"Your Island Is Moving at 20 Knots!"

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^fYour Island Is Moving at Knots¹/''

Shortly before midnight on the night of 28 November 1944, the USS Archerfish (SS-331), on patrol about a hundred miles south of Tokyo Bay, flashed an urgent message to Submarine Headquarters at Pearl Harbor:  . . AM PURSUING LARGE

AIRCRAFT CARRIER . . Unknowingly, the Archerfish had come upon the Shinano, the world’s largest aircraft carrier. Still incomplete and presenting an inviting target for the increasing frequency of B-29 attacks, the Shinano had been forced to make a nighttime, desperate dash from the port of Yokosuka to the sanctuary of Japan’s Inland Sea.

'                                                                                           U

A graduate of the State Un¹ versity of Iowa in 1949, N' Underbrink was awarded M.A. in Library Science W the University of Chicago >^fl     _v

1957. He has been a librarian ^ at the State University ⁰ Iowa Libraries (1958

1961); the University of Sou*

Florida (1961 to 1962); and a*                       5

MacMurray College (1962 ^t0                           ^

1967). Since 1967, he has been Head Librarian a* Blackburn College, Carlinville, Illinois.

The keel of the battleship Shinano was laid down in May 1940 at the Yokosuka Navy Yard. She was to be the third of the Yamato class, the largest battleships ever constructed. The Yamato was completed late in 1941 but, by the time the Musashi, second of the class, was completed in August 1942, Japan had suffered the catastrophic loss of four first-line carriers at the Battle of Midway. It was air­craft carriers, not battleships, that were now desperately needed. The Naval Ministry hurriedly revised the design of the half-com­pleted Shinano to convert her to a hybrid- carrier. Since the Shinano was designed to supply fuel and ammunition to aircraft from other carriers, she herself would carry less than 50 planes. To meet the target comple­tion date of February 1945, construction of the carrier was given top priority. Behind a wall of wood and secrecy, thousands of work­ers rushed the completion of the monster warship.

Installation of her 18.1-inch guns was can­celled, and large sections of armor plate were removed. While the Yamato’’s main belt of armor was 16 inches thick, the Shinano’s pro­tective shield was reduced to 6.4 inches. Her underwater hull, supposedly “torpedo-proof,” was identical to the Yamato’s. As protection against aerial bombs, much of the Shinano’s huge flight deck, 838 feet long and 130 feet wide, was covered with three inches of hardened steel. Two hangar decks were lo­cated below the flight deck, then came a sec­ond sheet of armor four inches thick. The double layer of armor protection required special engineering and substantial rein­forcement of the vessel’s structure.

Each of her two elevators was provided similar protection, greatly increasing their weight. The larger elevator, located near the bow and designed to handle attack planes, weighed 180 tons. The after elevator, de­signed to handle fighter aircraft, weighed 110 tons. Engine room ventilators and hoist tubes for bombs and torpedoes were also protected by armor plate.

While all this activity continued at Yoko­suka in 1943 and 1944, the Archerfish, a 1,500- ton fleet-type submarine, had been built and had gone to war. Her keel had been laid in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in January

1943, and she had been commissioned on September 1943. Following the voyzS^e through the Panama Canal, the Archerfi^s" steamed out of Pearl Harbor on her first W^3r patrol on 23 December.

For a time, bad luck seemed to dog the Archerfish. Her first patrols amounted to too much bad weather and no targets. Othe^f U. S. submarines had, of course, been active in the Western Pacific which probably c<* plained why suitable enemy target vessel³ were becoming increasingly hard to find' Finally, on the Archerfish’s third patrol iⁿ June 1944, she attacked and sank an 800-ton enemy frigate. On her fourth patrol, she res­cued a Navy fighter pilot.

When the Archerfish departed Pearl Harboi on her fifth war patrol on 30 October 1944, the submarine had a new CO—Commander Joseph F. Enright, 34 years of age and ³ graduate in the Class of 1933 at the U. S- Naval Academy. The new skipper was not overly pleased with his assignment, which amounted to lifeguard duty for the crews of B-29 bombers attacking the Japanese home­land. While he and his men realized the im­portance of rescuing Army Air Corps creW' men who had ditched in the Pacific, they wanted a piece of the action.

One week later, while the Archerfish was on station off the island of Honshu, the Shinano was commissioned at the Yokosuka Navy Yard. Captain Toshio Abe took command, ³ large portrait of Emperor Hirohito was hung on the flying bridge, and limited quantities of stores and ammunition were taken on board. The majority of the Shinano’s 1,900 officers and crew had reported for duty the previous month.

