This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
cal,
ha'
Ve far-reaching effects. Specifically, the
Within France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the political eile> again, is unsettled; the transition to "evv regimes, as always, creates confusion ^‘thin the nation and compels caution with j^gard to its foreign policy. The departure of Varies de Gaulle has been like that of a ""ghty battleship; long after the majestic pas- *aSej the wake disturbs the water. The politi- economic, and military repercussions will
'Ullre role and develpoment of the force de raPpe will have a significant influence on the Solution of NATO strategy.
proper strategy for NATO has been the J'0al of its member nations in countless de- ates over the past 15 years. But, a consensus
{he entire alliance, from either a military °r Political viewpoint, has yet to be obtained.
Undoubtedly, the protracted emphasis on nuclear weapons—and the repeated expres- Sl°ns of Western resolve to use them immediately in the event of attack—has con- 'lr>ced key European leaders that deterrence, father than the conduct of the war, was the Principal, if not the only purpose of military 0rces. A build-up of the conventional forces, S° goes the argument, would signify a Weakened Western will to resort to nuclear art»s immediately and would encourage 0viet adventuring.
During the protracted debate on strategy, ^ATo’s military planners have sought to improve the defenses. For example, the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force was Organized in 1960 to react swiftly to threatened limited attack, primarily from the NATO ^anks. The flanks of NATO, from the outset, Have not been as well defended as the central region. Fundamentally, the flanks are defended by national forces—to the north, Norway (lacking both significant foreign Hases and nuclear arms) and Denmark; f° the south, Turkey and Greece. The secur- lty of Europe rests primarily on the defense of
NATO’s central front, which represents a portion of the defense system reaching from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern frontiers of Turkey. Both NATO flanks are unstable and vulnerable to direct aggression as well as indirect Soviet manipulation. The forces in all cases are weak; the Greek- Turkish southern flank is further hampered by those countries continuing in enmity toward each other.
There is no question that NATO’s defense is unalterably linked to nuclear arms. Nevertheless, a continued dependence on U. S. strategic dominance appears inevitable. If Europe’s role is out of balance with the requirements for an adequate defense, a more meaningful contribution of mutual effort is called for to elicit larger and more systematic participation by Europeans.
Many of the European partners want revisions from the existing arrangements but fail to agree among themselves as to what the objectives should be. Differences emerge partially from a matter of geographic outlook by the strategists. Defense of Europe has been characterized as a strategic matter for Europeans and a tactical matter for U. S. defense planners.
Europeans do not wish to trade space for time; they seek to prevent aggression of any kind from emerging. Therefore, should aggression occur, the idea of winning a fight becomes a matter of secondary concern for the European. The United States desires to adopt measures that reduce the threat of total destruction to its homeland were interpreted as antithetical to European interests. The need for change in the defense posture has long been evident.
Officially, within NATO policy circles, little has changed throughout the 1960s despite U. S. efforts to effect a change of forces and strategy. Attempts to accomplish this end gained only the skepticism of NATO allies for the U. S. commitment to cover the spectrum
disguised by announcements of apparel harmony. Despite an official acceptance b> NATO of the strategy that has prevailed & facto over the past several years, this move lS merely a legalism that cloaks the genui>lC differences that still exist. Questions of defefiS£ of NATO have by no means been resolved- The time has come for a searching examine tion of the future means for an effectiv'e security posture to assure defense of the A1' lantic Community.
of conflict through the use of nuclear weapons. The crucial problem for NATO lies in its inability to reshape its policies to take full account of the strategic rethinking imposed by the breaking of the nuclear monopoly. Under President John F. Kennedy, the United States abandoned the doctrine of massive retaliation—a doctrine which became untenable when retaliation against U. S. cities became a near-certain result of any nuclear exchange. It will be recalled that President Kennedy, during the Cuban crisis of 1962, clearly indicated that the United States was prepared to run nuclear risks where transcending U. S. interests were at stake. In brief, the nuclear management problem of NATO consists of the doubts shared by many Europeans as to the willingness of the United States to take similar risks for a vital European interest and the inconsistency of its doctrine.
Within NATO, co-operation can be effective only if it proceeds from a continual adjustment of military strategy to meet the needs of security and cohesion. Throughout the 1950s, the problems of strategy exceeded those stemming from the contradictions and ambiguities inherent in political needs. Indeed, the search for formulation of a coherent military strategy threatened to destroy the incentives for effective collaboration within NATO itself.
