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aillpus Unrest”
{See D p
' aldwell, pp. 58-62, June 1969 Proceedings)
F •
O* Robert I. Aaron, U. S. Naval Re- newe~~Midshipman Caldwell denounces the Viet tned*a for their distorted coverage of newa,n and campus unrest. He criticizes ;ltlrjSltl<'n for their search for the sensational $pQaj~*andonment of the moderate and re- notlb e; The distortion is present, but it is to r.a '^'liberate, destructive plot by the media her °n^Use {he truth. The distortion is an in- 1 part of the incomplete nature of news.
If
Perf,
reP°rters, editors, and announcers were
ancjC(T lhe picture of the world that television he newspapers produce would still be a ^lustration. There is only so much time Porte^ Inucb spacej everything can’t be re-
ij,r)ljiective reporting of the real world suffers av . ase °f these limitations, but they are un- alr|ahle. There are finite limits on the Ptibl^t news that can be transmitted to the lc- Within these limits, decisions must be
Poi
'Or
J?ade i : ei
be.graPlhc. It overwhelms the moderate, not
t'lj”^ 0n the order and presentation of news. theernPhasis is often on the sensational and
trait 6 rePorters trY to paint a twisted portlet; campus life, but because of the present ^ ttion of news.
,evvs Is what is recent and what is change. erate student actions do not fit this con- hiu unfortunately, are not reported. So
that w^at’s happening concerns change is, aWst all the time and space available 1h e<^. with the recent and the dysfunctional. jj.re >s not room for the slow and moderate, broader story is to be told, the media defj . .e public must change their narrow ternit'°n of news. The media need more in- rrleci^etation and in-depth reporting. And the cha ^ need a greater understanding of the ge that makes so much of the news. If the
tfjJ'T'retation is to be meaningful, however, Ij^P’hblic will have to be willing to read and The mass audience has shown no great
e m that direction—yet.
There is, in Midshipman Caldwell’s article, the hint of a suggestion that a great deal of the campus confrontation is the child of the media and the impression that it will all go away if we don’t talk about it too much. This is not true. The violent events that take place on campus are real. They should be intelligently reported with respect to their importance. But they should be reported.
There was no civil rights problem in this country before 1954, according to the nation’s newspapers. Of course the problem existed, and the United States was caught unready to face it. The media only make the news, not the real world.
The media have an obligation to make the news as close to the real world as possible—■ even if it is unpleasant and not the way we want it. The news will always be incomplete, since man can only make an imperfect image of the real world. The flaws in reporting apparent campus upheaval reflect this imperfection, not planned misinterpretation.
Midshipman Caldwell’s analysis of protest is an otherwise accurate profile, based on my experience as a midshipman at Northwestern University.
★ ★ ★
Rear Admiral James K. Davis, U. S. Navy (Retired)—According to Midshipman Caldwell, “. . . who would dare ridicule the idealist who is willing to go to prison or otherwise sacrifice himself for his beliefs?” He adds: “Is this not one of the most admirable qualities of my generation?” Here is a viewpoint which, in the far reaches, could bear heavily upon the future “admirable qualities” of our Navy.
Precision-timed, dynamic responses by subordinates, generally large in numbers, always complex in functional range, not necessarily performed within a comfortable locale, stand out as the essence of battle efficiency in a man-of-war. Seemingly such a tempo and certitude in performance are even more essential to the Navy than to the other armed services.
How would the Navy fare with a scattering of self-regarded martyrs who have come to regard abnegations in terms of prison walls as old hat and who would seek to further energize their Utopian compulsions in even more vital sectors in the armed services.
I first suggest that a reputed ideal, ipso facto, merits no aura of sanctity. Ridicule understandably may not be a fitting attitude in the presence of what longshoreman- philosopher Eric Hoffer terms a “true believer.” But a test of rationalism directed at the pursuit of an ideal surely is the over-all, determinative criterion for action.
Sacrificial, but illegal conduct in support of an ideal, well may square with an ultimate concept of rationality when directed against implacable, authoritarian tyranny. Under democratic rule, where change is responsive to the popular will, such a violation would, however, be without justification.
Clearly, in a democratic society, it would seem that any imagined advantage to the community extractable from a wilful act of statutory disobedience would fall far short of the mark. It would be lopsidedly outweighed by the inherent chipping away at the foundations of freedom and order.
Citing that “admirable quality” labeled “courage,” General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his posthumously published article, “We Must Avoid The Perils of Extremism” (April 1969, Reader's Digest), noted that often a moderate stand requires more “intestinal fortitude” than does the decision for an extreme course. The General pointed out that the middle-of-the-roader comes under a crossfire from both camps of the extremists.
"Why ROTC?”
{See J. H. Davis, pp. 120-122, April 1969 Proceedings)
Midshipman First Class Peter M. Fried, U. S. Naval Reserve—One of the most silent parties in this debate has been the student in the ROTC programs. Somewhat for this reason, the ROTC is viewed by many college communities as a monolithic organization, rather than a group of individuals desiring professional training.
Recently, an independent group of Cornell NROTC students, without expense to, or supervision by the Navy, published a position
paper. On the morning of 7 May, the^ ^ of our presidential review ceremony, 2, ; copies of the paper were distributed ar°ul i campus. The paper was also widely circm3 among the faculty. . ^
At Cornell, the paper seems to have gallV support for the ROTC position among n’3t people who were previously misinformed^ uninformed. Many people were glad to see students independently back the program', .
Herewith is the content of that p°SI paper:
On The Occasion of The Presidential Review
We, an independent group of interest Navy students, feel that the faculty and stu dent body are getting a biased view of Cornell ROTC. This bias is a result of arg3 ments which are based on incorrect state ments and irrelevent opinion.
As concerned members of the Cornell Co’11 munity we present here what we consider t0 be relevant opinion and pertinent facts in aJl effort to put the ROTC in sharper perspeC tive.
(1) Involvement in ROTC at Cornell is v° untary. We are here because we choose to here.
(2) The departments of Military Science d feet only those members of the Cornell Con5 munity who, as stated above, have voD15 tarily affiliated themselves with ROTC, a° affect them no more than any other pr° fessional education.
(3) The ideals of a democratic society de mand protection by a military which is cO*1' trolled ultimately by civilians. ROTC 0lj campus, in the process of providing a liber3 and free education of the officer corps, ret11' forces this concept of civilian control.
(4) We feel that Military Science as an ac3' demic department at Cornell, is being eS’ ploited by activist groups as a political symbol This is irrelevant to our true function of pr°' fessional training.
ROTC Fact Sheet
(1) The agreements between the respecti'1 military services and Cornell Universiff state that no military instructor shall be assigned to Cornell without approval of the Un1' versity. This includes approval by the Vtce President of Academic Affairs and the Dea*1 of the Faculty. The University has the opt'011 of interviewing prospective instructors.
°Wlin,
raphies
es: pertinent material, and bibliog-
JjJaterials are generally developed by boards civilian education. The instructor is not re- || ec[1] to follow them or use them in any way. °.Vv he teaches the course and the content to achieve the
minimum scope are en-
(5)
ian
f0]
studi
^lj .
rj °w for discussion; that the subject matter in°CS n0t meiat academic credit; that ROTC q, tuction was less than average Cornell a,U,a%, etc. It is hoped that these knowledge- tv' u V°tces wtU t>e given at least equal weight llh those which clamor most loudly for re- °val from campus of all things with military aPpearance.” *
B 'B
The ROTC instructor is encouraged to as far in his course as his knowledge, re. > study, and time will allow. Suggested
are provided to assist him. These
of
^,re y his responsibility. For example, the aval Science course in ship’s engineering sys- s taught at Cornell this year was developed t'fely by two Cornell NROTC instructors. (3^ C{
j the classroom we are not constrained an T Presenting all points of view for student ysis. To present only one view or try to theVCrt stu^ents t0 a personal opinion held by Ca(,teacher, military or civilian, is neither edu- °n, nor adequate instruction for a proSpective officer. *
(4) t£rT1u
. ttie services would be happy to have ta FSeS tp‘s type (political and historical)
. Sht by qualified civilian faculty members, v- Vl(ted the minimum objectives of the ser- are met. In the absence of such Uni- S1ty action, military officers teach them at ^ent.”* The Cornell NROTC has recently p s_tuted the history department’s American °reign Policy course for its own Naval His- t0ry course.
No auditing of military courses by civil- faculty members has taken place. There- 1 ’ we consider the midshipmen, particu-
cn i- sen*ors; to be the only persons who are a died by exposure to both academic and dary teaching, to make fully valid com- ^arisons in certain areas.” ROTC student Ponses to the questionnaires (circulated by -pe Presidential Commission on Military Gaining) “positively refuted such allegations at military courses are too easy for Cornell ents; that military instruction does not
(6) No ROTC course at Cornell has classified (secret) content. These classes are open to any University student. The University policy on auditing is followed implicitly with no additional restrictions. We invite anyone interested in the ROTC controversy to audit NROTC lectures; indeed, we feel that this is essential to enable faculty to objectively view the situation.
Published Independently By Concerned Navy Students
"The Tanks of August 1968”
{See W. Kotsch, pp. 86-93, May 1969, Proceedings)
William V. Kennedy—Captain Kotsch observes that Czechoslovakia “owes nothing— absolutely nothing—to the West.” One might ask, what does the West owe to any people who, in three major crises—1938, 1948, 1968 -—refused to fight in their own defense?
This is not intended to be a reflection on the heroism displayed by the Czech Legion in World War I, the Czech underground in World War II, or those individual Czechs who risked and, in some instances, gave all in the latest crisis. But these were essentially individual acts, and the tragedies they produced are all the sadder for the fact that they were not supported to the point of emulation by the nation.
