The Department of Defense legislative program for the 90th Congress included a draft of proposed legislation “To amend Title 10, U. S. Code, to permit Naval Flight Officers to be eligible to command certain Naval aviation activities and for other purposes.” Although the bill died in committee, it was revived this year. The subject of this proposed legislation has caused considerable consternation during the last few years. Revolving primarily around the question of squadron command, the debate between pilots and Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) has not always been erudite or enlightening.
The BuPers manual states: “The one unchanging goal for the unrestricted line officer is command.” The NFO, an unrestricted line officer, thinks, “Hey, that’s me!” until he realizes that he is not eligible to serve as aircraft commander or as commanding officer of an aviation squadron—simply because he is not a pilot. Why, the NFO asks, does Title 10 state that a squadron skipper must be a pilot?
Very little is written about the specific qualifications for command. Much is written about leadership and managerial expertise and its relationship to the exercise of command. In the area of command qualification, however, most literature is so nebulous as to be almost meaningless. For example, one three-word sentence from Douglas Freeman’s “Leadership” lecture, delivered at the Naval War College in 1949, is often quoted to newly commissioned officers. Dr. Freeman’s “Know your stuff!” is good advice. But, very often, the newly-commissioned officer does not know what “stuff” he is supposed to know, or what bearing a particular skill will have on his ability to command.
The question boils down to what a prospective CO should know and what he should be able to do. One school of thought holds that the man in charge must be intimately familiar with, and be able to perform, all the routine tasks he assigns to his subordinates. This position is ludicrous. How many Maintenance Officers can repair jet engines? How many AVWEPS Officers can repair a misbehaving radar or fire control system? How many squadron skippers can do either job, let alone both!
The other, equally ridiculous, extreme is encapsulated in Gilbert and Sullivan’s nautical maxim: “Stick close to your desks and never go to sea, And you all may be rulers of the Queen’s Navee.”
Let us consider this desk-bound mariner, this operational know-nothing. Could a man really administer something about which he knows nothing. No! Effective administration and squadron management require an intimate knowledge of aviation operations. Matters such as aircraft capabilities and limitations; supply, personnel, and maintenance problems; the effects of adverse environmental conditions on operations; and the impact of morale within the squadron can be learned only by direct association and personal involvement. In order to ensure peak performance from his squadron the CO must know a great deal about his men, his mission, and his machine.
But, must he be a pilot?
Before the question of squadron command can be discussed, however, we must decide who will be eligible for command of a single aircraft. Until an NFO has successfully demonstrated proficiency as an aircraft commander he will not even be considered by a command selection board no matter what Title 10 says.
Furthermore, we ought to stop telling a young NFO that, although he cannot command a squadron, he can aspire to the command of an aircraft carrier. Without knowing the historical background of that law, some junior officers might think that holding out the possibility of a major deep draft command is the “carrot on a stick” approach to retention. In order to dispel any notion of such a BuPers hoax and at the same time provide an insight to the problems which now face the NOF [sic] in particular and the aviation community in general, it is necessary to look briefly at the infancy of naval aviation.
On 26 July 1912, Ensign C. H. Maddox, U. S. Navy, flew as a technical observer aboard a Wright B-1 aircraft to perform electronics tests with the USS Stringham. At that time the entire air arm of the U. S. Navy consisted of three seaplanes. Time marched on and aviation technology advanced—more rapidly, in fact, than the ability to prepare for a smooth transition to the tactical implementation of the new weapons system.
Even more important for the topic under discussion was the inability of the armed forces to devise a viable career pattern for officers specializing in aviation. An example of the air arm’s growing pains was an admiral who was very much in favor of using the new technology of aviation. He testified during the Congressional hearings of the Naval Appropriation’s Bill of 1916, that he would prefer to see enlisted men, rather than officers, as pilots. He felt that enlisted men could be taught to “chauffeur” officers who, as observers, would make tactical scouting decisions and direct the delivery of airborne weapons.
But, silly as were some of the things that were being said, they were not nearly as hurtful as what was being done. For example, great names which today are legendary in aviation circles apparently were extremely unfamiliar to post-World War I selection boards. The first naval aviator, Ellyson was out of aviation by the summer of 1918, and Towers asked to be relieved as air attaché in London because he was “running terrible chances” of not being promoted. This exodus from aviation by the pioneers of the field was primarily brought about by a Navy Department policy that required aviators to be fully qualified seamen. Examinations for augmentation and promotion were much too broad in scope for men really trained only in flying. Even though grand declarations were made by senior naval officers about the rapidly growing importance of aircraft and the career-enhancing aspects of becoming an aviator, the net gain of pilots during 1923 was 120. A year later, the net gain was down to two. Clearly, junior officers were reluctant to venture into as uncertain a career field.
