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bag, away from the landing area. Appro*’ mately 200 pounds of spuds, eggs, cabbag^’ apples, and the like were loaded in each of 1 coaling bags sent to the Sterlet. The Bole kep1
An Unusual Unrep
Commander F. C. Collins, Jr., U. S. Navy—“Plan to shop at the Commissary tomorrow, anything I can pick up for you?” This lighthearted offer set into motion a chain of events which culminated in a rarely seen Subrep evolution, viz., a venerable World War II submarine, the USS Sterlet (SS-392), being replenished by an equally venerable World War II Fram II destroyer, the John A. Bole (DD-755).
After a day beneath the surface, the Sterlet surfaced and assumed Romeo Corpen 350, speed 10. In the Bole, Ray Stroup, BM1, had contrived a rig which he thought would be tailor-made for the job. It consisted of a 21- inch manila highline, an 8-inch wooden snatch block for the trolley, a 50-foot length of 6-thread for a messenger, and 100 feet of 21- thread for an inhaul. A standard phone and distance line was rigged between vessels.
With the Sterlet on 350° at 10 knots, the Bole began her approach at 15 knots from 750 yards astern. The speed was cut as the Bole's bow came even with the Sterlet’s sail. The ship “coasted” to a point with the bridge abollt even with the Sterlet’s bulbous bow, at whir1 time a bolo was lofted over the Sterlet just f°r' ward of the sail where it was easily retried and the messenger brought aboard. The high' line was shackled to the Sterlet’s sail, runiii11? to the Bole’s torpedo deck midships highlit rig. With Bole personnel tending the highlit the submarine sailors needed only man the i'1' haul and clear the loads, delivered by coaliOe
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station approximately 40 to 60 feet alongsi^ the Sterlet, as the nuclear-powered frigalf Truxtun served as lifeguard some 1,000 yard5 astern. Thirty-five minutes after starting hcr approach, according to the official timer an3 Bole’s Executive Officer, Commander Fahey, the Bole hauled down Prep 3n“ broke away at 20 knots. The evolutio'1 had taken far less time than would either 3
j&otor whaleboat or helo transfer and with ss hazard to personnel and equipment.
Just before breaking the bridge-to-bridge (Jtrmiunications, the skipper of the Bole po- *>tely advised George Fraser, the Sterlet’s skip- fer, that he was “heading for a filling station Uss Hassayampa AO-145) this evening. Would ,r)u care for me to pick up a few gallons of tetrol for you?” “Thanks, Frank,” came the luick reply, “I’ve still got 80 per cent ^oard.”
Early Command—Who Wants It?”
T. B. Shemanski, pp. 99-101, October 1967; *0(1 D. R. Anderson and M. W. Searight, pp. 105- >07 March 1968 Proceedings)
Lieutenant M. D. Busby, U. S. Navy ^fter having served 20 months in command * a lieutenant, I feel compelled to enter the iscussion. There is controversy not only ’■Hong young tigers in the Fleet, but also ’hiong the detailers at the Bureau of Naval 'ersonnel, as to whether an officer should lay ‘is career on the line so early. Although there
are many different opinions, there seems to be one point of consistency: those who have held early command universally agree that it is desirable.
Mr. Searight seems dismayed that officers who have served in command of small ships are then assigned to “qualification” tours as executive officers of destroyer types. I do not understand how a destroyer XO’s job can be defined as a “qualification” tour. It is a demanding and often physically exhausting job. It would be pleasant to assume early command and then progress upwards, simply taking command of successively larger ships, but this is not realistic. Being personally acquainted with about 20 officers who have held command as lieutenants over the past several years, I know of none who share Mr. Searight’s view. To the contrary, almost all are enthusiastic about assignment to a destroyer as executive officer. In some respects they may feel better qualified than their contemporaries, more experienced in all phases of shiphandling, more aware of the problems of command and control, more confident of their ability to handle any situation. But dismayed? No!
Some say that early command is a chance. A young officer is gambling his career against a yet untested ability to exercise under pressure the fine judgement that is required every day of a young captain. This argument seems to me to be the epitome of mediocre thought. Acceptance of responsibility and command at sea has always been the height of the naval profession. Why should a young officer not aspire to command? It is the goal which we all should seek.
It is also argued that early commands are no more than “bonus” tours, and as such are not career enhancing. Of course a command is a bonus! It is a reward, as all assignments are rewards. They are based on past performance. This is the way the detailing system is meant to work. It is this procedure of officer assignment that sets the Navy apart from other services, and, in my opinion, it is a superior system.
I would advise any young tiger who is thinking seriously about asking for command, but is hesitating because he has been advised against it, or because of his own doubts, to go ahead and take that chance. You haven’t lived until you’ve made a really difficult landing with your own ship; or snaked an awkward tow up a twisting channel in a busy harbor; or taken a minesweeper into treacherous waters at night with gear out; or beached an LST on a fog-shrouded beach. There is no substitute for experience of this sort. I do not see how early command can be anything but advantageous to an officer’s career.
"Naval Review 1968"*
(See K. P. Huff, pp. 88-113, Naval Review 1968)
Lieutenant A. J. Hodgdon, U. S. Naval Reserve—Captain K. P. Huff, U. S. Navy in “Building the Advanced Base at Da Nang” in Naval Review 1968” states, “For the next ten years, the Navy will have officers and men experienced in this kind of work, but, unless the above measures are taken, who knows what will happen if the experience is dissipated and the skills are lost?” It would indeed seem wise for the Navy to use the obvious skills of Captain Huff to blueprint a flexible plan for the establishment of possible future advanced amphibious bases should the need be. The lessons learned at Da Nang could most certainly be applied in time-saving energy to any future operations of this type.
It is quite evident the Nucleus Port Crew Program needs a major overhaul.
★ ★ ★
(See E. E. Outlaw, pp. 184-201, Naval Review 1968)
Rear Admiral F. H. Michaelis, U. S. Navy, Commander, Carrier Division Nine— The opportunity to read Rear Admiral Outlaw’s article, “V/STOL in the Navy of the Future,” prompts me to write in support of the matter of “getting to VTOL from here.”
As a corollary to the incentives enumerated in Admiral Outlaw’s discussion of the VTOL capabilities which can enhance execution of naval air missions, it is suggested that how well we succeed will depend on how well we
* See Frank Uhlig, Jr., (ed.), Naval Review 1968, Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute.
