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IVI Hilary officers who have served in Southeast Asia seem to agree that aSfnen in Vietnam have written distorted tor°UntS rnilitary activities in that warn nation. Some might nod understanding^ c^n reminded that General William Te- ha SC^ ^dermanJ who once had a newsman cc Sed for
espionage, wrote that he would ab ller governed by Jefferson Davis than "'ho^ ^ a Set dirty newspaper scribblers 0 have the impudence of satan. ...”
Th
0e amount of information that has poured jjas Vietnam has been staggering. Not only to flore been written and filmed in regard ot> e Vietnam conflict than during any American military engagement, it is •n? V u^0n S drst extensive war coverage, meanly •at battles are being viewed 24 hours of a ln ccdor tn the living rooms of millions rnericans. The impact is obvious. he .e number of the press corps—“press” einafter applies to all forms of mass com
munications—in Vietnam is said to have soared to over 600 after the Communists’ Tet offensive in January 1968. The figure normally is closer to 500, which means that there is a news correspondent for every thousand American servicemen in that country. The total is four to five times larger than that of correspondents reporting the Korean military engagement in the 1950s. That enormous press corps and their comparably enormous daily word output to U. S. mass communications outlets in the United States—10,000 newspapers, 8,000 magazines, and 7,000 radio and television stations—would seem to indicate that the American public has been well- exposed, if not overexposed, to the war.
Obviously, any criticism of the press coverage as being too limited will not hold water. What, then, is the reason for the sharp criticism of the Vietnam war correspondent? Why does the military and government official frequently feel frustrated by the “distorted” coverage by the American press?
If the military officer is to address himself honestly to the question of the press corps in Vietnam, he first must attempt to isolate the criticisms that have been leveled against the press. Secondly, he must examine the role of journalism in the open American society against the background of those criticisms. Only then is one able to determine whether or not the newsman in Vietnam has been responsible or irresponsible.
Five basic criticisms have been made against the press corps in Vietnam. In general, the complaints most often fall within the following groups.
• Position reporting. Historian S. L. A. Marshall claims that the news coverage of Vietnam has been the worst since “Zach Taylor at Buena Vista.” If he is right, many would blame “position reporting.” Position
reporting results when a newsman forms an opinion and takes a position on some aspect of a problem, thereafter reporting or stressing only that news which supports his position. Newsmen recognize the problem. Anthony Lewis of The New York Times, for example, is quoted as saying that it is clear “that the reporter must not become . . . committed . . . His instinct should be the other way.”
The Minister of Information for the U. S. Mission in Vietnam, Barry Zorthian, was quoted in 1967 as saying that he does not charge the press with deliberate blindness or distortion, but that once an impression is made on the newsman, it is hard to dislodge it. He cited as an example his feeling that some newsmen had developed an impression that the South Vietnamese soldier is not an able fighter and that the impression has become set in concrete in the reporter’s mind. In considering position reporting, however, one must not confuse it with interpretive reporting, a legitimate and necessary function.
• Crisis reporting. Many reporters overplay the sensational events, emphasizing those that will garner the headlines, while playing down or entirely overlooking activities that are meaningful to a complete understanding of the situation. The Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, Edward Barrett, told a gathering of newsmen in 1967, that journalism should be less concerned with events as they happen and more concerned with providing the public better background information about the events. Time defined the problem as early as 1966, stating: “Almost every Saigon newsman agrees that there has been an over-emphasis on day-to-day activities, that more time should be spent on background stories. But where will they find the time?” In the 10 June 1966 issue of Time, freelance writer Wendell Merrick opined, “We plod along and delude the American reader by not reporting enough on such things as the rural pacification and rebuilding programs in the villages. I don’t think the American people are misinformed, but I think they are ill-informed.”
