The Quest for Common Ground

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The political and diplomatic problems in­herent in the stationing of the armed forces of one country within the territory of another are not new. There are, however, three new factors that make today’s solution of these problems even more difficult and com­plex than in the past. First, there is an in­creased sensitivity about all matters affecting national sovereignty. This is noticeable both in the underdeveloped areas of the world and in the most sophisticated states of Europe. Second, there is the development of nuclear weapons and modern high-performance, long-range delivery techniques. This has permitted the Soviets to threaten direct at­tack upon support bases, and thus upon “host countries,” which under earlier conditions would have been far removed from the scene of conventional conflict. Third, there is the challenge that confronts the Free World as a result of the announced Communist policy of support for “wars of national liberation.”

It would be incorrect to suppose that the United States, whose experience in dealing with base rights problems has been limited substantially to the last two decades, is the only country plagued with these matters. England and France spent a great part of their resources and energies in the years following World War II trying to prevent their system of overseas bases from disinte­grating. And, in November 1956, a delega­tion from Moscow negotiated a “status of forces agreement,” with Poland and with the other members of the Warsaw Pact, covering the stationing of Soviet military forces within the territory of these “equal and sovereign allies.” One of these “allies” happened to be Hungary on whose territory Soviet tanks and troops had been busy earlier that same month suppressing a popular uprising against the Communist authorities.

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The combination of political tensions, the tremendous destructive power of new weap' ons, and the ever-present danger of escalation of bloody insurgencies makes this an ex­tremely volatile period in history. For the United States it poses a fundamental prob­lem—that of extending its defenses in depth- Toward this end, the United States took the lead even before the Korean conflict in advocating a system of collective security- We established various multilateral defensive

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^a iances (of which NATO is the best known) ^as well as a series of bilateral mutual defense ^ag^reements with our friends in far corners of ^e globe. More recently the growing power ⁰ Communist China has threatened another geographic region—that of South and South­^east Asia. This vast area includes the broad p^XPanse of the Indian Ocean from the astern coast of Africa all the way to the ^trait of Malacca. In November of 1965, the . ^nbsh announced that certain of their islands ^ln Indian Ocean had been organized as a ^entity, the British Indian Ocean Terri- °^ry, and would be available for possible Free orld defense needs. Here in our own ^ertUsphere, we are currently in the process of ^aegotiating new treaty arrangements with anania which will include not only revised ase rights and status of forces agreements, kj^{Ut a}^^so authority to proceed with the possi- ^e construction and operation of a new sea- ^evd canal.

The Soviet Union starting from a different ^^e°graphic environment and a different mili- J*^ry concept than the United States—that is, th ^^as’^{s on} ground and missile forces rather _s^{an 0n} the combination of mobile land and

a*iso^POWer’ ^strateS^{ic air and ICBM} units—has _S>^S0 f°und it necessary to adopt a global

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j_c^{C ense} Treaty, both of which are being sub- ^C^^ec* to centrifugal stresses. _a^1VlnS as we do in the era of the nuclear Pr Ki ^balIistic missile, increasing political t_e^{ems ar}e being placed in the way of main- as ft!¹⁰⁰ defenses *ⁿ depth. For one thing, _c^c Prospect of having one’s country be­? ^an atomic battlefield without having ^stnks ‘^{t0 Sa}^ ^about h one way or the other _r^{S lnto} the mind of the man-in-the-street, to V, ^d]'_r^We^ become more and more difficult _as these alliances together. Then again, ^add V T^rang^e weapons systems improve, as \v_ea^10naI nations acquire their own nuclear forc_e °ⁿf ^an<^ ^strategi^c delivery systems, the teal ch° ^eConomy> national pride, and polit- pl_a^auvinism can be expected to come into back ^an<^,^tbe natural tendency will be to fall tionr>i°ⁿ home-based military power for na-

^aal security.