• well
can define our requirements and how 'v
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current aircraft assets.
First, it would be helpful to strip VT0' of its aura of mystique. VTOL is merely specialized technique for taking off and la° ing aircraft. It adds no new role or mission- fact, some flexibility in mission applicant1 will diminish as one moves from the helic°P ter to high performance VTOL, since 111 practicability of hovering for extended PJ riods, generally speaking, varies inverse, with the requirement for greater Per formance. Therefore, we will need to seize 0,1 developments where VTOL will really £l1 hance mission accomplishment, with 1,11 ^ sions taken singly first, and later consider0 in a collective sense. ...
Second, we must recognize that VTOL " be expensive. More thrust means hig^ engine costs and complications; stability al1. control requirements will be more sophistlj. cated; and also, VTOL is costly in ternrs 0 total mission performance, when compa^ with conventional take-off and landi'V (CTOL). This is particularly true if the a,r craft configuration permits flexible use 1,1 both VTOL and STOL operations. For exa1’1 pie, given equal aircraft weight, approximat‘ size, and generally equal speed capabilib’ VTOL payload will be less for a VTOL attac aircraft than for a CTOL system, resulting 1,1 fewer weapons delivered, or less radius. So''c must seek missions where we are willing u’ pay the price. As a starter, we should look missions in early development where we caI' afford to accept some decrease in range 1,1 payload in trade for other more prized char acteristics.
Third, VTOL development should be on al' evolutionary basis rather than a revolution ary one. VTOL zealots tend to address on1, the total transformation of the carrier Na'T a totally new stable of aircraft as well as new stable, a carrier designed to acconin11’ date VTOL only, a simpler, cheaper °3<j which would satisfy the advocates of sin3 carriers. The implication of all-or-nothn1» cannot help but dull the enthusiasm of na'3^. pragmatists who have participated in a h3^ century of STOL development in catapult a11 arresting gear equipped aircraft carri°rS' What is needed now is a plan for achieving
this
new breed in selected missions, as part of
I(JL on an incremental basis, gaining the ^vantages of VTOL or STOL by operating
rtllx with CTOL on board contemporary airCraft carriers.
On the premise that first employment of ^/STOL carrier based tactical aircraft should e a mixed complement on board contemporary carriers, VTOL aircraft must enhance CaPabilities without interfering with the °Peration of CTOL aircraft. Mixed opera- Uons appear reasonable. To a mixed opera- tl0n of jet and propeller aircraft operations, l''6 have added helicopter rescue and utility. ”e have tested employment of ASW helicopters in a mix of attack and defensive aircraft 'Jt' board attack carriers with satisfactory remits. Brief tests of the P-1127 were conducted 1966 on board the USS Independence (CVA-62) and USS Raleigh (LPD-l) with highly encourag- lri? results: major problems were non-existent. Concomitantly, the catapult-equipped carrier should contribute to the effectiveness °f V/sTOL aircraft using the STOL mode of derations by extending radius or payload llnder overload conditions.
Assuming that mixed CTOL and VTOL derations on a conventional carrier can be acComplished effectively, it is important next to establish the desired order of VTOL airCraft acquisition, and to proceed with a pro- Sram which will permit accruing operational experience in VTOL at the earliest possible
date.
Of the missions considered, most advantageous and urgent for initial VTOL application, is combat rescue (SAR), or more Precisely, the capability to conduct combat r<‘scuc as an integral part of strike operations, different from other missions discussed herein, the SAR mission employs vertical Ending and hover during the mission rather lhan solely at the beginning and end.
The need for a high speed SAR vehicle ^xists in Southeast Asia, and will become '^creasingly important as the U. S. Navy extends the radius of strike capability. The A-3, A-6, A-7, and RA-5 today, and, hope- hilly, the VFAX tomorrow afford operation at much greater ranges than those employed ltr Southeast Asia today. It will be necessary also to provide performance and survivability 'n a combat rescue aircraft which will roughly approximate that of the strike aircraft. As a general rule, the deeper the penetration, the greater the importance of the SAR aircraft accompanying (or remaining within supporting proximity of) the strike group. Performance criteria will necessitate rescue techniques that have rapid retrieval with minimum hover, and, an in-flight “snatch” capability.
To offset development cost and pay its way in terms of deck space, this aircraft must permit reliable routine SAR functions during carrier launch and recovery, either airborne or in readiness on deck. It would also be an effective vehicle for more rapid search of larger sea areas than is now possible with the helo.
A combat rescue VTOL aircraft is technically feasible within current state-of-the-art. Configuration will include compromises between high speed and the need to reduce down-wash velocities and temperatures during the rescue operation. The characteristics of speed, range, and pick-up tend to focus on VTOL configurations such as fan-in-wing, tilt- engines, or some form of stowed rotor propulsion system. In-flight refueling must also be included.
After satisfying the urgent needs for combat rescue and operational experience in a mix of CTOL and VTOL, we should investigate areas where we can gain significant mission enhancement from VTOL and, at the same time, accept some loss in certain characteristic in order to gain in others. For example, in accepting some sacrifice in range, we might very well obtain significant improvements in Fleet air defense through a VTOL and STOL aircraft of reasonable size and weight. Similarly, more effective close air support for the Marines could be achieved if we were to trade some range for flexibility in siting these aircraft without airfield or SATS construction.
VTOL and STOL fleet defense is probably a tougher job technically than the combat rescue aircraft. Conceptually, however, the flexibility afforded the carrier through VTOL interceptors would contribute significantly to the fleet air defense posture. As noted by Admiral Outlaw, thrust-to-weight ratios sufficiently high to make VTOL deck- launched interceptors cost effective should be
the
be
V/STOL fleet defensive fighter cannot pegged precisely to the calendar. The V/SI
processes of strike preparation and dispersi0'1 of defense elements to maximize offensn levels in the CVA. Also, V/STOL defensfie fighters can be assigned temporarily to sup port a variety of operations: ASW HL1' groups, amphibious operations in the jective area, and defenses ashore in *'lC amphibious transition.
Continuing to apply the fundamental prl11 ciple that V/STOL technique may be adva11
tageous where short legs or payload can
available to the Fleet in a few years.