• Uninformed, reporting. Harold Kaplan, a former chief of the U. S. Mission Press Center, has been quoted as saying that the reporter in Vietnam often is not as well-informed as his government counterpart. Certainly, without the necessary background knowledge, the perspective of a news story likely will be out of focus. If the newsman is not informed—has not done his homework—the report to the American public will be at best superficial' Kaplan’s criticism undoubtedly contains some validity. There have been newsmen who have not fully understood the situation. There have been newsmen in Vietnam who were inexperienced and who did not fully comprehend the responsibilities of journalism. Conversely) there also have been newsmen in Vietnam who possess a very thorough understanding the situation, and who, in fact, have been m that country much longer than the official whose tour of duty usually is but a year or two- Many American military people, caught up 111 a small, inaccessible corner of the war, have gratefully listened to a visiting newsman pr°' vide an intelligent overview of the war effort as he had covered it throughout Vietnam-
A misconception lingers in military circle3 that the newsmen do not get out into the countryside to see for themselves. A safer generalization would be that newsmen have covered military operations and visited the countryside whenever possible. The number of newsmen and cameramen killed and wounded attests to this. In May 1968 CharleS Eggleston, a 23-year old United Press International photographer, became the seventeenth correspondent killed in Vietnam- Scores have been wounded. The casualty lists climb.
One of the dramatic stories of the war centers on the quartet of newsmen killed Cholon last spring by a Communist band 0 terrorists who shot four of the five mufti-clad reporters, even as they shouted “Bao chi'. Ba° chi'.” (Vietnamese for newsman.) One of the group feigned being shot, then dashed f°r safety, where he later recounted the story-
i
• Factual reporting. Errors persistently plague news reporters, and in Vietnam the number of errors that have been filed by newsmen, and which subsequently have form their way into print or into news broadcasts) is undoubtedly large. To appreciate the problem, it must be remembered that not1" factual statements, almost without excepti°m are unintentional. A newsman’s profession3 standing is in large part based on his accuracy- There appear to be two levels of errors. ON
troops had not been ambushed. They
had 1
c°ncerns minor errors that do not substan- hally detract from the public understanding.
116 second level includes those serious mistakes which, even though corrected later, maY have a prejudicial effect on the reader. Tew Tork Times writer Jack Raymond has Scribed how errors can result from reports resh from the battlefield. General Westmore- "d was advised by telephone from Washing- °n of headlined stories that claimed an a"’bush had caught U. S. troops and forced to retreat. In reality, Raymond wrote,
■The
^ unexpectedly come upon an unsuspecting °rth Vietnamese Army unit. Both sides were ^Jrprised into instantaneous combat. The lead ’"erican assumed at first that they had been aJ"bushed and said so in an on-the-spot inter- YyCvv- Ironically, when it was over, General estnioreland described the clash as the latest victory of the war up to that time.” n the initial shock of battle, erroneous infor- non had been filed—certainly not inten- "ally. The incident strongly underlines the ., essity for a newsman to make every pose effort to determine the facts before filing nfr;t0ry' ^ illustrates the necessity for military l Cers to recognize that the initial shock of he can lead to erroneous reporting. °ubtless, deadline pressures are the most j, "’on reason for factual errors. Stanley arn°w, a well-known and respected news- <(g n c°vering the Asian scene, explains that c^rcc competition between news agen- c ' ■ • frequently results in half-cocked ac- Certainly, major combat stories will receive wide attention must be ^fully checked.
^ or the record, too, it should be noted even the most professional example of jecturate, factual reporting often may be sub- do t0 su^sequent editorial shortcomings that : ,n° service to the reporter in the field. Few, seee<a’ are the reporters who have not ob- ho\v ' with understandable unhappiness, rW lhe original validity and accuracy of a "ot rt’ aS ^e<^’ undergoes severe stresses, if 0utnght distortions, which are imposed by de f,Xl^enc*es °f space available, press-time l.- lnes> and the inherent hazards of head- llne writing.
qu* Not-on-the-team. One of the most fre- "tly heard criticisms of the newsman in
Vietnam is that he “is not on the team.” Evident from discussions with numerous officials, both military and civilian, is a tendency to feel that, if a correspondent reports an unpleasant event, he becomes an adversary. American Ambassador Nolting once asked a group of reporters, “Why don’t you newsmen give [President] Diem the benefit of the doubt?” Admiral H. D. Felt, U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Pacific, has been reported as facing several newsmen in Saigon in 1964 and admonishing them to “get on the team.” Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey, while talking to some 30 U. S. correspondents during his November 1967 trip to the Republic of Vietnam, asked them, “When you speak to the American people, give the benefit of the doubt to our side. I don’t think that’s asking too much. We’re in this together.”
