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IV ost U. S. scholars in the past have dis- P A cussed the military and militarism in ahn America only when these subjects in- ed upon, or affected, their principal areas study. Generally, these writers were politi- scientists, sociologists, economists or his-
lans, many of them with no military exTrience or background in their own lives. a<;'r writings for the most part reflected their atlpathy—as well as that of the Puritan ethic ninety ^lat produced them—to everything
^ -^Tost of these scholars concluded that the ti^tln American military, with little justifica- t n. ^or the traditional military role of pro- ^ the nation from outside aggression, ofS 'uterfering with the accepted civilian role a ‘ninistering the nation, making laws, and
hj, --****311.1 mg me n*inun, maxing laws, a ^fving internal order. They applied
to
this T •----------------- —
Sg r-^tin society the same criteria that made
eSseC *n t'le*r own> Quite different, society. Ir Oon
ence, they implied that if only the heavy, Unproductive weight of militarism could be
horn the backs of the people, food would hungry mouths, ragged backs would be
prjk&h anQ justice and U{
Aa*l throughout the land, larilnCe War II, however, and particu-
during the past decade, certain scholars t^r6 aeen studying the Latin American mili- , Per se. Many of these observers possess the a,1C^ knowledge of military life. Using research skills of their various disciplines
and Justice and Democracy would
and recognizing that the role of the military in any nation grows out of the pressures and needs of the whole society, these scholars are developing a new appreciation of the role of the Latin American military.
The Greeks, in listing the various forms by which people are governed, ranked democracy as least desirable, next only to chaos. Many of the countries of the world are democracies. Our difficulty is that we tend to think of these countries as functioning in the same manner as does our own democracy. They do not. Even England, whose democratic forms most resemble our own, is different.
If, then, our increasingly significant relations with the nations to the south of us are to reflect our awareness of and appreciation for their way of life, a better understanding of their origins is in order.
The two great systems of law observed in the Western Hemisphere, Roman Law and English Common Law, reflect to a considerable degree the similarities and divergencies which cause the Latin American and the North American to evaluate the same problem or situation on the basis of different concepts. And, as Professor F. H. Lawson reminds us, “The law of a nation expresses, in the long run, the character of a nation, and a similarity of the legal method corresponds to a similarity in other aspects of social life.”
Burckland and McNair observe in Roman Law and Common Law, “In the Roman law
65
in
the service of the Revolution, and later, of dlC infant Republic. Still, we experienced a p‘r iod of fragmentation during 1781-1789, wbfI’ we were governed under the Articles of Co11 federation. The drift towards a chaos of qlia.r reling states, each claiming sovereignty wid1"’ its borders and taxing other states, avoided by the narrowest of margins wh New York, a critical state, ratified the Co*1 stitution of 1787 by a majority of three votes’ 27 to 30.
Now, let us follow the other stream Western culture, again with the Roman arllj_ ies, to Spain. The Romans brought the cU ture which resulted not only in their langua^e’ but also—and this is quite important m ^ laws. Roman law is like a Roman wall, W1 , every brick mortared to that which preceo it, and the pattern quickly discernible. . _
As the Roman sword rusted, Spain was ^ vaded by the Goths, Visigoths, Vandals, al1
no agreement was a contract unless the law made it binding. In our law (Common Law) every agreement purporting to affect legal relations is a contract unless the law for some reason, such as illegality, or lack of consideration, rejects it.”
It is not surprising, then, that the United States should often feel morally bound, whether or not it is treaty obligated, to do certain things. This “moral obligation” is a significant, if not always satisfying, factor in both our private and national lives and often causes us to do more than is required by the letter of the law.
Since all Latin American countries except Cuba are democracies under a republican form of government, let us try to determine how the Anglo-Saxon and Latin concepts of “democracy”—and, at the same time, “militarism”—came to be so different.
All of us, North Americans and Latin Americans, have sipped from the stream of Western culture whose headwaters were the ancient Greek city-states. From Greece the cultural flow passed to Rome. Here, after some centuries, the first fork occurred. One stream passed with the Roman armies to what is now Western Europe, thence to Britain with the Roman outposts. In both instances it mixed with the murky waters of crude peoples.