In concept, deck-launched VTOL interceptors may operate from carriers, adjacent escorts, or distant picket ships. In the latter, for example, a cruiser could be assigned to full sector defense, employing both surface-to- air missiles and interceptors in a single ship. VTOL, deck-launched interceptors (DLl) from the carrier could serve as back-up. Operation of VTOL interceptors in Fleet defense permits trading some range for performance when employing the deck-launched intercept mode. Launch will be independent of wind line. The flight is of short duration and some fringe section of the deck is always ready for immediate landing, obviating waiting for position among many landing aircraft, or waiting for the carrier to turn into the wind. Aircraft acceleration, agility, speed, and flexibility are gains which can offset to a degree the added weight in VTOL propulsion and similarly reduced fuel load. For the CAP mission, the VTOL deck-launched interceptor would be catapulted at STOL weight.
High-performance supersonic designs have been verified in several studies and at least one effort, (the VJ-101 West German tilting wingtip jet pod development), has led to a better understanding of stability and control made possible through redundancy using solid state and micro-miniaturization. Importantly, the problems of erosion and thrust lost through recirculation should be more easily accommodated on board ship than ashore through the use of grating extensions at deck edge to serve as take-off and landing pads. In short, attainment of the VTOL interceptor becomes a matter of applying and exploiting existing technology. However, studies must be started to define a development that, in addition to being technically
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
feasible, is operationally and cost effective' The question of when to introduce
defensive fighter will depend on propel^ structuring the associated aircraft nn*-, would be imprudent to assign all defensn tasks to an early version of VTOL fleet °e fense aircraft. This aircraft probably will ’ “short-legged,” and therefore, will be c ficient as an escort fighter or barrier Patr^ candidate in the target area unless opera11' with adequate air tanker support—a qllt> tionable planning factor in a period whel1 deck space for attack aircraft will be a1 premium. In the other roles, DLI and G (fleet defense), the V/STOL should be able 10 “pay her freight” from the outset.
V/STOL fleet defense aircraft might entcr the inventory after an advanced escort °r target (or barrier) CAP aircraft is availab1 ’ for example, after VFAX is in the Fleet.
In summary, the major incentives for VI ( fleet defense are enhancement of offensn operations by reducing interruptions to
be
accommodated, V/STOL attack becomes n° portant in special operations. One example 15 the amphibious campaign where close sup port, operating first from platforms in the ob^ jective area and later from semi-prepare sites ashore, can provide payloads compet1' tive with CTOL in an alert, on-call basis, °f airborne (with reasonable loiter reserve]’ provided such aircraft are operated fi"01’1 nearby sites.
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The performance required can be met in 3 subsonic aircraft with excellent visual deliver) capability. All-weather attack may achieved by utilizing TPQ-10/27 radar co& trolled bombing systems. This aircraft show0 be an appropriately unsophisticated plane 1(1 order to ensure introduction early in tli°
Projected V/STOL development program.
The requirement to increase speed, radius, atld capacity of assault transport exerts a con- Pftuing pressure on V/STOL development. The progressive goals for Marine assault Penetration capability increase by an order of Magnitude in the next two decades without ^creasing the time to complete execution, ^or decreasing the number of troops involved. Nearly, this requirement calls for increased V/STOL development to upgrade helicopter Performance.
Advanced designs of tilt and stowed rotors, r°tor wing, fan-in-wing and various compound configurations offer further advances T speed, range, and load carrying capability •or V/STOL transport.
Dispersion, while valuable to the future of a‘r warfare, has a high price tag in supporting requirements. Spares and personnel support are an integral part of planning effective V/STOL introduction. A carefully conceived Parent ship or satellite ship plan will be required. This concept envisions maintenance °o board carrier or V/STOL headquarters Tip. Only skeletonized crews for flight servicing operations and a very limited stock °f spares can be afforded on board the satellite Tips. Repairs beyond the routine would be effected by transporting maintenance personnel (and parts) to the satellite ship by helo. Duds would be lifted to the carrier by heavy fift helos.
The heavy lift helo is of singular importance to the dispersion concept. However, a VIOL Program alone would not have to stand the Costs of amortizing such heavy lift development. There are growing incentives for the development of heavy lift helos in the areas of retail delivery directly from logistic support Tip to the battle area, routine unloading of Containerized cargo, amphibious ship-to- Tore movement, underway replenishment, Combat retrieval or salvage of aircraft and small Marine craft. The need for lifting battle damaged aircraft CVA-to-shore is even now an established requirement in Southeast Asia. Technology to provide high lift capabilities in reasonably sized helos is gaining rapidly With recent technological developments such as the hot cycle.
The heavy lift helo is a must in a well balanced VTOL program.
VTOL as a technique has application to the air missions of all services. The VTOL aircraft described herein—SAR, heavy-lift helicopter, close air support, interceptor, and assault transport—represent missions common to at least two of the armed services. The requirements applying to acquisition of advanced V/STOL aircraft by all services are about the same as those which developed the helicopter, if we add the need for improved mission characteristics—speed, range, and lift capacity. Furthermore, all services would like to exploit dispersal in one form or another.
Joint or co-ordinated research and development has been characteristic of recent VTOL projects. In the development of a long- range plan, multi-service participation will be important to the end result. Although we have come part way, much more aggressive, extensive, and costly engineering is needed. Advanced VTOL capabilities can be achieved most rapidly and at least cost by the Services moving ahead in concert.
"Civilian Command or Civilian Control?”
(,See Samuel P. Ingram, pages 26-31, May 1968 Proceedings)
Second Lieutenant Richard E. Radez, U. S. Army; MBA Program, Harvard Business School—Systems analysis is only an analytical technique and nothing more. As such, it is only as good as the humans who use it. For example, Captain Ingram refers to a systems analysis “study” which assumes that Soviet strategy, vis-a-vis NATO, is defensive. He is attacking not the analytical method, but rather the assumption upon which this particular analysis is based. People determine the assumptions in a systems analysis study. A poorly conducted study is the fault of those conducting it, not the analytical method. From my relatively limited viewpoint, I should think that it might be entirely possible that in the military, or any other organization, 20,000 man-hours of labor could be spent on a 202-page systems analysis counterstudy and the end result be nothing more than sophisticated garbage.
