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The disclosure by the U. S. Atlantic Fleet on 27 October 1967 that the Soviet i Union is building an aircraft carrier is of vital Slgnificance to the United States and the U. S. Navy. The subsequent information that the carrier was on sea trials, that a second carrier had been launched, and that others may be being built indicates an important development in the capability of the Soviet navy.
An indication of Russian appreciation of lhe obvious advantages that mobile naval seapower has given to the United States in recent years, the decision has important impliCations for future U. S. policy—particularly
1,1 the use of naval forces in the Third World those uncommitted nations of the world htch are not aligned with the Soviet Union the United States. The decision to build a helicopter carrier is significant because it ^eenis to confirm a Soviet trend toward the , fyelopment of a credible limited war capa- UtY- It also appears to confirm a growing
Soviet determination to challenge U. S. naval superiority at sea. The most recent examples of this have been their fleet movements during the 1967 Middle East crisis and its aftermath, and the appearance of a Soviet task force in the Sea of Japan following the seizure of the USS Pueblo (AGER-2).
Apparently the decision to increase limited war capability was made in 1963, when construction was begun on the first amphibious carrier, and an increase in the number of Soviet ship deployments commenced. A small Marine Corps was reactivated in 1965 and Soviet literature reflected renewed interest in amphibious operations. Professor Uri Ra’anan commented in the October 1965 issue of Survey:
It is true that by 1965 the U.S.S.R. was beginning to develop some of the elements required for any military action overseas, for example by reactivating the Marine Corps (Marine Infantry). However, in the continued absence of the important ingredients of a naval-air striking force, above all aircraft carriers, it did not appear likely that there would be a real Soviet capability in the near future to intervene in Afro-Asian situations by limited and conventional means. The U. S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets were still decisive factors in the region and Soviet threats of counter action did not appear to have too much substance behind them (assuming always, of course, that nuclear confrontation is ruled out.)
Professor Ra’anan’s cautious approach toward the beginning indications of Soviet amphibious capabilities was typical of many experts in Soviet military affairs who did not want to read too much into that development. But, two years later, in the October 1967 issue of Current History, RAND Soviet military expert, Thomas Wolfe, could say more positively that:
. . . The present regime has moved in this direction building on measures initiated in the Khrushchev era to improve Soviet amphibious capabilities, to train the reactivated marine forces (naval infantry) in landing operations, and to secure base arrangements growing out of Soviet military aid programs abroad. The dispatch of Soviet Naval units, including special landing vessels, to the Mediterranean in connection with the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis was a clear example of this trend. How far the Soviet leadership may be prepared to go, however, either in actually committing its own forces in local situations or investing the resources necessary to make such intervention effective, remains among the crucial questions on its agenda.
The decision of the Soviets to build a medium size carrier has given a clear insight into the extent of the commitment. The Soviet carrier is estimated to be from 23,000-25,000 tons and to carry from 30 to 35 helicopters, which is the same capacity as U. S. helicopter carriers (LPH). However, they most closely resemble the American amphibious dock (LPD). The only flight deck space on the Soviet ship is in the after half.
There are other changes in Soviet ship construction that also indicate an increased emphasis on amphibious capability. Ships similar to the U. S. tank landing ship (LST) were first constructed in 1965 and commissioned in 1966, and have been sighted in the Mediterranean following the June War. Of perhaps even greater significance is the sharp increase in the numbers of oilers, repair ships, transports and supply ships necessary to sustain a fleet at sea and project Soviet sea power to distant areas.
The following comments of three senior Soviet admirals on the occasion of their Navy Day celebration, 31 July 1967, seem to be particularly indicative of a greater emphasis in Soviet naval strategy.
In a newspaper article, Fleet Admiral V. A. Kasatonov, First Deputy, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, said:
As a result of technical re-equipping, our Navy has been able in recent years to transfer to a qualitatively new type of combat training—the working out of missions in remote regions of the world ocean, which was previously considered a zone of supremacy of the fleets of imperialist powers. Our ships can now be seen in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the tropic latitudes of the Indian Ocean, and in the severe Arctic.
Meanwhile, in far-off Vladivostok, still another expression of what is obviously the present party line was being expressed in a Navy Day interview:
Admiral Anelko: . . . various ships of the fleet are represented: submarines, surface ships, equipped with missiles, antisubmarine vessels, landing craft—that is everything which is necessary for the fleet to carry out any task assigned to it.