In Britain, the culture was ultimately and basically influenced by the Magna Carta and the resultant heritage of Common Law that eventually exerted such a profound influence on the United States. In England, during the centuries that followed the signing of the Magna Carta, the struggle between the absolute power of the king, diminished since Runnymeade, and the broader base of power exercised first by the nobles, and increasingly thereafter by the landed gentry and the emerging mercantile class, swayed back and forth. England, in the historical perspective, was in a constant state of instability. Recurrently, the Duke of This or That arose with a band of local followers and others enticed to his banner by family or political arrangements— and marched on London. These nobles were sometimes defeated in the field, and, themselves had to flee, or the king’s adherents were defeated and he had to flee, generally to France. This state of things continued until the Wars of the Roses.
We tend to forget, however, that the period of instability in our Anglo-Saxon culture was fought out for us in England, that only yesterday, historically speaking, the English beheaded a king; Charles I. The great legacy the English bequeathed to the United States was the two-party system and the concept o* “Loyal Opposition.”
Three types of colonies developed in North America: Proprietary—Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware—Corporate—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut—anu Crown—the remainder of the colonies. In in' stitutions such as the House of Burgesses 111 Virginia, the colonists had local representation in government for generations. These representatives often overruled Royal Governors, particularly where money was concerned' Committees of Correspondence were estah fished and, increasingly, as the situation wu ^ England grew more tense, the interchange 0 information between the colonies made ap parent to them their interdependence. The fate of one was the fate of all. When the tiuie of proof came in the closing of Boston’s harb and the clash of arms at Lexington an Breed’s Hill, the colonies stood as one. Sup plies and men were furnished by all of colonies to fight in Massachusetts.
Our great good fortune at this period waS that there were several political geniuses
e period ure W2® f yester- lish bet legacy d States ncept of
a North
, Mary-
issachu-
ut—and s. In i"' rp«ses i11
Atni
> du:
J^ther semi-barbaric peoples. Two other pro- °hnd influences were exerted upon Spain
riod "’aS fluses in
it, of the
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;y with111
tes, 'vaS ns whel1 he Coo- se votes;
reant ian an" the c"1' ingna§e’ it-theh
ith
all, Wf
>recede^
i was i°' lals,
Entering the naval service in 1926, Captain Toner was commissioned in 1933. His 39-year career included seven sea commands: USS PC-465, USS PC-1225, USS Fleming (DE- 153), USS Keller (DE-419), Destroyer Escort Division 89, USS English (DD-696), and the USS Mississinewa (AO. 144). Long a student of Latin
ptierican affairs, he was Chief of Naval Mission to fpCUa^or an<l Naval Advisor to the Minister of De- Cnse, Republic of Ecuador. During the Cuban Quar- ntlnc and Dominican Republic crisis, he com- Jnded the U. S. Naval Station, San Juan, Puerto p'Co- In 1965, he joined the staff, University of or'da, as Assistant Director of the Center for Latin erican Studies.
Spanish cities became walled enclosures into which the tillers of the soil retreated each night. Out of this there grew an intense feeling and attitude of local identity, La Palria Chica, (the little fatherland), the localismo of the Latin American. In its essence the culture of Spain was made up of small monarchies. The driving impulse of the reconquest came from the central upland kingdom of Castile, the “Land of Castles.” The Casdllians, a breed as hard and unconquerable as their native country, possessed a profound sense of their intimacy with God and of their own worth. These men contributed much to Spain’s greatness—and to her eventual decline.
It is essential to an appreciation of Spanish culture, to be ever mindful of two of its mainsprings. First, there was and is Spain’s intimate association with Christianity—for the war against the Moor was a religious war.— Seneca said, “Spain was Christian perhaps before Christ.” The Spaniard also derived a sensuous feeling for religion from both Jew and Moor. Secondly, Spaniards place great value on courage and soldierly virtues. The “way of the warrior” was ultimately inherited by the Conqmstadores, in whose veins ran Spanish and Moorish blood that had mingled, particularly in the South of Spain.