The call for the resumption of close cooperation between the Congress and the Department of Defense sounds suspiciously like iumping the chain of command. In effect, the
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An up-to-date listing by name and type of over 2,000 ships and 120 aircraft and missiles. Over 400 illustrations. 64 pages. Paperbound. List Price $3.50 Member's Price $2.80 A U. S. Naval Institute Publication
Secretary of Defense would become a powerless figurehead. The generals and the admirals would run the defense effort in close collaboration with a small group of Congressmen. The President would have nothing but a limited veto power over his own national defense policies.
My conclusion is that many of us, both military and civilian, have failed to realize that the environment in which we, as military men, must live and operate, has profoundly changed in the last 20 years. We do indeed live in a world where communication and control systems are such that the President, if he so desired, could command a platoon in the farthest reaches of Vietnam from his desk in the White House. The military actions of this country have immediate international consequences and, as such, are possibly of greater concern to the civilian chain of command.
To perform our military missions in this new environment, we need to strive for even greater professional competence in such new fields as systems analysis. The military must lead the way in anticipating, evaluating) and assimilating changes, rather than have civilians forcing changes upon us. In this manner, by responsibly and intelligent meeting the challenges of a rapidly changing environment, we will have true civilian control, rather than civilian command.
"Career Development for the Naval Flight Officer”
[See S. E. Loftus, pp. 57-65, May 1968 Proceedin0^
Lieutenant Commander J. D. Piccion') U. S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command) Washington—Lieutenant Commander LofiuS has hit a rusty nail squarely on the head- seems rather archaic that command responsibility, in the aviation community, should bf harnessed to a pilot’s seat. The time has long since passed for the Navy to recognize tha1 squadron operational procedures can, amaz' ingly enough, be comprehended and managed without a plane commander’s qualify3' tion certificate.
Currently, the NEO prospective beyond the 0-4 level is at best poor and offers little incentive to continue with a career culminating in 3 dead-end assignment. Since the NFO is obliged to compete with the pilot on an eq1131 basis with respect to selection, why then should not the same ground rules apply where command is concerned? Clearly, it is appar' ent that NFO demand can only increase aS technology advances and it appears essentit that the responsible hierarch of the Nat take remedial action to correct a situation which required attention yesterday.
★ ★ ★
Major W. T. Wilson, U. S. Air Forcc> Senior Navigator, U. S. Air Force Academy-^ The military navigator-observer’s problem 0 positions of higher command of a flying unit is a critical one. Captain William A. Cohen’s article, “The Military Navigator in Aerospace Warfare” in the Air University Review (March-April 1967) echoes Lieutenant Commander Loftus’ views.
Apparently navigator aspirations for 3 flying command are similar in both services"^ and rightly so. The desire for command should be an integral part of every officer S ambition. Both authors show two avenues that open higher positions for the navigator;
either he is put on a par with the pilot for election to these positions, or he ends up spe- ■'alizing. Commander Loftus’ additional thought of “delineation of qualifying billets, other than tactical air command, which would ead to deep draft and major command” is Probably more of a Navy problem, but it Seems to portend roadblocks which need not e)fist for your service’s NFOs.
Other than the ability to control physically the air vehicle, pilots and navigators are equally well qualified to hold command: the Pilot because of his knowledge of the aircraft (and how to control it) and his understanding of related flying problems; the navigator bemuse of his expertise in that specialty and his Understanding of related flying problems. An ■^ir Force radar intercept officer (RIO), who is also a rated navigator, and who crews the P'101B (comparable to the Navy’s F-4B backwater), is a case in point. If he is conscientious, he learns not only the mastery of radar Weapons system, but also he can handle the Pilot’s job, except for flying the aircraft. This lr>eans he must have knowledge of procedures, regulations, maintenance problems, and tactics. When the pilot and the RIO reach command potential, does any significant differ- eOce in background and experience exist? Here we are considering two officers with identical potential. The pilot receives command by service regulation and policy. But "'hat if the RIO had demonstrated more command potential? The service is the loser bemuse it didn’t get “number one.” The ability to manage, to assume additional responsibilities, and the willingness to “lay it on the line develop the ability to command.
Another case in point is an Air Force navigator who, when immediate staff decisions Concerning flying problems were required, blade the decisions because the pilot operations officer was not readily available. The navigator, by circumstance, was forced to make the right choice because he not only exposed his own professional judgment and reputation, but also, and more importantly, the position of his superior. The foundry of operational necessity possibly has forged a future commander, capable of choosing the proper solutions in a flying operation. The salient point with both Commander Loftus and Captain Cohen, however, should be of genuine concern to both services: how can we afford to overlook some officers of potential command capability? If a unit commander were to be selected from 100 officers with the best effectiveness reports (which would naturally reflect their ability to assume responsibility and to get the job done) and all were pilots, what of the top 100 navigators? If we sprinkle the top 100 with 50 navigators, do we not now draw from a pool of much stronger potential? Therein lies the true meaning of these two authors’ articles.
"Lord of the Californian”
(See J. C. Carrothers, pp. 58-71, March, and pp. 109111, June 1968 Proceedings.)
John C. Carrothers—Since writing this article, a most relevant fact concerning the Titanic’s distress position has come to my attention. According to The New York Times, the Carpathia, after picking up the survivors, gave all the pertinent information to the SS Olympic, the only ship in the area with equipment powerful enough to transmit the information by wireless to Cape Race, the nearest land-based station. The New York Times, Tuesday, 16 April 1912, stated:
The White Star Liner Olympic reports by wireless this evening that the Cunarder Carpathia reached, at daybreak this morning, the position from which wireless calls for help were sent out last night by the Titanic after her collision with an iceberg. The Carpathia found only lifeboats and the wreckage of what had been the biggest ship afloat.
The Titanic had foundered at about 2:20 A.M., in latitude 41:16 north and longitude 50:14 west. This is about 30 minutes of latitude, or about 34 miles due south of the position at which she struck the iceberg (or the Titanic’s broadcast distress position).
This position of “about 34 miles” south of the Titanic’s broadcast position was, in all probability, an educated guess on the part of Captain Rostron.