Still, events do get reported that military or government leaders simply would prefer not to have reported. There is an understandable explanation. It has to do with what military officers and football coaches call a “victory momentum.” It also has to do with the simple but extremely important ingredient called morale. Those who recognize the phenomenon are disappointed at news accounts that they feel detract from the drive to victory by dividing the American public or at best cast doubt on how the effort is progressing. It is not difficult to understand a military leader’s feeling that a newsman is not on the team when he reports military or nationbuilding setbacks, or writes articles from Saigon dealing with corruption in government, the black market or myriad other subjects reflecting the dark side of the war.
But, military officers dare not forget what team membership could mean to the press in an open society. If getting on the team means that reporters must eliminate all criticism of the effort in Southeast Asia; if it means no adverse articles, even though factual, then the cost of membership is, understandably, too high for an honorable newsman to pay.
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy said, “ . . . there is little value in opposing the threat of a closed society by imitating its arbitrary restrictions. . . . there is little value in insuring the survival of our nation if our traditions do not survive with it.” As James
Reston points out, our Founding Fathers were quite dogmatic about the role of the press, writing into the first article of the Bill of Rights a flat prohibition against government control of the press “and even assumed the opposite: that the press would censor the government.”
The role of the American press is unique in helping maintain the traditions of our nation. While there are no “enforceable” rules to assure responsible journalism, other than certain legal restraints which will be mentioned briefly, responsibility of the press has become a tenet, which, though not enforceable, is no less meaningful to responsible journalists. To understand the press operations in Vietnam and to evaluate them properly, it is necessary to possess at least a cursory understanding of the functions of journalism. In general, it may be said that a responsible press ought:
• To enlighten. Journalism is charged with the function of enlightening the public, by informing the public of events of interest, or “news,” and by discussing and analyzing those events. A straight, factual news story informs the public, while editorials, news analyses and even letters-to-the-editor assist the reader to understand what the story is about, what it means to him. While informing the public, the press is responsible, as the Commission on Freedom has noted, for providing a “truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them meaning.” This simply means that fact must be distinguishable from opinion or speculation. If the reader is deceived or confused, if he is led to believe a halftruth is a whole truth, he is not being properly informed.
• To act as a guardian. The press should act as a watchdog—or a censor—to assure that rights of the individual are not encroached upon by the government. In performing its watchdog functions, it is apparent that dissent is a proper part of the guardian concept. The role of guardian does not require elaborate discussion in a country where the individual’s rights are basic to its principles.
• To be a market place. The press should act as a common market place, bringing the buyer and seller together. This function leads
us directly to the fourth point, having to do with the economics of journalism.
• To avoid special interests. The news media should remain economically independent so as to avoid the special interests that depen' dency brings with it. This does not mean that a publication will not express its own opinions- It simply means that it should remain free of outside special interests. Naturally enough) the profit motive plays an important role m the news industry. The accusation hurled a1 newsmen, that they are only interested 1,1 “selling papers,” takes on new light when viewed in this context. The term unfortunately has an onerous connotation, whereas “selling newspapers” is exactly what one should expect of a publisher. An analogy could be drawn to the American usage of the word “politics,” a word that has long since been given a rather lowly place in our lexicon when the reverse should have been true.
• To entertain. This point is clear enough to obviate discussion, and is mentioned merely in order to round out the responsibd1' ties and functions of the American press.
The press, then, has specific responsibilities in an open society. It also has restrictions- For purposes of simplification, one may group these restrictions under three headings:
• Legal restrictions. The individual has 3 right to his privacy and a right to be protected from slander.