Spanish faith, then, was a militant faith. During the 12th century, several military orders were founded; their patron saint was Saint James—Santiago—who was known as “The Moor Killer.” These orders, the Knights Templar and the Hospitalers; the Knights of Santiago, Calatrava, Alcantara, Uccles, and Montessa, ultimately became the hard core of the Spanish army under Ferdinand and Isabella. Entirely familiar, too, is another order organized on a military basis by a soldier, Ignatius Loyola; La Compania de JeSus— the Jesuits.
Along with the great gifts bestowed by the Moors, the Spaniard inherited one of the Arab’s most glaring weaknesses. This is best summed up in the writings of the Arab historian, Ibn Khaldun; “Generally speaking, the Arabs are incapable of founding an empire except on a religious basis such as the Revelation of a Prophet or a Saint, because their fierce character, pride, roughness, and jealousy of one another, especially in political matters, make them the most difficult of
of
The struggle for self-liberation in
rdr
peoples to lead . . . and also because every Arab regards himself as worthy to rule.” This is a trait of Spanish character that repeated itself throughout subsequent Spanish history. Spanish nobles said to a king, “You are simply a knight like the rest of us.”
Spain’s great tragedy was the expulsion of the Moors and Jews, a considerable portion taking place in 1492, a year of some interest to the Western Hemisphere. Within the next few decades a strong flow of Spanish culture was brought to the New World by two courageous and audacious groups of men, the Conquistadores, and the priests and monks; each seeking their own version of the greatest of prizes: for one group, gold and honor for and from the king; for the other, the winning of immortal souls for a greater King.
The Conquistadores, like the clergy, brought no wives with them—only their swords of Spanish steel. In the northern and southern portions of their earliest explorations they encountered two highly advanced Indian cultures, the Mayas—more correctly, the Aztec and Toltec inheritors of that culture—and in Peru, the Incas. The Mayans were the Greeks of the Pre-Columbian world, they built the great city-states of Palenque, Tikal, Chichen Itza, and Uxmal, and, within them, immense pyramids, and temples of splendid design. Their astronomers and mathematicians had developed a calendar more exact than that of the Julian calendar of the Spaniards.
The Incas were the Romans of the New World. When the Inca’s conquered a people they did not slaughter, enslave, and plunder. The conquered were incorporated into the empire and the sons of the caciques, or chief- tans, were taken as hostages to the Inca capital of Cuzco and raised as wards of the Inca.
In Chile, the Conquistadores encountered the warlike Araucanians, very much like our own Indians of the Western Plains, who fought the Spaniards and their descendents for nearly 400 years. They were never conquered; a peace treaty was signed in the latter part of the 19 th century.
Authoritarianism was deeply imbedded in Spanish colonial government. During the Spanish colonial period all upper echelons; civilian, military, and ecclesiastical, were Spanish Peninsulares, brought from the Mother
Country for a tour of duty, then to return 1° Spain. Latin Americans thus early became accustomed to the Spoils System, since the majority of the Peninsulares considered the King’s appointment a reward and an opp°r' tunity to enrich themselves.
Contrast this with the parliamentary forms of government then in vogue in the Nod American colonies. In 1641, for example, at a meeting in Newport, Rhode Island, the select' men stated, “ . . . the government which this body politic doth attent to ... is a democracy or popular government . . . that is to say: itlS in the power of the body of freemen, orderly assembled, or the major part of them, to mak6 or constitute just laws, by which they will 0 regulated, and to depute from among them selves such ministers as shall see their fa* fully executed between man and man.”
Vast distances, immense mountain rangeS and deserts, separated the Latin America'1 colonies. There were no natural barriers of s° formidable a nature separating the Nod American colonies, and the sea was their opeI1 highway. While the sea was equally imp°r tant to the Spanish colonies, the distances wed far greater. To reach the four west coa colonies; Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colo'1^ bia—except for the Caribbean coast 0 Colombia—it was necessary to round Cap Horn, usually a fearful experience, or transport men and merchandise across 1 Isthmus of Panama where Yellow Jack lay ambush.
