One of the strangest and least publicized activities in Vietnam involved the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Coast Guard. In December 1966, a one-man Coast Guard unit was attached to the U. S. Navy’s Military Sea Transportation Service Office (MSTSO) in Vietnam—the Coast Guard Shipping Advisor.
The mission was to handle problems arising on board U. S. merchant ships engaged in the Vietnam sealift. With the number of ships in the longest supply line in military history steadily increasing, and with a daily average of 75 ships at anchor along the coast, crew problems were causing increasing delays to vital ship movements.
Contrary to the predictions of advocates of air power in the 1950s, 98 per cent of all military supplies carried to Vietnam were to be carried by the U. S. merchant marine. As a result, there were thousands of merchant seamen involved in the sealift, and there were many incidents of misconduct creating problems. However, the percentage of seamen involved in disciplinary problems was less than 2 per cent of the manpower involved. This percentage is comparable to the percentage of servicemen involved in Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) offenses.
Actually, in 1966, the crews had reason to become unruly—no mail service, launch service, or motion pictures, and they often had to stay on board ships lying at anchor up to two months. In addition, the heat in Vietnam was oppressive, and prior to 1967, the ships were not air-conditioned.
To complicate the situation, there was a complete vacuum insofar as law enforcement in Vietnamese ports. Unlike the military service, the merchant marine has no UCMJ, no provost marshals, or military police to maintain discipline. Although the master was usually able to exercise control on board his ship, once ashore, the seamen were subject only to the local law enforcement authority.
Theoretically, the U. S. Consul in a foreign port is responsible for the conduct of the seaman ashore, and calls in local authorities when necessary. However, in South Vietnam during 1966 and 1967, the only shipping consul was located in Saigon, and he did not travel to the other seaports. The Vietnamese authorities maintained a hands-off policy with the civilian merchant seaman. This policy was determined more by practicalities than politics, since the average Vietnamese policeman was outweighed 50 pounds by the average seaman. Further to emphasize the vacuum, the U. S. military police, with no UCMJ jurisdiction over the seamen, had a hands-off policy until late in 1967.
For possibly the first time in maritime history, ships’ masters had no recourse to law enforcement agencies when in port. Since many of these ships were loaded with ammunition, the situation often bordered on the ludicrous. One example illustrates the masters’ problems. In DaNang one night, a fight started on board a ship and then adjourned to the dock where there was more room. One of the combatants pulled a knife and badly lacerated his unarmed adversary. The master interceded, disarmed the knifewielder, and held him in an arm lock until the MPs arrived. When they did arrive, however, the officer- in-charge informed the master that since merchant seamen were involved, the military could give no further assistance.
The general situation became intolerable and reached its lowest point when the mayor of Vung Tau was struck in the face by a drunken seamen and nothing was done about it. The Vietnamese police said they could not arrest him, and the MPs claimed they had no jurisdiction over merchant seamen.
In the shipping industry, both management and labor, had been urging, since early 1965, that a Coast Guard Merchant Marine Detail (MMD) be established in Saigon to assist the overworked shipping consul. In November 1966, the commander of MSTS, Vice Admiral Glynn R. Donaho, U. S. Navy, (now retired), alarmed at the increasing reports of problems involving merchant ships chartered by MSTS, requested that the Commandant of the Coast Guard provide an officer to serve on the staff of the MSTS Commander in the Far East.
The officer was to be assigned in Vietnam, officially as a technical shipping advisor, but actually to act as a one-man Merchant Marine Detail. Unorthodox at best, it did appear to have a certain logic, as the advisor would have official status for his presence and travel in Vietnam.
It should be noted that this was not an altruistic move on the part of MSTS. The small MSTS staff in South Vietnam’s ports had been working both night and day with many problems involving merchant seamen that the U. S. military police and Vietnamese authorities could not handle. As the principal chartering and ship-routing agency for the sealift ships, MSTS fell heir to the problems. For example, it was normal for the police in ports such as Qui Nhon to deposit the victim, the assailant, and the weapon on the doorstep of the MSTS representative following a bloody dispute ashore.
This author, an ex-merchant marine officer, was assigned as the shipping advisor and arrived in December 1966. The MSTSO Vietnam complex was located in an old French Foreign Legion- type building by the Saigon River. An office in the building was furnished, and access was given to the radio communications network which covered shipping in all South Vietnamese ports.
Besides Saigon, the deepwater ports in Vietnam at that time were: Vung Tau, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Vung Ro, Cam Ranh Bay, and DaNang. In addition to Vietnam, the shipping advisor’s area of operation covered 1,000,000 square miles of Southeast Asia, which included all of the major seaports—Singapore, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Manila, and Keelung.
The word of the shipping advisor’s arrival spread along the Far East waterfronts, and radio messages began coming in around the clock asking for the Coast Guard to board vessels in many of these ports. By traveling continuously during the first few months, this writer was able to investigate most of the more-serious cases. At times, it seemed to be one continuing series of assaults with deadly weapons, i.e., a straight razor, a stevedore hook, a meat hook, a roast knife, a serving fork, and knives of every description . . . switch, sheath, pocket, butcher, paring, French, and butter.