IV;

^hen American B-29s based on Saipan ^Inade their first major attack in the Tokyo ^a^^ea on 24 November, the Japanese realized nat the Shinano was in grave danger. The ' aval Ministry ordered the uncompleted '^varship to the Inland Sea, that relatively 'yell-protected body of water lying between p islands of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. ^ar from the Tokyo target area, the Inland ea offered a safe anchorage for fitting out ^{the b}ig carrier.

The move meant that the Shinano would ^ave to make a sea voyage of roughly 300 "“les down the coast of Honshu. And much °f the area was known to harbor U. S. sub­marines. To reduce the risk, the Japanese ^avY took every precaution. The voyage ^Vv°uld be made at night. Three destroyers ^Vv°uld provide escort, and the entire trip '^v°uld be made at high speed.

The Shinano and her three destroyers stood °^ut the entrance to Tokyo Bay in the late afternoon on 28 November 1944. Since con­duction would be completed at Kure, more Tan a hundred workmen from the Yokosuka I'avy Yard accompanied the vessel. By night- ^aH> the ships were racing southwestward at high speed.

Tor the Archerfish, the 28th had been un­^eventful. Having been released from her life­guard duty early in the morning, she con­ducted a submerged patrol in an area south ^and west of the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Since Te radar had not been operating at peak ^efficiency, and it was not needed while the ^Craft was submerged, it had been dismantled *°r repairs during the day. The radar officer and his men were still working on the instru­ment when the Archerfish surfaced at dusk. Though the sky was overcast, light from the moon occasionally broke through the clouds ^and visibility was good for about 15,000 yards.

At 2048, the radar operator reported to Te bridge that the instrument was back in °peration; he also reported a target at 028° ^true, range approximately 25,000 yards. The bridge watch was unable to see the target, but lamba Shima, a tiny island, was in sight ^at about 058°.

Lieutenant (j.g.) John Andrews, Officer of the Deck, indicated that the radar was ap­parently picking up the island. He surmised that the radar repair crew had replaced the bearing circle about 30 degrees removed from its proper position, and he suggested the instrument be corrected. The next report from the somewhat irritated radar man: “Your island is at 028° and moving at 20 knots.”

The OOD hit the “Battle Stations” alarm. Minutes later, radar reported they were on­to “something big and fast,” and the plotting party determined the direction and speed of the target. Cranking up all four big diesels to 18 knots, Enright made course to intercept.

On first sighting, the long, flat silhouette was assumed to be a tanker. But, within the hour, the target was identified as an aircraft carrier with a single escort vessel steaming down the coast of Honshu. Using a zigzag pattern, the enemy was following a base course of 210° true.            •

With the sky partially overcast and the north horizon dark, Commander Enright planned to cross the carrier’s track and make a surface attack from the starboard side, away from the moon. The appearance of a second escort, on the starboard beam, caused Enright to revise his plans and to attempt to gain a position ahead for a submerged attack.

Moving at flank speed, the Archerfish took two hours to reduce the distance, and, even

then, the situation appeared hopeless. Off the carrier’s starboard bow—but well off the track —the Archerfish strained to keep up the pace. At 15,000 yards off the target’s beam, the sub­marine was still too far off the track for a submerged approach. The Archerfish was, in fact, hard pressed to keep up with the fast­stepping carrier force. Luckily, the enemy’s zigzag maneuvers reduced his effective speed. By maintaining a steady 210° base course under maximum power, Enright struggled to keep his position. But it was a maddening chase. Though Archerfish was pounding her heart out, the enemy flotilla slowly, ever so slowly, drew ahead.

Range to the nearest destroyer was only about 6,000 yards. When the carrier flashed a red signal light, Enright feared they had been spotted, and he ordered his lookouts below. He soon called them back, however, when the enemy ships continued to ignore— or failed to detect—the submarine.

Though Commander Enright detected only three destroyers, one on either bow and a third on the starboard quarter, he assumed another escort vessel was hidden by the car­rier.

With the moon breaking through the over­cast from time to time, the enemy force con­tinued zigzagging on a 210° base course,

maintaining a speed of 19 to 20 knots.

Following a careful surveillance from the bridge, Commander Joe Enright hurried be^­low checking on the plot, the radar scope, a^n<^ the torpedo data computer. With the latest calculations clearly in mind, he returned to the bridge.