The Mercantile Marine Service Association, in their petition addressed to the British Board of Trade, reported the following information:
The captain of the Carpathia originally estimated that he had 58 miles to go to the position broadcast by the Titanic. He took 3 hours and 25 minutes to reach the lifeboats, which indicated an average speed of 17 knots at full power throughout. But the Carpathia’s normal maximum speed was 14 knots, in addition to which 8 minutes of the time was taken at half speed and 25 minutes (the last stages of the final approach to the lifeboats) at slow speed, navigating “cautiously” to avoid icebergs. Flares from the lifeboats were seen as long as 1| hours before the first was reached, and the inescapable conclusion is that the actual distance covered by the Carpathia was considerably less than the 58 miles originally envisaged, probably being between 40 and 48 miles. If so, then the true position of the lifeboats, and of the disaster, was to the southeast of the broadcast position, as confirmed by the Mount Temple, and the Birma, and as claimed by the Californian.
The possibility of a southerly drift of the Titanic during her sinking is eliminated. The navigational charts indicate that the normal set of current in this area is easterly at about one-half knot. Under these circumstances, the stricken Titanic would have drifted no more- than one-and-a-half miles eastward while slowly sinking.
From evidence presented by other captains who responded to the distress calls, it would appear that Captain Rostron was heavy in his estimation of the distance. The distance south of the broadcast distress position to the survivors and wreckage was about 20 miles and not about 34 miles.
An editorial error appears in the first word on page 66 of my essay: the word Carpathia should have read “the [unidentified] ship.” This error has caused confusion to some readers who have questioned me by saying, “But you said elsewhere that the Carpathia did not arrive until after the Titanic had sunk.”
I have had inquiries as to where the research was done for this article. The book, The Titanic and the Californian, by Peter Padfield, and the “Text of a Petition addressed to the President of the Board of Trade” were used.
Inquiries concerning this and the second petition should be addressed to Mr. Leslie Harrison, Gen. Secretary, The Mercantile Marine Service Association, Nautilus House, Mariners Park, Wallasey,.Cheshire, England.
★ ★ ★
Walter Lord—As the author of A Night to Remember, I read with perhaps special interest
John C. Carrothers’s arguments that justice miscarried when the steamship Calforntan was held to have been within sight of the sink' ing Titanic 56 years ago. To me, his case juSt doesn’t stand up.
Supporting his point that the Titanic ga'e the wrong position, Mr. Carrothers offers 3 map, putting this position on the far side 0 an impenetrable ice field. But the field on hlS map doesn’t at all resemble the way it laH as plotted at the time by the U. S. Hydr°" graphic Office. A photocopy of the Navy De" partment’s Hydrographic Office map Pre” pared for the U. S. Senate hearings, based 0,1 ice reports from nine different ships include the Californian herself, shows the Titanic’s re" ported position clearly on the near side of the floe, where of course she belongs.
There is also positive evidence that the Titanic gave her position correctly. Mr. Car" rothers brushes aside the assurances of Captn'11 Rostron of the rescue ship Carpathia—says the Captain wasn’t noticing, but that’s certain!) not the picture that comes across from h*s testimony. Rostron well knew the important^ of what he was saying, and he went out of hlS way to emphasize the point. On four separate occasions altogether, three of them unde1' oath, he stressed that the Titanic was exactl) where he said she was.
Apart from this, there is independent com firmation from the Carpathia. As she left the scene on the morning of the 15th, at 9:45 sh® radioed her own position as 41°45,!s 50°20'W. Allowing for the fact that she "'aS starting back for New York, the longitude lS certainly reasonable, and the latitude, all-in1' portant in the charge that the Titanic laf farther south than she said, is just one mile below the position she gave.
There is still more confirmation from Cap' tain Moore of the steamer Mount Temple, b) now also in the area. Twice in the U. S. investigation, Senator Smith suggested that the Titanic lay to the south of the position she gave. Twice Moore specifically rejected the suggestion. He did indeed feel that the Titan‘c sank at least eight miles east of her stated position, but that would put her nearer the Cal1' fornian, not farther away.
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There is strong evidence that the Califot' man, on the other hand, was lying closer to the scene than she said. She started for the T*'
-llally3 they were seen within 20 minutes, as ’•he men began unlashing the boats, or as soon as any one began looking.
But the heart of the matter is not what was Seen from the Titanic, but what was seen from ’tie Californian herself. Boiled down, she saw a shange ship come up from the East around H:00 p.m., just as the Titanic did. She saw her s’°p somewhere to the South between 11:30 ar»d midnight, just as the Titanic did. Later, stie saw her apparently fire eight rockets, just
the Titanic did. She saw her gradually disappear, finally vanishing toward 2:30, just as the Titanic did.
Mr. Carrothers says that the two men on ’tie Californian's bridge believed that the Sockets were rising from some point well beyond the other ship.” Not so that night. Later, Second Officer Stone did indeed suggest this, tiut the testimony of Captain Lord, Chief tilfficer Stewart, and Apprentice Gibson all Utake it clear that Stone had no doubts at the ’irne. At the British Inquiry, Stone conceded tie was “sure” one of the rockets came from the ship he was watching, and “almost certain ’he others did. As for Apprentice Gibson, the
>anic’s position at 6:00 a.m. and was in sight almost right away. Second Officer Bisset of Carpathia saw her in the distance at 6:00. ’aPtain Moore of the Mount Temple also saw ler about that time, heading West through ’tie ice field before beginning his run South.
c estimated she was about as far North of !|le Carpathia as he was to the South, about ave or six miles. Wireless Operator Durrant of ’tie Mount Temple corroborated this in a septate statement. Third Officer Groves of the (<Qljornian saw the Carpathia on the port beam, atiout five miles away, when he went on the “r’dge about 6:50.
Overriding everything else are the events
the previous evening. Mr. Carrothers says ’tiat the strange ship seen by the Titanic was ^loving; whereas the Californian was station- arV. It is true that some of the people on the titanic thought the stranger was moving; but °’hers always thought she was stationary, ^he was certainly on hand all night long; ®°at 8 was still rowing toward her when the f*arpathia appeared from the opposite direction J^st before dawn. Mr. Carrothers also says the Titanic did not see the strange ship’s lights until “about an hour” after the collision. Ac- other man on the bridge, he was always certain the rockets came from the vessel in sight.
Nor is it true, as Mr. Carrothers, claims, that neither of the men noticed any detonating flash from the other ship’s decks. Stone conceded he saw “evidence” of this in the case of one rocket, and Gibson was very explicit on the point. Describing the first rocket he saw fired, he later wrote, “I then got the binoculars and had just got them focussed on the vessel when I observed a white flash apparently on her deck, followed by a faint streak towards the sky which then burst into white stars.”
