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"Whatever Happened To The Battleship Oregon?”
(See J. D. Alden, pp. 146-149, September 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William A. Erwin, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve—Two incidents of the Oregon's dash around Cape Horn should be preserved.
Before sailing from her home port, the ship received on board a number of Naval Militiamen and recruits, few of whom had ever seen salt water. One young man, when assigned berthing by the master-at-arms, rushed to his division officer and protested, “That fat man in the cellar wants me to sleep in a canvas bag!” We hope that he became better accustomed sleeping in a hammock by the time the Oregon reached the Atlantic.
There was some apprehension that the Oregon might be ambushed by a Spanish squadron while en route. These fears proved to be groundless, as no warships of any nation were encountered during the passage, and indeed, few ships of any kind. The Oregon did,
however, meet Joshua Slocum sailing around the world single-handed in his sloop, Spray- When asked if he required any assistance, Slocum signalled back: “Let us keep together for mutual protection.”
The movement to recommission the Oregon during World War II was sponsored by people who romantically envisioned the old ship’s guns as sinking Japanese aircraft carriers in revenge for Pearl Harbor. Others, better informed about naval affairs, vigorously opposed the movement, as they did the proposal to scrap the ship. It is unfortunate that the greed of the War Production Board for scrap prevailed. We might note that in spite of far greater economic difficulties, the Russians preserved the Aurora, the British the Victory, and the Japanese the Mikasa.
★ ★ ★
Charles A. Sprague, Publisher, The Oregon Statesman—The old ship Oregon came to quite an ignoble end, one not contemplated when she was offered for return to duty or when she was given up for conversion into scrap.
My original offer, just after the outbreak of the war with Japan, was for her possible use as a fighting ship in defense, say at the mouth of the Columbia River. (Fear of invasion of the mainland was real at the start of the war.)
We were advised that her conversion to war service would be too long and too expensive. Later, when the word came that the ship was wanted for scrapping for metal, we learned that the Navy still held ownership, that the ship was only on loan to the state. Accordingly, and in the interest of helping the national war effort, the Battleship Oregon Commission assented to her recovery by the Navy. I did, however, make a telephone call to Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal asking that the ship be spared. He had to comply, however, with the order of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
One additional item of interest. At the ceremony when the flag was lowered and the Oregon formally turned back to the Navy, one
°f those in attendance was Lyndon B. Johnson. He had come in from a tour of military duty and was on his way to Washington where he resumed his political career.
I was criticized for turning over the Oregon by those who did not know all the facts. Your article sets forth the facts; and I am glad to have it appear.
'Trawler!”
(See C. R. Stephan, pp. 60-71, September 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (j.g.) Robert M. Coker, U. S. Naval Reserve, Patrol Squadron Two—Com- tnander Stephan’s article created great interest among VP-2 personnel. As a sister squadron of VP-1, whose aircraft found and hacked the captured North Vietnamese trawler in 1967, and as one of the four Whid- bey Island SP-2H squadrons that deploy regularly to Southeast Asia as part of Opera- uon Market Time, we were glad to see “Pa- hon One’s” name in print. The appearance °f this article is all the more timely, for Patrol Squadron One has been assigned to Vietnam L>r its second deployment since the trawler operation.
It is significant that the exploits detailed by Commander Stephan were repeated fourfold on the night of 29 February and 1 March 1968, when three enemy trawlers were destroyed at separate points along the South Vietnamese Coast and a fourth, whose skipper aPparently decided that discretion was the better part of valor, turned away from land and retreated to the security of Communist Lhina. Throughout the operation, VP-2 and VP-17 Neptune aircraft were continually on station, and during the final phase, orbited the craft and directed in Market Time surface Units for the kill. All this occurred at a time ^hen Viet Cong and North Vietnamese fight- ‘ug units, after the savage though abortive Tet offensive of February 1968, were par- t'cularly desperate for the trawler-borne supplies. During Tet, VP-2 conducted routine °perations from Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The 1 March victory, described by
Captain J. J. Herrick, Commander Coastal Surveillance Force, as “. . . the most significant naval victory of the Vietnamese campaign . . . ,” indicates how a well coordinated, behind-the-headlines effort can materially contribute to an ultimate victory.
That the SP-2H (P2V-7), which was to be obsolete and out of the Fleet by 1963, is still on the job has now become convincingly evident. “Patron Two,” the first VP squadron in Vietnam and the first to complete three tours in Vietnam, flew more hours on deployment —in excess of 8,500 in six months, and more than 11,700 during fiscal year 1968—than any other West Coast Patrol Squadron.
"The Proximity Fuze, Whose Brainchild?”