^ls trend could not have been brought

home more vividly than it was by President Charles de Gaulle in the portion of his Febru­ary 1966 press conference which dealt with NATO. He pointed out that as France has now become “a nuclear power by herself, by her own means, she is led to assume the political and strategic responsibilities which that im­plies.” This, in turn, DeGaulle went on to say, called for a restoration of “a normal situ­ation of sovereignty, in which everything that is French, on the ground, in the air and on the seas, and every foreign element stationed in France must be under the sole control of French authorities.”

Any erosion of the collective security con­cept obviously causes far more complications for the United States, which is basically an air/sea power with continuing interests in foreign economic development, than it does for the Soviet Union, a land power with rela­tively little present capability for foreign economic enterprises or trade. Thus, from the American point of view, it is mandatory that we solve the problems related to our overseas bases in an intelligent, farsighted manner calculated to maintain our present system of defenses in depth, to strengthen our alliances, and to improve our relationships with like- minded people everywhere.

The basic principle governing the station­ing of the armed forces of one country within the territory of another is mutuality of defense interest. Ideally, the granting of base rights by a host country is a voluntary exercise of its national sovereignty based on mutual security considerations. However, no matter how you look at it, once two countries agree that it is in their common interest for the forces of one to be stationed on the soil of the other, this recog­nition of military realities carries with it an unavoidable sacrifice of national sovereignty by both parties.

As complicated as the military and strategic factors are today, it is still comparatively easy to establish common ground insofar as the military analysis of the mutual defense requirements of the two parties is concerned. But it is at the next stage that both sides begin to “see through a glass, darkly.” Domestic political pressures begin to enter the equation, beclouding the issue. From there on, the heads of the respective delegations engaged in

a base rights negotiation must exhibit those rare qualities that distinguish true statesmen from clever negotiators. Only under wise leadership which senses the course of history in the decades to come will both sides find the patience to include in their analysis of the facts a sympathetic understanding of one another’s local problems.

From an understanding of the mutuality of defense interests comes a willingness to sacrifice a certain degree of national sover­eignty in exchange for greater security. Thus, the first task of the two delegations is to under­take a careful and intelligent examination of the military threat and of the defensive re­quirements generated by this threat. They must then consider the political and economic problems inherent in meeting these require­ments, including the day-to-day problems related to the operation of the bases. And, finally, they must evaluate the net long-term value of the joint defensive effort to both par­ties. As each side expects to gain by the trans­action, the sum of the parts must be greater than the whole. But, since this is a problem of human relationships rather than mathematics, it is not impossible. The base rights negotiator must take his cue from the businessman who makes his livelihood through the exchange of goods and services to the profit of both him­self and his customers.

It takes practical statesmanship to deter­mine how far both parties can go at any particular time toward reaching an area of agreement, taking into account the current political realities in both countries. As this is the stage where discussion ends and hard bargaining begins, it often appears that a clever negotiator is a valuable asset. However, this is the point where wisdom and judgment are much more important than bargaining skills.

What we must remember is that any base rights negotiation is only one phase in a con­tinuing and, hopefully, an enduring rela­tionship between two sovereign nations. If the respective delegations have done their work well, they will leave behind them a stronger and more viable relationship than existed when they started. But it cannot be expected to be permanent or unchanging. Human affairs are ever in constant flux. Wise agree­ments last longer than foolish or expedient ones, but no agreement lasts forever. All that can be expected of any single negotiation is to make progress in the right direction so that at a later date this progress may be resumed. One of the best rules for the U. S. spokesman is to “make haste slowly.”

The first task, then, is to reach agreement on the military threat. As complex as this is when weapon systems include both conven­tional air power and ballistic missiles and both conventional and nuclear explosives, it is still susceptible of solution. It requires a basic understanding of the Communist doc- j trine of ultimate world conquest, of the Soviet or Chinese Communist military capabilities for attack under atomic or non-atomic condi­tions, and finally, of the Communists’ ability to achieve their end by subversion or through a combination of military and subversive pressures.