Large Indian populations continued thrive as their blood and heritage and 1 ^ Spaniards’ intermingled throughout most the Spanish colonies. This was partiem3 true of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Cond ^ this with the North American genocidal so tion to its Indian problem—kill them off war or watch them die by disease and, fma ’ herd the survivors into reservations.
all
Latin America continued for almost a qua of a century, although most of the battles W fought between 1815 and 1825. It was an UP rising of intellectuals rather than of a Pe°P^e Profoundly influenced by the writers of *• Age of Enlightenment, this oligarchy moved to action in most instances by Napa on’s conquest of the Mother Country-
eturn to became ince the ;red the a oppof'
ry form® e North iple, at a ae select" hich this
fo:
e,r military adversaries, found themselves l“e only group competent and capable of excising power in an organized manner, there ,ere no local organized civilian groups, and Cce the military controlled one of the inanimations of power—force—political power °uld have flowed to them even if they had C attempted to seek it; which they did. In- ependence for many Latin American coun-
LTorth American Revolution, the first true Evolution of modern times, had also inspired the oligarchy. But, to those Latin Americans tt'ho closely watched developments to the hiorth, the actions of their Yankee neighbors '''ere not always easy to understand. In the united-in-name-only states, several years of •tear chaos had resulted from government Under the Articles of Confederation. A strong federalist government was deemed to be esSential after the Constitution was adopted in ^89, in order to hold together and form a ^nion of various states with divergent interests. Even though this government was one of SeParation of powers, and included a “Loyal Opposition” of only one other principal party ''vs. the numerous splinter parties of the Spanish tradition—the Liberal Democrats '•nder Jefferson had to wait a generation after Cessation of hostilities before they were able ln come to power. Nor was that era without violence, as witness the “Whiskey Rebellion” ln 1794, and Shay’s Rebellion, which preceded by three years the adoption of the S. Constitution.
Let us see how the fluid and inter-acting irces previously mentioned affected the evolution of the Latin military. Rarely can a uutp line of demarcation be drawn so that °ne could say, “Here at this point one type of |°Vernment ceased and another began.”
. uutetimes with the advantage of hindsight, it ls Possible to indicate a turning point. It is Probably best to consider these varying forms ^government and evolving military, as phases into one another, with occasional relapses. Pace limitation will not permit the discus- jlou of the evolution of the military in all 20 ufln American nations; the four West Coast c°Untries of South America will be used as epical examples.
In the former Spanish colonies the leaders J die Liberation Armies, having defeated
tries was followed by a period of predatory military, sometimes called the Praetorian State, characterized by frequent overthrow of governments and associated with a high degree of social disorganization and political unrest, with a corresponding low degree of professionalism of the military. This was true of Chile and Peru. In 1823, after five years of rule as Dictador Supremo, Bernardo O’Higgins the Liberator, with Jose San Martin, of Chile was overthrown. Some six years of anarchy followed. One ruler, Admiral Blanco Encal- ada, was in power two months.
In Peru, after its liberator San Martin was forced by political pressure to leave, anarchy followed, resulting in 20 years of civil war. In 1832, seven different generals proclaimed themselves “President” at the same time. Political life was dominated by the “Marshals of Ayacucho,” the battle that gave Peru its independence. General Santa Cruz held power two years, his defeat by Chile in 1839 led to another period of anarchy.
The Praetorian State generally phased into what has been termed the Gendarmist State, resulting when a single individual, generally but not always a military man, made himself master of the state, imposed social and political order, tamed the army and made it a gen- darmery to maintain himself in power.
At the time of its independence, Ecuador did not experience the chaos and turmoil of the typical Praetorian State; but it had no alternative but to become part of Gran Colombia, the Super State conceived by Simon Bolivar, comprising Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, since Bolivar’s Army of Liberation continued to occupy the country.
