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Self-Destruct Devices?
Captain Roy C. Smith, III, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—In countless pages that have been written about the USS Pueblo, a great deal of the commentary is on her lack of self-destruct devices for the highly sensitive equipment she carried, and for the ship herself. Frequently, there have been references to Gary Powers’ U-2 aircraft, which had such a device but came down with it unused. And there have been others, like the thwarted attempt to scuttle the U-505.
Fifty-two years ago, the U. S. Navy was involved in an effectively used self-destruct device in the first military action of World War I. The circumstances differed in some respects from those of the Pueblo, especially in personal decency on both sides, but there are also similarities that make this vignette from our naval history of interest today.
The Cormoran was originally a Russian liner, captured by a German gunboat in the South Seas early in 1914, then taken to Tsingtao and fitted out by Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee as an armed commerce raider. Unlike the Emden and the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, her raiding career was short and unsuccessful. Running out of coal, Captain Zuckschwerdt took the Cormoran into a hidden South Sea harbor and sent three officers in a small boat on a 600-mile trip to Guam to arrange for supplies. On arrival, they were promptly interned, with no word to German authorities. When the time for their return had passed, the Cormoran got underway for Guam, using coconut husks for fuel; she evaded a Japanese cruiser and slipped into Apra Harbor. There her Captain had a rude shock. Instead of being allowed to fuel and depart, the Cormoran was effectively interned by letting her have no more coal than enough to ride out a typhoon and return to Guam, should it be necessary to put to sea. Later on, her breech plugs, gun sights, small arms, and ammunition were all removed, but the real lock to the door was the closely audited limitation of coal supply.
On 3 February 1917, the day diplomatic
relations with Germany were broken, the Governor of Guam, Captain Roy C. Smith, U. S. Navy, wanted an inspection of the Cormoran’s coal bunkers to make sure that a reserve supply had not been built up over previous months. A polite request that morning to the German captain was refused on grounds of extra-territorial rights, a peremptory order followed and was again refused. By late afternoon, the inspecting officer returned the third time, stating that he was prepared to take the ship by force if need be. This time the Captain acceded, under protest, and a thorough inspection was made. The coal on board was found to tally within a few tons of the audit computations ashore- Why the difficulty, particularly when German and American officers dined on board in harmony that evening?
When the declaration of war came through, the Cormoran was ordered to surrender forthwith, but, instead, all hands abandoned ship, and immediately afterwards, she blew up with a thunderous explosion. Later on, Captain Zuckschwerdt explained that the ship had carried a huge demolition bomb in the bottom of her main bunker, which would have been found by the inspection and removed. He had to stall for enough time to disassemble the bomb and remove all traces of its presence before permitting the inspection. Then it had to be reassembled in place, and two months later it was used with complete success. A simple, but effective, self-destruct device!
"Modern Destroyer Bridge Design”
CSee R. L. Scott, pp. 44-50, March; pp. 113-114, June; pp. 102-105, September; and pp. 115-116, November 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant J. L. MacMichael, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, USS Marathon (PG-89)— The completely enclosed bridge of the Asheville-class patrol gunboats (PG), contains partial solutions to many of the problems about which Commander Scott wrote. On the bridge centerline, the helmsman sits behind a control console. On his right, the OOD sits behind a radar repeater, and to his immediate right, is the traditional “captain’s
| chair.” All chairs are equipped with seat ; belts for use during foul weather.
The following is a list of the equipment and displays within immediate reach (three feet) °f the helmsman or OOD. For the OOD: Voice tube to CO’s stateroom; radar repeater; radio handset with selector switch for use with on board UHF or HF equipment; two 19-chan- uel selector switches for URC-9 UHF equipment; and the 1CK intercommunication circuit unit. For the helmsman: helm and rudder angle indicators; steering mode selector switches; steering unit status indicator lamps; gyro and magnetic compasses; diesel and GT (gas turbine) throttle controls; shaft r.p.m. indicators; GT r.p.m. and temperature switches; status indicator lamps to show which engines are operating, which clutches are engaged, or f»T readiness; general, chemical, and collision alarms; high temperature (magazine) alarms; propeller pitch indicators; control illumination rheostats; windshield wiper and water Wash switches; 1MC microphone; and 1CK •utercommunication circuit unit.
Additionally, the following are within sight and easy reach of both: pit log dial, clock clinometers, barometer, pelorus, Fathometer, navigation and signal light panels and
controls, and three radio amplifiers.
The radar repeater is a Raytheon 2502S, and the “paint” is visible without a viewing head except in direct sunlight. It features an 80-r.p.m. scan rate, and can be viewed simultaneously by the CO and OOD; “scope head” plots of relative movement may be readily observed.
The 1CK intercommunications circuit is a battery-powered, amplified-voice, ten-station communication system, using transistorized audio-amplifier units with integral speakers and microphone or microphone headset units. It has station selector switches, which permit clean two-way conversations between any number of stations. Station locations include CIC, OOD, navigator’s table, lookout, and wardroom. In addition to the manpower savings, which results from not having phone talkers, the speed of communications is increased by two thirds.
The various controls located in front of the helmsman may be monitored by the OOD, and the self-activating engineering status indicator lamps clearly show the condition of the drive train. The bridge has both heat and air conditioning and doors and windows may be easily opened to make it easier to hear out-
Asheville-class patrol gunboats, the author suggests, may contain some of the solutions to bridge design problems. The helmsman sits in seat at left, the OOD in the middle, and the CO on the right, with equipment and displays located in functional groups.
Tacoma Boatbuilding Co.
side noises. Present condition III and IV watches use a three-man watch in the pilothouse: OOD, helmsman, and petty officer of the watch.
It would seem that the existing design represents a practical approach to the problems of crowded, weatherswept bridges, instrumentation centralization, and sound- powered phone chaos. Many of the solutions used in the Asheville class could markedly improve existing conditions on Fleet destroyers.
"The Command Personality”
{See E. B. Potter, pp. 18-25, January 1969 Proceedings)
Admiral Robert B. Carney, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Professor Potter’s vignette of Admiral Halsey does not sit well with one who served under him as a cruiser skipper and, thereafter, from the summer of 1943 until after VJ Day, was constantly close to him as his chief of staff. The qualified encomiums in the penultimate paragraph do not, in my opinion, offset the greater space devoted to criticism of questionable merit.
For a starter, his preoccupation with Admiral Dyer’s views is odd in the light of his limited contact with Admiral Halsey, and some of the observations attributed to Admiral Dyer call for examination.
Regarding tactical control (in the Central Pacific with the Third Fleet) it was Commander TF 38, or one of the Task Group commanders, who issued tactical orders, not Commander Third Fleet. Carrier operations called the tune.
I liked Admiral Dyer’s observation that “he (Halsey) never did things the same way twice,” although the observation, as stated, did not appear to have a favorable connotation. Halsey’s constant purpose was to keep the enemy off balance and in the dark, and by avoiding fixed patterns of objectives, tactics, communications, etc., he achieved tactical surprise on many occasions. He was confident that his subordinates were professionally up to meeting the requirements of modified orders.
Descriptive expressions, such as “whimsical,” “slapdash,” and “probabilities man” have a slant potential of which, presumably a professional writer would not be unaware. “Whimsical” I would buy, because it implies the saving grace of humor. “Slapdash” is defined by Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary as “in a slipshod manner”; slip' shod, in turn, is a way of saying “careless, slovenly,” according to the same dictionary- “Slapdash” I do not buy.