Shortly after 2300, the enemy ships swung west, radically changing to a course of 240 • Though this narrowed the range somewhat, the submarine was still unable to attack.

When Enright realized the submarine was falling behind, he called for and got more power. But, both he and his “black gang knew the four nine-cylinder main engin^eS could not run indefinitely at such overloads- Half an hour before midnight, Enright radioed Pearl Harbor:           “FROM ARCHER­

FISH TO COMSUBPAC AND ALL SUB­MARINES IN EMPIRE AREAS AM PURSUING LARGE AIRCRAFT CARRIER FOUR DE­STROYERS POSITION LAT 3230 N LONG 13745 E, BASE COURSE 240, SPEED 20.” About 30 minutes later, the enemy carrier force made another course change to the west—new course 270°. Commander Enright immediately shifted to an identical course and coaxed a few more turns from the already overloaded engines. “From here on,” he re­calls, “it was a mad chase for a possible firing position. His speed was about one knot in excess of our best, but his zig plan allowed uS to pull ahead very slowly.”

Although the Archerfish continued the fly' ing chase for two-and-a-half hours, it was problematical whether the submarine could get into an attack position. If the enemy car­rier continued on its course of 270°, Enright would have no chance. At 0241, he radioed a second contact report to Pearl Harbor.

Then, 19 minutes later, the Japanese made a radical course change to the southwest. The big carrier and her three escort vessels were heading straight toward the Archerfish- This was the big break everyone on board had prayed for. The submarine quickly crossed the track. Enright changed course to 100° and ordered his submarine to periscope depth for the attack. At a range of approxi­mately 12,000 yards, the submarine eased into position off the target’s starboard boW- As Commander Enright sighted the carrier through the periscope at a range of 7,000

Archerfish positions Shinano and escorts

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□

Archerfish track is dashed line. Speed 17-18 knots all on the surface except last 12 minutes, then submerged at 3 knots.

Shinano track (base courses) is solid line, speed 18-20 knots reduced by zig-zagging, to 17-19.

Local Time 28 Nov. 2048

(1)

Archerfish sights target. Believes it to be unescorted tanker. Tracks, then starts surface attack from downmoon side.

Target identified as carrier, with escorts. Tactics changed. Attempt to get ahead, on track or near, for submerged attack.

Target changes base course, placing Archerfish on port bow, about 6 miles off the track.

Target changes base course. Submarine off the track about 8 miles.

Target changes base course to 210°. Archerfish submerged on track 5 minutes later.

Target zagged away, placing Archerfish in perfect position. Fired 6 bow tubes. After torpedo hits, Shinano turned northerly toward Japanese mainland.

^^ot and commentary by Captain Joseph F. Enright, U.S. Navy (Retired)

yards, he decided the target would come too close, He swung 10° to the left giving himself ^a small starboard angle on the bow and ^range 3,500.”

The fire control party had a perfect set-up. ^leutenant Dave Bunting on the Torpedo­ing Data Computer (TDC) checked and double-checked his solution for course, speed, ^and range. The plotting party, under Ensign Gordon Crosby, had accurately solved the ^target courses through the night permitting ^tl'e Archerfish to select the base course and gain Position. Lieutenant Tom Cousins, the diving officer, took the ship under quickly, smoothly, ^atld accurately maintained proper depth. The '^cherfish was ready for the kill.

For a few moments Enright feared the es- ^c°rt off the carrier’s starboard would interfere "dth his attack. Fortunately, the destroyer ^aPproached the Shinano to receive a blinker message passing “nicely ahead” of the Archer­fish at 400 yards. And when the sonar man tracking this nearest destroyer reported, “No pinging. He isn’t on us.” the skipper knew they were in the clear.

Commander Enright was not quite satis­fied with his firing position, but the 72,000- ton aircraft carrier—growing bigger by the minute—was rapidly closing the range. Then, just before he gave the order to fire, the Archerfish got her second big break: Shinano zigged away about 30°. Instead of being too close, Enright found himself in perfect at­tack position, 70° starboard track, range 1,400 yards—and a broadside target 800 feet long.

The skipper reported the target had zigged away “to his left,” and Bunting fed the 30° change into the TDC. When Bunting re­ported “Ready,” Enright gave the order to fire. At approximately 0316, the first of a six- torpedo salvo left the bow tubes. The Mark 14 torpedoes, set at ten feet, were spread from aft to forward to rip the carrier all along the starboard side.