Colombia’s early years as a nation, like Ecuador, resemble more a blurred Gendarmist State rather than a Praetorian State, although there was turmoil. The first struggle for independence was put down by Spanish troops and was followed by a reign of terror. Bolivar, a Venezuelan, crossed the Andes and defeated the Spaniards at Boyaca. Bolivar was elected President and Francisco Paula Santander, another Venezuelan, became Vice President. Santander, called “The Man of Laws,”—“Our arms gave us independence, laws will give us liberty.”—remained in Bogota to give an orderly administration to Colombia, while Bolivar liberated Ecuador.
the
to an elected president. Rojas Pinilla, in
Chile became a Gendarmist State when, in 1829, a Chilean businessman, Diego Portales —whose firm had provided funds in 1824 to pay the national debt in return for a monopoly on tobacco and other commodities—overhauled the army and strengthened the militia. Portales proclaimed the Constitution of 1833, which remained in effect until 1925. Portales, who made Chile a nation, said, “Democracy is an absurdity in our countries. I recommended a republican, strong central government by men of virtue and patriotism.” He was assassinated in 1837. His death united the Chilean people behind the government.
In Peru during July of 1844, General Ramon Castilla, a Cholo (mixed Indian and white blood) and a Caudillo (military leader), restored constitutional order. He was elected president in 1845. It was said of him that he was, “simply a general who understood the people. When he retired in 1862 he had given life to the nation.”
As a result of the growing power and organization of civilian parties, the military learned, sometimes the hard way—as when the populace of Lima and Callao strung up two military leaders to lampposts in 1854,—- that they had to combine with a civilian party to assume power. This shifting of the power base, with occasional lapses into Caudil- lismo, the rule of the single man, might be termed the Transitional State.
The European revolutions of 1848 produced reactions throughout Latin America, liberal parties were formed and were elected to, or seized, power; often under a civilian. The Transitional State, commencing in mid- 19 th century, saw the emancipation of the Negro in many countries, removal of the tribute placed upon the Indian, and a growing anti-clericalism, together with an increase in secular control over education, marriage, and other areas which previously had been the exclusive prerogative of the Church.
Parliamentary governments came into power in the decades at the turn of the century. This led to the development of what has been termed the Civilist State, where the military are essentially a political and under the control of the civil administration. This was particularly true of Chile when the Congress in 1891, with the aid of the Chilean Navy, defeated the forces of President Jose Manuel
Balmaceda, a strongly anti-clerical liberal) who was also called “The last of the personal autocrats.”
Colombia is an anomaly. Caudillismo has never flourished there, it has for the most par1 been ruled by civilians, yet it has experienced and is still suffering from “La Violencia,” the most violent and lasting civil disturbances 31 Latin America. This has been summed up in the following verse:
In Colombia which is the land of singular things,
The military bring peace and civilians bring wars.
Colombian loyalty is given to a symbol or an idea, rarely to a person. Battles are waged for ideals. This is in contrast to the intense personalismo of the greater part of Latin America. No Colombian president has ever been assassinated and a real despot has never been able to maintain himself in power. Yet; Colombia has repeatedly been torn apart b)' civil war and violence. In 1908, it was estf mated that there had been 27 revolutions since independence. In the early 1850s, as was the case in many Latin American countries, 3 liberal reaction set in. The Partido Liberal &■’ pelled the Jesuits and brought about the aboh' tion of negro slavery in 1853, but, in typic3 pattern, civilian factions began to split- Y11 uneasy and continuing struggle for power the11 set in, resulting in civil strife that, in 1899> erupted into the so-called “Thousand Days
War” that left 100,000 dead. ^
Although Colombia has a long tradition 0 an apolitical military, the military did political action in 1953, when the Liber3 b and Conservatives in their continuing qu3f rels threatened the stability of the country General Rojas Pinilla took power, but himself later removed by the military whetl he began to assume dictatorial powers. As result of this political action by the military the Liberals and Conservatives have agree to alternate in the administration of country. The military men turned over po"cl last general election held in Colombia in 196 ’ formed a third party, but was defeated by Liberal, Carlos Restrepo, a well known econ omist. Also, the apolitical Chilean Am1) took political action in 1925 to ensure refornlS’
liberal,
personal
Ismo has lost par1 erienced
no? the ances in ::d up i11
ngular i bring
As is the case with all other military forces, Te Latin American military today performs two major roles. At the risk of oversimplifica- tl°n, the Exterior Role is the traditional role of Te military as a balance of forces to protect nation from agression, or a threat to its v'tal interests. Its Interior Role is the performance of those duties which may significantly affect the organization and functioning of the administration of the government and na- honal economy.