Captain Kotsch implies that the Czechs were dissuaded from open resistance by the results such resistance produced for the Poles and the Hungarians. He then goes on to say that the Czech intellectuals were finally stirred to a revolt of sorts by the threat of economic obsolesence.
We know from the diaries of General Haider that, had the Czechs chosen to fight in 1938, even after their betrayal by Britain and France, there was a strong possibility of a revolt against Hitler from within the German Army. In all of their major crises since World War II, the Czechs had a relatively open avenue of escape across the West German frontier, and some chance that determined resistance would have shamed the West into action.
The Hungarians were in a far more difficult position, yet they fought. Poland and Ireland fought for centuries against odds just as hopeless. All three of these countries have worn the chains of tyrants. But to Czecho-
1
Uti
shoi
rail
-On
r ost tan
of C
tior
the
Ship
lars
-
IS ty(
W
ther
be total ship ccip the Port
ing the requirements of interocean transp1
an®
Indeed, as long as the rather vaporohy
somewhat loose with its constructing sta
tut-
investigate the air transport mode.
There is another point which I wish,1.
Gibbs’ “Southwest Passage” should not
anal
Jo-
Hidalgo. If treaties become “obsolete” by
biy
Republic of Panama, of the American
-CO11"
structed and operated Canal must never
idc
i0®
effective first by improving and building llP..
M
:d)
■—This article is highly imaginative but la'
,<P
eb>
Sage,- cm iiiuicaLc sca-iaiiu-sca
moving many thousands of tons of freight
Slovakia alone, in the words of Time magazine, has fallen the task of “forging its own chains.”
Is this, then, the lesson of history, that it is worthwhile to suffer any indignity, any degree of enslavement, any level of self-abasement so long as one’s factories can be kept intact and the stones of one’s ancient buildings kept one upon the other? It is possible that part of the answer is to be found in the form of “resistance” now in vogue in Czechoslovakia—that of burning one’s self to death.
"A Southwest Passage”
(See H. H. Gibbs, pp. 64-73, April; and D. J. Flood, pp. 118-119, September 1969 Proceedings)
Richard B. O’Keefe, George Mason College—Admiral Gibbs appears to have decided a question that is very much alive and undecided, i.e., lock vs. sea level canal. He should be assured that this argument is neither concluded nor arcane. A considerable body, made up of engineers, canal experts, members of Congress, and academicians continues to argue quite cogently that a lake- lock canal at Panama is navigationally, operationally and politically superior to a sea level canal.
Referring to the disaster of oil spillage, Admiral Gibbs almost makes, but misses an important point in “Only recently, a bulk carrier sank in Gaillard cut under circumstances that could have existed at sea level. Such disasters can be prevented, but the remedial action is necessarily extremely expensive.” The fact is the Japanese bulk carrier that sank in the Canal was raised and put on its way within 18 hours because of the efficiency and skill of the technically trained U. S. personnel present in the Canal Zone, a part of the much-abused “14,000” staff figure the Anderson Commission is fond of blackguarding, (viz. the American colony whose life-style exacerbates the envy of a relatively poor Panamanian populace). The Commission is fond of the citation of a staff force of 600 to support and operate all services to a sea level canal. In the context of Admiral Gibbs’ point, such a work force is absurdly small.
I feel that the statement “There is no indication that the Commission has considered it important to study the possibility of satisfytation by improving overland modes routes . . .” stimulated the Honorable Da"H J. Flood to write you about his five-y struggle to prevent the Anderson Commit, from exceeding its legislative authority . investigating anything but a sea level cal1 titled Commission appears to have pla' (with impunity), there would appear t0 no reason why the Commission could 111 clarify. If in diplomatic or administrate.. retreat, the United States abandons its ba , 1903 treaty, there is no reason why Adm1 ‘ jeopardized, when Mexico, acting ^ gously and in her own interests, dema11 renegotiation of the Treaty of Guadah'jj
mere passage of time, the Treaty by 'vhlC the United States acquired the territory f°r “Southwest Passage,” being unquestiona1 the settlement of a colonial conquest, c‘ hardly bear examination. t
Finally, the true benefits in both diU income and development increment to
V
forgotten. This remembrance can be n>a' the present lake-lock Canal, and second j by a firmness both just and politically so111’ on the part of American representatives.
★ ★ ★
Captain E. B. Perry, U. S. Navy (Retn'el
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necessary details. It discusses, in very gene- • terms, a proposed complex traffic problein moving great weight and bulk overseas on lected routes by ship-rail-ship from the N°r Atlantic port of New York to one or m0^ ports in the Far East. So long as one stick8 generalities, the sailing is smooth. When necessary to get down to troublesome det<n - however, the going may then become tong In discussing the proposed “Southwest Pa'j an intricate sea-land-sea method
U
th.
jsi r Itu"'
v
1)0'
Po .nUrnber of unproductive days required in shi a^SO t^le costs to die shippers and the l lJS; What will be the cost in days and dol-
^rS Trvv. f - „ . . .
stlould
to railw,
tiv<
,asi£
(lir1*1
b«
al,r
in*)*
up*
tl>*
c°nst; costs canal of
from one seaport to another? This include the costs of the shore facilities, ay equipment, right-of-way, and the
id1
or*
biy
c*1'
great f We
red th« •pv ■ V adc po”
iiy-
Weight and bulk on a ton-mile basis, sh' u are to take advantage of the merits of All °ard transportation from a port on the
no3
Pfesi
•. cos
yK but i
expei
c°uld.
.a miles. The canal voyage, with a 20-knot fA might be made in about 22 days. The
sh:
C0lti
■i steP in the wrong direction. Since much of lhe i
p. West of New York, why were Corpus whr’ ■
th.
i Well + .
1 to consult your abacus.
ieren considering the Southwest Passage,
[J(. R are several economic details which must
(0[JIVen some thought. What would be the
shi tU,ne transit between the loading of a
cei s goods in New York and their re-
the ' ^le foreign purchaser? What will be
Ic^S f 1 /
tra °r ^ai'd movement of the cargo in its
. ns'er from nnp ^ nntln^r’? 'T'hic
antly increasing labor costs. All probable oaust be considered if we are to contrast ( transit versus sea-land-sea movement [WUr cargo. And finally, would the protec- th n two Ports be less of a problem than
j Canal protection?
j ls axiomatical that the ship is funda- tally the most realistic and economical - aod of long distance transportation of antic to ports in the Far East, there can be cluestion as to the need for a canal. The ent costs of the operation of our ships is
it is reported that our railroads are rtencing similar difficulties.
[j v'°nsidering only the New York to Yoko- vatna suggestion, the article contrasts a sea ^ - agc of some 9,700 miles via the Canal with aCotnposite 7,910 miles via Corpus Christi d San Diego. The distance via sea-land-sea
very realistically, go up to at least
Posite voyage could amount to 29 days, great percentage of operation expenses ^mes from cargo handling. It is certain that . e Southwest Passage would result in in- aased costs of cargo movement, and that is
cargo would be generated in locations to risti and San Diego selected as transfer ‘nts for the cargo? There are existing rail- ^ ads across the continent and many of them Ungry for business. If we must resort to trans- ^atinental rail transportation, why not make e cargo transfer in San Francisco, using
existing facilities and saving some 2,400 sea miles? The article may have provided food for thought, but we need a more balanced diet.
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Albert H. Robbins, U. S. Navy —The article performs an essential service; it questions our Isthmian fixation. Arthur C. Clarke identifies two classes of planning failures: failures of imagination and failures of nerve. We fear to dream large dreams. Even worse, our dreams are limited by the word images we use. The canal people think in terms of a deep water path; the author visualizes a super-train.
By skillful selection of terms—passage vice the more familiar landbridge—the author obscures the fact that his proposal will not transport ships. In the days of our one-ocean Navy this was one of the more pressing j usti- fications for a canal; it would still be desirable for the Forrestal-class carriers.
While emphasizing that trade patterns might shift during canal construction (and presumably while inventing and building the Southwest Passage railroad and deepwater ports) he ignores the distinct possibility that existing ships might be made obsolete during the same period.
Historically, we have been able to assume convenient life spans, economic life cycles, for ships as well as the facilities which serve them: canals, port facilities, shipyards, dry- docks; 50 years for a Great Lakes “boat,” 20 years for a freighter, 25 for a cruiser, etc. Last year, we suddenly discovered that the “Big Box,” the container and containership, would drive conventional break-bulk ships from the North Atlantic trade, possibly by the mid-1970s. This year, despite a punitive longshoreman’s contract, it appears that break- bulk ships are virtually dead, technologically obsolescent. This is a common problem in the aircraft, electronics, and missile industries. It has come as a shock to shipbuilders and operators.
Senator Strom Thurmond recently referred to the air cushion vehicle (ACV) as the magic carpet of the future. He quoted Dr. D. C. MacPhail, of the Canadian National Research Council, “The British have concentrated on higher and higher speeds over the water and the U. S. has emphasized military
A. Bole (DD-755) was preparing for her regular overhaul in four years. The ship faced with serious personnel shortages, lin11] funding, an immense ship’s force work 1 and she was both worn and weary from A' */. Pac deployments. A Proceedings arUc^ was read with interest by the ship’s officers, ^ a solution to the problem of organizing a’\ supervising the work to be done during 1 overhaul.* ^
Six months before the Bole’s overhaul) ‘ Overhaul Planning Commission consisting , CO, XO, department heads, damage con”'1
Je-
destroyer, PERT and CPM techniques "'e‘l
* See H. G. Bradshaw, “Overhauling the 0^c< haul,” February 1968 Proceedings, pp. 55-63.
requirements . . . But we [Canadians] have areas where speed isn’t so important, where the mere ability to move goods at all is an achievement. Not much work has been done in this field and it might be the answer for Canada.”
