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by Rear Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle, U. S. Navy
Too often in the past, the naval officer had two alternatives—support or silence-to a ctothan-detemmed
military program, decision, or course of ac ion wi . >., . t „ r-limnfa Inualtu can soon become
In an era of the most rapid, pervasive, and voluminous mass communications in history, the U. S. Navy seems to have lost its voice. In a time of national need, the U. S. Navy truly may have become the silent service.
It is only in the wardrooms and messes across the Navy that worried voices speak of the improper employment of seapower, or of the failure to use seapower at all; of growing Soviet seapower and diminishing U. S. Navy strength; of falling behind in oceanography, maritime commerce, fishing, industrial shipbuilding, tactical air, space, and even nuclear power. Angry voices also charge that tactical combat decisions are made by unqualified and inexperienced civilians, that choices of weapons and weapon systems, and strategies of using them, are no longer the domain of trained naval officers. But these blue and gold voices are largely preaching to the choir—a massive example of washing each other’s laundry. The public, the press, and the Congress, to a large extent, do not hear these voices and do not join the dialogue.
In 1949, the U. S. Navy could roam the seven seas and truly control them. Its naval leaders, who had just masterminded a great World War II victory, were respected, and their opinions sought and heeded. It was the only navy with atomic weapons, nuclear power, long-range missiles, advanced electronics, jet aircraft, large aircraft carriers, a real amphibious capability, and a real stay- at-sea capability.
Recognizing the long-range goals of the Soviets and the Chinese, the chains of NATO, SEATO, CENTO and the Rio Pact were forged on the anvil of seapower. Strong armies and air forces were placed in Asia dependent on the existence of a strong U. S. Navy. Seapower would prevent a Chinese takeover in Taiwan and the Pescadores (1954) and permit the evacuation of the Tachens and the rescue of Quemoy and Matsu (1954) and the evacuation of a quarter of a million people from Haiphong (1954). Seapower would inhibit a leftist movement in Jordan (1957) and would snuff out a Communist threat in Nicaragua and Guatemala (1960). Seapower would quarantine Cuba (1962) and repulse Communist attacks against the Royal Laotian
government (1962). Yet, seapower could have, should have, done more in furtherance of the Free World’s cause. And because it did not, the worlds of 1949 and 1969 are far more different than they might have been.
In 1969, we see a Soviet Navy in explosive growth and a U. S. Navy in decline. The Soviet submarine threat is increasing anc* our antisubmarine strength is decreasing- New ships of new types with new equipmen1 enter the Soviet Navy and our rate of naval construction has leveled off. Their merchant fleet grows and ours declines. Their fishing fleet expands and flourishes and ours sinks deeper in the doldrums. Their navy has beguC to operate in the vast Indian Ocean and our Navy still sails in the Indian Ocean with a mini-fleet. The Soviets maneuver and bargain for overseas bases in Cuba, Algeria, Egypt’ and India, and our Navy is under pressure to vacate Spain, Japan, Okinawa, and the Azores.
The Soviet Navy has more than 9,000 people engaged in oceanography; the U. S- Navy has 3,700. The Soviet Union has 1,500 professional oceanographers; we have 1,000- The Soviets have a dozen schools with ocean' ographic courses leading to an undergraduate degree; we have only one. In oceanographic ships, the Soviets have 2,300; we have 150.
In one year (1966), for example, the Soviets added more modern merchant ships to their fleet than the United States had built the previous five years. Their rate of ne\v merchant ship acquisition exceeds ours by eight-to-one. They add a million new tons per year to their merchant fleet while the United States is dependent primarily on World War II hulks.
The threats and dangers that face the United States in 1969 certainly cannot be considered less than were the threats and dangers of 1949. By any measure they are much greater today, though more subtle, j Czechoslovakia has shown afresh that Soviet determination to rule the world is undiminished, that their long-range goals are unchanged, and that the headliners in the Kremlin are back in the saddle. The Red Chinese threat is greater, not less. The danger of conflict in the Middle East is greater, not less.
In 1969, in contrast to 1949, both the Free
Until 1966, it was also a requirement that any Pentagon officer who met the media, whether at his or their initiative, or even accidentally, had to make a full report of the exchange.
Internally, military discussion and participation by those in uniform grew more limited and sterile with each budget cycle, as the civilian managers created the “Presidential Memo” vehicle and, increasingly, used it to circumvent true military participation. Civilian managers could make decisions, initiate programs, and choose courses of action within a forum where the ground rules and machinery seemed to invite and permit uniformed military discussion and participation. But, in reality, true discussion and real participation were not possible. This miasma of conformity was subtly transmitted throughout the services and helped create the climate of silence.