(See J. W. Brennan, pp. 72-78, September 1968 Proceedings)
Captain Lefteris Lavrakas, U. S. Navy— Just for the record, let me, on behalf of all the gunners, who gunned at Okinawa and in other campaigns where the Kamikaze operated against our Fleet, assure you that the proximity fuze (see photo caption page 75), did not make “easy prey” of the Kamikaze, or, for that matter, the buzz-bomb.
"Shipborne Radar”
(See D. Macintyre, pp. 70-83, September 1967; p. 101, January, and pp. 113-114, March 1968 Proceedings)
William H. Garzke, Jr. and Lieutenant Robert O. Dulin, Jr., U. S. Navy—In researching our book, Battleships, to be published by the U. S. Naval Institute, we have uncovered material that disputes the statement made by Captain Macintyre on page 76, concerning French radar development, which reads;
In view of the virtual immobilization of the French Navy during the next three years, it is not surprising that little in the direction of development of shipborne radar took place.
Several electronic firms in the metropolitan Paris area undertook the development of a shipborne radar set, despite the German occupation and the risk of deportation or death if the Germans uncovered their activity. This work continued for a period of two-and-a-half years until all of France was occupied by the Germans. Several sets were developed, although it is true that they did not match those developed in the United Kingdom or in the United States, as correctly implied by the author.
Until 1941, the greatest advances in radar sets had been for land station use. Finally, in January 1941, a shipborne radar set was installed in the French destroyer Le Terrible and, in May, another in the battleship Richelieu. The transmitting set was located on the upper platform of the Richelieu’s bridge tower and the receiving set was located on the mast stack. All the aerials were fitted at the ends of yards. This unit was capable of detecting aircraft at various ranges and altitudes: 50 miles at 4,900 feet, 31 miles at 3,300 feet, and six miles at 100 feet or less.
Slightly improved units were also installed on the battlecruiser Strasbourg and the heavy cruiser Algerie, which was the flagship of the cruiser division of the French Mediterranean Fleet. In June and July 1941, tests of this radar were made near Toulon but, owing to bad conditions (either sea or weather), it was not possible to determine precisely the set’s maximum range and potentialities. However, the following results were noted: on the aircraft the range was 23 miles; on the heavy cruiser Colbert the range was nine miles; on a destroyer the range was seven miles; and on a torpedo boat the range was six miles. The accuracy in bearing was 0.5 degrees and in range it was 160 feet.
Between January and April 1942, the Algerie had a new radar set installed which operated on a two-meter wave length. The
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
power, of 60 kilowatts, was nearly three times stronger than that of any preceding set. This new unit was completely operational by July or August 1942. The receiver set was entirely new, as it included rangefinding gear that was very accurate at short ranges (less than 20 miles). Trials indicated that it would not be damaged by a shock response from gunfire.
In the late summer of 1942, the battleship Jean Bart was also outfitted with a two-meter radar set. It was fitted to the upper platform of the bridge tower and, depending on the aircraft’s size, it had a detection range of between 31 and 43 miles from the ship. The heavy cruiser Colbert, stationed at Toulon, was also equipped with the same set.
French electronic firms had begun research on a 50-cm. wave length radar unit with a 25-kw. power output. However, all work ceased when southern France was occupied by the Germans in November 1942. All the radar sets on the scuttled warships at the Toulon Naval Base were diligently demolished on orders from the French Admiralty-
"Moonlighting Toward a Master’s”
(See T. W. Goad, pp. 59-65, August, and p. 113, November 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander D. M. McEligot,
U. S. Naval Reserve (R)—Lieutenant Goad’s proposal is interesting—and impractical. FeW universities will alter their operations for the benefit of the Navy (unless there is a strong financial incentive, above and beyond tuition) • But the main problem is probably the short length of a junior officer’s shore tour compared to the time necessary to complete a meaningful degree program on a part-time basis. (An appropriate instruction from Sec- Nav should overcome a smaller problem: command reticence to transfer duty hours so students may attend classes at 0800, 1100, 1200, 1300 or 1600.) I
Two years is not enough for any but the exceptional students. Even for top students, one bit of difficulty along the way—a scheduling problem, heavy work commitments for some short term project on duty, a 1 wife sick for a month—can eliminate any , chance of completing degree requirements during the tour. Few schools accept more than a pittance of transfer credit, so programs
now must be completed in a single tour since officers cannot be sure they will return to the same area. Realizing the situation in advance, most won’t bother to start such a program and the Navy and the individuals are the losers.
If the Navy feels it is advantageous for its Personnel to obtain further technical training at the graduate level, it must provide the 'ncentive and the means. Happily, a mechanism exists—almost. Let the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School administer the program and award the degrees. Essentially, the requirements for the student might be: His general program would be approved in advance by his PG School advisor; he would receive credit only for those graduate courses taken in an “acceptable” university and tvhich are granted full graduate credit in a comparable program in the university; he Would write a six-unit thesis with a recognized authority in his field (e.g., perhaps a faculty member engaged in contract or grant research for DOD, or a scientist at a Navy Laboratory).
