“Against All Enemies”
(See R. J. Hanks, pp. 22-29, March; pp. 97-101, June; pp. 89-96, July; and p. 95, August 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant R. S. Cloward, U. S. Navy—Captain Hanks’s article is a provocative, carefully written, and potentially dangerous article. It is provocative in that it brings into print many thoughts and doubts that seem to assail senior officers these days. It is potentially dangerous, in my opinion, in the twists of definition that can be given to it. In any final analysis, I suppose that potentially dangerous becomes a corollary to anything provocative.
I do think the courses of action suggested by Captain Hanks—to speak out and to vigilantly police our own actions—deserve priorities. To me, it would seem we must place the highest and fullest priority on restructuring our Services so that they will stand among government organizations as efficient, capable, and able to attack “. . . the problem of national military needs with hardheaded pragmatism . . .” and coldblooded honesty.
Then, and only with the knowledge and permission of our Commander-in-Chief, should we overcome “. . . the military man’s historic reluctance to speak . . .”. For myself, I feel if we speak out hastily we cheapen our traditional role as the nation’s war guardian. As General Douglas MacArthur put it so well in a 1962 speech to the Cadet corps:
Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government. Whether our strength is being supped [sic] by deficit financing indulged in too long, by Federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be. These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution. Your guidepost stands out like a ten-fold beacon in the night: Duty, Honor, Country.
I would also suggest that the credibility gap and even the “. . . vast chasm of distrust” vis-a-vis the American public exist today, made from a few actions taken by the military and a lot of words added by the politicians—the Pueblo, various aspects of Military Aid, overruns are a few subjects that come to mind.
Finally, I should like to address the statement that “Reasonable and informed Americans recognize that this state of affairs (power politics) will probably continue to exist until the arrival of that elusive millenium [sic] . . .”. Yes, but I would say that it will probably exist in one form or another, and it is that form that concerns reasonable and informed Americans, or at least this one. The historic role of world policeman is no more. We have done our job so well that we are almost “out of a job.” We should accept this and restructure our foreign policy, political, and military accordingly.
I thank Captain Hanks for making me think, for making me put into concrete terms my own feelings on an issue that is clearly before and will be with us. Still, I feel that when it comes to criticism, to turn a phrase, the best offense is a good defense.
“A Profile of Soviet Military/Naval Schools”
(See J. A. Fahey, pp. 134-136, August 1970; and pp. 102-105, April 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander John A. Fahey, U. S. Navy (Retired), Assistant Professor, Russian Language and Literature, Old Dominion College—Captain Chapman’s comments on my Professional Note warrant additional discussion. My original 15-page manuscript containing many of Captain Chapman’s observations was returned to me for revision to shorten the article to 1,500-2,000 words. The revised article was accepted for publication, but the editor omitted my list of military/naval schools. Most of the schools reported by Captain Chapman parallel the list that I provided to the PROCEEDINGS.
Captain Chapman’s warning to the uninitiated, that my article is no definitive guide to the subject is justified without the publication of my list of schools. My initial manuscript explored the subject in greater depth, and with the increasing emphasis in this field of Soviet endeavor, I hope that the PROCEEDINGS will provide more coverage of Soviet military/naval education in a future issue.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Because of space limitations, a listing of over 100 Soviet military/naval schools was deleted from Commander Fahey’s original Professional Note. Similar considerations made necessary the deletion of a list of some 150 schools included in Commander Fahey's lengthy, detailed reply to Captain Chapman’s comment.
“Development and Problems in Carrier-Based Fighter Aircraft”
(See C. O. Holmquist, pp. 224-253, May 1970 PROCEEDINGS, NAVAL REVIEW ISSUE)
Lieutenant Raymond V. Welch, U. S. Navy—In this article, as well as other technical publications, I feel that the air superiority aspect of the fighter mission is being somewhat downrated or misunderstood.
Considering this mission, where our fighters are to engage the enemy over his territory, in his radar/GCI environment, probably a half hour’s flying time from the aircraft carrier, we are starting on the short end of the tactical stick. Include in this scene a fighter that cannot outperform the enemy in maneuvering combat, and we are imposing a real strain on our superior tactics and training.
Presently, the MiG-series aircraft enjoy a real advantage in maneuvering performance over the F-4 below 400 knots, primarily from their lower wing loading, which allows them to achieve higher normal load factors, i.e., turn faster and in a tighter radius without encountering buffet or stall. To the fighter pilot, this means that whether he is trying to press the attack or defend himself, he is going to see a lot of his opponent’s intake.