Still, the commissioned pilot program did become a permanent part of the Navy; but the Naval Aviation Observer’s (NAO) role remained less well defined. In 1922, a formal NAO training program was initiated. At that time it was felt that a separate career program for NAOs would not be necessary since these were to be so-called surface line officers temporarily assigned to aviation. This attitude may explain why the NAO is considered competitive for command of aircraft carriers and aircraft tenders, but not for command of “a naval aviation school, a naval air station, or a naval aviation unit organized for flight tactical purposes.”
During the period between world wars the question of aviation command was temporarily solved by a quirk of technology. The emphasis in naval aviation at that time was on the single-engine, relatively uncomplicated, single-piloted aircraft. NAO billets were not numerous, formal NAO training lapsed, and all commands went to aviators. As time passed, it became apparent that the need for non-pilot officers was directly proportional to the sophistication of the associated airborne weapons systems. As these systems became more sophisticated, heavy burdens were placed on pilots who were expected to fly the aircraft and simultaneously operate newly developed electronic sensors. After World War II it was clear to all that a highly trained specialist would be required to operate the complex devices. However, commanding officers found it difficult to fill specialist billets. There were three candidates for the job: the pilot, the enlisted technician, and the non-pilot commissioned officer.
Pilots were well-trained, intelligent individuals who could bring to bear a knowledge of aviation in general on the problems of operating airborne weapons systems. “Well-trained” individuals, however, are very expensive to train and usually in short supply. And, because they were intelligent, most pilots did not want to do two things at once—they did not want to operate electronic sensors, they wanted to drive airplanes. Ask any naval aviator what two things he most enjoys doing and one of them surely will be flying. He positively will not include navigating, operating an ASA-16 or computing a radar intercept. So expense, scarcity, and desire all combine to make the pilot a poor choice for aviation sensor operator.
What about enlisted technicians? Undoubtedly many of our best sensor operators have been and are enlisted men. The complexity of new electronic equipment and the requirement for rapid data correlation necessitated a high level of formal education. A large percentage of these men were given advanced training in mathematics and electronics to broaden their background and to better qualify them in their speciality. They soon found, however, that their new skills were also in demand in the civilian marketplace. Many chose to leave the Service. Many others, having been educated at government expense, were then commissioned and transferred to other billets.
Too, the safe return of an extremely expensive aircraft—not to mention the lives of its crew—depend on the navigator’s skill. Should an enlisted man ever be required to assume such a responsibility?
The final candidate was the commissioned naval observer. Formally educated and technically trained, the NAO program could provide a cadre of highly motivated, knowledgeable men who were ready to relieve the pilot of aeronautical duties related to the operational mission other than the actual manipulation of the aircraft’s flight controls. Unlike the pilot, the NFO was and is completely absorbed in sensor operation and not at all distracted by the desire to get his hand on the stick and his feet on the rudder.
The NFO costs less to train than does the pilot. Training an NFO, however, is not an inexpensive process. If it were, we would not be quite so concerned about NFO retention. A recent BuPers “memorandum for the record” placed the average cost at $52,942.00. But this figure must be compared to the $100,000-plus price tag for training a naval aviator. More important is the fact that the greatest dollar savings accrue not in initial training but in use. A pilot trained as a navigator or weapons system operator will spend no more than two years in the performance of those duties before being moved into a cockpit. Just when he finally feels at home with his job as a tactical crew member, he is moved, and another nugget takes his place. In patrol squadrons this practice has ensured the lowest possible level of experience for the man responsible for directing the aircraft mission—the tactical co-ordinator.
The level of ASW expertise is rapidly increasing as a result of the Navy Department’s having chosen the third of our three candidates, the nonpilot commissioned officer. Early in 1959, the General Aviation Training Conference set forth the requirements for a program to provide Naval Flight Officers for the fleet and, in July of 1960, the basic Naval Aviation Officers school was established. Originally an adjunct to the training department of the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida, the school became a commissioned unit on 1 August 1963. Thus, the nucleus of a new pattern for officers interested in a career in naval aviation was formed; or was it?