Under such constraints, the PG School need not worry about compromising the quality of 'ts degrees. The officer-student could extend Lis study over several shore tours, at separate schools, confident that he would have the °Pportunity to complete his work as long as Lis scholarship was adequate. Many would ffius benefit from work they would not start Under present conditions.
Che handing at Veracruz: 1914[1]
(See H. W. Hill, Book Review, pp. 117-119 this issue)
Vice Admiral Paul F. Foster, U. S. Navy— The author has done an outstanding job of research and historical writing and I predict a brilliant future for him as a naval historian.
I should like to record a minor error in the Look, appearing in the last paragraph at the Lottom of page 83 in which it is stated that
• . . Ensign Foster ran through a cross fire to
Pull him to cover and applied a tourniquet
to his leg. Within minutes Nickerson was on a
stretcher headed for Pier Four. . . .
I Was not the man who pulled Nickerson to cover and applied a tourniquet on his leg. It
must have been Ensign George B. Junkin, who was the second in command of my Company from the Utah and who, at the time of this incident, was in tactical command of a section of our company, and Boatswain’s Mate Nickerson’s squad was part of that section. When Nickerson was wounded, I was at another street corner with the other section of my company that was also under a heavy crossfire, and I was unaware of Nickerson’s misfortune until after he had been carried to the rear. The action ascribed by the author to me was wholly in keeping with Ensign Jun- kin’s conduct under fire and it is he, and not I, who should be credited for the assistance given to Nickerson.
Book Review of Incredible Victory and Rendezvous at Midway
(See pp. 122-125, December 1967, and pp. 97-98, April 1968 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral J. M. Worthington, U. S. Navy (Retired)—In the interest of attempting to clarify certain points about which there is conflict, the writer has had correspondence with the authors of these two books.
With respect to the decision to abandon ship, mentioned in the second paragraph of the comment made by Captain J. E. Green- backer, U. S. Navy (April issue), the following view is submitted. Proceeding from station screening of the aircraft carrier Enterprise, our small group of heavy cruisers and destroyers sighted the carrier Yorktown burning fiercely from three bomb hits, and upon joining up, found her dead in the water. The Yorktown had gradually built up speed to about 19 knots, when the second Japanese attack drove home, and scored two torpedo hits. The carrier took a sudden severe list, and soon lay dead in the water for the second time in about two hours. Certainly, capsizing appeared likely to this observer, stationed close by. Another air attack was believed imminent (the Hiryu had not been touched until two hours later), and submarines were reported to be in the area.
It is a sound principle of command that the commander base his decision upon the information available to him at the time. Also, a commander has responsibility for the lives of officers and men under his command. The surviving members of this experienced and gallant crew, about 2,270 men, lived to man new carriers and fight another day, as a result of this timely and courageous decision by Captain Buckmaster.
With regard to the view expressed by Assistant Professor Clark G. Reynolds that the captain’s delaying departure to be sure that he was the last to leave his ship and having his boarders stop for a short prayer, was “extravagant and unnecessary,” the following is offered in rebuttal. In my opinion, the age old tradition in our Navy, in foreign navies, and in the merchant service: namely, that the captain should be the last to leave sinking ship, needs no defense, and is still good practice today. This simple and brave act has been an inspiration to seamen for centuries. As to stopping work for a short prayer, I strongly support such action in time of stress, and believe this has happened many times in our Navy with good effect.
In an earlier discussion (December issue), Professor Reynolds conjectures what might have happened had an air admiral been present at Midway. There are many “ifs” that might have affected the outcome of this battle. My only comment is the firm conviction that Rear Admirals Fletcher and Spruance co-operated admirably under the command of Admiral Nimitz, and their judgment and teamwork made this victory possible. And, evidently, Admiral King had a certain confidence in non-flying admirals by appointing them as wartime commanders of the Atlantic, Pacific, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Fleets
"... a most successful naval visit”
(See R. E. Bublitz, pp. 36-42, September 1968 Proceedings)
Arthur E. Fajans—Just what is a frigate? The text of the article refers to Kynda-class frigates, Kashin-class frigates, Kresta-class frigates, and Petya- and Mirka-class units “for escort services.” Similarly, the Proceedings added illustrations from the authoritative Weyer's Warships of the World, which show the Kynda, Kashin, and Kresta classes as destroyers, and the Petya and Mirka classes as frigates.
I should like to use the article for an excursion into an examination of the naval classification “frigate,” and to clarify the current
use of the designations for Kynda, Kashin, Kresta, Petya, and Mirka-class ships.