Entering its second decade, NATO was undergoing a crisis of unconfidence because it had failed to recognize and resolve several radically altered conditions. Robert E. Osgood has concluded that official quarters did not choose to recognize serious military- strategic deficiencies. In his study, Nato: The Entangling Alliance, Dr. Osgood points out that “military deficiencies and strategic anomalies” were the by-product of an accumulation of foreign and domestic pressures, “undisciplined by coherent strategic doctrine.”
U. S. efforts to revamp NATO were carried out as part of a general revision of domestic strategic aims and were not gratefully received by our NATO partners. To a degree, strategy within NATO as an entity was paralyzed through obstructionist efforts of the major allies. In the past, American dominance has prevailed through its military role as protector, but the- situation in Europe ba changed—within the political and econoflllC spheres—and dissatisfaction within NATO cal’ be expected to increase. Only after Francf withdrew from a military role in NATO | the United States able to convince the a fiance to accept officially its long-propo5C strategy of flexible response. In Decefflb1’1 1967, almost five years after the initial pr° posals for something less than massive >c taliation, the NATO Ministers adopted dje U. S. military plan. At the same time, New York Times reported that the U- ’ representatives conceded that “it has befl| exceedingly difficult to sell the allies on b’1 idea that nuclear superiority does not assutc military victory.”
Despite the apparent agreement that ha’ recently emerged in regard to NATO strategy the need for a conventional buildup to 11,1 plement flexible response is a nccessaj' prerequisite. Conventional elements are st> below the levels called for by NATO require ments. Further, the reductions of British Canadian, and American forces within Central European region and the propoSe reductions by the West German governmel11 are not expected to bolster the case for a force calculated to meet the requirements of a flexible response posture.
Continued division within NATO cannot be
Military options cannot be considered in 3 vacuum, however. As E. M. Earle wrote- “Diplomacy and strategy, political coni' mitments and military power are insepa" rable . . . strategy, therefore, is not merely 3 concept of wartime, but it is an inherent element of statecraft at all times.” There are specific realities—military and political—no'v clearly pertinent that should guide the future policy decisions in regard to NATO’s defense-
into the 1970s; the Treaty has no sPecific duration, but under Article 13 a "ai'on after that year may cease to be a Party after appropriate notice. None has done s° and France has affirmed its strong attache
* Within Europe there is an increased desire more equitable co-operation, an expres-
F’
^*C niiiilarY problems: espite protracted discussion and conation that have been carried on within *0) the delicate question of nuclear con- continues to plague the Alliance. Both -ain and France have a limited inventory nf uCSe arms> but approximately 96 per cent bis arsenal is under sole U. S. control, in f^CCOrb on strategy has yet to be reached act. If NATO, sans France in a military e> has agreed to a doctrine of flexible re* nse> the hard realities of undermanned eral purpose ground forces throughout the ltral front indicate a lack of firm commit- to achieve this defense posture, j. Many of the European allies, give only P-service support to NATO’s defense posture, genuinely believe that the military feat is low. in any case, the real deterrent as been the nuclear weapons of the United ates and not the Alliance. Only France has ^ °sen to act on the basis of this rationale, to e sure, but the sentiment is not limited to aat nation.
considered alone, these points would en- 5 Oder little cause for deep concern—many, not all, have long been with NATO—but . nen the contemporary political environment examined, it becomes evident that adjust- jnents are mandatory. Politically, the Al- nee must recognize some significant developments:
* There is little doubt that NATO will con-
unue
ament to NATO.
for
s|°n of the widespread Western European de- *lre for continued participation in NATO affairs.
• The new role for NATO will center on Political aspects. The mood in the Alliance, as TJ- S. Ambassador Harlan Cleveland noted, ls not to brood about 1969, but to plan in earnest for the 1970s.”
Former NATO Secretary-General Dirk . hkker has observed that military authorities, *n an effort to cover themselves from every Possible risk, often impose demands and requirements that are blatantly unrealistic. Assuredly, some compromise must be evoked from military-imposed strategy.
