A person who has not been exposed to terrorist action finds it difficult to fully appreciate its true meaning. To live in an atmosphere of terror is to await the grenade arching over the garden wall, to search an automobile three or four times a day for detonators and a bomb, to realize that the whim of the enemy could result in the kidnapping or murder of one’s children, to keep one’s senses abnormally alert to every sound, to sleep with a revolver by the bedside and to search the face of each passerby for a sign that he, or she, desires one’s own death or mutilation.
Jacques Soustelle, the former Governor General of Algeria, described terror as a psychological weapon of unbelievable power. “Before the bodies of those whose throats have been cut and the grimacing faces of the mutilated,” Soustelle states graphically, “all capacity for resistance lapses: the spring is broken.”
Breaking the spring of resistance is the goal of a guerrilla movement. The guerrilla leader knows that each spring broken within the individual adds up to fracturing the giant spring of an established government or society or, at the least, rendering it useless by robbing it of support.
Terror is often the first form of action available in a guerrilla campaign. It is a stock item ready for use at little expenditure in personnel or funds. To understand terrorism one must take into account the interpretive differences inherent in this form of action.
Menachem Begin, one of the chiefs of the Israeli Irgun organization, once complained that foreign correspondents were describing his men as terrorists and suggested that they use another word. The word was “patriot.” Begin reasoned that, as the Irgun’s actions were liberating the Jewish people from fear, his men were, in reality, anti-terrorists.
The bomb-thrower of the Irish Republican Army, the political assassin of the OAS in Algeria and the Chinese gunman of the Malayan Races Liberation Army were practicing the art of terrorism. In their own context, however, they considered themselves patriots.
Whether the men involved accept the term terrorist or call themselves patriots in no way changes the fact that they are using a sensitive psychological tool with several automatic advantages. It can intimidate the enemy, particularly if the enemy’s motivation is shaky or uncertain. More important, it can intimidate the population, erecting an invisible barrier of non-co-operation between the people and their government.
Terrorism can also serve as effective publicity for a guerrilla movement announcing to a nation, and to the world, that a war has been declared on the existing government. Repeated acts of terrorism then reveal to the people and to international opinion that the government is impotent to stop the attacks. The people begin to doubt the government’s ability to protect them, and other nations are hesitant to express support for a government that cannot keep its own house in order.
Another advantage is terrorism’s efficiency as a liquidator of opposition. A respected legislator and family man, with a substantial position and economic resources, can be devoted to a political ideal or movement but his degree of devotion may undergo an abrupt readjustment when weighed against the threat of terrorist action. Death is a very permanent state and man is a most human animal. Dying for a cause is much easier to contemplate in the abstract than when it becomes an immediate possibility.
The disadvantages of terrorism can often stem from the manner in which it is applied. Clumsy, unplanned terrorist action can alienate a population, solidify support for an existing regime and force an otherwise hesitant government to apply its complete resources to crush a guerrilla movement.
The unleashing of a terrorist campaign can also present a guerrilla leader with problems of control. Once the Pandora’s box of terrorism is opened it may be difficult to close. The ingredients of violence and hate present in all guerrilla movements find an easy outlet through terrorism. A leader who has ordered one or two acts of controlled terrorism may find his subordinate commanders and their men only too eager to continue such actions indiscriminately. In their eagerness, based on revenge, a desire for action, or the knowledge that terror can present an immediate return for little investment, they often lose sight of the fact that such violence can escalate beyond any measure of its practicability or profit. The competent practitioners of terrorism usually know how their actions will effect [sic] their enemies and what reactions they can expect from those not directly involved.
It often comes as a surprise to find the Viet Cong so quick to claim credit for acts of terrorism that have taken many innocent lives, a majority of them Vietnamese. But the Viet Cong have had years of active experience. Their goal is that of the classic terrorist—to inspire fear resulting in a psychological paralysis that cancels the people’s desire to participate in government organized programs.
In the early 1950s, a bomb of great force exploded in the heart of Saigon in front of the Opera House. It had been timed to go off at a busy hour, and its principal victims were the small shoeshine boys who made the steps of the Opera House their headquarters. The bomb also killed or mutilated a number of French and Vietnamese civilians. It was a bloody incident and it received wide pictorial coverage in the world press.
This attack was immediately labeled as a Viet Minh atrocity and the French Information Service gave it additional publicity. The Viet Minh did little to refute these charges. Several years passed before the blame for the incident was squarely placed on the leader of a Cao Dai dissident group unassociated with the Viet Minh.
Up to this time the Viet Minh had profited, in their own way, from the false mantle of guilt. They had falsely, but effectively, demonstrated their power to strike with force and at will in the heart of a heavily controlled symbol of colonial presence, the city of Saigon. They had falsely, but effectively, shown that their action could be terrible and implacable. They had falsely, but effectively, embarrassed the French authorities and made France’s Vietnamese and Chinese collaborators highly uncomfortable.
