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It was a leaping strategy; a series of visible, discrete steps, each dependent on the one that preceded it. Historians, then, may call it a “saltatorial, sequential strategy.” But, by any name, Israel's Defense Forces executed their moves with such assiduity, such finesse, and such impertinence as to astound even the non-Arab strategic and tactical experts.
Across the years and centuries ot great wars . and innumerable small border raids, across the bitter wastes and the few flowering valleys of the Middle East, who can really say when one war ends and another war begins? Who can say if the first blow of the six- day Arab-Israeli War of 1967 was a pre-dawn Egyptian mortar attack that set the wheat fields of a kibbutz aflame? Or who can say whether the “ghetto fear” of a new nation almost completely surrounded by openly hostile Arab camps precipitated a pre-emptive attack by Israeli jets?
t aj
As is normal at that time of year, Mon j morning of 5 June 1967 dawned clear, ^ the sun began to burn its way through early haze rising from the Sinai and NefC deserts. Egyptian troops were arrayed in main lines across the harsh sands. On the [1] posite side, Israeli forces were simha j, poised. Suddenly, the space between was insufficient to permit restraint or reas..
At 7:45 a.m. Israeli time (8:45 a.m. time), the first wave of Israeli strike airC u “went in.” It was directed against ten A . airfields, of which nine were hit at ah'1
arrive “on target” at almost the
Sattte
Tl|cted—and every single bomb exploded. Postulated by one of today’s foremost ary theorists and tacticians, Rear Ad-
actually two very different kinds of egies that may be used in war. One is sequential, the series of visible, discrete Ps> each dependent on the one that pre-
Pep
precisely the same moment. The tenth airfield, ayid, was attacked a few minutes later, for it s stiU half covered by the morning mist t'i?r t^le Suez Canal. The strike aircraft had en off at precise intervals so that they ^ all '
s moment, thereby achieving maximum
Pt'ise. Each attack was made by four air-
h flying in pairs. Every aircraft reached
target and carried out its mission exactly as ‘ttsti
As
ttlilit;
^lral J. C. Wylie, Jr., U. S. Navy, “There
strati the
Ceded
two-fold: to render the runways unusable, and to destroy the maximum possible number of MIG 21 aircraft. The MIG 21s were the only Egyptian aircraft which could effectively prevent the Israeli Air Force from achieving its immediate major goal—the destruction of the Egyptian long-range bomber force, which constituted a major threat to the population of Israel. It is now known that eight formations of MIG 21s were destroyed as they tried to taxi to the end of the runways for takeoff.
Several days before hostilities began, the Israelis managed to “persuade” the Egyptians to deploy 20 of their first-line aircraft (12 MIG 21s and 8 MIG 19s) from the area around Cairo and the Suez Canal—where Egypt’s major air bases were concentrated—to Hurg- hada in the south. For all intents and purposes, these 20 aircraft were hors de combat. The Israelis accomplished this by vectoring
Sf':rris piling one on top of the other until at [ 1116 unknown point the mass of accumu- ated actions may be large enough to be criti- cj ” Obviously, the Israeli strategy must be as-Sed as sequential. 1 several strong probes of aircraft southward over the Gulf of Aqaba. These feints convinced the Egyptians that the Israelis were probably planning to attack around the southern periphery of the Sinai Peninsula instead of, as proved to be the case, from out over the Mediterranean Sea. At Hurghada, these MIG 21s and MIG 19s were effectively removed from the primary area of Israeli activity. After the initial Israeli strike, these same aircraft redeployed northward to Egyptian airfields near the Suez Canal, but upon arrival found that they had no runways on
instantaneous or it could be set on a varia
t>lc
time delay. Runways are usually fairly
destroyed all the aircraft but ignored aim1 all of the dummies under camouflage cov'e,rS, When asked if this resulted from poor qual'k dummies or high quality Israeli intelligell(7 reports, Brigadier General Weizman statel that it was the latter.
ith'
which to land, and fell victim to the Israeli jets. Other than these aircraft, only two flights of MIG 21s managed to get airborne. These succeeded in shooting down two Israeli aircraft, which were attacking Egyptian air bases, before they were shot down.