In this atmosphere, wherein suspicion and impugned motives could flourish, where telephone bugs and DoD spies were half seriously joked about, the word was not long in getting out over the cocktail and service gossip networks that visits to one’s congressman, the public expression of contrary statements or opinions, or bucking the system was not the pathway to fame and fortune. One prominent committee counsel was heard to remark: “A few years ago, when a piece of military legislation was being considered, there was a line of uniforms outside my door that went all the way down the corridor. Now, no one comes.” An equally prominent and experienced legislator, at an awkward moment of a hearing intended to extract information from military witnesses, finally apologized for being so ill-informed that he could not ask the right questions, saying he realized the witnesses before him could not volunteer any opinions or information. Such is the wall built up between the executive and the legislative branches insofar as the military are concerned.
In such a climate, it will not take many years to produce a military organization wherein advancement and promotion will go to the obedient, the docile, the silent. Unfortunately, such men rarely make the vigorous, dynamic, forceful men of action who win battles and campaigns.
0rld’s and the United States’ unity and ^rength to oppose these Communist threats . ave clearly diminished. Britain has declined n Power and influence: France has aban- °ned NATO in all but name; the nations Jhich once anchored the eastern end of , 10 Greece and Turkey—have been on e verge of war for years. The United States as itself withdrawn forces from Europe and as allowed its Sixth Fleet to be weakened in length.
. On the other hand, the Soviets have moved |nto the Middle East in strength over the past ^ years. Their flourishing navy has become Permanent force in the Mediterranean, eir influence has grown tremendously in >ddle East affairs. Most observers believe e dangers of conflict in the Middle East are 1Tlore certain in the near future than at any lrrie in history.
And as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, ^en an absolute U. S. military victory over ,0rth Vietnam would not eliminate the . reat which Red China and Russia will pose lri South and Southeast Asia for many years— °r decades—to come. Anything less than V|ctory in Vietnam will undoubtedly en- c°Urage further infiltration, and new proxy ^ars of liberation in every country from Si, Cria to Sumatra, including the nations which order the Indian Ocean.
. Over the past several years, growing civilly11 domination within the Department of efense has slowly throttled the service voice 0 a whisper. President Dwight D. Eisen- ower’s farewell speech in 1961, warning of ne danger of an overpowerful military in- Ostrial complex, was misinterpreted and Misapplied. By gaining control of the pro- Srarns, the decisions, and the dollars, the Clyilian general staff within the Pentagon was ole to control Defense machinery across the 0ard. A subtle but unrecognized part of this c°ntrol was exerted over the uniformed miliary in the area of expression, both externally and internally. Externally, all public speeches an<! public statements by military leaders ad to be cleared for policy and security. All statements before committees of Congress ad to be screened for security. In question- atld-answer periods, military witnesses were j^fluired to give the departmental position rst, and then, if pressed, a personal response.
40 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August I960
What has happened over recent years is that the middle ground, between the extreme of loyalty on one hand and obeisance on the other, has been narrowed to a very small ledge. In the past, there existed a middle ground where the loyal man could stand and yet have freedom of expression and conscience. Regrettably, this middle ground is fast disappearing and there is in prospect too little distance between the loyal man and the silent and servile stooge.
During the Navy’s long history, this middle ground has always existed. It has long been a hallowed Navy tradition that whenever a policy, decision or problem was under determination and discussion the division officer, the department head, and the staff officer could express his opinions, offer his estimate of the situation, and give his recommendations to his skipper or seniors. True, he was expected to do so rationally, responsibly, and constructively. And, within the bounds of reason, he could even disagree and criticize—up to the point where the decision was made or the policy announced. After that, the naval officer was expected to be loyal and obedient and, indeed, to support the decision as enthusiastically as if it were his own.
It is this middle ground, this cockpit of loyal dissent, which is disappearing in decision-making forums and councils of government insofar as the military man is concerned. The man in uniform is too frequently being constrained to give loyalty to a civilian- determined military program, decision, or course of action with which he does not agree, for which his opinion is either not sought or, if requested, can find its way into a circular file. In such a dilemma, the military man will have to either quit or be silent. In such an atmosphere, also, one bold enough to dissent will do so at the risk of his career, and gaining the reputation of a maverick, a boat-rocker and a saddle-burr—one who can expect either orders to Lower Slobovia or to be placed in Coventry. In such a climate, loyalty can soon become subservience, obedience can become servility, and military leadership can be degraded to stoogism.