Actually, most of our development dollars are in the Joint Surface Effect Ship Program Office (JSESPO) basket. Presently, two study contracts ($1.5-million apiece) aim at building testcraft by 1972. These two 100-ton, 80- knot, rigid sidewall testcraft, while interesting, will not revolutionize world trade.
By contrast, the primitive SR.N4s which began commercial operations last year) operate at speeds up to 80 knots, weigh 160-tons fully loaded, and fly above the surface on an 8-foot thick cushion of air. As the author points out, the further north we build our passage, the better.
The Northwest Passage becomes a broad freeway for the pure ACV. The ACV travels as easily, in fact more easily, over ice than water. ACVs have not yet been designed for cold weather, or long range operations. Several (SR.N5, SR.N6, SK-3, and SK-5) have been tested and operated in the far north. An SR.N6 was tested at Churchill, Manitoba. Operating over open water, ice, and snow at temperatures to — 41°F., the chief problems noted were in navigation and control.
Our aging Great Lakes fleets constitute one economic market for the ACV. According to Lloyd’s, the United States has 286 Great Lakes “boats”—1,892,427 gross tons. Canada has 288 more—1,479,518 gross tons. This seasonal fleet is limited to “navigable” waters and developed ports. Northern ACVs will be able to range far beyond the Lakes— going directly to the mines, the forests, and the wheat fields for cargo, regardless of season. Man-made barriers, buildings, and laws will define the ACV routes.
The existence of vehicles capable of sustained high speeds in the polar and subpolar regions necessitates a critical review of past economic and military decisions. An unescorted ACV, at 59 knots, could shuttle supplies between Little America and New Zealand in two days.
Great circle navigation, over the polar surface will as drastically alter world military posture, as did the Zeppelin raids in World
War I. Resupply to Thule, or to our p° research stations will no longer require ^ icebreaker and supply ship task force, frozen expanse north of the tree line cease5t|]f be a defense in the same manner that English Channel ceased to serve as Engl2'11 moat earlier in the century. >
The author acknowledges the super-tan* which cannot enter most of the world’s 11 bors, or any of the canals. He mentions containerships which have made most of1 world’s ports obsolescent. He ignores the A ^ which will have a far more drastic effect world trade routes in the next ten years t*1 earlier. In making any long range plans, . investments, we must clear our visions, we must consider technology.
Overhaul for the
USS John A. Bole (DD-755)
Lieutenant Commander William F. F0C;
U. S. Navy—Some months ago, the USS
of tro' I
assistant (DCA), and engineering maintenaf officer (EMO) was formed to study and imp1 ment the program evaluation and revie', techniques (PERT) and critical path metha (CPM) techniques into our overhaul. * DCA, who as a civilian had worked with p’0, duction efficiency and planning methods, _ given the task of applying PERT/CPM to a reP resentative portion of our ship’s force work 0 a trial basis. All officers and senior petty oI cers were briefed on this experiment, and e couraged to offer comments and criticisms- It soon became painfully evident tha, given the environment of a small 23-year-
neclntncate and time-consuming than was c^. ssary. Perhaps with data-processing ma- a^nery, ample working and display spaces, sdi a ^CSS ^rant^c training and operational || ec^e> PERT and CPM would do the job. lf.j^V<“Ver’ without the space, machinery, and
5ny
orCe
c°rtr s>ze of
Prehensible and manageable, and the the work centers (15-20 men) allows
adei
supervision.
“°WeV(
Pects
the
■'•SA states:
Oi .
, nip’s force work during . . . regular over- auls shall be planned on the basis of a stan- ard work week for enlisted personnel not exCeeding 45 hours per week for watchstanders arid 41 hours per week for non-watchstanders.
applying this CinCPacFlt criterion to the
to design and implement the program, attempt at wholesale PERTing of the ship’s . “ Portion of the overhaul, would have (j0 % become a case of the tail wagging the t (a ship the size of a destroyer, such de- nec ^ Panning and estimating simply is not Csary-The ship’s company is intimately , *tiar with the work to be done, the ship e*f is compact, the scope of work is both
tjuate
top-of-the-head, free-lance approach,
er, with a complete lack of formal man- sj7“laent or planning, will result in a poor jtlp.s force work package at best. At worst, cause confusion and interference with ® shipyard’s tight work schedule.
Xamining both the intricacy of PERT/CPM j aniques and the ineffectiveness of the free- cCe aPproach, it became evident that a ttia Pr°mise was needed. Required was a pp naSement system somewhere between „ VCPM and the woefully inadequate “per s1 Progress” bar graphs used by most all ships.
(j ae John A. BoDs Overhaul Committee Pie ne<^ lbeir problem: “To devise and im- nient a method to make optimum use of c bable manpower in performing the ship’s Ce Work to be done in an overhaul environ- ntj without interfering with the work ogress of the overhaul activity.” From this ement of the problem, the following as- are evident: Manpower availability; r nature and amount of work to be perth tTle^’ interface with shipyard work; and ^ e niethod (tools) of management.
47 Manpower Availability. CinCPacFltlnst f0.5A stata-
best estimate of the number of personnel to be abroad during the overhaul produced a gross manpower available figure, which was broken down by planned maintenance subsystem (PMS) work centers. This gross manpower was then reduced by the “nonproductive” factors—diversions which would reduce the manpower available for ship’s force work: watches, payday, leave, schools, unauthorized absence, medical and dental treatment, etc. These diversions were applied carefully and selectively to the appropriate work centers, and some were effected more than others. The manpower figure finally arrived at was termed the actual manpower available, by the PMS work center, and it was expressed in manhours per week. It was disappointing, although hardly surprising, to note that the “non-productive” diversions had reduced our manpower availability by about 50 per cent. As time for overhaul approached, the number of personnel assigned to the ship fluctuated almost weekly, and these manpower figures were continually updated to reflect changes.
• Nature and amount of work to be performed. CinCPacFltlnst 4710.5A further states:
It is expected that repair work other than routine maintenance, normal housekeeping, and preservation will be assigned to industrial facilities for accomplishment.
This, of course, is an impossibility, as anyone who has been through a destroyer overhaul can testify. A significant amount of overhaul and repair work must be performed by the ship’s force. Combining the ship’s force work list, which was compiled by ship’s company, with the jobs designated by the type commander as being within the capability of ship’s force, produced a work package of monumental proportions.
Early planning sessions identified the jobs which could be started before the actual overhaul. It also showed those which should be delayed until after the overhaul was completed. Even with these jobs eliminated, however, there still remained the danger that more work would be scheduled than could properly be accomplished. To avoid this pitfall, each ship’s force job was accompanied by an estimate of the manhours needed for accom-
MAINT CONTR NMBR | BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF JOB | PMS WORK CNTR | PETTY OFFICER IN CHARGE PE | MAN HOURS | ASSIST RQRD | EST START WEEK | EST FINISH WEEK | YARD WORK INTERFACE | priori |
0212 | PRESERVE ANCHOR AND CHAIN | WBM . | BM1 STROUP | 250. | NONE | 4 | 6 | DRYDOCKING | B |
6052 | REMOVE, OHAUL, INSTALL #1 AND 2 BLR AIR RGSTRS AND BURNER ASSYS | .EBT(F) | BT1 HORN | 400 | SAND BLASTING | 1 | 6 | LIGHTOFF | A |
NONE | CHIP/PAINT FWD MAST | ORD | RD1 SMITH | 220 | CRANE, SKIP BOX | 7 | 8 | RADAR ANTENNA | C |
Figure 1
plishment. Again, to quote CinCPacFltlnst 4710.5A:
Commanding officers and type commanders must ensure that ship’s force work listed for accomplishment during an industrial availability adequately reflects the availability of man-power to perform the planned work.
When the estimate of manpower required to perform the work on the initial work lists was compared with the actual manpower available, it was found that there was manpower available to complete only about 60 per cent of the planned work. There followed a period of negotiation, soul-searching, and hard decision-making by the Overhaul Planning Committee in order to whittle the work lists down to those jobs that could be accomplished with actual manpower available. A preliminary work schedule was then prepared, outlining estimated start and completion dates for each job.
• Interface with Shipyard Work. Once the shipyard’s work lists and PERT/CPM charts were received, they were closely examined to see how the shipyard work would affect ship’s force work. Officers, chiefs, and the senior petty officers in each work center were consulted and given the opportunity to review their ship’s force work plans, comparing them with that of the shipyard. Areas of conflict were, in most cases, immediately evident, and adjustments in the ship’s force work schedule were made.
Scheduling the ship’s force work is vitally important, because a properly prepared schedule provides accomplishment goals to
the work centers, reveals conflicts with 1
uled shipyard work, and uncovers perso:
_ . — | -1^ shortages. Once the shipyard work scheoj ^ is received, the final ship’s force schedid11~ can then proceed. To retain flexibility! 1 ship’s force work is scheduled weekly, ratl than on a daily basis.
• The Method (tools) of Management. management tools were devised. The Force Work List, (Figure 1) was essentially ( planning tool, used to channel the officeP and Petty Officers’ efforts toward prepa(a tion, scheduling and manpower availab'11 ^
and allocation. Each PMS work center
MCN
0512
0513
0514
0515
0516
0517
JOB DESCRIPTION
PRESERVE MT 52 MAGAZINE
PRESERVE MT 53 MAGAZINE
O’HAUL DREDGER HOISTS
O'HAUL MT 51 HOIST LINKAGE
O'HAUL MT 52 HOIST LINKAGE
O'HAUL DIRECTOR SCUTTLES
MAN
HRS.