Finally, there is the hard fact that the rockets and the other ship always remained on the same bearings. According to Stone, the stranger began steaming away at the time the first rocket went up. If she had been between the Californian and the rockets from a more distant Titanic, she would have steamed away from in front of those rockets. But she didn’t. The rockets went right along with her as she gradually “disappeared,” to use the chilling word that occurs again and again in this part of the recorded testimony.
And what did Stone and Gibson think these rockets meant? Mr. Carrothers says, “At the time it was obvious that at least the Second Officer and Apprentice did not recognize them as distress signals.” Was it so obvious? At the British Inquiry, Apprentice Gibson said both he and Stone felt the strange ship was “in trouble of some sort;” and again that “there must be something the matter with her.” Gibson himself thought it was a case of “some kind of distress.” Stone never admitted that much, but he concedes he told Gibson, “A ship is not going to fire rockets at sea for nothing.”
Chief Officer Stewart was not on duty at the time, but it is worth noting that he thought the rockets “might be distress signals” when he relieved Stone at 4:00 a.m. and Stone told him what he had seen. At the British Inquiry, Stewart admitted he thought “something had happened.”
Yet nothing was done, although Captain Lord was informed of the rockets three different times during the night. Later, he said he was told of only one rocket, but he is contradicted by all three of the other men on the bridge. Feeling as he did, Captain Lord
Aboard the USS Monitor: IHU2
The letters of Paymaster William F.. Keeler edited by Professor Robert W. Daly, U. S. Naval Academy. List Price $6.50. Member's Price $5.20. A U. S. Naval Institute Publication
"Amidst the plethora of Civil War memorials now hitting print, this publication stands out like a first-order lighthouse on a clear and sparkling night."
—American Neptune
claimed there was no need to worry. But he was worried enough to wake up his wireless operator at 5:15 a.in. and ask him then to check. The tragedy is that he didn’t do it sooner.
How much could the Californian have accomplished anyhow? Mr. Carrothers argues that she was really too far away to help. I feel that she was close enough to have done a great deal of good. But wherever she was, she might have tried. Speaking recently at a school, I mentioned that the California^s defenders had two distinct theories: The rockets came from the Titanic, but she lay behind the ship being watched and too far away to reach; or alternatively: the rockets didn’t come from the Titanic but from some other, never-identified vessel. At this point one of the students piped up, “I can’t see what difference it makes who fired them or where they came from, rockets are rockets.”
Sometimes young people have a way of putting things far more succinctly than their elders, and I think this is a good example. “Rockets are rockets;” the men on the
Californian saw them; they agreed they re sembled distress signals; they sensed t‘\ something was wrong; they told the capj3111 what they had seen; and he did nothin?' This, in a nutshell, is the case against Capt3"1 Stanley Lord and the steamship California1
"U-Boat With Wings”
(See R. D. Layman, pp. 54-59, April 1968 Proceedings)
Kenneth W. Estes—Hopefully, forthcr efforts will be made by writers to relate tb* complex story of the experimentation by sn mariners and designers to achieve a balance force of arms in the “submarine carrier’ The subject of aircraft-carrying submarine* and their evolution remains neglected for du most part by historians, despite the signific3'1* contributions of the experimentation to na' 3 technology which are in evidence todar From the time of the German and BrHlS experiments in World War I, which Mr. La) man describes, this concept contributed tCj the tactical and technological foundation 0 the modern guided missile submarine.
It was first proposed during World II to fire rocket weapons from submarine^ the German Army rocket scientists 0 Peenemiinde were the source of the de velopment. In 1942, bombardment rockets0 the German Army “Nebelwerfer” type vvOe fired from a submerged submarine at a rangc of two miles with great accuracy, during eV periments in the Baltic. By 1943, the Germ3l|. scientists were ready to study the possibility 0 firing their newly-developed V-2 guided mlS' sile from submarines. It was planned that 3 submarine would tow as many as three 50°' ton caissons and submerge them by means 0 a controlled integral ballast system; eac*1 caisson would contain a rocket and fuel. the launching position, the container won* be flooded at one end to place it in an uprigbj position. The upper end would be opened a110 after fueling the missile would be launched-
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At the end of 1944, the Germans de' cided to proceed with this project, but PCL' nemtinde had to be evacuated before the Soviet Army’s advance in Feburary 1945; only preliminary drafting had been coi'1' menced by that time. The ultimate objects1 of the project was to have been the guided' missile bombardment of the eastern seaboar0
°^the United States with this 160-mile range Weapon. 5
I The U. S. Navy also had limited experience llh submarine-launched rockets. In June July of 1945, the USS Barb (SS-220) "'mbarded Japanese coastal towns with 'lnch rockets fired on the surface to a range 1 approximately 2.5 miles.
^Vhen the War ended, the U. S. Navy gained firsthand knowledge of the Japanese Hcraft carrier submarines and the German Seagoing rocket project. These designs attracted the attention of several submarine officers, who were impressed by both the of- ensive capabilities of the large Japanese "tOO-class submarines and the firepower of Sman rocketry. They formulated a proposal 'a late 1945 for the Bureau of Ordnance which Called for a surface-to-surface missile which c°uld be launched from both surface ships ^nd submarines. However, it was not until ^48 that two U. S. submarines, the USS (SSG-348) and USS Carbonero (SSG-337), 'Vf:re fitted with guided missile launching gear °r evaluation. A cylindrical hangar and a Punching ramp were fitted for the Loon fissile, a copy of the German V-l flying ’(jmb. During Exercise Miki, conducted in Hawaiian waters in October 1949, the Cusk ^ad Carbonero surfaced and fired their missiles °ver the horizon at a “hostile” surface fleet.
he experience gained from this and other e*periments with firing the Loon led to the development of the Navy’s first operational guided missile, the Regulus. It was an airbathing, cruise missile that would deliver a Htclear warhead to a maximum range of 500 'Hies. The USS Tunny (SSG-282) and USS ®arbero (SSG-317) were converted in 1953 and 1955 respectively to handle this missile. The "fluipment carried was the same as that in the j'vo earlier boats except for an improved fold- Hg launch rail.