Next, I would look at “probabilities man.” Does Professor Potter imply here, a fixed and general mentality and way of thinking? Without dwelling on that question, it might be helpful to say that early in the South Pacific campaign Admiral Halsey concluded that he could not penetrate the Oriental mind as to intentions—probabilities—and adopted, as a substitute, the device of disrupting enemy thinking and planning by sudden—and sometimes diversionary—thrusts. Throughout the war, he looked at enemy capabilities in terms of things important to our side in determining his own courses of action. In short, in the opinion of one who enjoyed an authentic vantage point, the title of “probabilities man” is a misnomer. As a matter of fact, in view of the on-the-offensive character of all of Halsey’s operations after the tide was turned in the South Pacific, enemy “probabilities” were largely defensive in character"" which would seem to weaken Professor Potter’s case.
Professor Potter says that “it was Halsey’s misfortune to be dealing with a highly motivated, alert enemy.” I find it difficult to discern misfortune in the context of Admiral Halsey’s over-all dealings with the enemy! his South Pacific campaign ended in total misfortune for Japan, and the two campaigns, of the Third Fleet in the Central Pacific inflicted on the enemy, losses of planes, warships, merchant ships, and installations, which added up to Japanese disaster. To
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
what, then, is Professor Potter referring when he speaks of Halsey’s misfortune? On that point, he is not specific in his Proceed- ■Ngs article. Perhaps he had Leyte in mind.
I If so, I could add nothing of substance to
I Admiral Halsey’s own statements concerning his decisions, but I have long thought that it Was a strategic and tactical misfortune that the vast array of U. S. seapower in the area Was not under some one, over-all commander.
One last point. Aggressive fighting against a tough enemy, over a period of years, and along a road extending from the South Pacific to the Japanese homeland, inevitably included damage and casualties, but compared to the successes, the setbacks were few in number and manageable in magnitude, and the seasoned Old Pro took them in stride—not "impulsively,” but with stamina and determination.
★ ★ ★
R. C. Hubbard—Professor Potter’s splendid contribution to the more perfect understanding of command could not be more timely for two reasons. First, for many years, the service, as well as our nation, has been entirely too preoccupied with the fagade called "public image.” Our youth apparently share this thought with their plea, “Tell it like it •s.” The author’s essay is the first wholly successful attempt to portray King, Nimitz, Spruance, or Halsey as real personalities. Secondly, since World War II, we have been almost obsessed with admiration for the many technological breakthroughs. Our preoccupation with the technical aspects of the times has in effect limited our capacity to use Properly these significant technical advances as well as they should be used. When we equate command to hardware by calling command by an engineering term such as "subsystem” we may well be inadvertently endangering development of the art of command. By focusing on the command personality, Professor Potter does much to restore command to its proper position.
Although it should be properly considered secondary to Professor Potter’s points, I must advance a concern. It has been said that the British Empire always was able to come up with a Churchill, a principal leader of sterling qualities, when the survival of the empire
was at stake. Quite obviously, King and Nimitz, as well as George C. Marshall, were our “sterling leaders” in time of need. In the next echelon down, Halsey and Spruance ably provided the leadership when it was essential to our national survival. However, it may be too much to expect chance to provide enough leaders of the Spruance caliber.
★ ★ ★
Captain Robert H. Emerick, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I had contacts with both Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey, out at Pearl, during the war years. In fact, in November 1941, the Halseys, my wife and I, and our young son were celebrating his fourth birthday at the Moana, and we spent most of the evening with the Halseys—all of us in civilian clothes—and no names given until we were about to depart. Then I said, “I’m Lieutenant Emerick, of the U. S. Navy,” and he replied, “I’m Admiral Halsey, same Navy.” We promised to come back to swim with them (they had a cottage on the Moana grounds), but 7 December interfered.
About Nimitz, after he arrived at Pearl, a tremendous change took place in the spirit of the base. Depression and doubt took one look at him, and scrammed. Absolute confidence moved in. It was everywhere. Why? There was just something about him that caused us all to feel that he had the answers. We felt the Japanese might as well give up right then.
★ ★ ★
Mrs. Robert C. Hayes—I thoroughly agree that it is imperative that someone produce “adequate, timely biographies” of at least the top naval commanders whom Professor Potter discusses in his article. It has long been a source of regret and some irritation to me that Admiral King has seldom been given the recognition he deserves for his contribution to the war effort.
From 1946 to 1953, I was involved in the preparation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff history of the war against Japan. This was produced in 50 copies, which still bear a secret classification. My research for this history convinced me, without a doubt, that Admiral King’s grasp of the total war situation, in the European as well as the Pacific theater, was
far more thorough than that of the other members of the Joint Chiefs. I feel sure no one would dispute this in respect to the Pacific, but his contribution to the war against Germany was considerably greater than he has been credited with.
I had the privilege of talking with Admiral King several times, and he read and commented on several chapters of my history. This was, of course, toward the end of his life, and the friendly, smiling man with whom I talked was far removed from the tough character he was considered to have been.
"Indebtedness”
(See D. G. Smith, pp. 140-142, December 1968; pp. 114-116, April; pp. 109-110, May 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Harold J. Sut- phen, U. S. Navy—Any discussion of interest rates can easily become mind-boggling to one who is not well-versed in finance. Because there are several different ways of computing interest and expressing interest rates, all legitimate to one degree or another,
I have found it best to avoid all reference to interest rates when giving financial counsel.
... these old hands
To those old hands who already know the difference between a yawl and a ketch, a beehole and a boomkin, a carburetor and a condenser, a Danforth and a kedge, The Skipper has a special appeal...
As one old hand put it: “When the hook’s down, it’s an evening of real pleasure with The Skipper ..another growled: “It's the only one (yachting magazine) worth looking at..still another snorted: “They don’t talk down to you as though you were a knuckle-headed, blankety-blank landlubber ..yet another commented: “Thf. Skipper isn’t afraid to say what it thinks.. •”
Of course, we agree with our readers and feel that they have nutshcllcd what we arc trying to do. We believe that the “what is it... wherc-is-it... how-to-do-it” elements of “Boating for everybody” arc well covered by good books and by our competitors.
We arc attempting to bring to those yachtsmen — whether they are powerboatmen or sailing men — who arc enamoured of the sea, the best reading, the most graphic art. and the most compelling photography of the sea in all its myriad facets that we can find. And when it comes to the significant trend and change in today’s yachting, we try to report it without fear or favor.
Our readers tell us we arc succeeding, but the comment we liked most was from one old hand who noted, while watching a young neophyte deftly muzzle a genoa on the foredeck: “He’ll be graduating to The Skipper soon, now.”
The Skipper is 60 cents a copy; $7 for one year; $12 for two; $16 for three year subscriptions in the United States and possessions and Canada. All other countries, $8 per year. Published monthly.
I have found it far more effective to compare alternative financing programs by determining the dollar cost involved in each case. Simply multiply the monthly payment by the number of payments, and then subtract the amount actually received from the lender. The resulting figure is the dollar cost of the loan. Through this process, it is a simple matter to show, in easily understood terms (dollars and cents), the relative cost of financing through finance companies, revolving charge accounts, credit unions, and commercial banks. All of the necessary data can usually be obtained by making a few phone calls, and no complex formulas or involved computations are required. If a man can be taught to make such a simple comparative cost study before he makes a credit purchase, he will usually select the lowest-cost method of financing. The opportunity to reduce borrowing costs through early repayment will usually turn out to be a bonus available to the man who finances through the credit
Union, the source which generally has the lowest cost of borrowing as well.