NO. MeN
200
200
25
25
25
30
its c eacl cal oft tine ope Pric on! /
of 1
one
list.
PEi
One
mg
thr
! TOOLS f
interface } k x I o.J
INTERFACE 5
J .O.S'y
Th,
e second management tool is the ship’s
rce work Progress Chart (Figure 2). Unlike
this
point on the chart it was 100 per cent
lts own work list. A priority was assigned to eachjob, ranging from priority “A” (a criti- i°b which must be completed by the end the overhaul) through priority “C” (rou- tle repairs or maintenance, which affect the 'Operational capabilities of the ship), to Priority “E” (work that should be performed °nlY if extra manpower becomes available), can be seen from Figure 1, a great deal hrne, effort, and most important, thought foresight goes into this ship’s force work st, but not so much as would be required for CPM planning. The division officers senior petty officers are capable of draft- la8 it themselves, and use it as a reference roughout the overhaul.
foi
'he work list, this is a monitoring rather than Planning tool. This is a progress chart for °ne Weapon’s department work center to use the end of the sixth week of overhaul. Ex- f^Ples show maintenance control number 0512 (Preserving Mount 52 Magazine) parted and ended a week late. However, at
Complete, but it took ten man-hours longer han estimated. MCN 0513 (Preserving Mount Magazine) was scheduled to start during tle sixth week, but was delayed because of
Mount 52. MCN 0514 shows 100 per cent complete one week early, taking ten man-hours less than estimated. MCN 0515, scheduled to be accomplished during the fifth and sixth weeks, started on time but was only 40 per cent complete at the end of the sixth week. It was evident that if the difficulty with MCN 0515 was not solved, MCN 0516 would also be in trouble. The department head decided to cancel low-priority MCN 0517 in order to start MCN 0516 on time. Both 0515 and 0516 interfaced with a shipyard job, and required constant attention.
Even from this brief example, the importance of the progress chart is obvious. It immediately spotlights schedule slippages and trouble spots, and will also draw attention to future troubles before they develop. This is, of course, the raison d’etre of any management tool—to identify problem areas before they happen. With the information on the progress charts and the ship’s force work lists, the department head knows the who, what, when, where, and why of each job. The commanding officer and executive officer have, at a glance a complete, up-to-date summary of how their ship is progressing.
This system represents a compromise between PERT/CPM techniques and the inadequate “per cent of progress” bar graph.
50
60
70
80
90
100
15
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
100
90
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
100
90
groaning abo" who glowing!)' as two footba*
Used on board the John A. Bole throughout the overhaul, it proved simple and highly effective. It forced supervisors to think and plan ahead, gave ship’s company advance notice of work to be done, provided work centers with progress goals, and warned department heads, the XO, and the CO of impending trouble.
"The Newsman In Vietnam”
(See R. Blanchard, pp. 50-57, February; pp. 115, June 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant T. F. Schuster, U. S. Navy— Lieutenant Commander Blanchard asks, “Why does the military and government official frequently feel frustrated by the “distorted” coverage by the American press?” Perhaps their coverage wouldn’t be liable to the term “distorted” if our PAOs better handled their assigned mission. The old expression that there are two sides to the coin certainly applies to PAOs.
The author lists the five functions of the press, four of which are directly applicable to PAOs. To enlighten; to act as a guardian— PAOs are responsible for escorting media and ensuring that they get what they’re after; to be a market place—of Navy stories; to avoid special interests—by co-operating with the other services and staying away from “cutthroat” tactics when vying for press attention.
Let us examine our own efforts before we pass judgment on others. The U. S. Navy in Vietnam is in a position to get more favorable publicity than at any time since the Korean conflict, yet is not obtaining it. This is because of three basic flaws within the PAO program. By way of background, the mission of the incountry Navy is unique, and it is being successfully performed without acquiring any unfavorable stigma among the civilian press corps working in that country. On the contrary, the Navy appears to be the one service toward which these media are generally favorably disposed. The very nature of the tasks of many in-country Navymen can be described as unusual, revolutionary, colorful or exciting. All are jobs far removed from the bridge of a ship, and they invite the correspondent’s attention.
Within this framework of naval activity, a group of the world’s most influential news media operate, present in force and continually looking for stories. Admittedly, duri0f a Con Thien or a Khe Sanh, the Navy 1 hard-pressed for its share of their space 311 time. But, during the regularly occur''"1- “lulls,” the wire services, networks, and xn^S3 zines all hunt stories. At the Da Nang P*f'' Center and in Saigon, there are large c01’ centrations of these media, year arou" 1 There are also very large Navy Public A fairs shops. Yet, the publicity is not fox^ coming. How many of the people in ^ United States are aware of the Navy’s aC complishments? To imply an even \vo>sC failure for the Navy’s in-country Public a fairs program, how many are aware of the very existence of the in-country Navy " Vietnam? The answer is: too few.
The three faults mentioned earlier are rl sponsible for this answer. If immediate actio'1 is not taken in these trouble areas, it may that the Navy will be the loser in this W3'J As the other services share the spotlight [2] the Navy’s exclusion, so will they share forth coming support of all types—public, co" gressional, budgetary—to the Navy’s exd'1 sion.
Mr. Blanchard says “. . . news organic3' tions must assure that experienced and c°" pable newsmen are assigned.” Conversely shouldn’t the Navy have PAOs with these same qualifications if they are to work effeC” tively with the media? Yet, COs persist in rde' gating PAO collateral duty to the neared ensign. Seasoned correspondents come bad from a trip to Yankee Station the ensign assigned to them described a “flight deck as big fields.” If we are to demand experience0 newsmen, we must concurrently demand eX' perienced Navymen to deal with them. M°sl damaging to the Navy’s Public Affairs effort is this continuing practice of assigning newly' commissioned ensigns to full-time publ'c affairs billets as a first tour. How a man wh° has never been on board a ship and wl'° knows nothing about the Navy can expla"1 the Navy to others is a mystery to this writer-
PAC
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Secondly, the Navy is not producing lts own news release and features in the quantity and of the quality that it should. PAO shops> like everything else in Vietnam, have groW" overnight until they now have personnel) equipment and budget in quantity that fe'v
lhan
a little awed by the size of their new
it) V
Peasant at best, this means leaving the air- Cor>ditioned office as little as possible and one St°ry per man per week. A sad output for a Nor pao shop.
j ^Vhat can be done about this? The remedy p °ur first problem must come from the top. °gnizant flag officers must put out the word
letnam, where conditions are usually un
all hands will co-operate to the fullest
e must not lose sight of the fact that a good
N;
i have previously encountered. The shops ^ve been “given their head” and allowed grow, unguided and unmanaged. Most ' Js reporting to a Vietnam billet are more
“Nation. Used to working in cubby holes lP a couple of enlisted assistants, they are sMdenly in charge of a shop that may con- *lst of 15 to 20 enlisted men and one, two or tfjVeral iun'or officers. Taking what appears “ he the path of least resistance, the PAO |. en decides that his men are mature, intel. ^er*t individuals capable of unsupervised, "dependent work. In fact, they are ignored
N morale sinks to low ebbs as the men’s CfT
°rts go unnoticed. As a result, they work their own speed and in their own manner.
that
extent with our Public Affairs effort. Bupers
Nt stop sending new officers to PAO billets. We
1 avY PAO must first be a good naval officer jllld secondly a good PAO. He cannot be the atter without being the former. We cannot IN and sell Navy unless we know the Navy. / 'vould seem that the ideal PAO organiza- h°n in Vietnam would consist of a career 1650 commanding officer and a seasoned 1100 leutenant (j.g.) (fresh from a sea tour and qualified) as his assistant. The lieutenant u-g.) having demonstrated desirable characteristics as an OOD, should be a very capable escort officer and, with that combina- ;'°n, you should have the optimum balance between a PAO expert and a Navy expert.
As with all else in the Vietnam theater, the 40 effort has expanded and developed in a Ptirry. Expediency was the original order of 'I'c day. But, now is the time to settle down acd take a long hard look at our effort. How efficient is it? Not very. What does it need? Nod management aided by the co-operation °f others. The Navy is doing a tremendous Job in Vietnam and doing it successfully. Let Us get our PAO shops organized and begin to
get credit for our accomplishments.
The mess in the public affairs shop can be straightened out through a combination of actions. Public affairs officers must take greater cognizance of their personnel problems and make concerted efforts to effect sound leadership and managerial practices. They must be hard chargers who will lead, direct, organize and administer. Along with this, local commanding officers in Vietnam must pay personal attention to their public affairs officer and his method of running his shop. Lastly, senior public affairs officers in WestPac should pay particular attention to this area during their periodic inspection trips. Specific, revealing questions should be asked: What is the weekly output per man? What per cent of releases are ever used? Are features and in-depth articles being prepared? Do standard operating procedures exist? Do officers closely monitor work assignments and check every release? Do junior officers use their journalistic training and write? What is their output? The answers to these questions tell a lot about a PAO shop and any problem areas it may have.
Honors Rendered—
And Returned
Stuart B. Mockford, Portland (Oregon) Yacht Club—It may come as a bit of a shock, but courtesy is not dead at sea.
I completed a most enjoyable 4th of July weekend cruise, crewing on a 40-foot ketch from the Portland Yacht Club, out the mouth of the Columbia River to Port Angeles on the Straits of Juan De Fuca.
On Saturday afternoon, 5 July, with a bracing breeze aft, sailing wing-and-wing up the Straits, we saw a mighty naval force moving out to sea. First came four modern destroyers, then three more, then the battleship New Jersey, and then another destroyer.