• Public pressure. Public pressure is re' fleeted more or less unconsciously in what n printed or broadcast. An excessively grisly war photograph, for example, may be gen' erally unacceptable to a newspaper’s readers) and, therefore, is not published. At the same time, responsible journalists such as Clift01*1 Daniel, Managing Editor of The New 1°^ Times, recognize that the press “must tel people what they need to know, not what they would like to hear.” The two points are n°t contradictory, however, since one point has to do with public acceptance and the other> with responsibility.
• National interests. Clearly, if the nation s security could be jeopardized by the public3' tion of certain information, then that information should not be published. But this g°eS beyond the simple matter of military security' A study of the problem results in the naggin§
that
reflects adversely on the efforts inViet-
inclusion that there are limitations short of 'n>Htary security which are nonetheless vital ° the national interests, and, for that reason, p °uld be a restricting factor on the journalist. °r example, premature publication of sensi- Ve foreign policy information during negotiations with another country, while not violate mhitary security, may in fact jeopardize e results of the conference to a point where llational interests are adversely affected.
^ discussion of the coverage of the Vietnam ^nfiict would not be complete without a nef word on the “credibility gap.” Nor- ^ahy, for our purposes, the term refers to a nation in which the American public has not §iven full credence to government pro- ll0Uncements on the war situation. In Viet- the credibility breakdown is described " newsmen as having resulted from official . Crnents and briefings that have either tK Sle<^ ^le Press corps or omitted information
The New York Times columnist James eston notes that “War always raises delicate . C1 even dangerous complications in the rela- y.ns between officials and reporters, but ^jetnam has raised more than most. . . . So> the Administration’s relations with re- .ers in the Vietnam war have been ls°ned by a long record of misleading stately nts by generals in the field and officials in
ashington about how well the war was going. . >>
tt Credibility inevitably raises the question of ^r'anaging the news.” Times writer Jack yaymond clarifies the predicament of the th'etnarn situation, controversially contending t the government has a responsibility pre- ev to manage the news. “The irony of the t^esent situation,” he wrote last year, “is that job ^0Vernment is doing an increasingly good Qf °i facilitating news coverage of the war. ist C°Ursc’ like its predecessors, this Admin- ation has sought to ‘manage the news’ in yp er to cast a favorable light on its efforts.
anaging the news is not only a prerogative of gov- ariri6nt’ ^ut Pr0Per responsibility. [Italics
P ed.] News should not be mismanaged, ^Otyever. If, as has been contended, news is a tQrpP°n in the governmental arsenal, then dis- *°ns and cover-ups—even when small in Utl|ber—can lead to self-inflicted wounds.”
To analyze the torrent of Vietnam-dateline news material would be an impossible chore. But, we can take samplings from the flowing stream, provided we recognize this as a hazardous method of determining whether correspondents in Vietnam have been responsible or not—whether they have supported the tenets of responsible journalism. Shall we, then, sample three randomly selected periods to determine how the news coverage of the Vietnam war should be characterized?
The first period is from December 1964 to January 1965. The American effort was to expand greatly only a few months later when Vietnam was faced with a rapidly deteriorating military situation. Even so, in December 1964, there were thousands of U. S. military officers and men serving in Vietnam, and for that reason there was considerable news media attention. Almost without exception, news magazines, which were the primary focus of attention during this period, depicted the situation as extremely grim. Article headlines, such as U. S. News & World Report’s “Choice in Vietnam: Get Tough—or Out,” reflected what most news magazines were telling the American public. The defeatist attitude in the press was scored at the time by officials, reflecting the combined criticisms that the press was “not on the team,” but simply indulging in crisis reporting. The influx of American troops lessened the impact of the criticism, since the reports seemed to have accurately reflected the real situation. One could even argue perhaps that the articles during that period contributed to the formulation of public opinion that later helped Americans understand the necessity for introducing American combat troops.
A review of that period seems to indicate that news reporting in general was meeting the criteria placed upon journalism by the American society.