To clarify, it has been agreed to reclassify [ Kynda and Kresta units as guided missile light cruisers (CLGM), generally on the basis that their missile armament is comparable to 8-inch guns. The Kashin class has retained the designation of guided missile frigate (DLG) ( and the Petya and Mirka classes are more accurately referred to as escort units (PCE)- These designations are in use within NATO-
Now, into the excursion. In the first half of the 19th century, Frederick Marryat, En- | glish naval officer and novelist, wrote, “No names can be too fine for a pretty girl or a ' good frigate.” The meaning is clear in his expression of preference for ship type. HoWever, in view of the broad range, from escorts to about 1,500 tons to cruisers of over 10,000 tons, that have been thrown into the generic j category of “frigate,” it becomes evident that | Captain Marryat easily could have meant to write that no name can be too finite for a good frigate.
The term originated in the Mediterranean and was used to describe small, but swift, vessels propelled by sail or oar. The French are usually credited with first using the word j “frigate” in relation to warships. The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) marked the adoption of “frigate” as a standard class, intermediate between ships-of-the-line and corvettes or sloops-of-war.
These 18th century frigates were used for cruising and scouting purposes, were somewhat analogous to modern cruisers, and were | the first love of privateers for their strength and ability to overtake any other type of ship on the high seas. These three-masted, “eyes of the fleet” and “maids of all work” carried their main armament on a single deck and additional guns on the poop and forecastle.
As many as 50 guns were carried, although between 30 and 40 was the usual number. , Later, steam frigates were larger and more powerful and constituted the major portions j of the navies of the world until about 1870. > During the transitional period from sail to steam, “frigate” gradually gave way to “cruiser” and its use in naval terminology all | but fell from sight until the term was revived j by the United Kingdom and the United States during World War II.
hin,
In the 1940s, the United States built about isify [ ^0 ships which were called frigates, and
3sile ' England, Australia, and Canada built over
iasis twice that number. These ships displaced
e to about 2,400 tons (full load), had a speed of 20
the j knots, and carried 3-inch guns. All of the
LG) 1940-vintage frigates were disposed of by
iore *be United States in the early 1950s—except
^E). ; T>r 22 that were on loan to other countries—
rO- and the designation fell to the Norfolk, then
ialf tinder construction as an ASW light cruiser
En- ; (CLK). Continuing this trend, many frigates
No *n the U. S. Navy now carry guided missiles,
r a i T>r example, the new USS Truxtun, (DLGN-35)
his at 8,200 tons.
)W- Other nations of the world have been de-
jrts Slgning frigates of varying size, speed, arma-
)00 rnent, and purposes all of which preclude any
■ric Sort of an internationally precise definition,
hat According to Jane’s Fighting Ships, over 40
to ' Countries boast frigates in their navies. The
r a ■ Ested characteristics of this ubiquitous ship
Provides no insight into just what a frigate is. ,an The international composite of a frigate based
ift, °n Jane’s data is a ship that displaces any-
|Ch Where from 950 to 8,200 tons; her length is
>rd ) Tom 239 feet to 564 feet; her speed ranges
en Tom 18 to 39 knots; her complement is from
0n ^ to 496 men, and she carries from 2.25-
ite ltlch to 5-inch guns—not including guided
0r ftissiles.
The Dictionary of United States Military Terms or '0r Joint Usage (JCS Pub 1) has even made a
!e- ' c°urageous attempt at defining this nebulous
;re j Trm:
air, and surface threats. (Normal armament consists of 3-inch and 5-inch dual-purpose guns and advanced antisubmarine warfare weapons.) Designated as DL.
Thus satisfied by this definition, which assures harmony throughout the Department of Defense, the reader then turns to the JCS definition of the destroyer and finds that once again he has sailed into a fog of terminology.
Destroyer: A high speed warship designed to operate offensively with strike forces, with hunter-killer groups, and in support of amphibious assault operations. Destroyers also operate defensively to screen support forces and convoys against submarines, air, and surface threats. (Normal armament consists of 3-inch and 5-inch dual-purpose guns and various antisubmarine warfare weapons.) Designated as DD.
The consensus in large navies apparently is to continue the traditional placement of frigates just below the ships of the line. In smaller navies, the placement is generally the same, although it is the ship of the line that is smaller and, hence, less powerful than the frigate. In this era of “flexible response,” frigates certainly will have no trouble feeling needed.
"The Day The Navy Caught a Zero”
(See R. L. Underbrink, pp. 136-137, February 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Richard L. McCracken, U. S. Navy-—One of the main reasons for the plane being removed from the island in such perfect condition was that the Seabees, who were given the task of getting
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the plane to Dutch Harbor, apparently kne\V little about the accepted methods of salvaging aircraft at that time. Instead of using the customary procedure of righting the plane before moving it—and thereby probably causing more damage—they lifted it vertically as it lay and placed a sled under it. It was then removed from the marsh in this manner, upside down.