For the United States the process of reach­ing agreement on the security threat is some­times easier with a small power than with one of our major allies. This is because the latter have their own world-wide, professional in' telligence services that frequently produce different estimates of Communist long-range intentions and capabilities than do ours; and also because the older nations have a greater technical knowledge (and consequently their own private theories) of the military implica­tions of the development of new weapon⁸ systems.

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The other major difficulty in reaching ac­cord on the military analysis is that the threat) even if agreed to by both parties, looks dif­ferent to the United States than it does to th<j host country. For example, we are convince that the best hope for world peace, and con­sequently for the security of any nation larg^e or small, is to maintain our own capability f°^f massive atomic retaliation against the sourc⁶ of aggression. The practical implementation of this concept requires us to take measure⁸ to contain the Soviet bloc within a system ⁰ defensive alliances and forward bases. Whd^e our friends generally agree that our reasoning is correct, their very geographic proximity ¹ the enemy compels them to weigh careful!) the advantages of being just behind the outc¹ perimeter of U. S. military power against th^e disadvantages of making themselves, by re3'

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avmg agreed upon these important points,

^es on their soil, an even more certain ^target for the initial Soviet attack.

In this regard, the specter of a possible • S. withdrawal from our forward military Positions is always in the back of their minds, nis results in many seeming inconsistencies the other side’s logic during the negotia- hons. On the one hand, they seek to obtain a specific continuing commitment from the nited States to defend their country; while the other, in order to minimize their sacri- ^Ce of sovereignty, they make every effort to ^reduce the term of the defense or base agree- ^rtlent to 20 years or ten, or even to one year.

, Understanding and agreement on the ^reat must then be translated into U. S. de­^nse requirements, of which any single base ^c°mplex is but a relatively small part, in ^c°rnbination with the host country’s require­ments, in most cases the defense of its entire ^^erritory. The U. S. negotiator has a fairly 0 cine bill of particulars (usually for air or in W           gi^yen hi^m hy the authorities

^ Washington, and he is instructed to obtain ^e base rights necessary to meet these re- ^rements. The country concerned, how­.     . has an e

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the ^.^resence U. S. military forces increases • ^c hkelihood of their being a target for the and^ ^^0V*^C|; attack—a theory which Pravda the Moscow radio reiterate at every op­portunity—the United States should under-

tion^,C °^{r t}^^1C 6^reater P^art of the host na­^s defense budget. In those countries pro ^ ^{WC arC su}PP^ortiⁿg military assistance _cj_e^^rarns this condition already exists to one

the stage is now set for the most difficult phase of the base negotiations; that is the political problem of determining what elements of na­tional sovereignty will be waived in the in­terests of mutual defense. No matter how much good will or personal trust exists be­tween the negotiators on both sides, any sacrifice of sovereignty is such a sensitive domestic issue that it has to be handled with statesmanlike vision.

In general, this phase is one where the local negotiator holds a tremendous advan­tage. In the first place, he is thoroughly famil­iar with the political situation and balance of political power in his own country. Second, he has access, either direct or through “leaks,” to his own press. Third, if deemed expedient, he can stimulate the “loyal opposition” to whatever degree of protest seems appropriate —all the way from an anti-government speech to a mass meeting or even a riot. Conse­quently, the U. S. negotiator can never be sure that these outward manifestations of local political pressures are real or merely good stage-managing.

The political problems inherent in meeting the agreed defense requirements are three­fold. There are the local political issues gen­erated in the host country proper; there are political problems of an international nature resulting from the effect that the negotiation has on the political image of the host country in the eyes of its neighboring states; and fi­nally there are the political repercussions which the negotiations might generate in the United States.

Generally speaking, the latter, while the most unpredictable of all, can usually be handled back in Washington by marshaling bipartisan support for the negotiation on the basis that it contributes toward the success of a broader national policy that has already been approved. This does not mean that the appropriate Congressional committees will not go through any major base rights agree­ment with a fine-tooth comb and ask the most penetrating and sometimes embarrassing questions. Nor does it mean that the U. S. negotiator will not be constantly reminded that whatever he comes up with will be sub­ject to subsequent scrutiny by the legal divi­sions of State and Defense, not to mention Congress itself. All this is, of course, necessary.