The first week of 1966, a year later, found the U. S. government in the midst of an attempt to bring about a settlement of the Vietnam crisis through what was popularly being called a “peace offensive.” The news as reflected in three newspapers was largely concerned with this effort. Understandably, the military report from Saigon, received much less attention than did the peace efforts of the government.
The quality of military news reports was considerably better than the year before. The standards of responsible journalism were not being blatantly violated. Viet Cong casualties were prominently listed along with friendly casualties. Examples of stalwart military action on the part of American troops were provided the public. The newspapers even exhibited restraint in reporting the use of the controversial riot control agents. Instead of sensationalizing the official confirmation that the “173rd has sprayed tear gas from helicopters ... in an attempt to drive Viet Cong soldiers out of jungle hiding places,” the material was given factually and in proper context. At least one newsman, however, has disagreed with this conclusion, writing a year later that the use of non-lethal gases (riot control agents) was improperly reported. He claimed newsmen over-dramatized the use of tear gas as though it was poison gas. “The stories,” according to that writer, “did not say they were poison but the tone of reporting implied that.” However, the accounts of the three newspapers studied, The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Christian Science Monitor, did not fit that “sensationalized” category. In fact, a prevalent military feeling at the time in regard to the humanitarian use of riot control agents was that the press handled the subject quite well. Granted there were instances of faulty reporting during the period, but they were comparatively minor.
In December 1967, exactly three years from the first period studied, one finds the newspapers and other news media organizations reporting a vastly different, but equally frustrating, situation in Southeast Asia. The newsmagazines of December 1964 represented an era when less than 100 newsmen were reporting the Vietnam scene. Three years later, there were approximately 500. The battle news reflected a brighter picture. A small South Vietnamese hamlet named Budop was in the headlines, where American troops were described as having repelled “assault waves on a Camp near Cambodia.” Troops were described in another battle as having been drawn away from “important rural pacification duties.” It was a period characterized by information about battles, and also about the nation-building aspects of the Vietnam effort
niust
A graduate of Duke Uni''CI of th; sity in 1952, Lieutenant Co10' ^
mander Blanchard was a rC porter for the INS Atlanta ,rag< Georgia, Bureau before set' 4 Set ing, from 1956 until 1958, j1’ ne\ys Assistant Public Affa'r< than
Officer, COMFAIR, A1)' tu
meda. From 1958 until > P
he was assigned to the Ne"s 0 fu Desk and TV/Radio Dh'; erilig sion, CHINFO. He then served two years as PAOt°' prehi
the Second Fleet, two years as Assistant PAO, CO'
TWELVE, and one year as PAO, Staff Military A ^ sistance Command, Vietnam. From 1965 to 1967, n ' J
was Assistant PAO to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific' Tl
He is now PAO, U. S. Naval Support Activity' Sirtie Naples, Italy. cfisis
------------------------------------------------- jourr
fact
which the press is often said to overlook. Thw vital themselves admit that nation-building t0° the i often gets little attention. A study of the ne'vS papc during the first week of December 1967, ho''" artic ever, negates certain criticisms leveled at thc sacri newsman in Vietnam. Not only did battleS nlen receive generally straightforward treatm^1 the but nation-building, the bravery of Sou1 preh Vietnamese troops, and Viet Cong atrocit'0’ day’
all were reported. hiea
. i ness.