Controversies centering on questions to determine whether or not the present force- level goals are realistic appear to be beside the point. On the whole, conventional force levels have never been met and give no promise of being met in the future. Under these conditions, forces to implement flexible response strategy exist only on paper. Therefore, perhaps an appropriate compromise incorporating a plausible defense posture might employ alternative combinations of fixed-forward forces, mobile forces, standing and reserve forces and an appropriate mix of weaponry. British Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard has advocated an emphasis on anti-tank weapons for defense rather than tanks for offensive penetration. Static defense that reduces the requirements for European contribution would also reduce the requirements for manpower within the mobile combat formation.
Two decisions that can be expected to contribute to this development are, first, for the United States to reduce its ground force contingent in Europe to two divisions. Long advocated by Senator Mike Mansfield (Dem.- Montana) and many others in Congress, as well as the late Dwight D. Eisenhower and other knowledgeable military men, this move would benefit the United States militarily and economically without eroding its Alliance commitment. Secondly, a European nuclear force could be created, using the present Franco-British stockpiles as a strategic nucleus. Limited numbers of tactical battlefield weapons would be retained by the remaining U. S. forces. Thus, some political control of nuclear weapons would accrue to the Europeans, and theirs would be the task of meeting conventional requirements for ground defense. Moreover, this development would allow the arming of a European SACE with control of the major continental nuclear response. U. S. control would still prevail over tactical units until these elements began to make their way into local forces from European national sources. With European political control over their use and implementation, a major source of politico-military frustration would disappear, or at the least be greatly diminished as a source of NATO friction.
Since 1963, he has................... . ...........................
Corporation and has served as a part-time instruc
an'
A 1967 report, submitted by an international panel of nuclear experts to the United Nations, asserts that only 100 tactical nuclear weapons with an average yield of 30 kilotons could devastate about one-tenth of the assumed European battlefield area (a front of 155 miles with a 31-mile depth); 400 weapons of this type would inflict physical damage corresponding to something like six times that caused by all the bombing of World War II. Thus, it is clear that only limited numbers of tactical weapons are required to implement the needed “pause” as a vital ingredient of the flexible response doctrine. Clearly, present inventories of tactical nuclear weapons exceed by far the minimum requirements for the task they are planned to effect and the requisite number can be secured by intra-European sources, if need be.
With the major portion of U. S. general purpose ground forces withdrawn from Europe, the bulk of its inventory of nuclear weapons could be likewise reduced. U. S. Air Force units, remaining at about present levels, would account for a quantity, but the majority could be safely withdrawn. Emphasis on the continued U. S. deterrent force, beyond the continental United States, would center on sea-based missiles.
Political and military developments, combined with recent technological advances in weaponry, clearly suggest that a new era in the defense of the Atlantic community is at hand: the seapower phase. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACL) would become analogous to SACE, in that forces would be assigned in peacetime rather than being earmarked for wartime use. Plainly, seapower has played a prominent role in past NATO strategy as indicated above. Moreover, as Admiral Sir John Hamilton, NATO CinC, Allied Forces Mediterranean, stated in May 1967, the seaborne forces have come “very far along the road towards complete integration of our navies. Never before in the history of the world has such close integration between allies been attempted, let alone achieved.”
Additionally, present complex and sophisticated weapons systems allow the naval units at sea and in the air to shoulder a wide variety of tasks needed to provide the mo-
Martin Company from to 1958 and the Vitro tories from 1958 to I960. ' was on the staff of the InstituI for Defense Analyses, ons Systems Evaluate Group, Office of the Secret^- of Defense, from 1960 to 1^ ^
been with Research Analysl ;t0f in the University of Maryland’s Government Politics Department.
bile and effective nuclear deterrent requir^ for continued protection of NATO areas' The full range of weapons systems that e3'1 be employed would be well-complementc by existing Polaris-type submarines, as "'e as the incoming next-generation Poseid01’ augmented by the increased firepower th3* can be derived from Multiple Independellt Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) capable of >n' creasing the missile payload of hydroge)1 warheads tenfold. Aircraft carriers and othd large surface ships plus the requisite numberS of destroyers and antisubmarine warfa^ (ASW) units could provide an effective n«j cleus for a number of NATO forces.