I also understand that the plane was eventually destroyed at North Island when another propeller-type airplane taxied into the Zero, hitting the tail and continuing up to the cockpit. The pilot of the Zero at the time was unhurt. He was, I believe, Lieutenant Commander Charles L. Crommelin, who was later killed in the war.
"Arm the AGRs?”
(,See W. A. Erwin, pp. 112-113, October 1968 Proceedings)
Paul H. Bock, Jr., ETC, U. S. Navy, former leading electronics technician, USS Belmont (AGTR-4)—Lieutenant Commander Erwin’s discussion, while indicating noteworthy concern, nevertheless can be placed in better perspective by reviewing the vessels involved with regard to their design and corresponding problem areas. Ships of this type fall into two categories: the AGER (auxiliary, miscellaneous, environmental research) and the AGTR (auxiliary, miscellaneous, technical research), with the USS Pueblo belonging to the former class and the USS Liberty the latter.
Three AGTRs are converted Liberty ships— USS Oxford (AGTR-l), USS Georgetown (AGTR- 2), and USS Jamestown (AGTR-3)—with reciprocating steam engines and a maximum speed of 12.5 knots. The last two Belmont- class AGTRs—USS Belmont (AGTR-4) and USS Liberty (AGTR-5)—are converted Victory ships with steam-turbine propulsion systems and a maximum speed of 18.5 knots. Being converted freighters of relatively old age—- both the Belmont and the Liberty were built in 1944—they are naturally not very combat- oriented. The original armament of the Belmont class consisted of four, single, 50-caliber machine guns, two located on the forecastle and one on each side of the superstructure, 03 level, just aft of the pilothouse. During the Belmont's last overhaul (January to April 1968), this armament was altered to include four, single, 20-mm. gun mounts. The present armament consists of: two, single, 20-mm. founts on the forecastle, a single 50-caliber fuount on each side of the superstructure at foe 03 level, single, 20-mm. mounts on each Slde of the superstructure at the 01 level, two, s®gle, 50-caliber mounts on the fantail, two handheld antipersonnel grenade launchers, aud an array of small arms, including riot guns, Thompson submachine guns, BARs, Nls, and 45-caliber automatic pistols.
There are insufficient weapons to arm the entire crew of approximately 280 men, simply because there is not enough storage sPace for the weapons or enough magazine space for ammunition. This is a converted freighter, and combat readiness was not the Original intent, nor does the hull design lend itself to this concept. And, therein lies another problem.
Structurally speaking, the combat readiness and watertight integrity of these ships is Poor. One well-placed torpedo amidships tvould break an AGTR in half. This is not to say that someone “dropped the ball,” since foere are no other Victory hulls afloat that begin to compare with an AGTR when it comes fo withstanding damage, as proven by the Liberty incident. The Liberty was hit about 25 foet aft of the watertight bulkhead at frame ^2, just under the third deck. The fact that fois bulkhead held is nothing short of miraculous, and the damage control exercised by foe crew proved that the ship was not “unsav- able.”
Nevertheless, the ship was not designed to fie involved in combat. Here are two alternative solutions to the problem: Provide constant protection for these ships whenever they arc operating in waters of even questionable safety, i.e., surface escort or readily available air cover, or both; decommission the AGTRs and AGERs and replace them with converted destroyers to afford maximum protection and ability to sustain battle damage. If the loss in mission capability due to the lack of space is deemed too critical, convert light cruisers instead. It might be mentioned that the first alternative is in effect for AGTRs operating in Pacific waters at present.
Emergency destruction on a ship of this type is a monumental task. The use of explosives is clumsy, time-consuming, and dangerous, and in addition, explosive devices must be magazine-stored for safety. Thermite in the equipment is out of the question because of the danger of accidental detonation by the crew or in the event of a small fire (which might otherwise be easily extinguished). This problem must be satisfactorily resolved, however, even if it means scuttling the ship to safeguard classified material.
In regard to improved mission capability, not only is more effective equipment required, but also, more highly reliable equipment is needed. Four years of electronic maintenance in the Belmont proved to me the need for specific equipment for the tasks involved, with reliability as a key requirement. Equipment maintenance on ships of this type is at times very difficult, due to the use of obsolete “interim” devices that have poor reliability, and the fact that spare parts are not available because of the relatively small number of port calls during a single deployment. The fact that these ships do operate successfully under these conditions is a credit to Navy training and human ingenuity.