Our country is gravely threatened and endangered—very subtly, to be sure, but threatened and endangered nonetheless. Our
c
Graduated from the V- ' Naval Academy with Class of 1941, Rear Admi(j) Cagle first served in ^ stroyers. Subsequently commanded fighter squadro^ in the USS Yorktown (CV-1 ■ and the USS Franklin Roosevelt (CVB-42). He b,er served on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Nav‘! Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean and ;li Administrative Aide to the Secretary of the Nay)1' attended the National War College, was Executi'" Officer of the USS Intrepid (CVA-11), and served 35 Deputy Director, Institute of Naval Studies. He thc'n commanded, successively the USS Suribachi (AE-21 and the Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42). He ",aS Director of the Aviation Programs Division in d’f Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (A*r; until he assumed his present duties as Command^ Carrier Division One. This article, written prior 10 last year’s national elections, was submitted as ^ entry in the 1969 Prize Essay Contest.
country needs a more modern Navy than *l has, if it is to provide the country with re3' seapower. Our country has not always used its seapower properly over the last two dec" ades. Seapower was not fully exploited Korea; it was not fully exploited in Cuba; has certainly not been fully used in Vietnam- Our country needs to be strong at sea and firs1 at sea—with a revitalized merchant marine supported by dynamic shipbuilding, oceanog' raphy, fishing, and research programs. Let us say all these things—constructively, responsively, and factually.
How?
First of all, a Middle Ground should be recreated within the Pentagon. The civilim1 general staff, which has come to dominate military decisions and policies since the paS' sage of the National Security Act of 1947, should be dismantled. There should be 3 return to the true intent of that Act, thereby to permit service secretaries and military' chiefs of service to have free and self-initiated access to members of Congress, its committees, and to the President. There should be a return to civilian control of the military wherein military voices are heard and there is freedom of expression and real participation.
Second, every commanding officer of every ship, squadron, and station should not only
e encouraged, but also required to make speeches—frequently—to every garden club, Uvanis, PTA, and fraternity house that will ,ear him on the subject of U. S. seapower.
is not nearly enough to leave this task to an overburdened CNO. Every Naval District s °uld have a revitalized speech and visitor Program supervised by a Master Chlnfo plan, very familygram from every ship should in- ll(le the seapower message to the parents and wives of our sailormen. The Navy League, le Sea Scouts, the wives’ organizations, V(-terans’ organizations, naval reserve and rchred officers should all be amalgamated lrjto a force for educating the American peo- P e about our country’s dependence on seapower not just one time, one week or one but a constant, continuing campaign, *ke the TV programs which sell beer, cigarettes, and soap.
Third, almost every career naval officer •iows at least one newspaperman, broadcaster, editorial writer or public relations man. These opinion makers should be cultivated. Our Navy’s predicament and our country’s dependence upon seapower should be explained to them and, through them, to all responsible Americans.
Fourth, every senior naval officer should know his own Congressman and Senator. Even though we may wear a uniform, and even though we remain professionally aloof from partisan politics, we retain our individual citizenship.
Fifth, when appearing before Congressional committees, naval officers should state their views fully and frankly to the elected representatives of the American people.
The time is overdue to stand up to be counted and to be heard. The time is overdue for the Navy to realize that it already has the right, the means, and the responsibility to recover its voice and to keep the United States in first place at sea.
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The Stormy Winds Do Blow
During the closing days of World War II, I had advanced to the position of admiral’s writer on board a submarine tender which had been designated the Flagship of Com- Seron Ten, a squadron handling logistics for the Seventh Fleet.
On a stormy night, immediately following Japan’s capitulation, our ship entered a small Japanese port where we had planned to settle down until the next day. With the Admiral s three-star flag flying aloft, we had just about dropped anchor when a blinker message came through from a lieutenant (j.g.) on board a lonely LST nearby. It read as follows: Dear Admiral: Welcome to the area. When the strong winds subside. I will
come aboard and visit with you.”
The Admiral, somewhat taken aback by such familiarity from a junior officer, immediately replied: Dear Lieutenant: Thank you for your greetings. An old classmate of mine should be able to visit with me anytime—regardless of the weather!”
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contributed by Frank G. Urbank
★ ★ ★
Crack Cockroach Control
For three consecutive Fridays, I had noticed an increase in the cockroach population in the ship as I made my inspection tour, so I called the Exec, the Supply Officer, and the ship s corpsman to my cabin and informed them that the roaches had to go.
The next Friday, not a roach was visible. After inspection, I called the three miracle workers together to congratulate them and find out how they had done it.
American ingenuity, Captain,” the Exec said cheerily, “We mixed plaster of Paris and flour and spread it around. We have been sweeping up petrified roaches all week.” Contributed by Lieutenant Commander Malcolm L. Huffman, U. S. Navy
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)