My host, a commander, Naval Reserve, and another of the crew, a lieutenant commander Naval Reserve, another ex-Navy man, and I (the only ex-Army man—major, Corps of Engineers), were pleased and thrilled to see this tangible evidence of our country’s naval strength putting to sea, particularly as we had been sailing all day through large groups of Russian fishing boats and mother ships working off the Washington coast. The
appearance of our Navy was more than flattering, comparably speaking.
We patriotically decided to cut over to port and “extend honors” to our fleet. The distance was such that the first four destroyers passed long before we got close. But as the next three swept by, they ignored our dipping ensign, which I’ll admit wasn’t very big and, as it was rigged to the end of the mizzen boom, might have been hard to see.
Then the huge New Jersey came along and apparently the OOD on the bridge was a bit disturbed at our intentions as he changed course twice, but we had no intention of ramming 45,000 tons of 16-inch armor plate, so we bore off well in time and passed at a safe distance. Then we dipped our ensign, but the bridge crew ignored us as we hopefully watched for some acknowledgement of our existence, from our only active battleship’s ensign, flying beside the flag of a two-star admiral.
Nothing happened; we felt crushed.
And then came “Tail-End Charley,” the last destroyer of the squadron, probably commanded by the junior skipper of the flotilla, but obviously much more on-the-ball than his peers. When we dipped our ensign this time, “Tail-End Charley” very smartly dipped his ensign in return.
We were acknowledged! Hooray for “Tail- End Charley;” he understands yachtsmen!
“New Look For Nautical Charts”
{See V. J. Hertel, pp. 135-137, February 1969 Proceedings)
Jerrems C. Hart—In Continental European waters and the Mediterranean, for instance, the charts by U. S. Naval Oceanographic Office (NavOceanO) appear to be largely reprints of Admiralty counterparts, whereas the reverse is generally true in U. S. coastal areas and the Caribbean.
Why is this seeming duplication of effort necessary? Could not both nations save expense by combining their reporting procedures and cross-referencing their chart catalogs according to agreed-upon “spheres of maritime interest?” After all, we have a common language, common standards of measurement (at present), and very similar chart symbols and abbreviations.
Ed. Note: To provide Mr. Hart with an answer
to his questions, u>e contacted the NavOceanO- I1" following is their answer. _ .
R. J. Beaton, Acting Director, Technic Production Department, NavOceanO—I1 lS true that some U. S. charts of foreign wateli are facsimile reproductions (with some nun°r modifications) of charts originated by othcr nations. For example, some of the chart5 published by the U. S. Naval Oceanograph‘c Office for the British Isles area are reprodllC tions of original British Admiralty chad’' Similarly, U. S. charts of certain ports a° waters of Belguim, France, Federal Repute of Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands Portugal, and Spain are, or soon will be mod* , fled facsimile reproductions of the charts 0 these nations, respectively.
There are no U. S. charts covering oth^ European and Mediterranean areas, 311 published for sale purposes, which are repdIl!’ of British Admiralty counterparts. This is d1'1 to the fact that the existing bilateral aSrcC, ment between Great Britain and the Unitct States, limits U. S. reproduction of British A3 miralty charts for sale purposes, to the Brit*s Isles area.
To the casual observer, there appears to considerable similarity generally betwcel1 British Admiralty charts and U. S. chads- The British charts of U. S. coastal areas an the Caribbean are no exception. The fact lS> however, that none of the British Admirals charts of these areas, or of any other area, is f reprint of a U. S. chart, even though mod1' fled facsimile reproductions of U. S. chad5 can be made by the British Admiralty at an) time under the existing agreement. .
As a rule (resources permitting) each mad' time nation prefers to be self-sufficient win1 respect to nautical chart supplies for lts sphere of interest. Such self-sufficiency cafl only be assured by eliminating all dependent on foreign sources of supply for bulk stocks- Each maritime nation, further, recognizes 115 responsibility to design, plan, complete, construct, and publish charts which most ade' quately meet the unique needs of its fleet operating forces and private mariners. Such charts, therefore, reflect national units 0 measurement, fleet operating characteristics! and chart specifications, symbols, and abbre' viations which are accepted and readily understandable by all of its navigators. Despite
considerable progress which has been f over the past 50 years in standardizing
nations
can be readily and interchangeably
rum and large-scale ranges. Production Ponsibility would, in all likelihood, be as- ?ned to individual nations on a geographic ea basis, with each nation being primarily sponsible for the charts of waters under its ereignty, and for such other areas of mari-
''till
th,
th,
ese areas, to some extent, would in fact
re
e for charting a given area, despite the fact at several nations might consider the area
of
the
fadi
autical charting, much remains to be ac- nplished before charts of all maritime
by all mariners, sta ^ attainment °f complete nautical chart clardization, whereby seeming duplica- nn effort among nations could be elimi- ] C( > represents one of the greatest chal- to ^CS facinS nautical cartographers. Steps ard the attainment of this goal have al- ady been taken by the International Hydro. PWc Bureau, which is developing the con- Pt of an International Set of Charts.
^ Commission to study the feasibility of Reducing an International Set of Charts was stablished at the Ninth International Hydro- [, Paic Conference, in Monaco, in April ^ '• Two meetings of this Commission have Cen held so far. The Commission includes P -Sates from Federal Republic of Germany, ^ance, Japan, Netherlands, United King- at, and the United States. First considera- . n is being given to the design and produc- s°n of International charts in the smaller Qa e ranges, and agreement has been reached j. the production of a specimen chart, oernes, or plans, for world coverage have s° been developed. Progress in other re- ects has also been highly favorable.
Cnee a set of small-scale International ‘*rts has been agreed upon and produced, e concept can be extended to charts in the ^edi
res
Sov,
e interest as mutually agreed-upon with e International Hydrographic Bureau.
Present “spheres of maritime interest,” ex- |^Pt that only one nation would be responsi-
th "''thin their sphere of interest.
Pending the development and acceptance a complete International set of charts, and Elated cross-servicing arrangements, mari- lt'ic nations having a world interest must be prepared to meet the nautical chart needs of
their fleet, merchant marine, and other navigators in the most adequate, economical, and timely manner, under conditions of both peace and war. Dependence upon foreign sources of chart supply in peace time presents difficult problems, especially with regard to receiving up-to-date information, during war time.
“The Navy—A Retention Gap”
(See J. G. McGarry, pp. 105-107, February; p. 113, July; and pp. 114-115, August 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Donald H. Hewett U. S. Navy—During the past several years, many approaches have been made in the Navy to devise a method of inducing a larger number of highly trained enlisted personnel in the technical fields to remain in the Navy. Most of the approaches have met with little success and some have caused a considerable amount of controversy.
For example, the pro pay idea could indicate that the Navy puts greater value on some rates than others. Is this really a valid idea? Can anyone truly say that the electronics technician (ET) is worth more to the Navy than the Ship’s Cook; or that the boiler tender is more highly trained than the boatswain’s mate (BM) of the same pay grade? Perhaps technically yes, but in the final analysis, all rates are required and are of equal importance to the successful mission of the Navy.
Another approach to retention of the rates has been to train (technically) and promote the men in certain rates at a much higher percentage than the men in other fields. How many times have we seen the chances for advancement of an ET or electrician’s mate (em) at 50 per cent while the chance for the BM or torpedoman’s mate (TM) was at 10 per cent? This has resulted in many cases where we have a technical field petty officer first class (POl), who knows little about military duties, being placed in charge of a group that included men from the deck rates who were junior to him in rate but had a much better knowledge of military duties in general. This is not meant to knock the technically trained man, for he performs a vital, expanding, and necessary function in the modern Navy. In many cases, however, he just does not have the background, experience or training to be a true leader in a military situation.
ample, P-9, M-6 or P-6, grade 15. For pay purposes
give the same relative weight to the combife military or command situations, the manvvl
P and M numbers regardless of rate; but
w
the senior M grade would be considered & senior man regardless of the pay grade
the P3'
other personnel. On the uniform, grade P and M of a man could be indicate' the number and color of stripes above
dW
ano
e*'
the specialty indie3
to<
These suggestions are made in the a'V3’e. ness that many problems in this line are 3
is)
■tai”
ceeded by President Warren G. Harding, latter, who was himself most anxious to p1
to
il
tof
He is what he has been expensively trained for, a technician. To help correct this problem, and to give credit both to the technician as a technician, and to the enlisted military leader as a military leader, and to abolish pro pay which has caused so much hard feeling, the following is proposed:
• Divide the advancement tests into two completely unrelated parts: “P” for professional and “M” for military. Advance the man within each field according to the needs of the Navy and the results of the semi-annual competitive tests. In effect, establish P-1 through P-9 and M-l through M-9. For instance, an EM P3/M3 could take the P4/M4 test and possibly pass the P-4, but fail the M-4. He would then be advanced to P-4, but remain an M-3. This would recognize his ability as a technician but not his military ability. Of course, the opposite could happen. In rates where a preponderance of effort is in the technical area, the man could be helped to advance faster in the “P” portion of his tests by assignment to additional schools and training in his technical specialty. This could give rise to situations where a man could be a P-7 but only an M-5, as an example. This would again indicate his technical, but not his military ability. This method could be especially applicable in direct procurement situations, where the man has a wealth of technical training and ability but little military knowledge. By separately recognizing the P and M requirements in each rate and giving weight to the relative importance of same within that rate, an ET, for instance, could be encouraged to put more time studying radar rather than the landing force manual. The BM and other military-oriented rates could be encouraged to do the opposite. This would give true emphasis to what the man is really expected to do in the Navy. This could also help correct the situation where the badly needed technician is assigned to purely military duties (shore patrol, etc.) for which he is poorly trained and to which he is assigned only because he has the required rate level. Duties such as this are military duties and should, to a large degree, be assigned to a rate that is military in nature and in which little shortage of personnel exists. Many examples of the above type of misuse of technical talent can readily be called to mind.