The mission of these ships is certainly worth the time and expense of seeing that the ships are armed and equipped in the best possible fashion with the most sophisticated electronic devices. They necessarily should not be simply auxiliary vessels, but combat- ready and deadly in their own right, if for no other reason than their own safety.
"Micronesia—Especial Trust”
(See D. J. Morgiewicz, pp. 68-79, October 1968 Proceedings)
Raymond J. Barrett, U. S. Department of State—Political and other developments are taking place at a rapid rate in the Pacific Islands. Two territories, Western Samoa and Nauru, have already become independent. The Cook Islands are now “associated” with New Zealand, and autonomy and self-government will undoubtedly increase greatly in the area. Other territories are likely to become independent in coming years.
This vast region is important to the United States. These islands control the strategic lines of communication in the Pacific and it is essential that they remain in friendly hands. It is also worth noting that the Pacific Islands region, which occupies 20 per cent of the
TERRITORIES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISSION AND REPRESENTED AT SOUTH PACIFIC CONFERENCES
GOVERNMENT
APPROXIMATE T<
■Oil
TERRITORY | RESPONSIBLE | POPULATION | |
American Samoa | United States of America | 20,850 |
|
Barrisii Solomon Islands Protectorate | United Kingdom | 136,750 |
|
Cook Islands | New Zealand | 19,214 |
|
Fiji | United Kingdom | 456,390 |
|
French Polynesia | France | 84.550 |
|
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony | United Kingdom | ,49,879 |
|
Guam | United States of America | 75,483 | (including 38.610 . \ Guamanian |
Nauru | Australia | 4,914 |
|
New Caledonia | France | 88,844 |
|
New Guinea | Ausrralia | 1,522,156; 16,920 j | | indigenous non-indig^ |
New Hebrides | France-United Kingdom | 61,322 i 4,479 | | | indigenous i non-indig^ |
Niue Island | New Zealand | 5,044 |
|
Papua | Australia | 548,852 } indigenous 12,889 \ non-indige^’ | |
Tokelau Islands | New Zealand | 1,899 |
|
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands | United States of America | 84,777 |
|
Wallis and Futuna | France | 8,313 2,533 ] | 1 indigenous | other |
South Pacific Countries Participating in South | Pacific Conference | ||
Tonga | Kingdom | 67,495 |
|
Western Samoa | Independent State | 114,427 |
|
South Pacific Bulletin
earth’s surface, is the largest geographic area in which Communism does not have a foothold.
The role of the South Pacific Commission is consultative and advisory; it has no responsibility for the administration of territories. The Commission’s budget is exceedingly modest, not much more than a million dollars a year; but its role is important because of the urgent need for economic and social developments to move forward as political institutions evolve. The Commission is concerned primarily with technical work and research in health, education, social development, agriculture, and economic development.
The Commission has tried to gear its activities to key needs in the area.
It has sponsored many research projects and conducted many technical conferences to develop and spread knowledge useful in the region. It has also provided expert assistance to the island administrations, encouraged the exchange of information within the area and established an extensive working library on the problems of the region. Some of the Commission’s projects have included boatbuilding courses, research on solar stills, community education, training, development of handicrafts, encouragement of co-operatives, and research on the rhinoceros beetle that threatens the coconut crop of the South Pacific. Its selective approach is based on the idea that, through its intergovernmental character, the Commission can provide expertise not otherwise available to the 17 member territories.
The South Pacific Commission meets annually; South Pacific Conferences are also held about every two years. These meetings bring together delegates from the local inhabitants of the territories to discuss matters of common concern within the region. The eighth Conference met in Noumea in October.
The South Pacific Commission has been a constructive force in the Pacific Islands region. It behooves the United States to begin paying more attention to this vast region while there is still time to maintain the friendly climate in the Pacific that is vital to the security of the United States.
"Flags of Whose Convenience?”
(See John J. Clark, pp. 50-59, October 1968 Proceedings)
John I. Mingay, Vice President, Marine Department, Texaco, Inc.—It is most obvious that Dr. Clark employed the standard phraseology and mentioned most of the issues with which any article on the subject he chose
Would be concerned. This equipment, however, was not balanced by a clear objective approach to such a controversial subject, and the resultant effort was misleading, confusing, and what is more, inaccurate.
The basic objective of the article is hazy. The author apparently sought to build a case for the repatriation of flags-of-necessity vessels under effective U. S. control as the key to rebuilding our declining merchant marine. Dr. Clark reasons that since subsidization of the U. S. Merchant Marine has not reversed the downward trend it, in fact, has had an inflationary effect of operation costs. He concludes, therefore, that U. S. maritime policy must be reshaped to “move in the direction of a more economically competitive merchant marine”—as if this has not been the intent all along. The author also seems to set a condition for the success of the entire proposal that these vessels would have to bring their share of World trade with them. Further, he assumes that as a result of a dual approach to the labor problem, these owners can be induced to shift to the U. S. flag.