Announcer: At last year’s review I did not see , ships of such a type and with such armament. Admiral Anelko: Our fleet becomes more powerful and mightier every year . . . The world situation compels all of us to pay attention to insuring combat readiness . . .
In a newspaper interview, Vice Admiral P. G. Kotov, Deputy Commander in Chief ol the Navy, spoke of Soviet nuclear submarines:
It is sufficient to say that they are capable of destroying surface ships and submarines of the enemy and also of transporting troops and cargo to any region of the oceans of the world.
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When asked about the “Naval Infantry> his answer was as follows:
Revived recently, . . . naval infantry has special armament and various types of amphibious equipment. Landing ships with naval infantrymen can surmount vast spaces of water and quickly put the men ashore.
Clearly, there is a role envisioned for the > Soviet version of the Marine Corps in placeS far from their homeland. In speeches in both 1966 and 1967, the Marines were depicted aS an elite group. The Soviet admiral then discussed Soviet surface ships:
They have been called on to defend shoreline and naval communications, to search for and destroy enemy submarines, and also to co-ordinate with ground troops in coastal zones . . . The geography of cruises of Soviet combat ships has significantly changed. While in the years of the past war our Navy on the whole carried out combat tasks at comparatively small distances from their bases, Soviet / seamen now, in defending the naval interests of the socialist state, serve both in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
Apparently the Soviets are developing a mobile, ocean-going Navy. And they [ developing a philosophy which will all0'' 1 them to use it. The lack of philosophy a° * operational experience, rather than the means, contributed to their failure to make some demonstration of sea power in, ^°r example, the Quemoy crisis of 1958.
The Russians have demonstrated their sea power in the past. Russian harassment of 6. S. ships is not a new development. However, the most blatant example to date occurred in May 1967 just before the Middle East war when, on successive days, Soviet destroyers deliberately collided with the U. S. destroyer Walker (DD-517) in the Sea of Japan. Soviet deployment of submarines to Caribbean waters during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 displayed a limited naval presence. Fleet exercises have been announced during previous crises; for example, following Jd. S. landings in Lebanon in July 1958. 6 Soviet task force has been maintained in the Mediterranean since 1964. But the deployment of ships to the Mediterranean in large "umbers and the build-up following the Middle-East crisis in June is a very significant mdicator of increased Soviet naval aggressiveness and an apparent attempt to neutralize s°me of the advantages that the U. S. Sixth Meet provides for the United States. In a ^>eech on 28 September 1967, Admiral Mornas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Opera- dons, said:
This new power is dramatically evidenced in their ever increasing naval presence in the Mediterranean. Soviet naval forces there just prior to the Middle East conflict had grown to 25 to 30 ships. At that time this was the largest number of Soviet naval ships ever deployed tnto the Mediterranean. The conflict in the Middle East apparently presaged a significant augmentation of Soviet naval forces to the Med. Shortly after this conflict Soviet naval strength increased to 35 to 40 ships and has remained at this level.
Muring the Khrushchev era, Soviet mili- dtry strategy relied heavily on the deterrent ttect of ballistic missiles and other nuclear Capons. Because of the nuclear stalemate, the arena of the nonaligned nations and the riational liberation movements became of Crucial importance. The Soviets felt that they must depend on insurgency operations and arrtls shipments and avoid direct involvement. They evidently were afraid that the resence of Soviet forces would cause Western tervention. They wanted the Western pres- llCe removed, not reinforced.
_ strong reaction by the West would . 'ruinate the Third World by dividing it either the Soviet or U. S. camps. Still,
the Soviet Union’s planners felt a need to maintain firm control in order to prevent embarrassing surprises and to be able to stop escalation in time.
The difficulties they have had in carrying out this approach and dealing with the powerful forces of nationalism in the fiercely independent, emerging nations has evidently given support to those Soviets who desired a changed policy that would provide a capability to intervene directly and have more direct Soviet control so that limited conflicts would not get out of hand. Professor Ra’anan foresaw this in 1965:
Some of the military leaders apparently argued that since it was proving so difficult to insure that the ‘national liberation movement’ would avoid provoking the West, the attempt should be made to deter the West from reacting to such activities . . . that is from exploiting its regional military predominance for the purpose of suppressing local wars; in that case, the U.S.S.R. could pursue its offensive in the third world without having to worry about the consequences of Afro-Asian militancy. In this context, the ‘West’ meant primarily the U. S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets.