The Interior Role of the Latin American '"ditary can be further subdivided into:
liie Nation Building Role. This has traditionary been a by-product of military training, ^rticularly so in modern times as the tech- logical expertise required of all military, even the lowest ranks, produces skills that are readily transferable to civilian life. And, few 'v°uld deny that Latin America is in need of a
drger middle class.
Of all social institutions in Latin America, e military probably provides the greatest °Pportunity for vertical social and economic mobility. Within its organization it is possible °r a bright but poor boy to win an appointment to a service academy, to receive a com- m'ssion, and to make a socio-economic leap r greater than his U. S. counterpart. Of heater significance however, because of the Teater number involved, is the less-spectacu- r leap of the recruits, who not only learn to rpad and write, but also acquire a skill which 'vdl provide them with far greater opportunity 'vhen they return to civil life.
The Public Service Role. This role is similar lhat of the Nation Building Role, except at the programs are not quite so directly Elated to the military missions of the armed
th,
h;
v*ces. All of the four countries discussed
^ Ve established programs of Ac cion Civica.
' S. military missions have long advocated ls and arc providing funds, equipment, and , "visors to assist. Accion Civica is not only p Ping to satisfy social and economic needs by Toning Up new lands for development, creat- T new markets, building schools, and im- oying licalth and sanitation, it is also pro- a'ng a release from the tremendous pres, lres building up as a result of the fantastic rrease in population in Latin America—-
'
I
I
greater than in any other part of the world including China and India—and the ever- mounting inflation. Desperate people seek desperate remedies.
Some writers argue that the case of Action Cwica does not take into account the exorbitant cost of the military, that the military establishment is “expensive and wasteful.”
Since it is unlikely that the armed forces of any Latin American nation would be voted out of existence—if such a vote were possible —their existence and cost of maintenance is a fact of Latin life that would continue whether or not such military forces are used for Action C'rnca purposes.
The Political Role. McAlister in his chapter “The Military” from, Continuity and Change in Latin America, states, “ . . . The direct intervention of the military in politics, commonly and loosely called ‘militarism,’ is the most spectacular aspect of their political role, and therefore has received most attention. Yet, it resists analysis, for it involves very diverse motivations, forms, and instruments. Historically military men provided not only military but moral and philosophical leadership during the independence movement in Latin America. After the expulsion of Spain they continued in their leadership roles—often as chief executives—and in the first decades of the 19th century they were active participants in the struggle to establish basic political philosophies and forms of governmental organizations. . . . Toward the end of the century, when the basic constitutional forms had been at least theoretically determined and relative stability achieved, the military saw their polit
ical role as the guardianship of the nation3! institutions, traditions and virtues.”
The Super Mission Role. Lieutenant Gene1"3' Benjamin Rattenbach, Argentine Army (^e tired), has stated that “ . . . the militarl overthrow of a constitutional government when the rulers have debased constitution principles, and prostituted democratic c° existence. In these cases, neither do the nn ^ tary intend to impart a warlike flavor to
the
government, nor do they wish to exert p°"er through an exaltation of a caudillo or a figure head; their goal is rather to guide the count) toward a re-establishment of the constitn tional regime by means of new elections.’ j- overthrow of the government of constitution ally elected President Illia, by the
ole-
This concept of the Latin American nnj) tary will seem strange and unreal to the U- officer with his heritage of the subordin3 ' of the military to the civilian government- we are not complete strangers to this concep During the Civil War, when the Un*^ seemed to be losing everywhere, there talk among some of the military of setting ^ General George B. McClellan as a d*cta^o
headed by General Ongania, is an example the military acting in the Super Mission i-01
In fairness to the Regular Service, those ^
cently in uniform, and many of them politicians by trade.