Israeli aircraft, in flights of four, sped to their assigned targets by various routes— some on a circuitous route out over the Mediterranean Sea to their targets around Cairo, the Suez Canal, and in Sinai. Others streaked straight across to attack targets in Upper Egypt. All flew only a few feet above the ground or sea level to remain undetected by Egyptian radars—but not only Egyptian radars. The Israelis were probably just as concerned about British, Soviet, and American radars as they were about Egyptian ones. “We went in right on the deck,” Brigadier General Ezer Weizman, the Israeli Chief of Air Operations, said later.
As the first wave of Israeli aircraft struck its assigned targets, the second wave was already on its way, and the third wave was getting airborne. They were spaced at 10- minute intervals. Each flight of four aircraft was allowed seven minutes over target— barely enough time for three or four passes, one bombing run and two or three strafing passes. An extra three minutes were allowed for navigational error or for an additional run over the target.
The Israelis operated on an incredibly fast turn-around time. For aircraft striking the primary Egyptian targets in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, the rotation was, roughly, as follows (all times approximate):
Time en route target..................... 23 minutes
Time over target........................... 10 minutes
Time return to base..................................... 20 minutes
Ground turn-around time............................ 8 minutes
Total Time 61 minutes
Thus, Israeli aircraft were over their targets for the second time within about 60 minutes of their first attack.
Israeli pilots made several passes over their targets to achieve greater accuracy and, consequently, to inflict greater damage to the Egyptian Air Force. Dive-bombing was used to a considerable extent and with great effect. The Israelis had little use for strategic bombers. Their aerial strategy called for the
destruction of runways and aircraft, and fte' considered fighters much more efficient this purpose. The almost total destruction 0 the Egyptian Air Force on the ground "‘15 due not only to the element of surprise, n ^ also was due, in part, to an ingenious boi'1 which the Israelis devised and perfected >° the specific purpose of destroying runvva) • As soon as the bomb left the aircraft retro-rocket fired to stop its forward jectory. Then another rocket fired to drive vertically downward into the runway. , the bomb had penetrated the concrete, it ", detonated by a time fuze. The fuze could 1
easy
to repair, but not when they keep exploding' varying time intervals. These delayed-acd0^ bombs deposited in the runways made repa‘ virtually impossible.
Another purpose of this unique bomb " , to enable aircraft to bomb runways wm1 flying at very low level and at high spee ' Conventional bombs released under the^ conditions would bounce and would Pr° || ably inflict only superficial damage. Not a Israeli aircraft were armed with this weap0^ and many runways were destroyed by d"^ bombing with conventional 500-lb. 3,1 1,000-lb. bombs. Egyptian aircraft, both the ground and in the air, were destroy6 almost exclusively by aircraft cannon fire- ^
Nineteen Egyptian air bases were attack1 in the first two waves on Monday morn111" between 7:45 a.m. and 10:35 a.m. ^ j Israeli Air Force estimated that it destroyed over 300 of the estimated 3 Egyptian combat aircraft—including all 3 of the long-range TU-16 bombers.
The major Sinai air base of El Arish (nea the Gaza Strip) was the only airfield wh°', runways were not destroyed. Israeli pla'j called for the use of this airfield as a forvVar supply and casualty base. And by Tuesdj1' evening it was used as such. At several of 1,1 Egyptian air bases, the Israeli Air ForCl
icP
For an hour and 20 minutes, almost w»
°«t let
up, the Israeli Air Force hammered
ay at the Egyptian air bases. A short 10- ute break was followed by a further 80 "tes of relentless pounding. Thus, 16 s of strategic planning was executed, and *n the short span of some three hours, an
60
21
5
2
IRAQ:
JORDAN:
17
1
5\V; htirti
'him
Vtaj-j
Mth:
^aeH victory was assured. By 11:00 a.m., Egyptian Air Force was a shambles.
^he Israelis estimated that they would ^Ve about two to three hours’ time in l^lch to deal with the Egyptian Air Force I °re being confronted by the air forces of f>, Syria, and Iraq. They had, in fact, lr hours. These air forces joined the battle |j ar Uoon on Monday, 5 June, mistakenly Jibing the seaside resort of Netanya and y f. ing the Israeli satellite airfield of Kefar ain near the Jordanian border. By that . ei however, the destruction of the greater c1 °f the Egyptian Air Force had been 11 Pie ted and the Israelis were in a position rreorient their full air power against these t forces. Before dusk, the Israeli Air Force 'sited most of the 23 air bases attacked (M'er jn qle day. jn addition to conven- Ir‘al bombs, they dropped delayed-action tijjhbs, timed to detonate periodically rc0lJghout the night and hamper runway a^a'rs. Using flares, the Israelis continued strikes throughout most of the night.