Of course, this only skirts the real issue. Financial responsibility and intelligent spend- ‘ng of income entails far more than minimization of borrowing costs. The problem of reducing credit costs paid by our men is small in comparison to the fundamental challenge: teaching them how to decide when to buy and when not to buy. It is the unwise purchase, not costly credit arrangements, which leads to indebtedness letters. We could reduce the administrative headache, created by letters of indebtedness, by steering our men away from the high-cost credit sources, because those same sources are the ones which are most inclined to try to use the commanding officer as a collection agent. This, however, would be a case of treating the symptom, not the disease.
Indebtedness problems can be resolved, but only through wise management of the Whole spectrum of personal finances. The tnan who draws a $6,000 Variable Re-enlist- uient Bonus and spends it on a new automobile (which depreciates by nearly 50 per cent the moment he signs the bill of sale), needs financial guidance just as much as Commander Smith’s man who was socked with a 5327 interest charge on a $922 television set. As Commander Smith has pointed out, solv- 'ng the real indebtedness problem requires a continuing educational effort using the resources which he cited. Focusing too much attention, however, on peripheral issues, such as interest rates and borrowing costs, may be distracting, and delay achievement of the ultimate goal of sound financial management.
"The Great Stone Fleet—Calculated Catastrophe”
(See Arthur Gordon, pp. 72-83, December 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Vernon C. Gray, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—Commander Gordon’s article can certainly be regarded as one of the more accurate and vividly descriptive accounts of the Charleston Blockade. His perspective on its value and outcome has support from at least one other current and eminent naval historian, Samuel Eliot Morison. In his Oxford History of the American People, Morison writes, “Naval blockade alone has never
won a war; it was the armies of Grant, Sherman, and Thomas that delivered the knockout blows to the Confederacy. But they were only able to do that after the South had been materially weakened by the blockade.”
Vernon H. Brown, my grandfather, carried out the private negotiations for the purchase of the fleet. For this reason, it was often referred to, at least in the New York area, as Brown’s Stone Fleet. By 1880, Vernon H. Brown and Company had established its reputation sufficiently to be chosen as the first agents for the Cunard Line. Shortly thereafter, the Cunard Line decided to set up an American branch with headquarters in New York, and selected Vernon H. Brown to be the first manager of the line in this country. In the earlier stage of Mr. Brown’s full and successful career, he owned as many as 11 clipper ships. I am sure that it was as difficult for him to carry out the Navy’s request to purchase the vessels for the blockade (thus precipitating the downfall of America’s Whaling Fleet) as it was for Davis to watch them sinking slowly off Charleston Harbor.
"Flags of Whose Convenience?”
(SeeJ.J. Clark, pp. 50-59,October 1968; pp. 108-109, January, and pp. 109-110, April 1969 Proceedings)
Philip J. Loree, Executive Secretary, American Committee For Flags of Necessity—Dr. Clark questions whether certain Liberian and Panamanian-registered ships will be available if they are needed by the United States, without ever taking into consideration (1) the achievements of U. S. effective control ships in World War II, Korea, and presently in Vietnam, or (2), the carefully documented endorsement given to U. S. effective control policy by the executive branch and top military planners in at least three administrations.
Instead, Dr. Clark attempts to assess the availability of these ships almost entirely from the standpoint of an abstract principle of international law, placing almost total reliance on the precept that flag states (Liberia and Panama) “enjoy pre-eminent rights to control the movements of these vessels.” This restrictive approach encourages him to foresee possibilities such as expropriation by the flag states, as well as involvement of the vessels in conflicts between flag states
and other nations, and to speculate that the fact that such possibilities “have not occurred is no guarantee they will not occur in the future.”
Apparently, Dr. Clark, whose field is economics, draws his legal references from Chapter VII of the scholarly and comprehensive study Flags of Convenience—An International Legal Study by Boleslaw Adam Boczek (Harvard University Press, 1962). Unfortunately, he draws only from the surface of this impressive work, and fails to give due weight to other considerations advanced by Mr. Boczek which qualify the “pre-eminent right” precept and which put the availability of U. S. effective control ships in a more realistic legal, operational, and practical light. Dr. Clark’s article attributes to Mr. Boczek the statement that “. . . no case has come to the attention of the author in which a state has succeeded in requisitioning a vessel on the grounds of ownership by its nationals over the protests of another state having more highly regarded connections with the vessel.” Actually, this statement, appearing on page 195 of the Boczek study, is not an observation by the author. Instead, it is a quotation from page 104 of a much earlier study by Robert Rie- now, entitled The Test of the Nationality of a Merchant Vessel (Columbia University Press, 1937). The Rienow study is concerned with possible tests for determining a vessel’s nationality, and has nothing to do with U. S. effective control policy.
The Boczek study shows how unrealistic it is to place blind reliance on the concept of “pre-eminent right.” Mr. Boczek points out that in the absence of consent or acquiescence by the flag states (consent exists today, as it has in the past, by way of informal agreements or understandings), the United States could exercise its right of angary and requisition vessels within its territorial waters in times of conflict. In addition, the author indicates that during such times, vessels indirectly owned by American citizens could be requisitioned by the United States on the high seas and in ports of other nations. Such action, in Mr. Boczek’s view, “could be justified by the motive of providing the ships with the necessary protection which flags of convenience nations are unable to afford.”
Conceding that such considerations may be exceptions to the “pre-eminent rights’ precept, Dr. Clark fails to develop these sig' nificant points, and ignores their obvious legal relevance to U. S. effective control policy. Equally objectionable, he also ignores the import of the present informal consent or acquiescence given by Liberia and Panama to the United States. On the other hand, Mr. Boczek suggests that formal treaty provisions would be appropriate in order to clarify the international legal status of U. S' effective control ships, but does not derogate the meaningfulness of the informal arrangements. In fact, Mr. Boczek concludes that with the flag states’ “. . . consent or acquiescence, the country of ultimate ownership [United States] is fully entitled to control and requisition the vessels in question in time of emergency.”
The most striking difference between the respective analyses of Mr. Boczek and Dr- Clark is the weight which each gives to the practical considerations underlying effective control policy. Mr. Boczek’s study, in depth, of the various international law principles ends with the brief but compelling conclusion: “Of decisive practical importance in the whole issue is the fact that the flag-of- convenience countries would be unable, in case of emergency, to enforce their control over the ships flying their flags on the high seas.” Dr. Clark, on the other hand, avoids any assessment of the realities of the situation, completely ignoring the practical question of how such control could in fact be exercised.
In attempting to downgrade the availability of U. S. effective control ships, Dr. Clark’s position coincides with that of a select group of U. S. maritime union leaders, whose statements over the years have been in direct opposition to those of highly placed government and military officials. As recently as June 1967, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in replying to the criticism of one such maritime union leader, stated: “In a full scale national emergency, we believe ‘effective control’ ships will be as available to DOD as U. S. flag ships.”