The Counterinsurgency Role. Along with 1 foregoing, a new role, brought about hy ^ threat of Castro-inspired insurgency in n^0ll. Latin American countries, must be
made this proposal were civilians only
ere
sidered. In the past the threat against internal order was the result of the pressures due to internal problems, directed by national indi- Vlduals or pressure groups. Today, not only a threat to internal order exists, but in several Countries widespread and centrally directed terrorism are requiring increasingly direct action by the military forces. This threat is jhe result of the co-ordinated planning, train- ln?i and support from Castro’s Cuba, directed by professionals in guerrilla warfare ar)d not lacking for financial support; preSumably from the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, at the 1966 meeting of the Organization of American ates in Rio de Janeiro, stated that the
St;
w,
fr,
estern Hemisphere is,
not yet free
°m the threat of ‘communist wars of libera- h°n.’ ” ln peru the disorders became so widespread that the Army took over from the °hcia Rural. The cost has been high casualties and money.
in
In summary, then, during the 19th cen- Ury, political power in Latin American r°untries rested in varying degrees upon a ‘Pod of the oligarchy, the church, and the military. With certain notable exceptions the ‘Pod was mutually supporting. In recent ^ars the authority of the oligarchy and the Urch have decreased somewhat. New in- ’;rUments of power, particularly the unions, 9re beginning to make their voices heard. In jjjany countries, the military—and recently e church—are adjusting to the changing , cus and pressures to a greater extent than e oligarchy.
ta^ *nstTuments power, the mili-
y still remains the most powerful and st ??*ses ‘be greatest capability to maintain Unity against pressures from within and u Communist-directed sources of in-
^ llal disorder are reaching into the unions, $Ur Un‘Versides, and the teeming slums that
c‘tiei
ound all of the major Latin American
s- For the foreseeable future there will be no decrease in Communist-in-
pr°bably
spired “Wars of Liberation,” with concomitant guerrilla warfare, requiring continued counterinsurgency operations by the Latin American military.
The Latin American military is a part of the social and politic body of its State. When it performs its Super Mission Role, it is reacting within the social and political body of its State, not as a foreign and separate entity upon it.
There are many who believe that leadership by civilians, parties, or individuals is as much to blame as the military in producing some of the situations which, in the past, have created the political ills so often ascribed to “militarism.” Until stable, well-organized political institutions are produced in Latin America, the military will continue to act, as one writer phrased it, as “symbols of national sovereignty.”
The aspects of the Spanish-Moorish-Jewish- Indian cultures will continue to influence Latin Americans. Their concepts of “democracy” will differ from “democracy” as we of North America conceive it. We, then, must outgrow our own provincialism and adjust to a world-ranging viewpoint consistent with our responsibilities as a world power.
The following paragraphs, from A Preface to Democratic Theory by Robert A. Dahl, are most illuminating:
Probably this strange hybrid, the normal American political system, is not for export to others. But so long as social perquisites of democracy are substantially intact in this country, it appears to be a relatively efficient system for reinforcing argument, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace in a restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified, and incredibly complex society.
This is no negligible contribution then, that Americans have made to the arts of government—and to that branch, which of all the art of politics is the most difficult, the art of democratic government.
To which statement may be added: Can we reasonably, then, expect the Latin Americans to “be like us?”
★
r,ng the ensuing centuries—the invasion V the Moors from Africa, and the Jews. The
*eini-oriental Moors, a desert people, loved ater. Amazed by the small and muddy Vers of Spain, they made the land bloom nc* * on the land they erected architectural ^ asterpieces. Algebra is not only their word, ut their discovery also. They brought the ^°hcept of zero from India, and it is their rabic numerals, rather than the cumber- ^he Roman numerical system, that most of e World uses today. They gave the world words—“Admiral,” from “Emir al ^ (r>” Lord of the Sea—and, in their words, re knowledge of ancient Greece and Rome ached European scholars during the Dark ^ges through the Moorish scholars who drew eir sources from the great Arabic library at eXandria.
c ,^n the south of Spain, a splendid Moorish j, hire arose with great cities like Cadiz, .-iHa, Cordoba, and Granada. Beautiful ^ SclUes, public and private buildings, were Jhlt in a pleasing and typical style which has ays been associated with Spain.
Meanwhile, an occidental branch of Jews led in Spain to become the financiers, t ’’"hants, writers, physicians, and intellects of the country.
0r almost 800 years the Spaniards fought 'tin *^00rs’ anci ^or if16 greater part of that e the Moors ruled most of Spain. As the