The advantages of a renewed emphasis 0<] seabased missile power are apparent front 3 military basis: immunity from sudden sun prise attack; enhanced mobility; relative h1" vulnerability from sabotage; and ability t0 respond directly into the enemy’s heartland; as well as to provide interdiction in the even1 of limited probing attacks. In addition, however, the political role to be derived is sin1' ilarly significant. First, an emphasis on effective defense of the long-vulnerable flank areas of NATO would be clearly manifest i*1 these newly-structured forces. More importantly, perhaps, the Alliance would have the ability to cope with political unrest that threatens these areas. Prevention of potential political crisis, say, a name-calling dispute between Bulgaria and Turkey, would contribute in large measure to assuring stability of the NATO areas without the need to move large contingents of forces overland or to deploy the ACE mobile forces on a peacekeeping mission that could exacerbate local tensions-
In
•Sit)' ct 0< till
955
■jty
tui«
o i> taO' 963- lysis ctOf
ed
as-
ca"
to;
re
kn1
h;»
eiil
in'
gen
her
jef5
are
m1'
:ll I securi
Povvi
POty,
rity is inseparable. The seas that unite it, Atlantic Ocean in particular, may prove the decisive means to disperse the ef- e striking force of Alliance military
on n 3 lurin' to iidi
en1
>vV-
111'
ef-
nk
in
nr-
he
iat
ial
ite
it i
ty
v-e
e-
ig
Ration, however, NATO inaugurated a new 0rdinate naval command as a result of
(Cls>ons effected during the Ministerial meet. §s in June 1968. The Maritime Air Forces
k,
Will
SUtf;
CQ Edition, the concept of seaborne NATO
,j Ces would allow the Alliance a mobility to
U a with troubles in areas, like the Middle ^a$t f
0 ’ .r example, that are beyond its present
Coerati°nal capability. These forces would ^AT^^Ute t0 t[1]le broadened scope that e ° envisi°ns for itself without the added umbrance of additional ground forces.
^ ae one contingency rarely mentioned in ^ Continuing debate over NATO defense is p .Possibility of war at sea with the Soviet ni°n, not involving any land batdes. The [j etltial may be remote, but the Soviet niOn is engaged in a program of strengthened an<^ building its naval forces with a recent the 3S*S *n t^le ^editerranean area. While pi6 United States possesses overwhelming p . ;n seapower superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet ni°nj the interrelation of U. S. and NATO
the
b,
fectiVl
er and to be the vehicle to project this
er into an adversary’s heartland.
■ nder the Johnson Administration, prob-
ls eIsewhere in the world, particularly in
pe Far East, occupied the attention of a
. resident bent on obtaining solutions of an
j? diediate nature. Troop reductions from
^ope were effected under the euphemism
, . r°tation,” and withdrawal of U. S. air
j ds did little to contribute to a positive
hef 6 t^le U- S. commitment to European
ense- In the waning days of that Admin-
subl
he.
'-'diterranean (MarAirMed), representing °ns on the Defense Planning Committee, carry out co-operative surveillance of ace ships and submarines in the Mediter- y nean. This operation, initiated in late . 0vember, constitutes a significant step for- jy, but much yet remains to be done, t he environment confronting the Adminsration of President Richard M. Nixon pre- ll:s a host of issues to be met. There are well-
known areas of political and military discord that prevail within Europe: the dismay
evidenced in regard to the strategy of flexible response in many circles; the lack of perception with regard to a genuine threat; the lack of response to fulfill force levels; the problem of nuclear control within the Federal Republic of Germany; the diplomatic strains created by financial instability; and the recurrent tension generated by efforts to increase membership in the Common Market, to cite only a few.
In the large view, perhaps the future of Europe’s strategic role will not be determined by French nuclear aspirations—technology, diplomatic pressures, and developments elsewhere will shape this area—but decisions dealing with the nuclear option will be a vital element in the moulding' of European defense. The role of the United States, under the impetus of a doctrine of non-proliferation, has been aimed at convincing NATO Europe of its firm commitment. Past U. S. policy has not been entirely successful in this respect. The challenge is a formidable one.
President Nixon has turned his attention to the interests of Europe. The early visits to Western Europe and to the NATO Council in Brussels were a clear indication of intent to deal with problems of the Atlantic Alliance on a broad basis. Later, in June 1969, Mr. Nixon made a forthright assertion that America would not turn its back on the world, but would meet its responsibilities both at home and abroad: “We shall meet both or we shall meet neither.”
This, of course, is language our European friends can understand. They, too, have responsibilities within and without their own borders and it can be presumed that their resolve to protect their own vital interests is no less strong than our own.
They know, too, that the North Atlantic Treaty was not conceived 20 years ago as a fraternal organization. It was formulated during a time of great danger and, although much of the fear has now abated, the potential danger remains.