*■ the end of the second day (6 June), the a^is counted the enemy losses: 415 air- 1 destroyed, 393 of them on the ground. e break-down of these losses was as follows:
GVPT: Fighters
MIG 21s............................................................. 95
MIG 19s............................................................. 20
MIG 15s/17s..................................................... 82
Sukhoy 7s.......................................................... 10
Bombers
Ilyushin 28s....................................................... 27
Tupolev 16s....................................................... 30
Transports
Ilyushin 14s....................................................... 24
AN 12s.................................................................. 8
MI4 Helos............................................................ 1
MI6 Helos............................................................. 8
Other Helos.......................................................... 4
Sy Total 309
A A • Fighters
MIG 21s............................................................. 32
MIG 15s/17s..................................................... 23
Bombers
Ilyushin 28s..................................................... 2
Helicopters
MI4s................................................................. 3
Total
Fighters
Hunters.............................
Transports................................
Helicopters.......................
Total 28
Fighters
MIG 21s................................... 9
Hunters.................................... 7
Bombers
Tupolev 16s............................ 1
Total
LEBANON: Fighters
Hunters
Total 1 Grand Total 415
The damage sustained by the combined Arab Air Forces has been estimated to have been over 500 million dollars worth of aircraft in two days. But not only were aircraft destroyed. Ground equipment, including 23 Egyptian radar sites, was also destroyed. It is further estimated that approximately 100 of Egypt’s 350 Air Force pilots were killed in the strikes. And in view of the large number of MIG 21s destroyed while taxiing on the ground, this figure probably represents a high proportion of Egypt’s most experienced pilots. It probably will take many years to rebuild the morale and the esprit de corps of the Egyptian Air Force.
Regarding the cost to Israel of inflicting this crippling blow, by Tuesday night (6 June), after more than 1,000 sorties, Israeli losses amounted to 26 aircraft, including six of the Fouga Magister trainers which had been equipped with rockets for anti-tank purposes. The Israelis lost 21 pilots, of whom almost half were taken prisoner in Egypt or Syria.
The Land Phase. The Sinai, whose limitless tons of sand and barren mountain ranges divide Africa from Asia, is an area of the utmost desolation. The sole inhabitants are nomadic Bedouin tribes whose ancestors have roamed this hostile and scorched wilderness
be achieved, the opening of the Strait ot would follow automatically. Under no cumstances could the Israelis allow
7 a1
their country cut in two on an east-west a* ,
its narrowest point. It was imperative Israeli forces move out to meet their ene' y Unlike the Egyptians, who dispersed
cofl'
fifl* thc
. . -efl
Sinai would be achieved. Facing the se , Egyptian divisions in the Sinai Peninsula '' ,> the equivalent of three Israeli “divisi0'15^, The task of breaking through at the
routes of the Egyptian forces, and the destruction of the Egyptian Army
for centuries. As a battleground for modern warfare, however, it is most unusual. This is one of the few geographical areas where entire armies can engage each other without involving civilian populations. It is an arena where literally thousands of tanks can maneuver and blast each other in the swirling desert sands. In 1956, this was the scene of the first battle between the Egyptians and the Israelis. And only 11 years later, in 1967, it was the scene of an even more decisive clash between these two forces.
In the latter half of May 1967, Egypt deployed more and more of her troops into this desolate battleground. By 15 May, there were two Egyptian divisions stationed in the Sinai Peninsula: the 20 th Palestine Liberation Army Division in Gaza (to the north) and the 2nd Division which was spread almost the entire length of the Egyptian-Israeli border. Between 15 and 31 May, these two divisions were reinforced by five moie Egyptian divisions. After these additional forces were deployed, the 2nd Division was concentrated in the Abu Agheila area. The total force comprised over 100,000 men and almost 1,000 tanks.
The Egyptians were well deployed for both offensive and defensive action. They were in a good position to thrust eastward across the southern Negev and link up with Jordan, thereby cutting off the southern port of Eilat from the rest of Israel. And, as a defensive deployment, the Egyptians were blocking all the main lines of advance through the desert with massive troop concentrations and strongly fortified positions.