The problem of the cumbersome deck hangar, which had been placed on all aircraft ^nd missile carrying submarines since World ^Var I, was finally solved when the U. S. ^>avy ordered new submarines designed as fissile carriers. The resulting craft were the 'JSS Grayback (SSG-574) and USS Growler (Ssg-577), completed in 1958, and the nuclear-powered USS Halibut (SSGN-587), completed in 1960. In these designs, the hangar
was placed in the forward part of the pressure hull and an automatic launcher installed forward of the sail. The submarines were to accommodate the improved supersonic Regulus II; however, it was cancelled in favor of the crash ballistic missile project. These submarines retained all normal attack capabilities and, with the several missiles that were carried, were able to strike inland targets without fear of retaliation. With this stage of evolution, the submarine had at last become a true strategic weapons system, something which had been but a dream to a few submariners of many navies through the four pre- ceeding decades.
When the evolution of submarine-deployed aerial weapons systems is considered over a period of some 40 years, the experiments of World War I and afterward no longer appear to have been crackpot schemes by any measure. The Japanese demonstrated some of the potential of the concept in World War II, but were far too late in seizing upon the possibilities of the strategic submarine. The United States, fortunately, was not blind to the immense advantage in the offensive power afforded by operating strategic submarines in secure positions off a potential aggressor’s territory. By substituting the guided missile for the airplane and atomic for fossil power, the homogeneous combination of two distinct systems was accomplished in the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile System.
"Relative Bearing Navigation”
(See J. H. Bartol, pp. 136-137, January 1968 Proceedings)
Captain D. Daragan, Russian Imperial Navy, C.B.E.—When I was a cadet in the Naval School in St. Petersburg (established by Peter the Great in 1703), we had to do with these questions two years before we became officers, and no cadet could be transferred to a higher (following) class if he was not able to solve quickly and absolutely correctly the most complicated combination, deviation, variation at the place of the ship with the correction of the year, drift or current.
I was very glad that a young officer took up the question of the magnetic compasses, so badly treated after the introduction on gyro compasses. I like magnetic compasses, and I had to deal with them for nearly 60 years; the
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not exist. Others state that the ones we cepted in the past have changed because
the new and fantastic weapons of our era, the atomic bomb. Still others hold that
last 20 years even with gyro compasses.
If one should make a short comparison of these two quite different instruments, I would say that a gyro compass is a “very complicated electro-mechanical device giving automatically the direction of the true (geographical) meridian.” The magnetic compass is “plain nature,” a light disk with magnet needles pivoting on a pin giving always the correct reading, not of the geographical meridian but of the direction of the magnetic field in the ship at the place of the compass bowl. Thus, knowing the deviation and the variation, every sea officer should be able to calculate quickly the final correction of the compass reading and get the true reading.
Using the gyro compass, one is not obliged to think, though in the case of a magnetic compass one must think a little. Every naval officer must follow the possible changes of magnetic conditions of the ship, and this is not at all difficult if you have been accustomed to doing this since your school days.
The Russian (de-Colong) Deflector (See February 1959 Proceedings, p. 117) was designed about 80 years ago, and is used to adjust compasses and even to fix the remaining deviation without any local or celestial bearing. I find that the introduction of deflectors and simulators for the adjusting of compasses is very important, but this apparatus is not accepted by the present naval authorities. Recently I visited some schools in Scandinavia but received everywhere the same reply: “We are obliged to give our pupils so much technical information that we have no time to teach them old fashioned methods.” Three years ago I went to Washington to visit my son and we made a trip to Annapolis. I approached the appropriate department of the Naval Academy and was given a very courteous reception, but I understood at once that there was no more interest here in magnetic compasses than there was in Europe.
After my return to Finland, I visited a big American cargo vessel. There was in the chart room a deviation table, but it was 18 months old and the deviation reached 9°6'.
Certainly, today’s new warships have to be equipped with the most modern instruments, but their users must have the knowledge, in case of emergency, to use old fashioned systems. I can confirm this by my personal experience on 28 August 1904. In the battle tween the Russian and the Japanese
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and I had to use a megaphone, shouting tance readings to the fore tower from W- they could be transmitted to other artilRE centers. A good voice pipe would have be preferable to a megaphone.
"Priticiples of War”
(See Bruce Keener, III, pp. 26-36, November and pp. 108-109, March 1968 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, U. S. Navy (^e_ tired), Director of Naval History—Much been written on the principles of war. So*’ students go so far as to claim that principle
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principles of war are simply common sense’ applied with audacity, resolution, and vig°r'
This last concept of the principles, and 11 true one, is shown nowhere more clearly tb^j in the following comment by Fleet Adm>ra Chester W. Nimitz on “The Nelson Touch- It comes from his papers in the custody of *be Director of Naval History.
Asked to illustrate the Nelson Touch by al' example in World War II, Admiral Nim'tz wrote in September 1962:
Your letter of September 10, 1962 indicates your desire to illustrate by some episode of World War II how the application of the “nelson touch” in modern war brought success as surely as it did in Nelson’s day.
In order to do this one must first understand precisely what is meant by the “nelson' touch,” and this I will endeavor to explain in the following paragraphs.
Nelson was not only a Master Mariner who had a thorough knowledge of the sea and the limitations of the ships of his day, but he was also a profound student of the age old principles of war that had been derived from land and sea warfare from the earliest days. H*s contemporary, Napoleon Bonaparte, was likewise such a student of land warfare, but quite lacking in the application of those principles of war at sea.
Nelson, furthermore, was an expert judge of men and had the ability to inspire in his subordinates many of the characteristics which he himself possessed and which mark a great
leader. He established within his command a Very high degree of mutual confidence and loyalty and resolution. This ability to deal
as his knowledge of the principles of war and how to apply them.
What then are these age old Principles of War?
Brought down to the present day they may he listed as:
1. The Principle of the Objective.
2. The Principle of the Offensive.
3. The Principle of Simplicity.
4. The Principle of Security.
5. The Principle of Surprise.
6. The Principle of Superiority.
7. The Principle of Movement.
8. The Principle of Cooperation—and
9. The Principle of the Economy of Force.
This list can be used as a “check off” list to test any tactical and strategical plans. The application of as many as possible of the above list and the omission of as few of the above as possible will go a long way towards ensuring success of the planned operation. Of the above Principles Nos. 1,2,3 and 6 were uppermost in Nelson’s mind when he planned his tactics against the combined French and Spanish f leets at Trafalgar. He planned to achieve Superiority at the point of contact when he resolved to arrange his own force in double columns and to strike at or near the middle of the enemy line. By so doing he would isolate the enemy flagship which was near the middle of the line and concentrate the full force of his fleet against a weaker enemy force. This plan Was simple to a high degree and it made application of all of the nine Principles listed above. Furthermore, he explained to his Captains and Admirals that “In case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood no Captain can do very Wrong if he places his ship alongside of that of an enemy.”