• The next question that arises is that of P3 and privileges. This would appear to be ^ , easiest to answer. Suggested is the creation 18 pay grades to consist of the P-grade 33 to the M-grade. For instance, a seaman ^ cruit would be P-0, M-l, for pay grade !• radioman (RM) P-6, M-4 would be pay gr3 10. For club privileges, all pay grades tween 6 and 14 would be considered Pc _ officers and all between 14 and 18 would considered CPOs. This would apply regard of how the pay grade was obtained. For
M-9 would be P3; and privilege
in below the man’s specialty marker. As an ample, a gold stripe could indicate three P ■ grades, a silver stripe two pay grades, an3 red stripe one pay grade. This would gbef: maximum number of three stripes above 3,1
three stripes below for any pay grade.
,ol
addressed, and with the belief that if the sll= gestions were refined and implemented, t3 could help correct the problems concert with pro pay, retention, and a better use technical talent.
"The Paper Torpedo”
(See R. J. Hanks, pp. 26-34, May 1969 Proceed!^ Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, Royal N3'.
(Retired)—I must join issue with Cap _ Hanks over a statement he makes with refefj ence to the Washington Naval Conference 1921 when he says: “ . . . the English Pr0; posed a naval limitations conference as cheap and effective way to maintain their o'' naval supremacy.”
The facts of the matter are as folio''5
When President Woodrow Wilson was sl'C
the mote international disarmament, lent a re3' ear to a suggestion put forward by Sen3
po^,lam E- Borah that the leading naval neCrs sh°uld be approached with a view to den°tlatfng a naval holiday. It was the Presi- QrW^0 fncluirccl of the governments of \v| a' Britain, France, Italy, and Japan a er they would be willing to take part in erence on the limitation of armaments
ill
it
belt)’ i
be
le?
eN"
}3)
uVone who reads the story of the confer-
th eno
'1
lii
i':
b!
lP‘;
eS'
d3 e3 jfld jtor
ire;
ug' tie? :ed . o<
vy in Michelson”
Livingston, pp. 72-79, June 1969
CRoc;
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jin
ef"
of,
ro-
3
vf
/s:
1C* be '
■O'
a[
cf
measurement of the velocity of light,
b
stein-
s formulation of the theory of relativity.
■Y appreciated the stature of my in-
stru,
Jig iUst naval but all armaments). It so rea 'j*ened that when the President’s inquiry Was.ec* London, an Imperial Conference sion 'n ProSress> which had reached a conclu- \Yahat some form of disarmament treaty Ceffesirable. Hence, there was ready ac- Caance °f the invitation, but the initiative ^le from the U. S. Administration.
£r-. as set out in Chapter 5 of my book tyjj15 Seapower will, I believe, agree that, r fever Lloyd George may have said in the tj0n01 t le moment, there was never any ques- Britain trying to maintain her naval face emacY’ s*nce it was obvious that in the *°f growing U. S. industrial and economic agrCr’ (Bis was impossible. For the rest, I Leae VvLL Captain Hanks that “the Son of astu^n’s representatives drove a hard and to fi? Bargain” which paved the way directly \yareir country’s participation in World
W*C^efson tn the Navy; 4he Na— - ■ * ••
o. M.
Eedings)
G •
v aPtain Lawrence Wainwright, U. S. Vy. y (Retired)—These recollections of a °f h‘ ^arnous NavY scientist, written by one bv *s daughters, were probably occasioned , recent dedication of the Naval Acad- cy s new Michelson Hall. They were ex- lfl‘r;«nally interesting to me, and aroused as y nostalgic recollections of my own, for, to afl 0r(fnance postgraduate, I was privileged (jrstudy under Professor Michelson at the Li !Versity of Chicago in the early 1920s. Mrs. knonSSt0n discusses at some length his well-
c_ Barely mentions his interferometer and— Sq —his part in the renowned Michel
- Corley experiment which led to Ein-
f full’
(a°r—a fellow Annapolis graduate who
had me assist him at a Navy Day observance —but I did not derive a full measure of benefit from his pre-eminence, because I was preoccupied with writing a thesis for a master’s degree. My thesis consisted of the invention, description, and analysis of an analog computer which I named a “ballistic engine.” In 1924, I communicated this invention to an M.I.T. professor who was also a Naval Reserve officer, and seven years later, M.I.T. announced its “differential analyzer.” This was virtually my machine with two important differences: instead of being expressly configured for the ballistic problem, it was generalized, and—unlike the Navy which muffed my offering—M.I.T. had actually built and operated its device.
The differential analyzer rapidly became very popular and widespread, and was undoubtedly a strong influence in bringing about the computer age in which we now live. It could well be that the inspiration which I derived from Professor Michelson encouraged me to conceive the ballistic engine, and so his example may have helped to set the scene for the sophisticated data processing systems of today.
"First Naval Gunnery Conclave”
(See R. T. Roberts, pp. 138-142, April 1969 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Loftus, U. S. Navy, USS Enterprise (CVAN-65)—As a report of the matters discussed at this high level conference, the article does not allow grounds for challenge, but it does serve as a springboard for comment on additional tasks which should be considered by those involved in the conference.
As a weapons officer on a FRAM I destroyer involved in CENTO exercises last November 1968 in the Middle East, I had the opportunity to visit the operations centers of two British frigates involved in the Allied exercise. During the gunnery conference which preceded the exercise phase, the weapons officers of each nation involved had a chance to compare procedures for anti-surface and anti-air exercises. Comparison of the British and American procedures showed that the American ships (all East Coast destroyers) were preoccupied with “competitive exercise” requirements which seemed somewhat stereo-
ing the fire control solution, and the el'1111'1. tion of the many unknowns that affect solution.” Shipboard alignment will am ^ remain a challenge and a responsibility . ship’s company after the initial docks alignment is accomplished; but one item lS thorn in the side of every (East Coast) 'vea.'(_ ons officer—gunnery sheets. These sheets inally served the dual purpose of provim
0
■cise
to®
results. If so, the gunnery sheets are far elaborate for the simple purpose they
and they should be consolidated. If gu"
fil*
the
typed exercises against a sled or catamaran on courses parallel to or reciprocal to the firing ship’s course, while the British were more realistic.
The first day’s exercises scheduled an American destroyer with a British frigate. When the tug pulling the target failed to arrive, the British showed us their type of gunnery exercise by making a firing run on us from 15 miles, opening fire at the earliest possible range, shooting astern of us using the offset method. The exercise was similar to one of our exercises which is an annual requirement but is seldom stressed. Of course this exercise is difficult to analyze—to acquire data for verification of gunnery accuracy, but it was far more realistic than any we were doing and, more than likely, what we would be called upon to do, given a real situation.
A second point was obvious during this exercise period. The British showed themselves more interested in mobility in gunfire support than we appear to be. The majority of our older destroyers at least find themselves circumscribed by confining limitations in naval gunfire support, limitations which are primarily ones of equipment and prompted by the luxury of command of the seas but also because of present day procedures. In every exercise period, in qualification at a range like Culcbra Island, and even in the actual Vietnam gunfire support situation, the weapons officer is careful to see that the ship is, if at all possible, steady on a fixed course with a dead reckoning plot projected over the next several minutes, with set and drift calculated and values entered into the fire control computer before the ship opens fire. In fact, there was a time when the firing ships anchored while they were firing. The British, because of their plot presentation, are able to shoot accurately virtually during a turn itself. This is not to say that we would not act similarly to protect ourselves, against counter battery fire, but not with friendly troops close by. I suggest that gunfire support equipment and the resulting doctrine should be added to the long list of high priority tasks established for the future.
A third subject was brought to mind by the following (true) statement: “The primary goal in the area of fire control and ancillary equipment was reduction of errors in reach
information for Naval Weapons Labors t01, (NavWepsLab) experts to help in the eh1', nation of gunner (particularly fire contf errors and to be used in reconstructing ing exercises. Not too long ago (Exei . Springboard 1968) an expert from the Na^‘. Weapons Laboratory asked the weapV( officers of ships firing at Culebra to sub111 the gun sheets they filled out during s*' ^ fire support. In so doing he showed that did not know the Culebra range facility the only agency required to submit data. 1
NavWepsLab representative noted, too, the gunnery sheets routinely submitted d ing surface and anti-air exercises are not ing used by the laboratory as originally 1 tended to substantiate competitive exen
data is to be taken aboard ship to support purpose of reducing or eliminating el1. wherever possible, serious, realistic work needed with improved collaboration n£°ei sary between weapons officers and the expe' from the Naval Weapons Conclave. ^
It is true that much work has to be done *' outlined by Colonel Roberts, but some of t1 tasks for the future are more basic than spaC oriented position orders and laser sens01’
"Victory in Limited War”
{See C. L. Parnell, pp. 26-31, June 1969 Proceedin'^ Paul W. Garber—In his article, Lieutena1'1 Parnell wrote:
Counter-terror must be used against the terrorists so that life will not be safe for enemy collaborators and informants. By whatever means we can, we must break up the enemy guerrilla infrastructure.”
It is difficult to determine whether be means terror to be applied solely agai'1 identified collaborators and informants, 0
Ca^ n5 a collaborator or informant. In either tde rcs"h must be the same, since the ertls in determining who are collabora-
tors
cult
t[^et^er he means general measures against Cot^P°Pulati°n to prevent anyone from be-
Probl
and informants must be especially diffi- ln a guerrilla warfare situation. js1 error, as Malcolm Muggeridge defined it, in3ri arrangcment whereby everyone is kept sa COndition of fear. Counter-terror, it would jyj > is designed to do exactly the same. q pSgeridge tells of a colleague visiting the -p U. secret police agency during the Stalin ; err°r °f the 1930s and asking an official why ^n°cent people were arrested. The G.P.U. n laughingly replied that of course they sted innocent people, arresting guilty Pto would not frighten anyone.