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deeded in connection with military requirements of this country.” In 1960, a similar Judgment was expressed by another former
ecretary of Defense, Thomas S. Gates: “Our experience in World War II and in the emergency since that war, has demonstrated the Practicability and value of the concept of effective U. S. emergency control. . . .” Such Apparent unequivocal support for U. S. effective control policy can also be found in Numerous statements and studies by Department of Defense and Navy officials charged Vv'ith the responsibility of assuring that emergency sealift capabilities are met. These offi- c>als did not base their evaluations on an abstract principle. They looked to such meaningful factors as beneficial ownership and control by American shipowners whose allegiance is to the United States; the strong hes between the United States and the flag states; and the impressive record of effective S. control of shipping during World War If, Korea, and Vietnam. These are but a few of the many compelling considerations tvhich the government has cited in upholding the availability of these vessels in the event °f war or national emergency.
Against this array of top-level determinations, Dr. Clark’s conclusion as to the availability of U. S. effective control vessels, based altnost exclusively on an interpretation of mternational law, does not appear to be a meaningful and realistic appraisal of a policy °f utmost importance to the United States.
Pictorial—"Dilbert”
(■Seepp. 83-98, December 1968 Proceedings)
Captain Homer T. Baird, Supply Corps, C- S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I am certain Gilbert meant as much to the new officers in ff>e air Navy, as Eggburt, the brainchild of ffarle Chesney, did to the new officers of the supply Corps. My purpose is to demand fffual time for Eggburt of the Supply Corps, an errant, aggravating, exasperating bungler, me paragon of bad example for junior officers.” A great many supply officers came into ^e Service directly from civilian activities, and, with no military training, made many an embarrassing error.
Earle Chesney and I were lieutenants, yhen he came up with the idea of Eggburt m the fall of 1942, and, since he was on the
staff and working with the former Bureau of Supply and Accounts monthly Newsletter, I got to know him quite well. His bungling Eggburt was the first thing the new officers looked for, so they could see what they had done wrong, or, what they should do to avoid foolish mistakes.
In 1945, I wrote to Commander Chesney about the value of Eggburt in Supply Corps indoctrination, as well as furnishing delightful reading matter. I told him I thought the entire series from 1942 should be published as a volume. However, many others had written him, and the book had already gone to press.
I am very proud of my autographed copy of the book, Eggburt and Other Navy Cartoons, which he sent to me.
I believe Earle retired as a captain or rear admiral. The last I heard of him, he was with the Veterans Administration. Can you shed some light on this?
Ed. Note: Earle D. Chesney served in the U. S. Navy during World War II until the end of 1945. He returned to active duty during the Korean conflict with the rank of captain and served until December 1953. He was appointed to President Eisenhower’s staff in 1954 as Assistant to the Deputy Assistant on the Legislative program. He retired from
Cadet Terrance M. Adlhock, Air Force ROTC, Stanford University School of Law-"' The author cited “deficiencies in the military
Order, and in the Military Justice Act 1968, which was signed by the President on 1 November 1968.
The new manual has the same basic ox- rangement as the Manual for Courts-Martial
the Naval Reserve in July 1960. He died on 29 April 1966.
Eggburt was demobilized with other Reserve officers in 1945, but when the Korean conflict broke out, Eggburt returned to active duty. Several months after the cartoon reappeared in the Supply Corps Newsletter, the decision was reached to introduce Ensign Gallburt, Eggburt’s younger brother. “After all,” it was reported, “Eggburt was now a lieutenant, and had mellowed into a competent officer.” He became Gallburt’s instructor, and he attempted to guide his brother past the pitfalls that caused Eggburt so much trouble during World War II.
Chesney was not alone in his Eggburt/ Gallburt cartoon. Commander F. Lowell Lawrance, Supply Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve, who was editor of the Newsletter, wrote the verses explaining the Eggburt and Gallburt foibles. Eggburt’s entire career was the product of a close partnership between Chesney and Lawrance.
★ ★ ★
Admiral A. K. Doyle, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The Dilbert account reminded me of many incidents that helped to lighten a very grim period for the Bureau of Aeronautics.
Bob Osborn was sent to my office by Lieutenant Commander Dick Farrelley, who was then serving as an administrative aide to Admiral Towers, the Chief of the Bureau. Dick, a World War I naval aviator, was, and still is a member of the Aviation Command- ery of the Naval Order of the United States, which originated in New York City following that war and has been of outstanding service to our Navy ever since.
Osborn handed me two small books, one entitled How to Shoot a Duck, and the other, How to Catch a Fish. In each, as I recall, the “anti-hero” violates the fundamentals of the sport and ends up frustrated, but happily plastered. I had spent the previous October in England visiting the R.A.F. Training Command, and had been impressed by the fact that the British were far ahead of us in organization and training techniques. They published, regularly, an information training pamphlet which featured cartoons depicting the imbecile operations of a Pilot Officer Prune, “P. O. Prune.” Suddenly, our training division had a brand new department.
No mention of the Training Division of those days would be complete without inclusion of the name of then Captain Arthur Radford. He reported on 1 December 1941 as Director of Aviation Training, and in two months the organization was equal in size to that of the original Bureau—staffed by a most wonderful collection of solid professionals and invaluable screwballs.
“Seapower and the Superpowers”
(See G. Ammc, pp. 26-35, October 1968; and pp. 118-119, April 1969 Proceedings)
Captain Gideon M. Boyd, U. S. Navy (Re‘ tired)—Captain Amme’s message is clear! but isn’t it a bit late? Haven’t recent develop' ments in U.S.S.R. naval material (weapons especially) and operational techniques already introduced “innovations” that pose serious threats to the U. S. control of the seas. The problem doesn’t appear to be one of per' ception; it is one of action.
The Navy is in good shape, but if somebody comes along with something that would upset our superiority, we had better keep our eyeS open and do something about it. In short, the concern should be for the present—there lS visible evidence that Russian seapower i® already sufficient to challenge our control o» the sea.
. .Justice For All?”
(See W. G. Proctor, Jr., pp. 52-55, November 19*^ Proceedings)
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legal framework” in such things as, “ . . . the justice of the summary court-martial, and ot possible abuses inherent in existing procedures for Administrative Discharge.” Correct Re action relating to certain deficiencies mad® clear during 18 years’ experience with the fir®1 Uniform Code of Military Justice (1951), lS found in both the new Manual for Courts* Martial, 1969, which became effective on 1 January 1969 through Presidential Executive
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(MCM), 1951. The procedure of special and Summary courts-martial must now conform to the procedure stipulated for general courts-martial, so far as practicable. The 1969 MCM contains an expanded statement °f the summary court’s responsibility to
thoroughly and impartially inquire into both sides of the matter and . . . assure that the interests of both the Government and the Accused are safeguarded.” Greater protection ls now afforded the accused by placing the responsibility for making a thorough and impartial inquiry on the summary court in all cases regardless of the plea. The accused in a tummary court-martial also receives the benefit of a detailed explanation on the mean- lng and effect of a plea of guilty, in revised and expanded form.