Since the close of World War II, the Vietnamese people have been bombarded with photos, pamphlets, tracts and newspaper stories of Viet Minh or Viet Cong atrocities and terrorism. Today they are close to the saturation point. The first human reaction after so many years of war is to be thankful that the viewer was not the victim. The second reaction, a bit slower but crucial in a psychological sense, is the inescapable impression of Viet Cong omnipresence and freedom of action.
Unfortunately, Americans have often failed to grasp the objective of the Viet Cong’s use of indiscriminate terror, and have rushed to spread the word of terrorist action throughout the country, thus acting as Madison Avenue publicists for the Viet Cong.
Reactions to terrorism vary depending on environment and the people involved. In Sicily, where small-scale but effective terrorism is traditional, the people quickly “get the message.” They go beyond the act itself to interpret its significance and meaning. They seldom expect or seek protection from the local authorities. Instead, they know how to read the language of violence, as promulgated by the Mafia, and their reactions, though bathed in an outward show of emotion, are based on experience and hardheaded realism.
In France during the height of OAS actions, the terms used to describe the OAS activists were simple “activist” or “terrorist” depending on the specific incident and its result.
Anglo-Saxon reactions are considerably different. In Dublin, during the winter of 1919, an attempt was made on the life of Britain’s Field Marshal French by members of the Irish Republican Army led by Daniel Breen. The British characterized the attack as an “outrage” carried out by “dangerous madmen” and “murderers.” In Anglo-Saxon terms terrorism is not only outside the law, it is something that is just not done. Thus, to the British, terrorists must be labeled as bandits and gunmen to place them clearly in a criminal category removed from any political validation.
Although pure fear is the first and most common reaction to terrorism it is usually accompanied by feelings of impotence and frustration. The law of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” may be universal but, when applied to the victims of terrorism, it lacks practicability. The desire to strike back is normal but one must first find the terrorist to lay claim to his eye or his tooth. Even a well organized police force or special branch operates with a thin margin of probable success.
When terrorists strike, the surviving victims can seldom take weapon in hand and track them down. They must rely on the forces of order. This is an impatient reliance that demands quick results. When results are lacking, the initial hate for the terrorist is diluted with frustration and resentment. This negative mixture is often directed at the authorities.
Selective terror can be highly effective. It was a favorite tool of the Viet Minh and it remains a standard procedure for the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Much of the South Vietnamese government’s inability to regain control of the countryside can be laid to the success of selective terrorism.
A government official named as a hamlet chief to replace a murdered predecessor, who had, in his turn, replaced another victim of terrorism, is understandably reticent about spending the night in the home or room where the previous deaths occurred.
The temptation is strong to leave the hamlet before sundown and bed down at the district headquarters. This soon becomes a habit. The Viet Cong then fill this leadership vacuum. They enter the hamlet at will for a night of lectures, songs, and discussions, often within pistol range of the closely barricaded police post.
The people are aware that their chief is absent each night and so are the police. Neither will normally risk a showdown with the Viet Cong under such circumstances. When the time comes, the Viet Cong assassination squad will ambush the hamlet chief on his way to the district headquarters or, if the police are sufficiently cowed, he will be shot on the street in full view of the people.
Selective terrorism is not always applied to the enemy. It is often used to “readjust” command or political differences within guerrilla organizations or between rival guerrilla bands. What appear to be indiscriminate acts of terror are often selective terror in disguise. In Yugoslavia during World War II, Soviet-supported partisans disguised as Chetniks raided Croatian villages thus turning the Croat population against the Serbian-dominated Chetnik movement.
The range of targets for selective terrorism can vary greatly. Government officials, military leaders, police officers, and politicians are standard victims, but guerrilla movements invariably match their targets to their political goals.
If a government is weak or vacillating the guerrillas may leave its officials in peace. They may be of more use to the guerrilla movement alive than dead. On the other hand a segment of society under a weak government may give signs of impatience and latent action that could pose a threat to the movement.
In such a case, selective terrorism might be directed at journalists, students or labor leaders hostile to the guerrilla’s objectives and impatient with the government’s lack of efficiency. The guerrillas then carry out their attacks in a manner that will place the blame on the government while they pose as champions of the murdered progressives.
One of the great problems in meeting the threat of terrorism is the difficulty of identifying and isolating the terrorist as an individual. A terrorist plan may originate in the office of a locally respected physician, but the person carrying out the plan may be a 12-year-old boy who has been paid to lean a bicycle against a certain wall at a specific time. The boy is unaware that the bicycle frame is stuffed with plastic explosive. Even under brutal interrogation he will be unable to provide useful information, for the man who paid him was a complete stranger. By the time the boy is ushered into police headquarters the stranger is on his way to another city.