The policy of the military leaders has obviously gained increased backing. Raymond Garthoff, in his book Soviet Military Policy, described a growing desire for mobile sea power in this way:
By the mid 1960s, the Soviet leaders probably wished they had some aircraft carriers, not for use in a major war, but in order to establish a military presence at great distances from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Marine Corps . . . was re-established ... to provide a modest wartime amphibious lift in the Baltic, the Turkish Straits, and the Sea of Japan, and perhaps also to provide an option for rapid establishment of a military presence in distant areas.
There are obvious advantages in being able to make a significant show of strength in any area of the world without ever entering the limits of territorial waters.
During the build-up to the June 1967 Middle East Crisis the Soviets decided to make a show of naval strength. But they were obviously frustrated by the power demonstrated by the forces of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, and this feeling was reflected in their press and radio broadcasts. There were frequent mentions of the Sixth Fleet before and during the crisis; a front page story in Izvestia on May 26 claimed that:
The U. S. Sixth Fleet is openly menacing the Arab peoples with its guns . . . Under the protection of American warship guns, a military crisis is now being engineered in the Near East. . . . While American diplomacy is shedding crocodile tears about the hotbed of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, the American military are getting up steam on their warships and putting Marines on board.
An indication of how closely the movements of the Sixth Fleet are followed can be seen from a transcript of a Soviet round-table discussion held on 28 May:
Speaker: One must say that the matter is not limited only to diplomatic pressure and a campaign of threats. The U. S. Sixth Fleet, which plays the role of Washington’s military stick in the Mediterranean, has now been brought into a state of battle readiness, and a considerable proportion of its ships is being concentrated in direct proximity to the borders of the Arab states. I think that now it would not be out of place to remember that the Sixth Fleet consists of 50 ships, with some 25,000 crew members, including the aircraft carriers America and Saratoga. By a strange coincidence, there has also appeared in the Mediterranean the antisubmarine carrier Intrepid. The Sixth Fleet has about 200 aircraft, including the latest jet fighters. On board there are several thousand Marines, and one must add that these are found aboard Sixth Fleet ships in larger than usual numbers.
New Speaker: One must say that the aircraft carrier Saratoga should have left for Vietnam in the near future, but now its departure has been postponed.
The second speaker was probably referring to the Intrepid which was waiting at the time to go through the Suez Canal.
Much was made of a statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the April 17th issue of U. S. News and World Report. He was quoted out of context as having said the “Sixth Fleet is behind us,” and that he had a U. S. guarantee “in the shape of the U. S. Sixth Fleet.” In a prophetic radio discussion in Moscow on 4 June, the day before the outbreak of hostilities, Eshkol is quoted as
follows, “In answer to the question as to whether the leaders of Tel Aviv policy count on U. S. help, Eshkol declared, ‘We obtained the following promise when we asked for weapons from the United States. Do not waste your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here.’ ”
The question actually asked him on D April was: “If Israel were attacked in force by its neighbors, would you expect help froin the U. S. and possibly Britain and France?
He answered:
Surely, we expect such help—but we would rely primarily on our own Army. . . . We get these promises when we ask the U. S. for arms and are told: ‘Don’t spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here.’ My reply to this advice is that the Sixth Fleet might not be available fast enough for one reason or another, so Israel must be strong on its own . . .
The following Soviet analysis in Izvestia, made after the cease-fire, reveals the extent of foe problems that U. S. fleets present for the Soviets.
To let the Israeli aggressor get away with impunity, and to grant these territorial claims, would mean to bolster the undermined positions of the colonialists in the Middle East.
This would make it easier for the imperialist forces to carry out the policy of interference in internal affairs of the developing countries of Asia and Africa, the policy of crude dictation, and blackmail of those countries. This would ease the situation of the U. S. Sixth and Seventh Fleets, those gendarmes of international reaction in the Mediterranean and the Pacific.
These words may unintentionally reveal foe policy the Soviets would themselves invoke with additional naval forces.