All was quiet in the Shinano. Though the aircraft carrier was proceeding through hazardous waters, watertight doors on and above the armored deck were open. And many hatches below the steel deck were open for access to machinery spaces. Most of the officers and crew were asleep. The assistant damage control officer had just finished an inspection of the ship and was relaxing in the damage control station in the island.

The Archerfish was waiting. The overcast had broken and under a bright full moon Enright saw the first torpedo smash into the Shinano just forward of the stern—47 seconds after leaving the tube. Enright observed and heard the second torpedo strike home ten seconds later, and, he remembers, “a large ball of fire climbed his side.” The second hit was about 50 yards forward of the first.

With the first two torpedoes observed hits, another four in the water—and an enemy destroyer less than 500 yards away—there was no need for further observations. An­ticipating a rough battering by the escort vessels, Enright ordered the submarine deep.

As the ship went down, the men thought they heard four more properly spaced explosions' They congratulated themselves on making ^a perfect score.

Though the enemy destroyers went after the Archerfish, they were neither accurate nor persistent. The attack lasted only 20 minutes and none of the 14 depth charges damaged the submarine. Apart from the exploding depth charges, sonar reported loud breaking' up noises lasting nearly an hour.

When the torpedoes from the Archerfish smashed into the Shinano, there was shock and disbelief. Convinced that the carrier could withstand three or even four torpedo hits, Captain Abe and his officers were slo'^v> fatally slow, to react to the emergency. Only four of the six-torpedo salvo from the Archer' fish actually struck the big carrier. But, four were quite enough. The three hits forward totally defeated the ship’s torpedo defense system. The Shinano immediately assumed ^a 10° list to starboard. The forward fireroom on that same side flooded instantly, and there were no survivors. Three additional fireroonrs began flooding and all efforts to control the incoming water were in vain.

The newly commissioned ship was manned by an almost completely untrained crew. Dis­cipline was bad, organization worse—and the presence of navy yard workers and civilian technicians added to the chaos. Many of the civilians, dressed similarly to officers and en­listed men, refused to obey orders.

The carrier was so new that her water­tight security had never been tested, and be­cause of the hurried construction, the over- all quality of workmanship was poor. Many holes in bulkheads and decks, for running cables and pulling pipelines, had not been sealed. Fire main and drainage systems were not in operation because the majority of the pumps had not been delivered before the ship departed Yokosuka. Gasoline handy billies were available, but no one knew how to operate them. Though some portable hand pumps, of limited capacity, were placed in use, they had little effect. A few water bucket brigades were organized, but the men soon drifted away.

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With the Shinano still moving at slow speed, progressive flooding, from damaged to un­damaged compartment, continued, and the

^st to starboard gradually became more pro- l ^nced- Ninety minutes after the torpedoes d'* ^ripped the hull, the Chief Engineer °°ded three firerooms on the port side. This ^ecked the list for a short time, but had no for'^Inanent ^e^^ect- ^B>’ that time it was too late I counter-flooding measures. Following the tos of all power at about 0600, the great hulk dead in the water. Pandemonium reigned. ^s dawn broke, crewmen and civilians began toidoning ship.

q he Shinano was clearly doomed. With the ^aPtain’s approval, the assistant damage ^ trol officer removed the Emperor’s pic- to from the bridge, wrapped it carefully, ^a transferred the portrait by line to a de- toyer alongside.

t he carrier had a heavy list when the es- ¹ vessels removed the crew. But the giant ^rship cji_ecj reluctantly, and it was not until j^^ariy 1100 on the morning of 29 November k that she capsized to starboard, rolling °tt°m up. Displaying her enormous rounded

hull and four large bronze propellers, the ship remained for several minutes in an up­side down position. Then, with a great shudder and a rush of air, the warship went down by the stern. Captain Abe and more than 400 officers, crewmen, and civilian work­ers perished with her.

It was not until near the end of the Pacific war that the ship sunk by Archerfish was identified as the aircraft carrier Shinano. The Allies had known of the two monster battle­ships, the Tamato and the Musashi, but the existence of a third such warship was shroud­ed in mystery. Having taken four years to build, the third and last of the superwarships was destroyed on the second day of her maiden cruise.

When Commander Joe Enright and his men in the Archerfish torpedoed and sank the “Phantom Carrier,” Shinano, they downed the largest ship ever sunk by a submarine. They may also have broken the heart of the Im­perial Japanese Navy.