Obviously, fair judgment of the America1’ f0lln press corps in Vietnam cannot rest solely0'1 ernp small samplings of the news reports over J plaj, three-year period. Such a sampling does nflt tean
attempt to evaluate, for example, thetele' ciSrt
vision footage of a Marine holding a cigarettc lighter to a peasant’s hut in I Corps area. f
does it consider the sense of helpless frusti'a' ade
tion military officers experienced when det(
New York Times provided its readers with a" tna, eight-article series on the effects of the Awerl bif; can bombing campaign in North Vietnam1’ jcct
while no corresponding coverage was givent0 : diSl
the horrors which the Communist Viet Co1® 1 det are inflicting daily on the peasants of Sou du,
Vietnam. It does not accurately reflect the 1° ha- dignation experienced when news phot0 hil
graphs depicted cruelty within South Vietna11’ pC|
ese ranks, while news accounts of a viUa§e chiefs family members, who had been dise'1’ , boweled during the night by the Communis1®’ slipped by with only scant notice. These in0' dents flash immediately to mind when ne" reporting in Vietnam is discussed. Yet, tne>
Univef nt Con1' ■as a re' Atlanta! >re sen” 1958, a' Affair* t, Mail 196®> ie Ne^ a DU' 3AO f°r
COM'
ary M" 967, hc Pacific
Lctivity>
Preh,
*n that •ffet ir
ensive, and intelligent report of the events
They g too : new*
, hoW' at the aattle5 tmeo1 Sou^ ;>cities
that correspondents have covered the
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Waning.” Crisis reporting has been aweak- {• Ss- The other criticisms, while not without °undation, very likely have been over- Phasized in many cases. And one com-
Plai
l®am-
cisrn [
n'ust be weighed against the entire coverage 0 that war.
Respite popular impressions that war cov- l|aSe in Vietnam has been distorted—often, See®s, giving comfort to the enemy—the ‘lews report has been far more responsible an most of us believe. When viewed from c Perspective of journalism as it is supposed c° fUnction in the United States—that is, to 'ghten the public with an unbiased, com- war—the news coverage generally has journalism’s responsibilities, the principal criticism which could be . e<t at the press corps in Vietnam is that of . 1Sls reporting, a traditional weakness of f^nalism in the United States. Despite the
nation-building efforts, the emphasis of e news has been the battle. As one news- Per admitted, “In the choice and play of teles about the war, interpretive pieces are tCrtficed to the hard-hitting day’s develop- ^ nts.” Responsible journalism must provide e reader or viewer with a “truthful, com- ^ tensivcj and intelligent account of the y s events in a context which gives them
lr,l that newsmen have not been on the
-as we have seen, is not a valid criti- tn the final analysis.
1 is apparent that television has not been ^ ec|uately addressed in this discussion. To etermine if that relatively new medium of , ss communication has met the responsi- . 1 tes of journalism could well be the sub- jj. °f a long study. But, even from limited ^^cussions with television news correspon- ^nts> it is clear that some members of the in- stry question whether television does not iull6 ^rnPortant stePs to take before it has y met its responsibilities to the American °ple. However, it should be noted that
documentaries have provided some excellent coverage of the Vietnam story. The basic criticism of television seems to rest in the belief that its coverage of the war tends toward superficiality. Certainly, the finest traditions of the war correspondent have been met by that tireless corps of television correspondents in Vietnam. The number of casualties sustained in their ranks attests to that.
In addition to resolving the problem of crisis reporting, news organizations must assure that experienced and capable newsmen are assigned to South Vietnam. It is a highly involved conflict that demands experience as well as intelligence. This does not mean that the young, inexperienced reporter should be a stranger to the battlefield. It simply means that seasoned reporting generally is required in a news bureau if the news report is to meet the standards of responsible journalism. News agencies should insist on a balanced and unbiased report from their representatives.
While this is not a discussion of the military role in the press coverage of the Vietnam conflict, it is clear that the military contribution to the general effort to obtain responsible news coverage is an important one. The matter of credibility in press relations is both crucial and difficult, and it will be an important factor in any future limited war.
Equally important, too, is the need for the military officer to understand the role of journalists and journalism before attempting to appraise the press.
Meanwhile, opinions of the press report from Vietnam likely will continue to vary from what Senator Thomas Dodd has described as “A distorted, incomplete and inaccurate picture,” to General Maxwell Taylor’s comments before a Congresssional group that the newsmen in Vietnam have been “reasonably accurate,” to unstinting praise from Senator Mike Mansfield who characterized the press as having “been outstanding in every respect.”
The press report from Vietnam has been what each of them says—and more.