The Sixth Fleet obviously looms very large on the Soviet horizon and there seems to be little doubt now that they intend to cap1 talize on some of the advantages seaport affords to U. S. foreign policy. Following foe Middle East build-up they did not go home- Instead, they increased their naval forces-
The Economist has summed up the Soviets l Third World predicament this way:
It isn’t just a little local difficulty that Mr- Kosygin finds himself stuck with after the Middle East war. When he decided not to m-
k, viet
®eping operations will be diminished if So- aircraft from carriers also fly over trouble
tervene on the Arab’s side he was admitting the central weakness of Russian policy: its lack of strategic mobility. This is a problem that hampers the Russians everywhere out- s'de the heart of the Eurasian land mass. It showed itself with brutal clarity on 5 June. The U. S. could have intervened to save Israel With the Sixth Fleet in a matter of hours . . .
Actually, there is no way of knowing how peat an impact Sixth Fleet forces might have had on the desert war had they been committed. But, the Fleet’s mere presence in the mediterranean undoubtedly reduced the Slgnificance of the Soviet display of power and, realists that they are, the Soviets were well pvare of the capability of U. S. forces vis-a-vis °viet forces.
hut the same Economist article ends on a h°te that is made more ominous by the subse- Ttent announcements that the Soviets have ecided to build carriers.
ffhe combination of an offensive ideology "ath a defensive strategy is apt to produce sUch diplomatic defeats. To avoid more Cubas and Sinais, the Russians will have either to resist the temptation to take on commitments !n the third world (which includes encouraging “Wars of Liberation”) or else to acquire dte military capacity this sort of policy calls for. This means building aircraft carriers and acquiring staging posts for airborne troops. It Vv‘H be a bad omen for East-West relations if there are signs that they have chosen the Second way out of their dilemma.
. AVhile all Americans can take pride in the ct that the United States has developed a I'Wal capability that the Soviets now desire ernulate, the implications are extremely ?ertous for all. The specter of U. S. operations, the Mediterranean or the waters of South ^herica, being confronted by a Soviet force ,c°mparable strength is not pleasant. Cer- ■ 111 % some of the effectiveness of our peace-
QPff°ts or if Soviet surface ships join us in patrols the shores of a beleaguered nation. The . lcture is even bleaker at the thought of hear- one day of Soviet landings in South East Sla or Africa to support a reputed Com- ^ntst uprising. Obviously this capability j . , give the Soviets a new flexibility and tative in exercising their policy.
Ironically, an aggressor doesn’t need a large number of forces in a limited war situation— it is the true peacekeeper that needs the larger, more responsive forces. Thus, even a small force will add a great deal to the credibility of Soviet pronouncements.
Still, there is little consolation in the fact that the Soviet limited war capability is presently small. We should have no doubt that the Russians have the industrial capacity to equip and support a large number of forces in a short time period if they desire.
It has not yet been determined how the new carriers will be employed. It appears that they have been designed primarily for carrying helicopters, adopting the vertical envelopment techniques pioneered by U. S. Marines, and are therefore a confirmation that the Russians have decided to put major emphasis on perfecting an amphibious capability. For the present, they evidently will still depend on their considerable land-based naval air arm for air cover.
There is a remote possibility that the carriers are being developed to carry out an antisubmarine warfare role, perhaps being directed toward an attempt to combat Polaris submarine patrols. However, because of the other signs of amphibious upgrading, it appears more likely that the carriers will be used primarily for amphibious lift.
The Russians have evidently abandoned the cautious attitude of the Khrushchev era toward the Third World, which reasoned that any type of direct confrontation with the West would ultimately lead to global nuclear war. That they are now willing to risk miscalculation in order to enjoy the fruits of mobile seapower seems to be confirmed by the present employment of naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan, and probes into the Indian Ocean. The Liberty incident during the June war is a prime example of the hazards of a close proximity of forces, even when it is clear that neither side desires to confront the other. If the Liberty attack had occurred in the confusion of the first day of the fight, rather than on the third day when the intentions of all parties were fairly certain, the consequences might have been even more serious. There were also reports of Soviet ship movements into close
A graduate of the U. S. Nava Academy with the Class o 1957, Lieutenant Commander Howe served in the US Bremerton (CA-130) for a year before attending Submarine School. He was then assigne to the USS Tench (SS-417) f°r 15 months, after which he attended the U. S. Naval Nu" clear Power School, staying on after graduation as the Training Officer for the West Milton nuclear prototype for 15 months. He served in the USS George Washington (SSBN-598) fr01® August 1962 until December 1963, and in the US Patrick Henry (SSBN-599) from December 1963 unt> June 1967. He is now a student at Fletcher School o Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
proximity to American ships on several occasions at the height of the Middle East crisis. They have evidently decided that reliance on indirect methods such as arms
shipments, third parties and revolutionaries,
is, itself, a very risky business without some means of direct control. How much influence a direct display of Soviet power will have on the independent and recalcitrant leaders ° the Third World remains to be seen.