Today, most of the NFO’s career indicators are very good. The last ten years have seen numerous career-enhancing changes to the program designed to bring the 1320 designator NFO, more into line with the 1310 pilot. But the ultimate question of command still remains. Until now, the question has been primarily academic owing to the relative lack of seniority in the Naval Flight Officer community. A breakdown of the NFO rank structure graphically demonstrates this point. In April of 1968 it was:
Captain |
1 |
Commander |
22 |
Lieutenant Commander |
265 |
Lieutenant |
356 |
Lieutenant (j.g.) and Ensign |
1,606 |
Total |
2,250 |
Commencing with year group 1956, which became eligible for selection to commander in August 1969, the following promotional projections reflect the growth of the NFO community in the rank of commander and subsequent eligibility for aviation command screening:
YG |
No. |
Normal |
Promotion |
Promoted |
---|---|---|---|---|
56 |
46 |
2 |
44 |
33 |
57 |
131 |
7 |
124 |
93 |
58 |
81 |
4 |
77 |
57 |
|
258 |
13 |
245 |
183 |
YG |
No. |
Projected |
Gross |
Normal |
Promotion |
Promoted to Commander |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
59 |
95 |
12 |
83 |
4 |
79 |
59 |
60 |
93 |
12 |
81 |
4 |
77 |
58 |
61 |
155 |
19 |
136 |
7 |
129 |
97 |
62 |
229 |
28 |
201 |
10 |
191 |
143 |
|
572 |
71 |
501 |
25 |
476 |
357 |
* Released from Active Duty
These figures indicate a rapid increase in the number of Officers coming into the command zone. It has been generally conceded that if we expect to keep good NFOs in the Navy we will have to show the junior officers in this program that these new commanders are being screened for command. One NFO commanding a squadron will do more for the NFO retention than all the BuPers promises and career appraisal teams in the world.
At first, very few of the NFOs under consideration will be chosen, and many 1320 officers will be discouraged by the low percentage of NFOs appearing on the command selection list. The reason for this poor initial showing will be the lack of plane commander and department head experience—experience which is vital for the preparation of an officer for command responsibility. The worst thing that could happen would be for a command screening board to react to this disappointment and select an unqualified NFO. The board must realize that to select an individual who has not demonstrated proficiency as both a department head and a plane commander would be doing a great disservice to the NFO community. The first few NFO commanding officers will be minutely scrutinized by both their juniors and their seniors.
In fact this increasing scrutiny and attention to the NFO command problem has already begun. In an October 1967 letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet said:
The relative importance of the Naval Flying Officer [sic] is increasing. It is generally agreed by naval aviators with whom the NFO flies that he has already become an inseparable team member whose contribution is absolutely essential if the full capabilities of the flying weapons systems are to be realized and the complete execution of the intended missions of multi-place tactical aircraft are to be accomplished. It is highly likely in the future with the increased sophistication of the weapons systems which are expected to be flying that the relative importance of the NFO will be even greater than it is now in late models such as the F-4, A-6, P-3, and E-2. I would expect therefore to see a further narrowing of the present gap between the 1310 and 1320 officer with virtual equality in their relative importance becoming a reality. . .
After careful deliberation of this important matter, from an operational viewpoint, I recommend that the Naval Flight Officer be accorded virtually “equal opportunity” with his Naval Aviator contemporaries; and, be eligible for Aviation Command Selection, including certain specified aviation units organized for flight tactical purposes.
Not all of the senior officers in the Navy share this officer’s enthusiasm for the NFO/CO concept. One admiral felt that the NFO/pilot relationship should be similar to the Engineering Duty Officer’s relationship with his commanding officer. That is, one of supporting, assisting, and advising but not succeeding or competing.
The NFO, of course, wonders just why this should be so. The NFO is no more specialized than the pilot. His ground duties are similar to those of his 1310 contemporaries. He has as much flight time. His level of education is the same. In every imaginable category; except driving the aircraft, the NFO is equal to the pilot. What special knowledge flows through that stick—this is what the NFO wants to know. What makes the pilot better suited for command?
Undoubtedly many pilots share the romantic vision of the commanding officer jumping into his Helldiver or Spad and, with a rakish toss of his white scarf, shouting over the roar of the engine, “Follow me!” Charisma, and the ability to inspire one’s followers, is still important today, but it seems that the mystique of command presence could be nurtured at least as well from the navigator’s table as from the cockpit.