The Military Justice Act contains the following major provisions, several of which touch directly on points raised by Captain Proctor: redesignated the law officer of a military court-martial as a military judge, and empowered him to make certain legal and Procedural decisions in a trial; provided that a defendant in a general or special court- martial could request his case be heard by a toilitary judge alone; prohibited a general Court-martial consisting only of a military Judge from deciding a case in which the death Penalty may be adjudged; specified that the Accused in a special court-martial or in a case where a bad-conduct discharge may be adjudged, be given legally trained counsel and required a military judge in the latter cases; Provided that a serviceman may refuse trial by a summary court consisting of one commissioned officer; provided that a serviceman desiring to have enlisted men serve on his Court martial shall make such request before the end of a pretrial session; created an independent military judiciary of commissioned officers who were members of the federal bar °r the bar of the highest court in a state to Preside over special and general courts- martial and provided that the secretary of euch service establish the requirements for these military judges; strengthened prohibitions against command influence over members of a court martial by providing that the Performance of a serviceman as a member of a court martial could not be evaluated in Preparing an effectiveness, fitness, or effi
ciency report; permitted the deferment of sentences to confinement, pending appeals, and allowed two years to petition for a new trial; redesignated boards of review as courts of military review to review court martial cases and also authorized the Judge Advocate General, because of new evidence, error, or fraud, to modify findings or sentence of a court martial which has not yet been reviewed. The independent military judiciary is to be outside the pressure and control of base commanders, and more closely in line with civilian judges.
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Critics since 1951, when the UCMJ was enacted, maintained that the military system was unfair to the accused serviceman and lagged behind civilian judicial processes in efficiency. Another major criticism concerned alleged pressures that could be exercised by base commanders in the outcome of courts- martial. But perhaps the most frequently cited shortcoming of the military legal system was the fact that sometimes, a defendant would not be assured of trained legal counsel. Such competent legal counsel was not re-
quired under the Uniform Code, and in many instances, the accused was defended by officers who might have no legal training. In addition, the law officer, who presided over courts-martial, did not have full authority to deal with procedural matters that a civilian judge held, thus frequently delaying routine decisions.
At the time President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the measure into law, he said the bill brought the soldier a long way from the “drumhead justice of Valley Forge,” by giving him first-class justice in addition to the other excellent services provided to the Armed Forces. He said the law “expands the concept of fairness by creating an independent court system within the military, free from command pressures and control.”
There are still some important loopholes, and the new legislation does not go as far as many had hoped. It avoids, for instance, the whole area of granting due process for servicemen subject to undesirable administrative discharges. But Senator Sam J. Ervin (Dem., N.C.), who worked for more than seven years on these changes, believes the new law constitutes a significant step forward. It was Ervin who introduced a mammoth omnibus military justice bill containing almost every reform then (1966) being discussed. There was enormous opposition to it in the Pentagon, and the Senate never acted on it.
"The Military in the Free Society”
(See S. H. Hays and T. A. Rehra, pp. 26-36, February 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant P. T. Deutermann, U. S. Navy —The authors’ most telling point was made in their identification of the changing attitudes of American citizens towards their government and authority systems in general. The symptoms of change are nowhere more evident than on our university campuses, and the attitude of university graduate students towards the military establishment is probably the most clearly defined: universal hostility.
Exploration of this almost automatic reaction commonly reveals an astonishing amount of ignorance about the military establishment on the part of otherwise fairly well educated and informed young people. Many graduate students have swallowed whole the voluminous propaganda published by activist student elements on the campusQuestioning reveals that many of them have never given a second thought to the possibility that the statements of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) might be less than the whole truth.
What provides the fire behind all the smoke is the Vietnam war and the Damoclean pressure of the draft board. The detailed and graphic coverage that television provides in the daily newscasts has made this war, its menace, privation, and suffering, a pre' experienced thing for university students who are eligible for the draft. It is a common occurrence for students to find that classmates have not returned for the new quarter because they have been drafted; the local draft board is popularly cast in the image of the Spanish Inquisition. Being drafted means Vietnam to most students, although that might not be the actual case.
Reinforcing this association are the young men who are returning to the campus from their draft service. There appear to be two types of returnee: one is the man who has matured during his military service, and who comes back to school with a substantially broadened perspective. The other type, and the more numerous and vocal, is the man who deeply resents the intrusion that his military service requirement made into his life, and who brings back to the campus his own version of how bad things were. Though this type of individual may have seen very litde of the entire defense establishment, the authenticity and accuracy of his “first-hand statements are rarely questioned.
It is interesting to note that the faculty members generally do not contribute to this syndrome. Professors who are expert in then fields, particularly in the political science and international relations, are very much aware of the threats this nation faces in the world; and the place of the defense establishment m our American society.
It appears to me that information is the key to diluting some of the animosity oI contemporary university students to the military. I should think that military officerS who have been selected to attend civilian graduate schools could become a substantia1 asset in a low-keyed, person-to-person effort on the campus. My own experience has shown
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★ * ★
First Lieutenant Richard E. Radez, Finance Corps, U. S. Army—I was left with a feeling of uneasiness as regards the main thrusts of the article concerning the newly emerging problems of socialization in our society, the defense of the military institution and its values, the problems of induction and training of recruits, and the veiled bewilderment as to why our youth has not evinced a greater demonstration of support for our military institution and its efforts in Vietnam, ft seemed that the authors decided to gaze backward in time for their conclusions, rather than trying to grasp the implications of the dynamic realities of today as they pertain to tomorrow.
The newly emerging problems of socializa- hon in our society revolve around two elements: the organization and the individual, f wholly agree that we are becoming a society of organizations. I only partly agree that the growing rise of individualism is due to a loosening of social controls at lower organizational levels. Possibly, a more significant mason for the rise of individualism may be °und in the effect of technology upon our society. To quote from The New York Times, the Harvard University Program on Technology and Society, “ . . . holds that technology has created a society of such complex diversity and richness that most Americans have a greater range of personal choice, wider experience, and a more highly developed sense pf self-worth than ever before.” Americans,
*t would seem, are on their way to becoming the most genuinely individualistic people in history. In doing so, they are changing their values.
The protest and the various forms of revolt hy our youth today become a struggle for Power and control over the organizations of PUr society. Owing to the enthusiasm, ideal- lsm, energy, and increased intellectual preparation of our youth today, I think that these individuals of tomorrow will exercise full and
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effective control and power over the organizations of our society, one of which will be the military institution. The posited triumph of the individual over the organization will have profound implications for the military institution and its values.
Patriotism, or the attitude of the citizens towards their nation and government, seems to be undergoing a change that is part quiet maturation and growing self-assurance, part internationalization of our outlook, and part discontent with the record of government to date. The patriotism of tomorrow probably will be much more subdued and restrained. The present concept of sense of duty may have to be sharply curtailed in order to meet the individual’s demand for a greater degree of personal freedom and privacy while he serves within the military institution. The implication is that if the military institution does not respond to these societal value changes, the individuals of tomorrow will have no recourse but to superimpose these changes onto the military institution.
While the leaders of tomorrow will operate in what promises to be a much more egalitarian environment, they will enjoy the minimal respect that is a function of their position of authority, but they will have to earn the respect that will be a function of their skills and abilities as perceived by their subordinates. The military institution will not be able to indoctrinate their individualistic recruits, but will have to meet the challenge of managing recruits so that they will motivate themselves.
Colonel Hayes and Lieutenant Colonel Rehm conclude that the “ . . . wiser course may well lie in shouldering our responsibilities as a nation, and in training our youth to accept them.” It is my contention that our youth has shown a great capacity to accept responsibility as evinced by their participation in such organizations as the Peace Corps, VISTA, and various civil rights organizations. The number of our youth who have gone to jail or fled the country because they were not willing to support and to participate in our country’s actions in Vietnam also have shown a responsibility to accept the consequences of their actions and beliefs, regardless of what one thinks of their actions—the problem is not one of training our youth to accept responsi-
bility. The problem is that the individual of tomorrow must perceive his country’s actions as being necessary and legitimate. If this perception of necessity and legitimacy is not present, individual citizen support will be then equally lacking.