This deficiency in the slow-speed maneuvering flight regime is a disadvantage in the development of the F-14. High excess thrust will be to the F-14’s advantage, as will the variable-sweep wing, provided it can be extended and retracted while maneuvering. The M-61 gun is a welcome addition, but a kill with guns is achieved by maneuvering with your opponent and actually tracking him in your sight from inside his turn. The Sidewinder is highly effective in this environment, but like the gun. it must be fired from the stern area. This is a difficult task if your opponent is always able to point his nose at you. In this type of combat, the Sparrow is severely hampered, since it cannot “lock-on” its target until boosted away from its launcher, and because its minimum range approaches visual sighting range in the forward quarter. The AWG-9/Phoenix system is not intended for this mission. Thus, while the weapons suite for the F-14 has an all-round capability at long and short ranges, it achieves its intended flexibility and effectiveness only when the pilot can maneuver the airframe into the launch zone for the particular weapon. If his opponent is outmaneuvering him, he has to rely on his wingman to get into position for a shot—a proven tactic—but one which arises from a deficiency in the fighter’s performance.
The term “performance” is too often equated with the questions “How fast will it go?” or “How high will it fly?” The more relevant questions for the fighter pilot would be “How many Gs are available below 300 knots?” or “Will I be able to turn with an A-4E or an A-6 or a MiG-17?” It is possible to make the F-14 a real performer at both ends of the velocity spectrum and, indeed, if neglected, this would be a flaw in a potentially excellent design.
“Seapower and the Satellites”
(See F. M. Murphy, pp. 75-83, November 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
James A. Carr—Captain Murphy describes the Soviets as poor salesmen in their attempt to impose Marxism on their European satellites. Salesmanship is hardly necessary when one has the power and is not the least bit reluctant to use it when necessary. Hungary and Czechoslovakia provide ample proof in that respect. As for calls by American ships, military or commercial, at satellite ports, such visits are possible only to the extent that the Soviets think they will be advantageous to themselves. Captain Murphy appears to ignore the record when he suggests that the satellite countries might become more nationalistic and better their relations with the United States through commercial contacts. Again, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are prime examples of the extent to which the Soviets will tolerate nationalism.
Captain Murphy claims, and properly so, that a truly independent group of Eastern Central European States would provide a long-term solution to much of the world’s problems, and that the alternative is a continuation of the present problems and the creation of new ones. However, the Soviets never have given any concrete evidence that they want anything other than the latter situation. In fact, Captain Murphy previously pointed out that the United States places far more importance on the reduction of tensions than do the Soviets, who regard turmoil as a normal condition. Perhaps this was the most noteworthy point in Captain Murphy’s paper. He would have made a very worthwhile contribution had he developed his paper on this point, because it is a key factor in the general American lack of will and fortitude, not only in regard to European problems but elsewhere, especially in the Far East.
“Naval and Maritime Events, 1 July 1968-31 December 1969”
(See D. L. Strole and W. E. Dutcher, pp. 15-96 and 520-558, May 1970 PROCEEDINGS, NAVAL REVIEW ISSUE)
Captain W. F. Guy, U. S. Coast Guard—I am writing to advise of an incorrect statement in the naval and maritime events section for 9 September 1968 in which it was stated that the Dutch freighter Johannes Franz sank about 650 miles east of New York.
To set the record straight, the Johannes Franz did not sink, although heavy seas did hamper our efforts to provide assistance. The Coast Guard cutter Dallas (WHEC-716) stood by the Franz for nearly three days, providing pumps, fuel, and other equipment necessary to keep her afloat. The tanker SS Naess Louisiana also stood by for the first day until released by the Dallas, Finally, on 21 September, the commercial tug Foundation Vigilant arrived on the scene and took the Franz in tow for Bermuda, escorted by the tug Tasman Zee.
I feel constrained to submit this correction, since this was the Dallas’ first major assistance case and all hands on board were very proud of the success of this mission.
“Trapped” by Nonselection?
Commander Carl A. Nelson, U. S. Navy—The emotions of the typical lieutenant commander who is not selected for commander are severe, and the problems are both immediate and long-range. However, thoughts about how to explain failure and how to face up to embarrassment when among contemporaries and peers soon give way to general skepticism about the Navy’s promotion system and more pragmatic thoughts about the future.
The officer in this category is usually closer to 40 years than 35 years old, and so it follows that he may ask himself the question: Should I get out now or stay on to collect the retirement benefits and try for promotion again? The answer, for the overwhelming majority of lieutenant commanders who are not selected for commander, is unique among all officers of all grades who are not selected for promotion. Lieutenant commanders are in the Navy until they complete 20 years service for retirement.