In building his case, the author ignores the differences between flags of convenience and flags of necessity under effective U. S. control. Inconsistent with his apparent objective, he unwittingly establishes the reasons why this nation has vessels flying flags of necessity under effective U. S. control. By his own hand he relates their existence to an “historical fact” of world trade—which is, after all, nothing more than the ability to compete—terms them “the ‘ideal’ world trader,” and concedes that as a backup to our national defense, effective U. S. control “may represent the best arrangement we can secure in the present circumstances. ...”
The reasons why the United States maintains vessels through private ownership registered under flags of necessity and pledged to our defense by the proven doctrine of effective U. S. control has everything to do with these "present circumstances.” Only by avoiding the poor economic climate, the labor strife, and high operating costs to which the U. S. Merchant Marine has been subjected, over the years, can the shipowner operate free of subsidies and pay his own way; provide the low-cost and dependable ocean-borne transportation required of a most vital link in our
nation’s international trade; and still have modern merchant tonnage available to our nation at any time of war or national emergency.
Dr. Clark never supports these reasons, but the reader is often led to believe throughout his discussion that his agreement with them is but a breath away. Instead, he surprises everyone by offering the completely irrational and impractical suggestion that these ships be shifted to the U. S. flag in order to rescue our merchant marine and make it more competitive.
As inducements to repatriation—which in itself is incorrect, since most of these vessels have never flown the American flag and therefore could not be brought back—he proposes that three ingredients of U. S. maritime policy be revised: restructuring U. S. tax laws, foreign construction and repair, and a dual approach to offsetting labor costs. To the pragmatic ship owner, the first is most unattractive, the second is a flexibility which he enjoys at present, and the last is, at best, wishful thinking.
In the most crucial area of the three— labor (as he himself admits)—he offers the sketchiest of explanations, and the only point he seems to make is that technology will solve the labor problem. In so doing, Dr. Clark exhibits a rather naive attitude toward technology itself and a lack of knowledge in maritime affairs. It is not an idle claim that constantly advancing technology is a means of reducing labor costs while producing better ships. He reckons that technology alone has an inducement value to the owner to shift flags. Dr. Clark should have known that flags-of-necessity vessels are among the most modern and advanced in the world and, since their owners have constantly sought better means to compete, they have led the way in technological advances. His comment and reasoning seem pitifully out of place.
What the author would have us believe by his entire effort is grossly misleading. Shifting these vessels to the U. S. flag will not aid the U. S. Merchant Marine in its struggle to become competitive. Having already priced itself out of the international market, the introduction of flags of necessity to augment its numbers will not make it competitive again— overnight or in the long run. If anything, repatriation, whether induced or forced, would compound its problems, thus generating even higher transportation costs. Rather than face this prospect, owners of flags-of- necessity vessels would be forced to sell their vessels outright or shift them to other foreign flags.
This article reflects so little understanding of the economic, political, and military values of flags-of-necessity that, when the facts are known, the reader is able to see that such vessels are indeed a “necessity” and under the present economic climate our nation’s only choice.
★ ★ ★
Ensign Sidney E. Emery, Jr., U. S. Navy, U. S. Naval Academy Trident Scholar who studied U. S.-owned, foreign-flag ships.— First and paramount is the concept behind the existence of the U. S. Effective Control Fleet (EUSC), and its inherent ties to flags of convenience. Effective control was brought about, not to bring ships back under the U. S. ensign nor even to buttress a rapidly diminishing American merchant fleet, but rather to provide a back-up supply of available tonnage in the event of a national emergency. Only a crisis of the level to invoke a presidential declaration of emergency would activate the full effects of effective control. Under normal or even stepped-up conditions, the government has no control whatsoever over ships under EUSC.
This brings up a second point, which Mr. Clark does cover, but it needs emphasizing. Flags of convenience are the result of the extraordinary competitive condition in the international shipping industry, a situation wherein only the most sophisticated and efficient carriers have survived. Ocean transport is truly the most international of all industries; its very nature fosters an irreverence for national boundaries and generates a competitiveness that permeates the most stringent national restrictions. In this light, the legal squabbles over whether the country of registry or the country of the owner has the ultimate control over a vessel is immaterial. Such arguments are never-ending. A Geneva Conference has failed to establish a solution, and such legal-oriented gatherings never will, for the roots of the problem lie not in the realm
of legal cognizance but rather in the complex economic structure of the industry.