Just as the Israeli Air Force persuaded the Egyptians to deploy some of their aircraft from the north—which was to be the theater of war—to the vicinity of the Red Sea, the Israeli Army also played an important role in the over-all plan of deception.
Immediately preceding the outbreak of
war, Egyptian reconnaissance indicated an Israeli force of two or three armored brigades positioned close to the Egyptian-Israeli border opposite Kuntilla (in eastern Sinai). There
was, in fact, only one—heavily “reinforced”
by dummy tanks under “inadequate” cain°l flage netting to make it appear much strong than it really was. The purpose of the dec Y tive plan was to convince the Egyptians t Israeli ground forces were planning anot mad rush down the coast to Sharm el-S*1 just as they did in 1956. And the ruse sl’^ ceeded. The Israelis could not, howe , repeat in 1967 the same strategy they j used in 1956. Because of its situation and n1 of communication, Sharm el-Sheik untenable in the face of the large conce*1 tion of Egyptian forces in the northern P of the Sinai Peninsula. „
The Israelis had no alternative but to gage the main force of the Egyptian A1" concentrated along their southern bor ^ and defeat it in the Sinai desert. If this c°
3f T iff11
cif'
the*r
hN 3l
of their tanks throughout their army, 0,1 y basis of one tank battalion for every infaI1 brigade and one armored group for ead11 fantry division, the Israelis kept their arl1’,, together. And they used their armor j mailed fist, thrusting forward with great sp and tremendous momentum deep into eneI^ territory—not to take the enemy’s positt0^ but to throw him off balance and inake positions untenable.
The bold and efficient Israeli plan ^ sisted of three phases: to break through ( Egyptian defenses at two of their strong points; an armored division would then 1 forward to the range of mountains just to east of the Suez Canal, blocking the es^ .
in
The map on the facing page shows only the land phase of the )tc Israeli War of 1967. The numerals in the arrows show the appro*1 bc[. movement that was made on the 1st through the 6th day of the c°P J The disposition of the Arab military units, as well as the boundar1 Israel, are as they were at the outset of the fighting on 5 June.
NETANYA
JERUSALEM^
KHAN YUMIS V RAFA
• EL ARISH ' • BIR LAHFAN
ISRAEL
QANTARA
, m XW Ml IMII&MNA
» • ABU \
^f.nr, AGHEILA \
• GEBEL \
— LIBNI „IM>_ • \
\ NEGEV f
SAFA ; n ro r nr I
( DESERT
\
EL KUNTILLA •
mitla pass
AQABA
SINAI PENINSULA
(EGYPT)
SHARM
ELSHEIK
LEBANON
s
• DAMASCUS
SYRIA
JORDAN
- 1
LEGEND
THIRD DAY OF ATTACK
EGYPTIAN DIVISION
JORDANIAN/SYRIAN TROOPS
‘.v " ' '■ : ■ ..
ISRAELI AIRBORNE LANDING TANK ENGAGEMENT - NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
SCALE IN MILES
SAUDI ARABIA
ited objective”—Gebel Libni.
During the time that Tal’s forces effecting the initial Israeli breakthrough
bat-
die1'
of the Egyptians in Abu Agheila wo
uld ^
•ht
complete—and all would be ready for a
ak- and the
w * , . 1r#»y
officer assigned the task of taking this 1 point was General Sharon who, with paratroopers, captured Mitla Pass in 1956
The system of defense employed by
bot
highly effective: establish Israeli artillery lfl forward position from which it could direct intense and accurate fire on Egyptian trenchments; block the Egyptians ir behind to prevent reinforcements from rea ^ ing them, and attack them from the rear "1 a separate force of tanks; employ paratro to attack Abu Agheila from the north-^
Sharon’s five-fold plan was complicated
selected points was given to the forces under Brigadier Generals Israel Tal and Aric Sharon. Once the initial breakthrough had been achieved, the forces under Brigadier General Avraham Yoffe were to make the dash southwestward across the desert to the Mitla Pass and other mountain passes east of the Suez Canal, thereby sealing off all escape routes available to the Egyptian forces.
