers to provide their own antisubmarine screen when there is a shortage of escorts, or with defense-in-depth when surface escorts are available. This is important when dealing with high-performance submarines. This lack of initiative, for which India’s admirals must accept full responsibility is going to make life extremely difficult during the 1970s until the ships of the Leander class become available in numbers.
The Russian submarines, of the large attack type, at 2,300 tons are more than twice the tonnage of the Daphnes, but can match the lighter submarines speed of 16 knots under water. Both can dive to about 750 feet. The Soviet submarines, however, have a great advantage in their long endurance and in their ability to carry twice as many torpedoes as the Daphnes. But, in action, the smaller Daphnes will have the advantage of greater maneuverability. Much, however, will depend upon the state of training and the maintenance of the submarines by their respective navies.
The “Petyas” at 1,200 tons, are extremely light for the monsoon conditions prevailing in the areas in which they will normally operate. With two diesels for economic cruising, their two gas turbines give them a maximum speed of 30 knots. Their antisubmarine equipment consists of four 16-barrel rocket launchers and four torpedoes. In addition, they carry four 3-inch dual purpose guns in twin mounts.
The “Osa”-class missile-firing boats have two Styx missile launchers, are capable of 40 knots and are believed to have a radius of action of nearly 400 miles.
With all these ships beginning to reach India, the statement of the Russian admiral visiting Karachi in August 1969, that Pakistan should have a stronger fleet caused a flutter in New Delhi. Disappointed, perhaps, that they had been unable to obtain a base from India for their operations in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets might well be sounding out Pakistan, which has provided such facilities in the past.
The Russians must have considered the consequences—a deteriorating relationship with India—of their providing aid to Pakistan. They have been right in assessing that the Indian government cannot afford to react too strongly, but they must know that they are losing whatever goodwill they had managed to build up so carefully over the years when the United States was assisting Pakistan.
The Russian thesis, that they will be able to wean Pakistan away from China’s bosom, does not sound plausible to Indian ears. The Russians might be considering the possibility of India turning against her, as China did, and would therefore not be too willing to have the Indo-Pakistani balance weighted decidedly in India’s favor. Also, by aiding Pakistan with limited supplies, the Soviets would force India to ask for more, thus making her even more dependent.
In attempting to improve the Navy’s antisubmarine doctrine it has been suggested that the Vikrant could carry helicopters and act in an antisubmarine role. If this thesis is accepted, her primary role of reconnaissance and strike would be adversely affected.
The Vikrant’s obvious roles are to destroy targets located at sea and to neutralize vital installations ashore—e.g., the submarine support and maintenance facilities without which, for example, Pakistan’s submarines would become useless. Failing this, it would be wiser to decommission her and free some of the escorts to undertake the numerous other duties that will undoubtedly be required during hostilities.
But, the most difficult task ahead, considering our conglomeration of ships and submarines, is going to be the requirement to formulate an integrated tactical doctrine for antisubmarine warfare. With the need to incorporate submarines into the doctrine, a complicated task will become more difficult.
The acquisition of ships not constructed indigenously is much easier for underdeveloped countries than is the provision of support and maintenance facilities for them. The Navy’s record in this respect has been disappointing, especially since India now stands on the fringe of the atomic age with her impending—hopefully, 1971—launching of her own satellite. There are over a thousand Indian scientists and technologists employed in the West on sophisticated tasks, while there is an urgent need for their services at home. The lessons from deficiencies in maintenance facilities at Bombay which adversely affected the maintenance schedules of the British acquisition program at the beginning of the decade have not been learned and the errors are being repeated at the end of the decade for the Russian acquisitions at Visakhapatnam.
There is talk of the construction of frigates of Soviet design followed by submarines either at Visakhapatnam and Calcutta. While this might result in standardization in submarine requirements, with the Leander class being instructed at Bombay, there is no possibility of standardization of ships because the hardware installed in the Russian ships is in many ways different from the British. A great deal of lip service is paid to the urgent need for standardization of equipment and weapon systems; yet, every time a new requirement arises, this vital need is entirely forgotten.
After more than 20 years of independence, India has not yet designed its own destroyer or frigate. Attempting to build seapower by obtaining assistance from foreign countries is no long-term solution to the problem, because power based on foreign benevolence is ephemeral indeed.
The ultimate aim still appears to be to become entirely self-sufficient in warship construction, but the program is so small that none of the civilian firms that could easily manufacture the hardware required, could possibly be given an order that would be economically profitable. The building of ships designed in two countries as different as England and Russia is going to accentuate this problem.
It is one of the great paradoxes of history that nations often give assistance and encouragement to their future enemies. Twice in this century, following World Wars I and II, there have been glaring examples of mistaken benevolence of this kind.
Yet, even as the Western powers have readily assisted the military buildup of their former enemies, they have neglected India, which has never been their enemy, nor been known to harbor aggressive intentions towards her neighbors throughout her long history.
Ultimately, however long it might take, India is going to become independent in shipbuilding, as in other fields. The direction its policies take and the posture that it assumes will be influenced by the treatment it receives at the hands of the powers who were in a position to help it. But, it will be difficult, indeed, for India to stand upright if the West continues to push it, however unwittingly, in the same direction as the Russians are pulling.
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Completing his initial regular officer training with the Royal Navy in January 1951, Lieutenant Commander Kaul had numerous ship assignments in Swan-class frigates and “R” class and Hunt-class destroyers. He specialized in communications in a course for India, Pakistan, and NATO at HMS Mercury, and graduated from the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India. He has held numerous staff appointments ashore and has served as Deputy Director, Naval Signals Division, Naval Headquarters, New Delhi. He also served at the National Defence Academy, Kharakvasla and commanded the Hunt-class destroyer, INS Ganga. He retired to undertake writing and is author of India's Strategic Spectrum, as well as editor of the Chanakya Defence Annual.