It is altogether possible that the Russian build-up of both its ABM capability an Hirnited war forces is directed at China rather than the United States. Although the possibility of a direct conflict between the Soviet Union and China is slight, there is definfle evidence of continuing competition between these two powers in the Third World, par' ticularly in the Asian area which the Chined regard as their rightful sphere of influence-
One interesting sidelight of the Mid^*e East crisis was the Chinese reaction whic denounced the Soviets for colluding with the United States. The following, which ap peared in People's Daily on 3 June 1967, con cerning the Sixth Fleet, is amusing but it haS serious overtones:
U. S. imperialists recently dispatched a large number of war ships to the Middle East region to intimidate the Arab people and support the Israeli aggressors. The Soviet revisionists clique also sent a number of warships to pl°"’ back and forth in the Mediterranean in the name of supporting the Arab countries to oppose Israeli’s aggression. When the U. S. and Soviet warships meet at sea, however, they
acquire increased capability. The United
St;
greet one another warmly. This can be called a “normal strange phenomenon” because U. S. imperialists support Israel whereas the Soviet revisionist clique pretends to support the Arab countries. As far as the situation in the Middle East is concerned, their aim is ■dentical. The sending of war ships to the Middle East area by the U. S. and the Soviet pnion is in fact a joint action taken with an •dentical objective: this is part of their conspiracy to dominate the world through U. S.- Soviet cooperation.
Realistically, however, the more obvious
inclusion is that our forces have been so
'-Rective and Soviet efforts to use indirect
Methods have been so ineffective and filled
^'th risk that the Soviets have decided to take
a Page from our book. It is encouraging that,
or the most part, the Soviet use of naval
°rces was cautious and circumspect during
^ June war and Pueblo aftermath. There is
j'° dear evidence yet that the existing Soviet
eadership will be overly aggressive in high-
r*sk situations. But we must base our prepara-
[°ns on the means they have developed rather
ban on speculation as to how they might
employ them. As a minimum, the Soviets
ave introduced an additional uncertainty
Jbto the U. S. approach to problems in the
bird World. They have provided themselves
^h a new option and greater flexibility in
e implementation of their foreign policy.
interesting commentary on the type of
Warfare that nuclear weapons have seemed to
'bake feasible is that the world’s two largest
SeaP°wers have recently reached back in time to ates has brought a battleship out of moth- bs and the Russians have decided to build ab amphibious carrier.
Obviously, it will take a tremendous effort °b the part of the Soviet Union to duplicate bbr total naval capability. But, by throwing bte disguise and entering the arena as a challenger, the Soviets have adopted a ture which is, in some ways, easier to combat. The United States is capable of skillfully countering a direct challenge to the seapower. The Soviets may find in the long run that a policy limited to economic and political penetration with all of its frustrations was the best one for them after all.
There is nothing that the United States can do to offset all of the advantages that accrue immediately to the Soviet Union simply for having developed this new naval force. But it is not likely that the country will sit idly by in the face of the Soviet challenge.
What is now necessary is for the U. S. Navy to make a thorough reappraisal of its needs as it prepares to replace its large number of World War II ships. Committed as we are to a counterpuncher’s role, the increased demands for mobility and durability would seem to dictate a need for ships with the advantages of sustained high speed and staying power—in other words, nuclear propulsion.
Those who have opposed further carrier construction for so many years, on the grounds that the Soviets did not have carriers, have had the wind knocked out of their sails by the Russian decision to build an aircraft carrier. We certainly have no assurance that the Russians are constructing only amphibious carriers or that they will be satisfied with their initial endeavors.
Our naval forces have proven their value during the last 20 years in a series of incidents that stretch from the Dominican Republic to Indonesia. But, like any portion of our fighting capability in the modern world, they cannot hold the advantage forever without considerable effort and funds. Although we may at times have trouble convincing the budgeteers of the efficacy of a mobile presence in the nuclear age, we have obviously convinced the Russians. There is no question that the United States and its Navy will be equal to the challenge just as it has been throughout the postwar period. But let us not underestimate the task involved or the unmistakable challenge that is developing.
★