The elite of the Israeli Armored Corps (about 300 tanks) under the command of Brigadier General Tal was assigned the task of achieving the initial breakthrough. The point selected was Rafa, close to the Mediterranean shore at the southern end of the Gaza Strip. The objective was El Arish (on the coast), 30 miles to the west of Rafa, for it lay on the railway line from Qantara, on the Suez Canal, to Gaza, and was the Egyptians’ primary logistic base for their forces in Sinai.
Rafa was defended by a force of brigade strength and was surrounded by a deep minefield shaped like a horseshoe, which stretched almost to the coast. Behind these formidable defense lines was a brigade of artillery equipped with 122-mm. guns, together with a battalion of long-range, 100-mm. guns. Between them they could fire some five tons of shells per minute.
The Israeli attack was planned with two considerations foremost in mind: avoid the Egyptian artillery, and avoid their minefields. This led to the decision to penetrate the defense of Rafa through the neighboring town of Khan Yumis (situated to the northeast), even though this meant tackling part of the 20th Palestinian Division as well as the Egyptian 7th Infantry Division. By taking this calculated risk, the Israeli forces were almost out of range of the Egyptian artillery. And once the Israelis were in Khan Yumis, they smashed their way into Rafa, avoiding the minefields by advancing swiftly in column—using the Egyptians’ internal roads. This was the first land battle of the war. Before the battle, Brigadier General Tal told his men: “If we are to win the war, we must win the first battle. This battle must be fought with no retreats; every objective must be taken—no matter the cost in casualties. We must succeed or die.”
Every objective was taken.
While the breakthrough at Khan Yumis was being achieved, Brigadier General Yo and his forces, 20 miles farther south, 3 vanced 60 miles westward across the san dunes toward Bir Lahfan. Here they esta lished a blocking position across the roa from Gebel Libni and Abu Agheila (in 1 _ south) to El Arish, preventing Egyptian rei3 forcements reaching El Arish. By dawn Tuesday, Brigadier General Tal and (vv entire armored brigades were in El An The air supremacy achieved by the Isral Air Force in the first three hours of the 'v made possible the lightning Israeli advan through Rafa to El Arish. From El Arish, 1 headed south with the rest of his forces rendezvous with Yoffe at their mutual ‘ l'*11
wete at
Rafa and Yoffe’s armored brigade was tling its way across the sand dunes, Brig30.1 General Sharon moved his men and equ’P ment westward from their defensive posit' around Nitsana (in the western Negev), s( that by nightfall on Monday the encirclemeI nig assault. Abu Agheila was the second bre through point selected by the Israelis, the
Egyptians at Abu Agheila was primarily 8-°* sian-type: meticulous defense-in-depth
quiring mass forces—with little or no 1 bility. This suited the Israelis just fine, , whenever possible, they avoided fron attacks. Sharon decided on a night attack three reasons: the Egyptians do not enj fighting at night; they do not excel in ha1' to-hand combat; and the Israelis do both
left
hind the main defensive lines—to silence Egyptian artillery; assault the Egyptian
1 Yoffe :h, 3<*'
e sand estab" roads [in the n rein-
wn
on
At 1°*° fortified area. attacjc P-m-> Sharon gave the order to ,-\rrL .' ‘^t 6:00 a.m. the next morning, Abu thj-Q^ a Was *n Israeli hands. With the break- lSra !? s at Rafa and Abu Agheila completed, r 1 forces were now behind the bulk of the
d tW" Arish; Israel* ie Waf lvance
h, Tal
ces to “liiir
\vCe
«h at
s bat-
rad'er ■quip' ' ;itio'lS
v), s° ■men'
Id b« nigh1
ireak'
,d the
s kef
h h*s
> 6-
f the
Rus- i re- ino-
h
'Syptiar
0 ‘ dir • Egyptians convergea irom
and Lectlons> they were continuously strafed tQcke )<ln'barded by the Israeli Air Force UQS’ napalm, and high explosives. Yoffe’s and brigade completed the slaughter,
ahtv
i -‘xgctvaA, ^UiiipiCLCU Li 1C SlilUgl
few h 2:00 a.m. on Friday morning,
lalafa
ShpU'- reached the Suez
onta
:k f°r
;njoy
,and'
jbn£ • in3
ct »n efl' fro'11 :acb' W'1*1
0oPs -be, th« left
had b
the f 6rn^ ^anh with infantry to “clear out” clearr°nt trenches so that engineers could ik • minefields; and crash through with
leart f army ail<d two gateways into the forCes °* t*le ‘Sinai were open to them. Tal’s Bir Q.ftoolc the more northerly route through lra(j7 ^afa to block the road through the hills on a^S to Ismailia. Yoffe’s forces advanced to tj.n .alni°st parallel, more southerly route key 1 ptla Pass. The Pass proved to be the lengt^ ana* victory. It is almost 15 miles in c0m ’ anc* whoever commanded the Pass ir»g taandcd access to the Suez Canal. Hav- Israel. °cked the escape routes, the three and y ^tvisions moved in for the kill. Tal drQVc blocked the passes, and Sharon tae Egyptians into the trap.