The members of the Viet Cong special activities cell charged with assassination and terrorism would seem to have much in common with the professional Tonkinese gunmen used by certain branches of French Intelligence during the Indochina war. The differences however are considerable. Not only is there the obvious difference in motivation, there is also the manifestation of an end to an era of professional terrorism.
The black-clad, mercenary gunmen perched on their haunches outside French Intelligence offices in 1953 were practitioners of a traditional art. They followed in their father’s footsteps, learned their trade, practiced it, and were paid accordingly. The identity of their victims meant little to them and they considered their Viet Minh counterparts as emotional amateurs.
Today, in Vietnam, the emotional amateurs have become the professionals. Terrorism has become too important to be left to the simple practitioner and its sensitivity as a political and psychological tool necessitates careful intelligence, planning, and control.
Most guerrilla movements have become highly selective in picking the men who are to carry out missions of targeted terror, for the psychological attitudes of the individual can mean the success or failure of a terrorist act. Nevertheless, a man devoted to a cause and demonstrating the highest motivation can be a complete failure as a terrorist while one who has no motivation can carry out a terrorist action with extreme efficiency and success.
One person may approach terrorism with considerable mental reservations. These reservations may be dormant, dominated by the emotionalism of a cause. They may then appear suddenly, flashing into the open at a crucial moment, triggering hesitation, uncertainty, and reluctance, luxuries a terrorist cannot afford if he is to survive and carry out his mission.
On the other hand, a hired terrorist may approach the act with a mind uninhibited by either political motivation or human considerations. He may be a young tough seeking recognition, excitement and violence, or a professional approaching his task with the pride of a journeyman. The policeman or special branch operative who can analyze such psychological differences in terrorist motivation has a much better chance of countering terrorism effectively.
Terrorism often produces the related violence of counter-terrorism. This controversial method of striking back at terrorists is swathed in the mystique of clandestine operations and strengthened by the normal human desire for vengeance and quick justice. It is supported by the argument that terrorists must liquidate terrorists.
Colonel Roger Trinquier, a leading French expert on revolutionary war and advocate of counter-terrorism, feels that physical brutality is as important as intelligence and ruse in guerrilla war and that when the three are allied they will always triumph over what he describes as blind armament.
But the cold, brutal escalation of counter-terrorism can appear as a public admission that a nation’s law enforcement capabilities have broken down. Frank Scotton, a U. S. Information Agency officer who has received the President’s award for outstanding field work in the Revolutionary Development Program in South Vietnam, explains that in combating terrorism the goals should be “the establishment of an equitable system of law and appropriate enforcement agencies (to include armed forces). Once this is accomplished, the elimination (arrest, trial, imprisonment, or execution) of terrorists becomes a legal operation under Police Special Branch or Army Special Operations.”
Fighting fire with fire in the field of terror can build wars within wars. The struggle in the fall of 1961 between the OAS terrorists fighting for a French Algeria and the “Barbouzes,” or special police, acting for the French government, is a classic example of runaway terrorism. The favorite arm in this clash was plastic explosive, and its use in the crowded streets of Algiers accounted for hundreds of innocent victims. The deliniation [sic] of who were the terrorists and who were the counter-terrorists became progressively vague as explosion followed explosion in the stricken city. Assassinations, torture, and kidnappings marked the skirmishes of the “commandos Delta” of the OAS and the “Barbouzes.” Well-organized attacks using bazookas were directed against the special police and they responded with bombings of the business establishments and homes of known OAS sympathizers. Typical of this bloody escalation was the destruction of the Radja Hotel where the “Barbouzes” had established their fortress-headquarters. A powerful bomb, disguised as a case of supplies was delivered and accepted. Its explosion completely destroyed the hotel and buried in its debris the mutilated bodies of those inside.
In this situation, the psychological, and even the political results of terrorism and counter-terrorism became secondary and were pushed aside in order that the blind killing could continue.
The clash of terrorist and counter-terrorist oblivious to those around them can create a vacuum of reaction. Numbed and sickened by what they see, the population can lose faith in a guerrilla movement or the government’s efforts to combat it.
Counter-terrorism may appear to be a tempting and expedient method to fight guerrilla terrorists but the counter-guerrilla who accepts its use is employing a tool of negative power, a tool that may well create new problems rather than solve those he already faces.
What’s in a Word?
The word “posh,” meaning high quality or elegant service, is said to have been coined more than a century ago on board the first steamship of the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company, predecessor and parent company of today’s P & O Lines, Inc.
Previous to the opening of the Suez Canal, steamer passengers from England to India traveled overland from the Mediterranean across the desert by camel to the Red Sea where they boarded waiting steamers. As a courtesy, dignitaries were assigned the cooler cabins on the shady, or port side, of the ship going out to India, and the shady, or starboard side coming home to England. Their tickets were accordingly stamped P.O.S.H.
—Contributed by Arthur L. Gunzel
(The U. S. Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the PROCEEDINGS.)