We are to engage in “warfare by any arj1118’" Abiding counter-terror, then we adopting a policy where the end justifies , , ’‘‘cans and where any claim to moral or p lcal superiority is futile. If Lieutenant a,^neh meant “reprisals” against known bahorators and informants, he would bardly be suggesting anything which has not ife,en done before by United States forces. But ae intends more, then he is recommending 0urentlrely nove^ P0bcy which runs counter to ac/ ^as*c not*ons °f lde and liberty. If we Pt such a policy, we had better under- d what we are doing and why. It would sad indeed if we fought wars overseas for ri [ d'^Pose of securing to those peoples the t 1 to a free choice of government only to Ou we bad so seriously compromised
own moral position that our democratic Poblicanism was destroyed.
★ ★ ★
jy ^0rnmander William C. King, U. S. isavV The subject of victory in limited war °ne which deserves the attention of military 0 Political planners, particularly in view of takes of the recent past. From the military 11 Hander’s point of view, victory will al- ys be the objective; however, overriding Ob’ 1C&1 conslderations may dictate national v- Motives which preclude complete military • °ry. In view of the complexities of the to CS raased by the author, it is disappointing tead in his essay the cliches of the past, be military officer should be just as aware
as his political counterpart of the complexities of international affairs in 1969. One of the old slogans which must be re-evaluated is MacArthur’s famous “In war, there can be no substitute for victory.” Playing the classic military role, MacArthur chased the enemy to the Chinese border, and the war escalated. Had he stopped near the 38th parallel—in keeping with the political objective of saving South Korea from the Communists—we would still be where we are today, at far less cost in lives. Going back to World War II, the policy of unconditional surrender may have cost us the possibility of having a united postwar Germany.
Lieutenant Parnell states “Only if we are prepared to fight World War III, can we prevent it.” I submit that we are prepared to fight World War III. This does not mean that we should deliberately- provoke it. The author goes so far as to discuss brinkmanship, and he even implies that we should return to this outdated policy. Unfortunately major wars often are started through blunder, miscalculation, and irrational acts, including brinkmanship.
The author’s prescription for fighting limited war is well-stated, but does not apply to Vietnam. No effective way has been found to cut the enemy’s line of communications in that country.
The time has long passed for us to be still dividing the world into two ideological camps, as Lieutenant Parnell has viewed the problem. Certainly the Soviet Union poses a major threat to our security. The reason for this is that the U.S.S.R., a country with interests inimical to our own, has a major nuclear capability; however, to see every other Communist country in the world as a threat is to ignore the deep divisions within the Communist world. If we are to follow a sensible national policy, we must exploit these differences.
The author counsels nipping Communist moves in the bud. This is sound policy, and has been done by the United States on more than one occasion. However, sometimes we end up helping the wrong side. Who could have predicted that Castro would turn Communist?
Of course political considerations are not applicable at the tactical level. A command-
Our historical ignorance, our diplo®'
atif
caf
always, however, the most unkind cut co
an1
id
ing officer who finds his ship under attack should defend himself without stopping to speculate on the political motives of his attackers. However, an essay which delves into matters of broad national policy should recognize the complexities of today’s international scene.
★ ★ ★
F. W. Geberth—I read with interest Lieutenant Charles L. Parnell’s paragraph:
Every atrocity of the enemy must be made public to the entire population of the affected country and broadcast to the enemy, so that in addition to being hated by the populace, some of the enemy may begin to doubt the rightness of their cause. The enemy, by a combination of sophisticated and simple psychological appeals, must be made to feel like an outcast from humanity, a criminal and traitor to his culture and heritage, and a tool of Communist imperialism.
Substitute “Western” for “Communist” and you have a very concise outline of the methodology of a vociferous segment of the population of the United States, whose propaganda assaults seem to be directed to making our difficult international position untenable.
Lieutenant Parnell’s discussion of the psychology we ought to bring to bear on the peace negotiations, and before, reminds me of a passage from a brief biography of General Sir Gerald Templer by the well-known naval historian, C. Northcote Parkinson. In his “A Law Unto Themselves,” speaking of the civil war in Malay, circa 1951, Parkinson talks about the years of British defeat in this theater, and he makes some observations about the non-Communist Chinese which are certainly applicable to most oriental philosophies:
Where they differ from the European is in being more realistic. Confronted by a battlefield or a racecourse, they seek, first and foremost, to spot the winner. To be on the losing side they feel, is neither dignified, profitable, or even safe. It is for this reason that diplomacy is usually lost on the Chinese. If they foresee your defeat, you are wasting your time.
If they anticipate your victory, it is they who will be trying their diplomacy on you. The vital thing is to give the impression that your success is certain and that your opponents are merely unlucky. This cannot be done, however by a mere play-acting. You need to ha'c a real confidence in your own real abilitieS' It must be made clear from the start that y°u simply cannot lose.
innocence and the punctilious Amenc conscious confronted by the particular he® break of this war makes us easy mark for slings and darts of a sophisticated enemy- *
omeS from closest home, the seats of power front rows of legislature.
Americans have always, finally, united 11 the face of “present danger,” but the ene''1' has weapons that are both effective and sub1 Let us hope that the danger is made clear the new breed of American in time. Mea1' while, some of us pin our hopes on the “P1^ fessional” services, for whom these ti’T must be “uphill all the way.”
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Commander A. N. Olsel1’ Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy—Liet’j tenant Parnell has very succinctly analyze the factors involved and sequence of evef ‘ leading up to the “limited wars” in which " ^ find ourselves involved. In his proposal ® quick action for small wars, he will find l't argument. On the other hand, two very ^ portant questions have been given only br'e mention in this essay. Discussions and Pr° posals on them could undoubtedly fih braries. On the first question “when do " begin?”, no comment will be made as th will always depend, as the Marines say—-“0^ the situation and the terrain” and in the fir>a analysis by a political decision.
On the author’s question of “how far c we go?” however, there is one theory, ^'C provisions of which should always be cot> sidered, prior to terminating hostilities where short of unconditional surrender.
With the elimination of personnel, Communists’ principal remaining resource lS that of real estate. At the present time, Communist world already controls a large percentage of the world’s land. But the) still want more: The loss of some of their present real estate would be a severe bio'' to them. If we were now holding Korea11 truce talks at the 38th parallel we might not
be ’
j Evolved in peace talks in Paris. If that jj^or* had not been learned in 1952, then we ^°uld be re-establishing the DMZ between e two Vietnams in the area of the 19 th
and consider the Ben Hai River only
evertheless, it is felt that questions such . se could be resolved rather quickly and <i 1,n’nate the need for the never-ending ^Peace” negotiations as are now being con
In
„bft ls to hurt the enemy,
*ood” to Communism is no loss at all, but the loss Of
soil” is catastrophic.
A •
nt*submarine Warfare Lieutenant Thomas F.
A patrolling S-2E
^avy AS\y
Parallel
Mother river crossing on the way to the front, f e eventual loss of real estate to Free World fefCes actually to the nation that had suf- lhe attack—each time a “limited war” to ^ Un’ would soon force the Communists band on such tactics as being too costly. tle question of how far to expand would ^ e to be a joint military/political decision, {he fact that the Communists will lose in 1C territ°ry each time U. S. forces become caved in combat should be a foregone collision.
s ^here is also the very high likelihood that lj ne °f our allies will become embroiled in a Jilted war, or a set of circumstances re- th l j 'n® a hmited war, in hopes of involving e. United States and eventually expanding la ^ °Wn territory. Many of the factors re- r u to this approach would have to be ref ec' to the diplomatic and political arena r resolution.
Me
in Panmunjon and Paris. any war, no matter what the size, the is to hurt the enemy. The loss of
air group observes a radar contact sus. ted to be a periscope, and the contact mediately disappears. The contact is tted, and the information is relayed to the fl ”• A decision is made to launch the ready UtV ASW helicopters.
^ o situations of this type, the helicopters e often vectored to datum, the last known e°sition of the submarine. For the CVS, how- th^’ most dangerous course of action that j e submarine may choose, in fact, the most °§jcal choice would be to intercept and at- the CVS. Thus, a tactically better deploy- eut of helicopters would be to vector them
to a point where they would intercept the attacking submarine, rather than to datum. By using Tacan equipment and some elementary maneuvering board plotting, the helicopter can be vectored to intercept the submarine regardless of the submarine’s course or speed. The only assumption necessary is that the submarine is intercepting the CVS on an unchanging course and speed.
The plan is based on the fact that the DRM of the intercepting submarine is a constant and is also a Tacan radial. Figure 1 is a rela-
tive plot. Point “O” is the CVS and the center of the maneuvering board. The datum is updated to account for any delays in the relay of information from the S-2E to the CVS. Point “A” is the geographical plot of datum. “AA'” represents movement of the CVS since datum time. “OA'” is the DRM which remains constant, and the MRM at datum time.
Figure 2 is a solution for the maximum SRM. “OP” is CVS speed, “OP'” is maximum
Captain William C. Nicklas, Jr., U- Navy, Head of the Naval Science Dep31^ ment, U. S. Naval Academy—Lieuten
an1
al'
be of doubtful value. ,
It should be noted that Lieutenant Doyle’ statement to the effect that no assumption ^ made regarding the submarine’s course 311 speed is inaccurate. Implicit in the dctcr mination of point “B” is the maximum spee of the submarine and a heading.
submarine speed, “PP'” is maximum SRM.