I have no doubt that the military institution will be retained as a part of the American society. My concern is that the military institution should understand the changes that are taking place in this society and respond internally to the implications that these changes have for tomorrow. For if it does less, the military institution runs the real risk of becoming not an integral part of our American society, but rather a subservient and ultimately dispensable part.
Radar Altimetry in Polar Regions
Commander Thomas Lutton, U. S. Coast Guard, Chief, Avionics Branch, Electronics Engineering Division, Coast Guard Headquarters—Perhaps the most important corollary to that oldest requirement for longevity in aviation—maintaining flying speed Is the equally vital necessity to avoid flying into the ground. And, while all discussions of the first aviator axiom include certain unchanging factors, the consideration of the latter “principle” is occasionally precipitated by the introduction of newly recognized variables. All too frequently, these variables first become evident in accidents.
There was, for example, the case of the HU-16 Albatross that, while on a practice night air rescue mission on the Arctic ice cap, began dragging a wing in the snow and then crashed. Then there was the instance of the C-54 Skymaster, which was executing a loW- level free-fall resupply mission in a polar area, using a radar altimeter to maintain a 50-foot terrain clearance. While the radar altimeter was still reading 220 feet, the aircraft propellers hit the snow surface, causing a crash landing.
Until very recently, the causes of these accidents would have little bearing on U. S’ Coast Guard aviation operations, since most of these operations are carried out in temperate maritime regions. However, as the role of the Coast Guard was expanded to include operations in the polar regions—as evidenced in its icebreaker deployments and
increased activity in Alaska and in polar maritime safety—the causes of these accidents assume greater significance.
The pilots of the aircraft involved were relying on a normally accurate instrument, the radio altimeter. In these aircraft and in all Coast Guard aircraft, except for the HH-3F, a frequency-modulated, continuous-wave (FM- CW) radio altimeter (synonymous with radar altimeter) is installed. The specific Coast Guard equipment is as follows:
Altimeter (NM-CW) Aircraft
AN/APN-22 HU-16E, HC-130B & H, C-123
AN/APN-150 EC-130 E
AN/APN-117 HH-52A
AN/ARN-79
The HH-3F uses a pulse radar altimeter system, the AV/APN-17l(v).
In non-polar areas, both the FM-CW and the pulse altimetry systems give similar accuracy results. In polar regions, however, accumulations of dry snow exist, sometimes to great depth. It is the fact that dry snow is not a good radar reflector which causes errors in FM-CW systems; whereas, pulse altimeters are not affected. In most areas in which the Coast Guard operates, dry snow does not cause a problem, since in these maritime regions it does not accumulate to any great extent. Further, most Coast Guard air stations are located in somewhat industrialized areas, where any dry snow is contaminated by airborne industrial waste products, which are better radar reflectors than the snow itself.
The graph shows that radar signals are reflected completely by some surfaces (e.g., terrain, wet snow, ice, water). Radar signals are only partially reflected from dry snow, however. The remainder of the radar energy Penetrates the snow until it reaches some other surface from which to reflect. In an FM-CW altimetry system, the energy reflected from all these surfaces is summed to give a composite signal. Consequently, since the reflections from the surfaces below the dry snow travel a greater distance, an altitude which is higher than the actual altitude is presented to the Pilot. This error does not occur in a pulse system even though the radar energy still Penetrates dry snow. A pulse radar altimeter ttses “leading edge tracking,” that is, the altitude of an aircraft is determined by the time of arrival of the leading edge of the return pulse reflected from the first surface encountered. The remaining energy is ignored in altitude determinations.
The U. S. Army has conducted tests of the AN/APN-22 and a pulse altimeter in Greenland, to determine their relative accuracy. Over all types of surfaces, except dry snow, both altimeters indicated the same altitude. When over dry snow, uncontaminated by industrial products, however, altitude errors of from 50 to 280 feet were recorded from the FM-CW system. The maximum percentage of error recorded during these tests was 50 per cent; when, at an actual altitude of 300 feet, the FM-CW system indicated 450 feet. However, at the lowest altitude flown, 250 feet, FM-CW altitude errors varied between 60 and 85 feet. This variation in error is a function of the variation of the reflecting surfaces below the dry snow. If, in fact, the actual altitude being flown above dry snow is less than the depth of snow, then the possibility exists of contact being made with the snow at an indicated altitude greater than zero. This was the cause of the accidents described in the beginning of this article.
For now, the only remedy for this “worst case” situation is to be extremely cautious when flying in polar regions in aircraft equipped with FM-CW altimetry systems. When over snow-covered terrain, visual reference with the terrain must be maintained. Flights in instrument weather must be conducted only at altitudes high enough to maintain terrain clearance.
"A New Approach to Navy Ship Procurement”
{See N. Sonenshein, pp. 135-140, January 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant David M. Gray, U. S. Naval Reserve—Admiral Sonenshein points to the provision for “cross-fertilization” in the CD phase of CF/CD procurement. The justification for cross-fertilization is, logically, that the participants in contract definition are being paid by the Navy to develop their design ideas. What this overlooks is the fact that much of the development of design ideas is not accomplished by the contractors being paid. In large measure, their task is to assemble systems made up of components supplied by numerous vendors competing to become subcontractors. These vendors are stimulated to originate unique design concepts by promise of significant business, not by a paid development contract. In this sense, their competitive environment is unchanged by the imposition of the new procurement procedures. Yet, they are expected to reveal substantial free information about their designs, information which has traditionally been considered proprietary to protect their ability to compete. The burden this places on many vendors causes each to reconsider the value of continuing to be a naval supplier. Beyond the patriotic motivation to continue, the vendors are seeing less reason to risk many years of engineering development, for what is a small portion of their business.
One point well worth examining is the fact that the manufacture of Navy equipment, in many instances, represents a very small fraction of a vendor’s business. No independent company could survive on the volume of Navy orders for most of the large, complex equipment supplied by vendors. It is essential that this equipment be supplied by large companies which have adequate engineering and manufacturing facilities devoted to related commercial products. The Navy equipment then benefits from the development of facilities and technical capabilities, even though the volume of the Navy business alone could not possibly support and sustain such development improvement. This is the basis for justification of the claim for propriety. Revelation of substantial technical
detail by unpaid vendors during contract definition, could prejudice their commercial efforts, because the “cross-fertilization” pr°' cess is bound to result in widespread dissent1' nation of much detail not previously available to competitors.
The end result may be a growing reluctance on the part of vendors and subvendors to participate in Navy business. One cannot dismiss this out-of-hand as a “good thing for the Navy,” since many of these companies have contributed substantially to the Navy s operational readiness, by the use of unique design concepts which were stimulated by non-Navy business The extreme result may
be that the majority of the remaining vendors will be either those which receive a sufficient volume of Navy business to make it possible to continue to supply quality equipment, or those who are willing to take whatever risk comes along, just to get an order. The latter will perpetuate deficiencies in our ships’ readiness posture, with no apparent cure in sight- The more obvious result will be the reduction or loss of a competitive environment, with an accompanying laxity in cost control, rising prices, and reduced cost effectiveness.
The Defense Department is making progress in improving procurement practices, but the problem described, and others like it, remain to be solved. If, as Admiral Sonenshein points out, CF/CD has resulted in doubling the cost effectiveness of some programs, then it is clear that we are on the right track. We must, however, be careful to avoid the pitfalls that can accompany any major revision of policy for multibillion-dollar procurement.