These investigations took considerable time, since they usually involved going to an up-country port to remove the assailant from the ship. The ship’s master generally feared further violence either from the assailant or against him by the victim’s friends. This necessitated escorting the sometime rebellious seaman back to Saigon for his return to the United States. Fortunately, the U. S. Air Force passenger terminal sergeants were understanding. When the harried shipping advisor would appear with a prisoner, they always found two seats on the first aircraft heading south.
In July 1967, the shipping advisor’s one-man staff was augmented by the assignment of another Coast Guard officer, who was also an ex-merchant marine officer, and a chief yeoman. During the first year’s operation, the three-man unit ranged the 1,000 miles of South Vietnam’s coastline from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to the Mekong Delta by jet, helicopter, U. S. Navy “Swift” boats, and native sampans. More than 500 ship boardings were made and 263 investigations were conducted, involving mutiny, sabotage, and assaults.
On 20 occasions, unruly seamen were removed from vessels and escorted back to Saigon. Sixteen licenses and documents were voluntarily surrendered in lieu of a hearing. Seventeen seamen’s documents were deposited, pending a hearing in the United States.
The U. S. Consul and the shipping advisor, working together, were able to make several policy changes, which had a quieting influence on the sealift personnel problems. An important change was that Saigon ended as the “romance” port for seamen who had missed their ships. Cases of seamen missing ships dropped from a high of 20 a week to five a month. Prior to this change, some of the shipping agents, working in collusion with hotel managers, were putting seamen in the hotels to await return to the United States allowing them to order “anything” from room service and then billing the ship. Some seamen had to wait for two months before return. The change in policy curtailed the “good life,” and made a sea voyage to the United States more desirable.
The biggest change was a Washington decision and resulting Embassy decree that civilians accompanying the armed forces were subject to UCMJ jurisdiction. Because of the long time hands-off policy, it was necessary for the shipping advisor to explain the decree to all U. S. Army provost marshals in Vietnam. A close working liaison was established with all of the provost marshals, and eventually, the conduct of merchant seamen was brought under control.
The most troublesome part of the assignment was waiting for transportation to the up-country ports. Even with priority orders, many hours were wasted in waiting for planes. However, the problem was solved when the shipping advisor discovered that a small airline, “Air America” had its own airport adjoining Tan Son Nhut airfield, near Saigon. It was well-equipped with over 20 Cessnas and a variety of other small aircraft. With a job where there was no way to know ahead of time where or when you had to fly, this “private” airline was the answer.
The first trip to the airline’s booking desk by this author, worked out much better than expected. It seemed that the appearance of an officer in jungle greens, with a .45 pistol in a shoulder holster, and a Coast Guard insignia on a fatigue cap, was enough to confuse or convince the most conscientious Vietnamese employee that space could be found on the next plane. From then on, flights up- country by “Air America” were put on a regular basis. The shipping advisors logged over 75,000 air miles.
The commanding officer of the Coast Guard Explosive Handling Detail at Cam Ranh Bay and the shipping advisor unit had worked out an emergency operation plan during an early visit. This was prompted by the fact that the provost marshals, at that time, would not authorize military police to be involved in problems on board merchant ships. As an example, a seaman could set his bunk on fire on board an ammunition ship (and this actually happened), and the master could not get assistance from shore authorities. It was decided that if a potentially dangerous situation began to get out of hand, the Coast Guard authority would immediately contact the shipping advisor’s office in Saigon for assistance. This worked on one occasion with the SS Loma Victory.
The Loma Victory, with 1,000 tons of volatile retrograde ammunition already in the holds, was loading more retrograde at the ammunition dock in Cam Ranh Bay. The master, who had become deranged, suddenly ordered stevedore operations to stop and that the original 1,000 tons be off-loaded. When the chief mate attempted to reason with him, the master armed himself with a .38 pistol and started staggering around the decks threatening to shoot his chief mate. The U. S. Army quickly became aware of the situation, and all cargo operations on the dock were secured. All military men were withdrawn from the pier area until the problem could be resolved.
The Coast Guard lieutenant notified the advisor’s office of the trouble by radio. The shipping advisor boarded a jet in Saigon and flew to Cam Ranh Bay, where he relieved the ship’s master of his command. The chief mate was designated as acting captain, and then this author returned to Saigon with the former captain under arrest. His license was subsequently suspended in the United States by a Coast Guard Hearing Examiner.
Notwithstanding the endless, round- the-clock calls for assistance, there were still moments for relaxation. The Shipping Advisory Unit obeyed, without question, the MACV directive that military men should take recreational leave whenever possible.
The unit is still operating, but there have been some changes. It is now known as the Coast Guard Merchant Marine Detail, Saigon. They are no longer assigned to the U. S. Navy, but are now attached to the State Department. The office has been moved from the MSTS complex to the American Embassy in Saigon.
Has the shipping advisor’s work paid off? There is no question that it is contributing vitally to the proper movement of goods in and around Vietnam. Probably the most important factor is that no ships have been delayed because of disciplinary problems. The very fact that the unit was upgraded to its present status, indicates that the Coast Guard Merchant Marine Detail, Saigon is there to stay.