On the average, officers in this category have 13 years of commissioned service at the time of their nonselection. Thus, they must serve six or seven more years (less service accumulated prior to commissioning) before they meet the 20-year minimum for retirement benefits. The options open to the nonselected lieutenant commander are: resign his commission and leave the Navy to begin a new career, or stay in the service in order to collect his retirement benefits. The decision resolves itself into a comparison of economic opportunities. The nonselected lieutenant commander must weigh the value of his estimated earnings in a new career, plus the estimated value of beginning that new career at the earliest possible time, versus the value of his Navy salary over his remaining service, plus some estimated value (plus or minus) for his love for Navy life.
It is doubtful that many, if any, nonselected officers try to quantify the problem. Nevertheless, by intuition or whatever other gut-feeling methods people use to make decisions, the majority of nonselected lieutenant commanders feel they must stay in the Service. The general feeling that they are trapped comes from the apparent imbalance of the choices and the well-known fact that the opportunity for promotion to commander, once having been passed over, remains at less than 4 per cent.
This unique situation stems from the fact that the options available to officers of other grades are not so heavily balanced in favor of having to remain for excessive periods of time with little hope of promotion or other remuneration. For example, the lieutenant who is not selected for lieutenant commander need only put in one additional year of service either to be promoted or return home with about $15,000 severance pay. On the other hand, the commander who is not selected for captain has, on the average, 20 years of commissioned service and can either retire almost immediately if he prefers or stay on in the service with the full knowledge that he could have retired at the 20-year service mark, but love of service or other positive aspects persuaded him otherwise. The nonselected lieutenant commander is then unique in his length of service until retirement (six-seven years), and his lack of incentive (promotion opportunity) during that period of service.
Because of this lack of incentive and a feeling of resignation brought about by feeling trapped, nonselected lieutenant commanders are most often not motivated, and the quality of their work is sometimes questioned. The acceptance of less than his best effort from any officer is not in the best interest of the Navy, and it is time to consider providing the trapped officer a more balanced alternative.
The alternative solution seems to be to give the nonselected lieutenant commander a way out of the “trap” by offering him, at some short period after being passed over, say one year, a lump-sum severance pay. This sum of money would, of course, be much less than the present value of future Navy salaries and retirement benefits. It would, however, be sufficient enough to permit a reasonable decision.
The result would be a change of attitude on the part of those nonselected lieutenant commanders who remain in the service. Those who stay on in the Service could hold their heads high with full knowledge that their decision was based on motives loftier than money.
Some would argue that if this change of policy were to take place, every nonselected lieutenant commander would take the option of leaving the service in their 14th or 15th year and the Navy would lose the benefits of all their experience. In response to this, the writer submits that upon leaving the Service each nonselected lieutenant commander would vacate a slot whereby a lieutenant could be promoted to lieutenant commander in his place. The issue then revolves to the value judgment of who is better for the Navy, a lieutenant commander who is motivated or one who feels dismally trapped.
“In Defense of the Large Slow Target”
(See J. H. Bower, Jr., pp. 128-130, January; and p. 94 September 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Albert A. McPherson, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Bower has recommended the major changes necessary within the ship to bring this 30-year old design into conformance with the modern Navy. All of these recommendations are consistent with today’s policy for new construction shipbuilding, and they all can be incorporated into the original hull design.
As the logistics coordinator for LSTs on the staff of Amphibious Force Pacific, during 1966, this writer was involved with the activation from Reserve Fleet of 17 542-class LSTs. These ships were modernized to meet the current fleet standards. During this activation and modernization one fact became obvious, the weight and space limitations of this hull design are not critical. The space within the ship, exclusive of the cargo area, can accommodate more equipment and larger units than were installed in the initial construction. This advantage was demonstrated when four of the 17 ships were designated as river patrol boat (PBR) support ships, and received additional installed equipment necessary for that mission without requiring major hull revision. The bow-thruster mentioned by Lieutenant Bower and incorporated into the 1179-class can also be added to the 542-class without hull change by using water jet nozzles and a system of piping and pumps within the hull in lieu of the tunnel and propeller type. A modern ship, using larger equipment and more complex systems necessary to cope with the problems of today’s Navy, can be constructed using the 542-class hull configuration, thus preserving the shallow draft capability.
I agree with Lieutenant Bower that the presently-under-construction “20-knot” LST, 1179-class, cannot replace the veteran 542. It would be well to count the tasks presently being performed by these old hulks and weigh these capabilities against the ability to keep up with a fast task force. As with a boxer, speed is important, but the ability to land a solid blow where it hurts is what counts. The construction of some new 542-class “sluggers” is definitely in order.