That “PanLibHon states . . . enjoy pre- • eminent rights to control the movements of their vessels, individual contracts notwithstanding . . .” as the author states, is just not a reality in the circumstances during which the subject ships would be called for. Liberia, for instance, in Sec. 1.41.1 of her Maritime Regulations, specifically allows the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs to approve contracts that agree to another country’s requisition of her vessels. Furthermore, “The granting of such approval shall also constitute approval for making the vessel available under the terms of the said commitment. ...” ,
This clause was especially added in 1960 to allow U. S.-owned vessels to participate in the effective control plan and still reap the benefits of foreign registry. Hence, all Liberian registered ships in the effective control fleet have executed such agreements between the owners and the government of Liberia. This is of particular importance when one considers that over 74 per cent of the flag-of- convenience fleet is under the Liberian ensign (some 310 out of a total of 422 ships).
Mr. Clark cites uncertainties stemming from “. . . explosive nationalism, charged with emotional overtones . . . among the emerging nations.” This would certainly be ) the case were U. S. owners registering vessels under the flags of Somalia or Lebanon, both of which are trying to attract foreign capital , through permissive maritime laws. Yet, effective control (and therefore flags of conven- | ience) concerns itself only with three countries: Panama, Liberia, and Honduras, the ' latter of which is perhaps a misnomer, for Honduran maritime laws are as strict as the traditional maritime countries of Europe. j Panama, which has recently proved to be somewhat unstable, still is very likely to accede to U. S. requisition of her vessels in 1 the event of a serious international conflict. Liberia is the most stable country on the African continent. Her governmental pro- , cesses date back over one hundred years and are a virtual copy of American democratic procedures. Her merchant marine is closely tied to U. S. commercial shipping operations; indeed, the office of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs of Liberia is on Park Ave-
nue, in the heart of the New York commercial World. Liberian administration has proved itself to be extremely responsive and reliable in all areas and particularly in maritime affairs, and has continually demonstrated a willingness to co-operate fully with U. S. maritime policy. Like Panama, Liberia Would gravitate toward the United States in an emergency of such scope as to cause wide- scale requisitioning of merchant vessels.
The author’s solution for the problem of foreign flag ownership (if indeed it really is a Problem) leaves many loopholes and could certainly be revised. Mr. Clark suggests that the tax advantage enjoyed by American subsidiaries overseas should be discontinued, thereby eliminating one of the major advantages of flags of convenience. What he fails to point out is that such action might very well be the decisive factor forcing major independents not operating under PanLibHon flags to sell out completely to foreign operators—thereby putting such vessels out of reach for good. Mr. Clark offers no really feasible solution to the labor problems, the single most difficult hurdle in the plight of the U. S. Merchant Marine. About 90 to 95 per cent of operating cost differential between U. S. and foreign flags is wages. While higher wages definitely are coupled with better technology, they should be directly related to manpower efficiency—something nonexistent on American docks and seagoing vessels. Until management amalgamates sufficiently to control the distribution of manning levels on its ships this problem will remain unsolved.
Because of the nature of the shipping industry, neither tax reductions nor subsidy adjustments will lure foreign flag operators back to the Stars and Stripes. In the long run, only more realistic labor demands and greater efficiency in shipbuilding will solve our critical maritime dilemma. Until Americans realize this, the stern hailing ports Monrovia and Panama City will continue to be a familiar sight throughout the world.
Just an Oversight
Thomas Gates, former Secretary of the Navy told this one on himself. After considerable combat as a naval pilot during World War II, he was granted leave in Honolulu. The city was crammed with servicemen, transportation hard to scrounge, and unattended vehicles often disappeared. He and his buddies rounded up a jeep and commenced doing the town. Arriving at a Waikiki hotel for dinner, they parked their precious jeep in the lobby. It seemed, he said, a remarkably fine idea at the time.
Following dinner, the celebrants returned to the jeep only to be greeted by a young Marine MP who saluted and asked for an explanation. The future SecNav launched into a lively account of combat, its strains, his remarkable exploits and those of his companions. The Marine remained attentive throughout the lengthy, but vivid tale. The saga at an end, the intrepid bird-men awaited the understanding smile, expecting a comradely warning.
After a short silence, the Marine spoke. “Lieutenant,” he said, “I don’t believe you returned my salute.”
---------------------------------------------- Contributed by Commander Robert E. Bublitz, U. S. Navy
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The Captain’s "Sargent”
Some years ago, HMS Glasgow was at anchor in Grand Harbour, Malta, awaiting a visit by the late Sir Malcolm Sargent, a personal friend of the captain. For some reason, instructions had not reached down the chain of command to the Midshipman of the Watch. Finally, the Captain came on the quarterdeck and inquired if there was any sign of Malcolm Sargent.
“I don’t know, Sir,” replied the Midshipman, “but a Sergeant Malcolm came in plain clothes and I have directed him to the Royal Marines Mess.”
------------------------ Contributed by Lieutenant Commander Mukund B. Kunte, Indian Navy