But in the long run this problem will probably be more tangible and less onerous than some of the others.

Sometimes, just when things seem to be going well, the American negotiator is sud­denly brought back to reality when the press in the local capital prints an extract from some Congressional hearing comparing the total U. S. economic and military aid that the host country has received with that received by neighboring nations in the same area. Only then does the U. S. spokesman understand that the real concern of the host country is not what its neighbors think, but rather whether it will succeed in getting at least as good, or if possible a better “deal” from the United States. Each nation wants to be the “most favored nation” when it comes to receiving U. S. military or economic assistance.

The local political issues generated in the host country by the presence of U. S. bases or U. S. military personnel are very real and, unfortunately, constantly recurring. They arise from the day-to-day operation of our

military installations overseas.

The basic question involved is that of jurisdiction—of which country’s laws are applicable in the event of criminal offenses involving our military personnel. This prob­lem is generally the major stumbling block in any base negotiation. Its solution hinges entirely on the degree of mutual trust that exists between the parties concerned—for there can be no agreement without a waiver of some element of national sovereignty by both sides.

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No U. S. negotiator can expect to make progress when the subject of jurisdiction is un­der consideration, unless he prepares himself properly. Before he even begins to discuss the subject he must first divest his mind of all assumptions, preconceived notions, or hear­say knowledge and get down to facts. He must understand the host country’s system of jus­tice and scale of punishments for various offenses. He must not be diverted by false notions which are often prevalent in the United States. For example, there is the persistent and erroneous belief that H

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J^ust because a jail is located in a foreign country it is necessarily worse than a jail in eorgia or Florida. He must know statistically ne probable number of various types of of- enses by U. S. military personnel which can ^e expected per year.

Once he has obtained a truly objective Understanding of the local procedures for en- orcing justice, the U. S. negotiator must then econie fully informed of the jurisdiction Provisions of all other base rights agreements *, ^at the United States has signed. The basic ocument to start him in his field of research th_e ]spyro “Status of Forces Agreement.” k ^{ls con}tains a set of principles, agreed upon f 14 nations, governing the stationing of the ^arnied forces of those countries on one an- ^er s soil. Having mastered that remarkable P^aper, he must then study the jurisdictional Provisions of every bilateral defense agree­ment the United States has signed to date. He ^J"^st keep himself as fully informed as possi- ^e °f the progress of other U. S. base rights ^negotiations which may be in progress else- ^ere in the world. This is important because the question of jurisdiction, as in the case . ⁽r^c°^nornic or military aid, the host country £ ^{1 ma}ke every effort to obtain the “most ^;u ored nation treatment” for itself.

erhaps most important of all, when the ' S. spokesman has mastered all this, he ^ ^st> ^at all costs, avoid a legalistic approach ⁰ the problem of jurisdiction. True, when y nation agrees to give up a portion of its the'°^na^ ^sovereiS^nty ‘ⁿ llm higher interests of state, such an agreement must be very _u^Clsely worded so as to avoid future mis- _r standings. But as stated earlier, this

Presents an area of mutual trust, not dis­trust.       ’

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ba ^{tlC actua}l operation of U. S. military p_)r^{Ses 0v}erseas is the responsibility of that nu k °^{Ur armec}l services with the greatest ^J.^er Personnel stationed on the base at _arj_s^tlme. The inevitable problems which U ^Sg ^daUy from the administration of these • ^lnstallations on foreign soil are, for the

most part, solved by the local commander in a satisfactory manner. From time to time, however, some relatively insignificant inci­dent gets out of hand and becomes a cause celebre, to the considerable detriment of our relations with the country concerned. Analysis of these incidents indicates that they can usu­ally be traced back to one of the following causes: an inability on the part of our mili­tary officials to distinguish between con­venience and necessity; the subconscious tendency of U. S. commanders to run their bases as though the obsolete concept of extraterritoriality still applied; the failure on the part of the military departments to dele­gate to the local commander authority to handle local situations promptly without reference to Washington; and finally, the absence of a “safety-valve mechanism” (perhaps in the form of a standing body com­posed of the senior military representatives from both countries) where problems arising from the operation of U. S. bases could be discussed and resolved satisfactorily in pri­vate before the local politicians or press have a chance to blow them up to the stat­ure of “international incidents.”