"My India: Diversity and Harmony”
(See A. P. S. Bindra, pp. 43-55, July; and pp. lG 114, October 1968 Proceedings)
S. M. Partap—Strategically, India is best suited to play a dominant role in the Indian Ocean region. Economically, however, India alone is unlikely to be able to do so for the next two decades, at least. Yet, India has to formulate its policy for this region in the midst of conflicting pulls. She cannot remain aloof while the United States, the Soviet Union, and China make major moves to secure their interests here.
The threat from China must be recognized
as the predominant one. While Pakistan’s hostility cannot be ignored, it must not regain the national fixation it seems to have become. India’s security in the Indian Ocean area requires a detente with Pakistan so that resources are not wasted in conflict with each other, to the obvious benefit of Peking. Today, owing to the emotional aura surrounding the Kashmir issue—the main cause of continued conflict with Pakistan—this is not easily foreseeable. It must remain, however, as an aim to be strived for.
Considering the present hostile posture of China towards the United States and the Soviet Union, it may be argued that any U. S. or Soviet presence in the area would be beneficial to India, as both forces would have as their aim the containment of Chinese expansion. Whereas the Soviet Union may be expected to be neutral in the event of renewed Indo-Chinese hostilities, India could ask for, and is likely to obtain, American assistance, especially if forces are available in the vicinity. Prima facie, this may appear to be a plausible argument, but two important facts must be remembered.
First is that any U. S. or Soviet presence in the area is bound to bring the Cold War closer to Indian shores. India has so far managed to remain on reasonable terms with both. It is to India’s advantage to maintain such a relationship. Secondly, there are no Permanent friends, only permanent interests. There can be no guarantee that our present satisfactory relations with the two super powers will continue forever. It is possible that with the growth of Chinese nuclear power, both or either of these two super Powers may seek to accommodate China. It is lor India to ensure that such accommodation is not at the expense of her interests.
India is not in a position to prevent either a Soviet or U. S. attempt to fill the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean. India is dependent on U. S. goodwill for economic assistance and on the Soviet Union for both economic and military assistance. A firm economic base is necessary for any subsequent buildup of military strength. In spite of the brave words spoken in favor of self reliance in relation to the possible effects of not signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, foreign assistance at this stage of India’s development
is not merely desirable, but essential. India must, therefore, tread the path of diplomatic persuasion with an appreciation of its delicate position, and convince the Russians and Americans that its position and interests in the Indian Ocean are of a fundamental nature. This must be followed up with the determination to increase its maritime strength, subject to the realities of the economic situation and defense priorities.
The planned increases in foreign trade demand an addition to Indian merchant ship tonnage, already nearly two million g.r.t., and the means to defend this shipping. Our likely adversaries, even today, possess the means to wage a war of attrition at sea, and are likely to attack our shipping in the hope of crippling our economy. That this has not happened so far is fortunate, but there is no guarantee that it would not happen in the future. Purely on this count, therefore, the continued neglect of Indian maritime power could have the most serious consequences. The lesson to be learned is that the boundaries
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U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
A must for military and naval speakers and writers. Over 5,500 quotations from the writings and speeches of philosophers, admirals, generals, poets, prophets, and politicians the world over. The quotations are categorized according to subject matter and appear under alphabetized subject headings.
of power must extend well beyond a nation’s frontiers, if her national boundaries are to remain inviolate.
On the evidence available, it has been interpreted that China may have to be contained in the long run by superior strength. The eventual answer to an expansive, aggressive China, is therefore an Asian coalition. Until one materializes, however, the security of this region, and its free countries, will have to be conditionally underwritten either by the Western powers or by a combination of Western powers and the Soviet Union.
India’s non-aligned posture in the world has so far precluded her from considering any regional defense pacts. With her limited capability, this posture can no longer remain valid, especially in the face of positive threats. Without abandoning non-alignment, vis-avis the United States and the Soviet Union, India could aim at an alliance with Australia, Japan, and Malaysia; later with Thailand, the Philippines, and possibly even Burma and Indonesia. All these countries are apprehensive of the Chinese threat. Moreover, this alliance could expect equipment and support from the United States and the Soviet Union.
"Our Russian War of 1918-1919”
(See K. Tolley, pp. 58-72, February 1969 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Ronald T. Strong, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—I should like to protest, but not too vigorously, Rear Admiral Tolley’s remarks that World War I Eagle boats had “sea-keeping qualities of an order probably lower than anything since the Mayflower." After all, the two Eagles he mentions had made their own way across the Atlantic, and others were still in use during World War II.
Admittedly, the Eagles had their peculiarities. The only way to land one alongside a dock with an off-dock breeze, was to come in fast, lay the high sail bow alongside the dock, ring “full speed astern,” and pray that you got it. The Eagles had a reasonable amount of power ahead, but only about four-kitten- power astern.
I well remember bringing Eagle 57 into the slip at Pier 1 in Seattle, in position so that “full astern” would kick her stern to port, and line us up perfectly for a starboard landing.
However, I got the word just then that the engine room had run out of steam. We were coasting directly toward the rudder and screw of a merchantman across the slip, when I decided that dock pilings were cheaper than merchantmen’s sterns. (An early evaluation on “cost effectiveness”?) With a hard left rudder, we cut quite a gash in the dock, but fortunately rebounded into position to creep slowly into our proper berth.
I also remember when, after spending a frustrating 45 minutes trying to lay Eagle 57 alongside the lee berth of a dock in Bellingham—at night in a snowstorm—I finally got her tied up. My navigator, the late, well known authority on Maritime Law, Captain Raymond F. Farwell (Rules of the Nautical Road), then a lieutenant, remarked, “A very successful landing—you didn’t break any of the crockery.”
There is also the story of the San Diego Reserve Eagle boat, coming in for a snappy landing alongside the Broadway pier. Failing to get any response to the “full astern” bell, she rammed the sea wall and cast her anchor into the middle of Harbor Drive.
After World War I, three Eagle boats were assigned as Naval Reserve training ships at Portland, Aberdeen, and Seattle. On one summer training cruise, the three were steaming in column up the Inland Passage to Alaska. Passing through one of the Narrows, the second ship in the column was caught in a sudden tidal whirlpool. After a series of unplanned maneuvers, in different directions, she ended up steaming meekly astern of number three. Corrective action would have been worse than useless, since all of this happened in such a short time.
In defense of the Eagle boat, however, 1 submit that Eagle 57, sometimes not too affectionately known as the “Pickle Boat,” was taken out once each month by Reservists on a weekend training cruise, regardless of weather- Navigation in fog by whistle echo was commonplace.
Traditionally, the December cruise was out through the Straits of Juan de Fuca to deliver a packet of Christmas magazines to the Swiftsure Lightship. In the winter seas off Cape Flattery, getting close enough to put a heaving line aboard a plunging, yawing lightship required some degree of “sea-keeping ability. Any young officer who mastered shiphandling in an Eagle, could handle any other surface ship known to the sea.
Looking at the enlarged photograph which hangs over my desk, showing Eagle 57 with the white ice cliffs of Taku Glacier towering above her, I must admit that she was not beautiful. But she hardly deserves Admiral Tolley’s description, “grotesque, coffinshaped atrocities,” nor the unkind words of the parody on “The Armored Cruiser Squadron” which Seattle reservists used to sing lustily on certain jovial occasions.