And in Nelson’s own words after the conference of Captains and Admirals on his flagship, H.M.S. Victory—before Trafalgar, “I believe my arrival [to command] was most welcome, not only to the Commander of the fleet, but also to every individual in it; and when I came to explain to them the ‘nelson touch it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears, all approved—‘It was new—it was singular it was simple! and, from Admirals downwards, it was repeated—‘It must succeed, if ever they will allow us to get at them! You are, my Lord, surrounded by friends whom you inspire with confidence.” (see pages 339 at seq of Vol II of
“The Life of Nelson—The Embodiement of the Sea Power of Great Britain” by A. T. Mahan—and also see page 163 of Seapower published by Prentice-Hall.
Now we come to your question “Is there any incident that leaps to your mind from either the Atlantic or Pacific War which could be called an illustration of “the nelson touch.” And then you—Mr. Bourne—[a book editor working on Nelson] have answered your own question by asking “Do you think Admiral Oldendorf’s action in the Battle of Leyte Gulf would qualify?” My answer is “Yes, it definitely would qualify because it applies most successfully nearly all of the Principles of War described herein—and most of all the Principle of Superiority—(at point of Contact) because Oldendorf was able to achieve that tactician’s dream of “Crossing the T” on the oncoming Japanese ships where-all, or nearly all of Oldendorf’s ships could fire on the head of the Japanese column—with only a minimum of return fire from the Japanese.
"Why Not Another Mariner Class of Merchant Ship”
(See E. B. Perry, p. 129, January 1968 Proceedings) John Conroy—Captain Perry’s proposal, although not entirely new, has considerable merit and must be treated as a start toward solving the economic ills of the merchant marine fleet. Foremost in the proposal to build a standard class ship for the merchant marine fleet is the question of economics. From a standpoint of national and international economic factors, a standardized ship is desirable and indeed an economic necessity.
The American economy will reap benefits from a progressive shipbuilding program emphasizing standard ships. The present system of building three ships of this class and four ships of that class is inefficient from an economic standpoint. Unfortunately, shipowners try to differentiate their ships from those of competitors in aspects of little significance. This is waste. The major consideration of the shipowners should be “what return on investment will I receive.” The shipper is looking for service at the lowest possible cost.
Building a large number of ships annually would allow certain economies of scale. The average total cost of the ship would decline somewhat as the number of ships built increases and thus the government subsidy required per ship would decrease, assuming that
ships to transport goods will lessen paym1 to foreigners for use of their equipment- the United States is to remain economical1
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superior, a standard class of ships must u built without further delays.
shipbuilders pass on the economics of scale to the ship purchaser in the form of lower bids.
Under the current system of building a handful of ships per year, the upgrading of the fleet is extremely slow. By the time the major U. S. shipping companies get enough subsidy money to build replacements for obsolete ships, the vessels built in the last five to ten years as replacements will be rapidly approaching obsolescence.
A solid shipbuilding program is vital from an international economic viewpoint also. With our ever-increasing foreign trade, the ability to ship American goods in American flag ships economically must be increase ■ Other nations recognize the significance ot strong merchant marine, i.e., the So'>et Union. The balance of payments situati0'1 would also be improved by using America11 ships to transport more goods. With the cur rent gold crisis and pressure on the dollar action must be taken to prevent flow of fi'n to overseas nations. Clearly, use of America'1
*
You May Fire When Ready, Gridley!
Captain Charles Vernon Gridley’s answer to Commodore Dewey’s famous command was not recorded, but it may be fairly accurately surmised. The results are well known; its long-range effects are still with us.
But what about Gridley? How was it that the skipper of the USS Olympia at the Battle of Manila Bay, to whom should go a large share of the credit for the training and readiness of the most important unit on our side, never figured thereafter in the annals of our Navy? The answer, not generally known, is that he died a month after the battle and was, in a manner of speaking, the only casualty of any sort sustained by the U. S. squadron.
As war with Spain appeared more and more likely, Gridley had been growing progressively debilitated with what was very probably cancer of the liver, and some time in April he received orders to proceed home for hospitalization. The arrival of his relief, Commander Lamberton, almost coincided with the Declaration of War. As Chief of Staff, as well as commander of the flagship, Gridley had had a great deal to do with preparations for the attack on Manila. On the strength of this, he protested his detachment on the eve of battle. In personal conversation with Dewey, he argued that, though admittedly weak from his illness, he could still carry out all his duties and was, in addition, thoroughly familiar with the detailed plans for the battle. Finally he convinced Dewey. Lamberton was appointed Chief of Staff, and Gridley remained in command of the Olympia. Gridley could hardly drag himself around his ship during the voyage from Hong Kong, but he remained true to the trust and confidence reposed in him. Only he, and possibly Dewey, appreciated what it cost him in the way of granite-like determination.
Our fleet at Manila on 1 May 1898 had been directed to follow the motions of the flagship. After Dewey’s order, Gridley descended from the bridge to the Olympia’s conning tower, received reports from all departments that everything was in readiness and that the pointers of both turrets were steady upon their points of aim. He then gave the order which climaxed his naval career and his life.
The Olympia’s conning tower, like those of all ships of that era, was extremely hot and very poorly ventilated. We had no casualties whatever on that day. The Spanish squadron, by contrast, suffered rather severely, but this is not quite the whole story. Captain Gridley had to be carried from his battle station at the close of the action. His weakened body had stood the strain of the fight, but in some unknown manner he had received a blow in the side which caused a rupture, and this, added to the terrible heat at his battle station, produced the most serious injury suffered by anyone during the fight.
He never rose from his sickbed and died on the way home one month later in Kobe. Japan, leaving behind an example of duty which deserves to be better remembered.
•---------------------------------------- Contributed by Captain Edward L. Beach, U. S. Navy (Ret.)