To enlarge briefly on each of these causes, take the first—our inability to distinguish be­tween convenience and necessity. This is one of our greatest failings in the operation of our overseas bases. Sometimes our commanders turn down requests from the local authori­ties without any explanation whatsoever. Sometimes they refuse because they feel that if they make any concession at all they will invite other demands. “Give ’em an inch and they’ll take a yard” is the attitude of some base commanders. True, this is always a risk, but by being stiff-necked we frequently get ourselves in a position which is com­pletely irrational and which we cannot pos­sibly justify. Take the case where a local highway runs through the base. Of course it complicates the base commander’s life to have a civilian road cutting across a military base. It increases the problems of internal security many-fold. It would be far prefer­able, from an administrative point of view, to have the highway detour around the base. But is it really necessary to make a major issue of this point, to go to the expense of building a by-pass road, not to mention the

inconvenience which the long way around would cause the local population? Some­times it is, but certainly not always. In the United States we have a number of military reservations which are bisected by heavily traveled national highways. To mention just two, there is Camp Pendleton, California, and Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

There are other instances where we seri­ously jeopardize our friendly relations when we refuse to be reasonable. For example, the right to fish in naval base harbors, or to tim­ber and mine in outlying portions of large military reservations, seems perfectly natural to the local population. If we refuse to permit nationals the use of such natural resources of their own country, we place the United States in an untenable position. Obviously, the base commander is responsible for the security of his installation, but he must also take into account the local economy. He can­not be arbitrary. Where the situation requires access to his base, he must establish controls. But in this as in other matters pertaining to the operation of the base, his criteria should be based on practical necessity and reason­ableness.

Unless a conscious effort is made to avoid it, it is very easy for a base commander to think of his installation as U. S. property. As a result, all his dealings with the local officials are based on this false assumption and short tempers on both sides soon follow.

Many of the problems previously dis­cussed could be alleviated, and perhaps even eliminated entirely if there existed in each nation where the United States maintains bases, a “safety-valve mechanism” to handle, on a quiet military level, the day-to-day questions which the administration of these American installations on foreign soil in­evitably raise. The U. S. negotiator, when he has had a chance to digest the various grievances concerning the operation of our bases which the other delegation is certain to bring up during the talks, will find himself confronted with a whole briar patch of thorny, unresolved issues. It will be impossi­ble for him to solve them individually and, in fact, any discussion of them during the bases talks will only distract the attention of both sides from the true goal of the negotiations. His best course, both from the standpoint of the immediate discussions as well as that of improving the daily relations between the two nations, is to propose the establishment of a joint standing military body, located in the capital city of the host country, whose job would be to consider and, whenever possible, resolve such matters on a continuing basis.

In all probability, this proposal will be well received by the other side. This is under­standable when one realizes how formal and cumbersome the present procedures for intergovernmental consultation are. In some cases the situation requires a “note” to be initiated through the U. S. Embassy, or the Foreign Office. This is slow and is generally impractical for regular use. Another method, which exists on paper, but which is never used for such routine matters, is through the consultative machinery set up by the bilateral or multilateral mutual defense treaty. These treaties usually provide for “regular meet­ings” to discuss the implementations of the defense agreement, but they occur so infre­quently (annually or even less often) and handle matters on such a high-level that they are quite useless as far as providing assistance in the practical operation of U. S. bases is concerned. Instead, what is needed i^s for the senior U. S. base commanders and the senior military officials of the host coun­try to sit down together in private at least once a month and discuss these problems.