Wag e SCene became a Valley of Death. There cles. Continuous stream of Egyptians, vehi- easte "C armor in full flight from central and ko,n ‘Sinai toward the Mitla Pass with no had tbat the western end of the Pass
Air pCen Covered for two days by the Israeli __ his Canal opposite _u ^ The three-pronged trap in Sinai tigjjti CCn sPrung, and it had snapped shut
Th^
short Pace °f the Israeli army was nothing days, stunning. To the northeast, in three Ara^ ,tlnic> it had smashed King Hussein’s the 0 eS*on> captured Jerusalem, and erased Thiij.1 * ,Te to the west of the River Jordan. By Egy * ay it had blocked the retreat of the day /an army in the Sinai. And, on Satur- ?ncir 1 Syrians were forced to abandon their ed positions and flee toward the rear. hre atae Syrians agreed to the U. N. cease- ^ ■ 30 p.m. on Saturday, Israeli forces of £) a tTlere 30 miles from the Syrian capital tfascus.
e lightning war that exploded over
Egypt and Israel on that fateful Mondaymorning just six days before—and claimed the lives of more than 35,000 men—sputtered and became barely distinguishable on Saturday night.
The Sea Phase. The naval portion of the six-day war was also the story of adverse odds being overcome. On Monday 5 June, the day that war broke out, the comparative strength of the Egyptian and Israeli Naval Forces was about as follows:
Submarines | EGYPT 12 | ISRAEL 3 |
Destroyers | 7 | 3 |
Missile-launchers | 18 | 0 |
ASW Craft | 12 | 1 |
MTBs | 32 | • 8 |
Total | 81 | 15 |
Because of its extremely small size and the old age of its vessels compared to those of the Egyptian Navy, deception was of even greater importance to Israel’s Navy than it was to her Air Force and Army. The primary Israeli Navy objective was to weaken Egyptian naval forces in the Mediterranean as much as possible, for only from the Mediterranean could they pose a threat to Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Israel’s populated coastal regions.
Once again, before the war began, the Israelis set about “persuading” the Egyptians to move some of their naval vessels from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. They accomplished this by sending four tank landing craft overland across the Negev Desert to Eilat, the Israeli port at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba. Egyptian reconnaissance noted the landing craft arriving in Eilat during daylight hours. But that same night, unobserved and under the cover of darkness, these same landing craft were taken back into the desert some 15 miles north of Eilat, and brought down for a second time during daylight hours the following day. After this maneuver had been repeated several times and the Israelis had sent the only three MTBs they possessed in Eilat on patrols toward the Red Sea, the Egyptians became convinced that the Israelis were preparing an assault on Sharm el-Sheik—as they did in 1956.
At any rate, the outbreak of the war found 30 per cent of the Egyptian Navy bottled up
Institute of Tech11” ied 3“
included command of the Fleet Weather ^aC* London (1956-1958), Fleet Weather Central ^ Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Guam (1961"* jf Director of Meteorology and Oceanography* "cC CINCLANTFLT (1963-1965). He is now *0 Meteorologist, Staff CINCUSNAVEUR.
thc
one just to the north of Haifa, one just to
attacked them with depth charges. It 15
mated that at least one submarine was - ^
aged, as evidenced by a large oil slick vV,
to the surface. All three subn*a:
at-
On reflection, the Israeli Navy,
fl 0
short of resources and with practically modern equipment, had: ^
• successfully protected the coasts an^ j,.
ha1’1
ifl*
at*0
equipped by the surrounding Arab
nage.
in the Red Sea. And even after the war was over on Saturday, the Egyptian naval forces in the Red Sea were unable to return to their Mediterranean bases. The Suez Canal had been blocked on the orders of President Nasser. This stranded segment of the Egyptian Navy—more powerful than the entire Israeli Navy—had to make its way to the Yemen port of Hodeida at the southern end of the Red Sea, where it still is at this writing.