Figure 1 is also a solution for the tacan range and bearing to which the helicopters are to be vectored. “A'B” represents the product of maximum SRM and time late. Point “B” is the CPA of the submarine for the time late, and is the relative position to which the helicopters should be vectored.
The plan can also be used if the CVS turns away from datum because the submarine’s reaction to the turn would not be instantaneous. A sharp CIC crew would plot point “B” initially as a geographical point, and then advance point “B” as if the CVS were on the original course. When this plot is combined with a track of the CVS, it would be a simple matter to pick off the range and bearing to point “B” for the ETA of the helicopters over point “B.” This range and bearing would be a tacan radial and distance. Where the CVS has changed course, the tacan position given the helicopters would be valid only once.
In the case of the disappearing radar contact without any other intelligence, this plan
is useful because at least it places the AS' helicopters in an area of high probability 0 making contact.
★ ★ ★
Doyle suggests a plan that in principle ready exists in tactical doctrine. His plan what would be called an intercept search- The unique aspect of Lieutenant Doyl® proposal and hence, worthy of note, is 1 association of the tacan information with 11 manuvering board solution parameters. , The applicability of this proposal reS on the assumption that the submarine is at tempting to attack the CVS. If there is aI^ other target of high value that might attra ^ the submarine, the plan described above
"Portrait of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King”
(.See cover, January; p. 115, May; and pp. 101"'®' September 1969 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral E. D. Stanley, SupP^ Corps, U. S. Navy (Retired)—With refcr' ence to the portrait of Fleet Admiral ErneS J. King, which appeared on the cover of d’f January 1969 Proceedings, there was e*' pression of interest in the fact that Fleet Ac miral King habitually wore a white handke* chief in the breast pocket of his blue servic^ uniform.
I do not know when Fleet Admiral Ki® first adopted this custom in dress, but I know that it was habitual with him when * first met him in 1926. My father reported th3' summer for duty on the staff of Command^1 Aircraft Squadrons, Rear Admiral J- J' Raby, whose flagship was the USS Wrig Admiral King, then a captain, was the Con3' manding Officer of the ship.
Fleet Admiral King was tough, very tough’ but he understood people and had a kindly interest in young people. With his permis'
and
°Ur Navy adopted the double-breasted sack i following the example set by the Royal \ avY, the uniform was designed with two _ C e Pockets and one breast pocket. In other 0rds, the Navy adapted the design of civilian 0thing of the time. It was civilian practice k Usc the side pockets to carry things and the feast pocket of civilian clothes habitually ported a handkerchief. Certainly, naval t'cers try always to be logical and to learn oy equipment is designed as it is. The very ct that the breast pocket was there implied -p at it had been provided for some purpose. , Us might not include carrying a pencil in e Pocket, but a handkerchief would be quite appropriate. Hence, it should not have been SUrprising to see a handkerchief placed in 'c breast pocket of the Navy uniform. As a
,tl0n> I served in the Wright as an official ^apprentice boy” and for some time (perhaps in p°nt^ was allowed to serve as bow hook jraPtain King’s gig. It is small wonder that °ITl that time on Fleet Admiral King was one "heroes.”
.aring my days as a midshipman and nior officer, I often thought of the handker- « which Admiral King wore in his breast ijrC^et and I admired that touch in his k ess- I was reminded of this use of a hand- erchief when I saw Admiral King in Norfolk at the time that he was appointed as ',lr|inCh/CNO. Shortly thereafter, I was aJrn°ted to lieutenant. I suppose that it was combination of emulating my hero, the Ppeal of adding a white spot below my then ribbon, and some sense of having ^ ached a most exalted rank; but in any t- ent> after checking the Uniform Regula- ns and finding no bar, I decided to wear a lte handkerchief in the breast pocket of V blue service uniform. I wore it from then .^>til I retired at the end of 1965. At no time n those 23 years did any senior officer com- • nt to me about it. Several times, however, mor officers asked me the basis for my cus- i !Tl- My explanation was essentially what I SCt ^own here.
, . hy did Admiral King wear a handker- let in his breast pocket of the blue service aorm? Here are some possible answers: ... t he blue uniform worn by our Navy up un- 1 the time of World War I had a high collar oo exterior-pockets in the jacket. When
matter of fact, it was not really uncommon to see a handkerchief worn in the breast pocket by naval officers in the early 1920s. But by the late 1920s, the practice had pretty much died out, except for the specific example of Admiral King.
It seems pertinent also to note that Admiral King was attentive to, and an innovator in matters of uniform. It was he who came up with the idea of wearing the grey uniform, which was official during World War II. It was he, who for a short while, wore the white service uniform jacket with blue trousers. I believe it was Admiral King who authorized the use of the black bow tie with the blue service uniform for semi-formal evening wear.
At this late date, I recommend that the Uniform Regulations be amended to prescribe (authorize?) the use of a white handkerchief in the breast pocket of the blue service uniform as a mark of, if not affection, then respect and admiration for Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King.
★ * *
Commander Edward C. Ives, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Although I never had the opportunity to see “Uncle” Ernie King in a dress uniform with a handkerchief in the upper left pocket, I did observe an unusual uniform violation which he practiced on the several occasions on which I had the pleasure to be in his presence.
Early in World War II, Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, who was a student of heraldry, noted that the cap device eagle worn by U. S. naval officers faced to “its own left.” In heraldry, a proud eagle should face “dexter”—to its own right. Secretary Knox issued a directive to the effect that all eagles
ENTER THE FORUM
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1
on officers’ caps should face right.
As far as I know, there were two senior officers who did not change their cap devices, i.e., Admiral “Ernie” King, who was Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet (Com- inCh), and Admiral William Leahy, who was the Naval Advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. I still have a “left-facing” eagle cap device.
The change from left to right facing eagles cost us about $5.00 per cap device even back in early 1942.
Who Fired The First Shot?
(See R. D. Layman, pp. 112-113, March; and p. 108, August 1967; see also the following comment, “Self Destruct Devices.”
Captain Lauro F. de Mendonca, Brazilian Navy—Mr. R. D. Layman believes SMS Goeben fired the first warship shots in World War I.
But Mr. Kenneth D. Smith, Jr., contradicted the statement later, and said that this honor should be due the famous German raider SMS Emden, which in the early dawn of 4 August 1914 fired several 10.5-inch shells at the Russian steamer Rjaesan.
Actually, the German cruisers SMS Augsburg (Captain Fischer) and SMS Magdeburg (Captain Habenicht) fired the first shots of the maritime war in World War I, over the Russian base of Libau, at 1 August 1914, three days before the bombardment of Philippeville by the Goeben, and the seizing of the Rjaesan by the Emden.
The first shots fired by a ship in that war probably came from the Danube flotilla, Austro-Hungarian Navy, which helped the Imperial Army to fight the Serbian defenses after 28 July 1914.
"Self Destruct Devices”
(See R. C. Smith, p. 96, June 1969 Proceedings)
Kenneth D. Smith, Jr.—During the last few years I have done considerable research on the Cormoran, including a review of official German and U. S. records and documents, and I would like to clarify one or two points in Captain Smith’s letter.
The Cormoran began her seagoing career as the Russian steamer Rjaesan (or Rjasan according to various documents). Built in Germany in 1909 for the Russian Volunteer Fleet Association, the vessel operated between Vlad1'0 stok and Shanghai.
In the early hours of 4 August 1914, 11 Rjasan was sighted in the Straits of Tsushi'11'’ by the soon-to-be-famous German crifof Emden, which was forced to fire several 10’ cm. shells at her before she hove to and s111 rendered. Thus, the Rjasan not only becaIllC the first of the Emden’s many prizes, but participated (unwillingly) in the first nav action of World War I. These were only of several “firsts” or “lasts” involving t0 Cormoran. She was also the last German "rar^ ship to remain at large in the Pacific afl^ Indian Oceans in World War I and, as note in Captain Smith’s letter, she participated l0 the first military action involving the Unfie States after it entered the war.
As Captain Smith indicated, the Comoro1 raiding career was unsuccessful, and Adfflir Graf von Spee undoubtedly recognized th this would be the case when he detached dlC Cormoran and the Prinz Eitel Friedrich fr°°j his squadron and sent them south to ra1 merchant shipping in Australian wate'5' His main purpose in sending these two raid1’15 south was temporarily to distract attenti°° from the movement to South America (al1 ultimate destruction) of the main force of the German East Asia Squadron, and in this be was successful.
Upon internment in Guam, the 6of' moron’s radio transmitter was effectively Pllt out of action and the breech plugs were re‘ moved from her eight 10.5-cm. cannon. Ho"' ever, her ammunition and smaller weapoPs’ including light cannon, machine guns, rifleS’ and pistols, remained on board. These wer° not removed from the ship until after Cap' tain Zuckschwerdt blew her up on 7 Aprl 1917, approximately two-and-one-half yearS after her internment. This armament wa* later salvaged by U. S. Navy divers, allC several of the smaller pieces are still on dis' play at the U. S. Naval Academy Museufl1' Ed. Note: An even earlier “first shot” is recordW in “ The Imperial and Royal Austro-HungarW1 Navy,” (Annapolis, Md.\ U. S. Naval Institute 1969) by Anthony E. Sokol, “...World War began when the monitor Temes oj the Austr»' Hungarian Danube Flotilla opened fire on the di' fenses at Belgrade. The first shot was fired at 0220 on 29 July 1914 ”
[1] P
e^t anagraphs 3, 4, and 5 are quoted from a state- i]:. ° 5 February 1969, by the various professors o tary science.