There is a certain rapport between military men of all nations which enables them to talk frankly and to reach agreement on matters affecting their profession. Consequently, the U. S. negotiator will find it to everyone’s advantage if he can obtain agreement to establish the “safety-valve mechanism” as a purely military body. The military represen­tatives on both sides will, of course, seek guidance from their respective governments, but they will be able to do this with a back­ground of practical understanding, using secure channels without fear of compromise or “leaks” to the press.

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Experience has shown that it is to everyone S advantage if the host country will assign military liaison officers to the staffs of the American base commanders to assist them in their dealings with the local civil authorities and to help them solve many of their admin' istrative problems on the spot. Matters which

General Black graduated from the U. S. Military Academy with the Class of 1940 and served in the OSS in the Euro­pean Theater during World War II. He received his M.A. degree in International Rela­tions from George Washington University. During his career, he has commanded the 2nd Battle Group, 19th Infantry, served as Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary Defense, and has been both student and instructor at National War College. Between 1962 and 1965, general Black served two tours of duty with the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. He was 'rector, Western Hemisphere Region, OSD, until ^ecember 1966, when he assumed command of U. S. 'vrrny Support, Thailand.

base commander, assisted by his liaison °fficer, are unable to solve at their level could then be referred to the military consultative °dy (which might be called a “mutual de- ^ense board”) for resolution. If the U. S. nego­tiator succeeds in his mission of obtaining a ase rights agreement founded on trust and Understanding, this same feeling will pervade the operations of the defense board. As a ^result, the great majority of the matters '^vhich have in the past caused embarrass- ⁿ'^Cnt to the friendly relations of the two S°vernments will be handled promptly and fiuietly by the responsible military officials.

The final step in the process of establishing ^an understanding of the mutual defense in­terests is the evaluation of the net long-term ^Value of this joint defensive effort to the two governments concerned. This evaluation is P^repared separately and independently by ^ea°h country. Although parts of these studies ^are revealed at the conference table, they are ^osely held as they form the basis for the con­cessions ^and sacrifice of sovereignty made by

. The American spokesman has two difficult kn ^{S t0 accom}Phsh here. He must, through his owledge, eloquence, and persuasive per­sonality, convince the host country that it is j° ^{Us a}dvantage to have U. S. military instal- fions on its soil. He must also make sure that *s superiors in Washington know exactly ^at they are getting for their money and

effort. The first job is generally well within the capabilities of the U. S. spokesman. The second is more difficult.

To be specific, the U. S. negotiator must acquire sufficient knowledge to evaluate polit­ical and economic trends in the host country. He must be able to think in terms of the strategic geography of the entire area and understand the importance of the host country’s location in supporting long- range U. S. defense requirements. He must be able to assess possible changes in the country’s strategic value to the United States taking into account the development of new weapons. He must weigh the military value of the base system against the political prob­lems associated with the presence of American soldiers and American military power in that area of the world. Moreover, he must be in­tellectually honest in making these evalua­tions and reporting his findings to Washing­ton. Toward the end of a long, arduous nego­tiation, when it seems that by making just one more concession or one more promise it would be possible to bring the talks to a suc­cessful conclusion, it is not easy to keep one’s objectivity and avoid becoming an advocate for the host country.

The U. S. negotiator will have military advisors of all ranks and from all services on his staff. None of them will be free of his service orientation and each will tend to present a somewhat different strategic esti­mate of the long-term value of the bases. Formal strategic guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is likely to be so broad and general that it is subject to various interpreta­tions by his military assistants.

And behind all of this uncertainty and con­fusion stands the Congress with the power to repudiate his entire effort if it is not to its liking. Every move he makes he must be prepared to explain, in an entirely different environment—in a Congressional committee room. There his audience (and jury) will probably not be overly concerned with either the strategic or long-term political value of the bases. The Congressmen more likely will be looking at the price tag and at the amount of jurisdiction the foreign country will have over “their boys” in the armed forces who will be stationed on the base.

The poor negotiator will have many sleep-