What about flight safety? The NFO has a vested interest in safety; he, too, is securely strapped to the aircraft. Nevertheless, most NFOs agree that the responsibility for flight safety should rest with the pilot. If the NFO on a particular flight happened to be the plane commander he would be in command of the aircraft even while safety of flight responsibility remained with the pilot. This situation is neither impossible nor without precedent. It is not uncommon to find aircraft reporting to a destroyer CO for combined operations against a submarine. The black-shoe skipper normally becomes OTC and assumes tactical command of the aircraft. The pilot, while retaining responsibility for safety of flight, follows the directions from the ship. If this works between ship and aircraft, surely it can work between NFO and pilot.
What about formulating squadron policy on matters pertaining to flight operations? Here the flight officer, the safety officer, and the executive officer may have to assist the NFO/CO in reaching a decision. Common sense will have to be used liberally in this situation, and the CO who is unable to use it will surely fail, no matter what his designator happens to be.
What about the NFO/CO’s ability to judge a pilot’s “airmanship” and to comment cogently in a fitness report about an ability which he himself does not possess? This is, of course, precisely what most AvWeps officers do when they evaluate the performance of their electronic technician. Also, although the NFO is not without some knowledge in the area of airmanship—he knows a bad landing when he feels one—the NATOPS officer and other senior pilots in the squadron are available to assist the CO in making such judgments.
In spite of all this, some officers will still insist that the commanding officer of a squadron must be a pilot. One admiral recently wrote:
Examination of the history of U. S. Naval Aviation shows that its achievements and present potential have depended in major degree upon our Navy’s firm and continuing policy that command of naval aircraft, of naval aviation units, and of naval air operations at the tactical level, is to be exercised only by designated Naval Aviators. There is great doubt that change in this policy would strengthen Naval Aviation or the Navy. There is substantial reason to expect that it would weaken both, when we review the experience of navies in which this policy has not been followed.
This view, not unanimous among naval aviators, has not been well documented. In fact, research indicates that “The experience of navies in which this policy has not been followed” is one of the NFO’s strongest arguing points. The report issued by the BuPers “NFO Duty Assignment” ad hoc committee reflected this view when it cited “. . . the success of the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. utilizing nonaviators in command billets.” As one who has operated with an R.C.A.F. squadron on many occasions, the author knows the officers of that fine squadron both professionally and socially, and knows that they praise the non-pilot CO system highly. A concurring, although admittedly less parochial, view was expressed by Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Wieschhoff in the October 1968 issue of the PROCEEDINGS. Mr. Wieschhoff said:
As a pilot, I would welcome him [the NFO] to compete with me, first for aircraft commander, and then for command selection. I would add that I have recently returned from a foreign exchange billet where my Commanding Officer was a Navigator, and where I flew on numerous occasions as first pilot under the direction of a navigator aircraft commander. It works fine!
Although the proposed legislation was not considered by the Congress, the NFO has gained two very important things: both official and unofficial recognition that he can command a squadron. The obstacles to command opportunity have been stated, discussed and, in the NFO’s view, successfully refuted.
As this article was being written, the Honorable Carleton J. King (Rep., N. Y.) went before Congress to introduce the proposed revision to Title 10. It looks as though the law finally will be changed. When it is, and when an NFO at last commands a fleet squadron, we shall be able to say that the Naval Flight Officer is a member of the “Aviation Line” in every sense of the word.
EDITOR’S NOTE:—In February 1970, President Nixon signed into law the bill (HR 11548) which makes naval flight officers, like naval aviator officers, eligible to command naval aviation schools, naval air stations, or naval aviation units organized for tactical flight purposes.
Spontaneous Praise
Last autumn, while serving as a French Navy liaison officer attached to the USS Springfield, I had a French Army driver in charge of the car put at the disposal of the captain of the ship.
Because of his hours of duty, the driver took his meals on board. When I asked him his views about the cuisine, he replied: “Superb, sir, far better than at the barracks, and fortunately not as spicy as the food on the Indian frigate the other day.”
In my opinion, this is the best compliment ever paid by a Frenchman to foreign cooking.
—Contributed by Enseigne de Vaisseau de [1è]re classe P. Roullet, French Navy Reserve
(The U. S. Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the PROCEEDINGS.)