HENRY ford’s NAVY
Of the Eagle boats we have no fear,
With the exception of the reduction gear,
Which goes out of commission ten times a year,
In Henry Ford’s Navy.
Oh! Why in the hell did Uncle Sam,
With all the money at his command,
Build a ship not worth a damn,
The Eagle 57.
"Moonlighting Toward a Master’s,
A Do-It-Yourself PG Program”
(See T. W. Goad, pp. 59-65, August; p. 113, November 1968; pp. 102-103, January; and p. 109, March 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Richard E. Johe, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, USS Berkeley (DDG-15)—Mr. Goad’s article has certainly alluded to, if not touched on, what seems to be an enigma of present-day Navy Department philosophy of advanced education acquired through moonlighting—i.e., assembly line master’s degrees of questionable academic value. What seems to have been substituted for reflective master’s research is a melange of area study courses and seminars where conclusions are usually reached without, in many cases, the benefit of basic theory.
The interdisciplinary field of International Relations seems particularly to have been subjected to a heavy influx of master’s candidates. Result—instant master’s work, many limes without a fundamental background of similar baccalaureate work, accomplished by those who can concurrently pursue a degree and persevere through the Naval War College or shore duty in the Washington, th C., area.
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I will concede that a premise for advanced
KNOTTING
SPLICING
education is to raise the level of officer corps education, but as a bona fide master (University of Idaho—1963), I am chagrined by the rapid proliferation of master’s degrees of what I term questionable academic value.
Finally, my quarrel is not with the officers who are being forced by present selection policy to pursue the master’s, often at a great personal sacrifice, but with the policy that can continue to hoax the academic world.
Old Navy—"The U. S. Monitor Patapsco”
(iSee E. K. Thompson, pp. 148-149, December 1968; and pp. 116-117, April 1969 Proceedings)
Captain W. H. Packard, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The blockade of Southern ports from South Carolina to Texas was proclaimed by President Lincoln on 19 April 1861, and the blockade of Charleston, South Carolina, was initiated on 10 May 1861 by the Niagara. There were no monitors or rear admirals at that time. As Captain Thompson states in his interesting story on the Patapsco, the monitors were built in 1862; the first rear admiral was
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Farragut, who was promoted to that rank on 16 July 1862. When the Patapsco arrived on the scene, more than a year after the blockade was established, Flag Officer Samuel F- DuPont (not Dahlgren) was in command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, which covered the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, and the east coast of Florida.
Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren relieved Rear Admiral DuPont on 6 July 1863. DuPont, in preparing for the first attack on Charleston, tested out some of his ironclads (the Patapsco, Passaic, and Nahant) on 3 March 1863 against Fort McAllister at Savannah, Georgia. He wished to see how they could perform against a live target. He found them “wholly unfit to go into action.” They could take a lot of topside punishment, but they were slow firing and not very accurate. Rear Admiral DuPont wrote shortly after this “drill”; “Our [newsjpapers instructed the rebels at what spot to aim and they did exactly . . .”
In the first assault on the Charleston forts on 7 April 1763, the Patapsco was again involved, along with eight other ironclads. They started their approach about noon at the change of the tide, and, after some unscheduled delays, commenced the action at about 3 p.m. The strong flood tide, which by then was running, made the ironclads frequently unmanageable. This condition, plus the maze of obstructions between Forts Sumter and Moultrie, completely disrupted the Union line of attack. The lead ship, the monitor Weehawken (Captain John Rodgers), unable to detect a passage through the obstructions, turned to head back out of range to seaward- In 40 minutes of engagement, she received 53 hits and was taking water.
The Patapsco, fourth in line, turned inside the wake of the ship ahead, lost steerageway and for a while was a sitting target. She took 47 hits before she could be brought under control and turned to seaward.
In brief, every monitor took a severe physical beating; the Keokuk, sank the next day.
The weaknesses of the monitors, brought out clearly in this attack, DuPont felt, were the direct cause of his failure, and he was also convinced that Charleston could not be taken by a naval attack alone. He wished to clear his name of this failure by explaining the
Weaknesses of the monitors, but Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles would not permit it. Such publicity would stimulate adverse public reaction in the North, and would give encouragement (as well as valuable intelligence) to the Southern forces. Admiral DuPont and Secretary Welles had a falling-out over this difference in point of view. Hence, Rear Admiral Dahlgren was ordered to relieve Rear Admiral DuPont, and the latter retired from active duty.
The lesson to be learned from this unhappy ending of Admiral DuPont’s career is pertinent today: a public inquisition to establish the blame, or to defend a name, seldom determines the true cause of a military failure, but it always provides an excellent intelligence gain for the enemy. Secretary Welles apparently knew this.
'The Newsman in Vietnam”
(See R. Blanchard, pp. 50-57, February 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (j.g.) William R. Bibber, U. S. Araval Reserve (R)—The article, whether intended or not, points up the responsibility °f the military man to the people—through a responsible press—as much as it does the responsibility of the press to the people.
For too long, military personnel, especially those in command positions, have viewed newsmen with a cynical and often distrustful eye. In rare cases, this is justified. But too frequently, newsmen—who have a job as responsible as the military man’s—are ignored 0r “used” to create a favorable impression of a situation or an individual. The former may be good psychological warfare; the latter is all too often an appendix to a fitness report.
As a civilian newspaperman for more than 15 years, and as a Reserve public affairs officer, I have been privileged to see both S|des of this often-perplexing question. The hard facts all boil down to trust and respon- sibifity. If a military spokesman is to be trusted, he must speak the truth. If he is reluctant, let him call upon a higher command. L doesn’t take a good newsman much time to learn he has been given only a portion of the fects—a most damaging thing—or, indeed, blatant lies.
Without exception, such statements haunt
the spokesman far longer than if he had revealed all he could without violating security or damaging a situation. Examples of this are historic. Bad news, without speculation, is quickly forgotten by the public; bad news, with speculation, prompted by more speculation, only aggravates a situation. A brusque “no comment” only invites more questioning by the reporter. A polished briefing officer can politely decline to answer specific questions with an explanation. The newsman will understand the reasons.
Lieutenant Commander Blanchard’s discussion of the “team”—newsmen who are linked to the military—has a parallel within the press corps. It is not a question of personalities, but rather, truthful responses whenever possible, which leads newsmen to seek out certain military spokesmen and ignore others. Newsmen, even from competing publications, belong to a fraternity of sorts and quickly pass the word about potential sources of honest copy and about who should be bypassed. As a professional newsman, I believe it is this which is a prime factor in the accuracy of reports from Vietnam. However, errors can, and are, being made—it is human. Military personnel, above all, should take this into consideration before berating a newsman for alleged incompetence.
Since the war is the subject of much discussion in the printed media, as much as it is “hard news,” military spokesmen must make every effort to explain, in detail—without violating security—a situation to newsmen. By telling interpretive reporters and columnists that they are being given as complete a story as possible, a lot of difficulty is avoided. And the reason is obvious. It is better to give an honest appraisal, than to have the hangover from a bad situation regurgitate for many days.
These comments indicate the utter importance of honesty and fair play when dealing with a free press—a vital and persuasive force within the United States. To do less, is almost assurance that a military mission can be misinterpreted or even downgraded. All that the people know comes from the public media, and the sole source is the military. In the final analysis, it is the latter who are informing millions of American citizens of their importance.