Israel’s naval action was launched with the same grim efficiency as her air strikes. On the night of Monday, 5 June, the Israeli Navy attacked the harbors of Port Said and Alexandria—the two primary bases of the Egyptian Navy in the Mediterranean. As the Israeli forces, consisting of a destroyer and several MTBs approached Port Said, two Egyptian OSSA missile-launchers came outside the breakwater to meet them. The Israelis opened up with 20-mm. cannon fire. Both OSSAs were damaged and returned to their base without firing a shot. Israeli frogmen then entered Port Said harbor, for it was thought that there were three Egyptian MTBs and three ASW craft in addition to the two OSSA missile-launchers located there. However, they were not found.
Although the attack on Port Said cannot be considered a success in terms of enemy vessels damaged or destroyed, the move did achieve one major objective—the guarding of Tel Aviv from the 18 Egyptian missile-launchers, whose missiles had a range of some 35 miles and carried 1,000-lb. warheads. For the next morning (Tuesday), the Egyptian Navy evacuated Port Said harbor and retreated to Alexandria, where the KOMAR and OSSA craft were out of range.
At the same time that Israeli naval forces were attacking Port Said, Israel’s sole operational submarine was discharging a force of frogmen off the entrance of Alexandria harbor. Their job was to blow up as many Egyptian naval vessels as possible. The writer estimates that these frogmen succeeded in damaging—possibly destroying—two Egyptian submarines and two OSSA missile- launchers.
The only offensive action undertaken by the Egyptian Navy was during the night of Tuesday, 6 June. A .force of three submarines made their approach to the shores of Israel—
ogy. He was commission1 ensign in the U. S. Naval serve in 1942, and transfer ^ to the Regular Navy 111(t He served as aerological ° of VN squadron 8-D5 r( 1942 to 1944. His subsequent duty as a meteor0 south of that city, and the third near Ash 0 Whether their mission was to attack shipP ^ or land saboteurs is not known. Still, altho the Israelis had only four sonar devices their entire navy, they succeeded in dete° ^ all three of the Egyptian submarines ^
dal**'
rii*C5
escaped without having inflicted any dai**3, .
extrei*16 population of Israel from a seaborne att<*
• assured the safe passage of mere*
shipping to and from Israel’s Mediterraf*e ports throughout the war; . J
• succeeded in penetrating the EgyP1'^. main naval bases at Port Said and Alexan ^
When one considers that the Eg)'P ,j. Navy outnumbered that of the Israelis b> ^ most 5 5 to one and that the Egyptian 1 ^
had some of the most modern vessels o equipment which the Soviet Union c j supply, the Israeli victory at sea was 1 .
than unbelievable. It was grossly iinpert*1
a ol,t’
Being vastly outnumbered and
to
how did the Israeli Armed Forces man^ achieve such an absolute military succe the phenomenally short time of six days-
,m°nth
of June, there is a morning mist, or
“aze
the S ~‘~^xx WX U1V- .......................................................... , lllv cxxxvx
bv 7 ,Uez Elanal. This has just about dispersed
gl-Q
und
by cannon fire. And fourth, since on deck” at least three hours 0re launch, a dawn strike would have
bef°tS must be the;
that
Pi •
init' a^ning: Consider the exact time of the
jSrla.. a’r strikes. Why at precisely 7:45 a.m. at rf * l*me (8‘45 a.m. Cairo time)? Why not sinClfVVn’ or 8*15 a.m., or 8:30 a.m.? First, lhe r:attac^s are frequently made at dawn, ale ^^yptian Air Force’s morning state of Was past its peak by 7:45 a.m. Israeli er>ds 21s were no longer waiting at the Ktjp runways on 5-minute alert, and the
base 21 a*rbornc dawn patrols had returned to Vvjt^'. When no attack had materialized E» ln. tw° or three hours after dawn, the Egypt!an ^ir Force lowered its guard. Second, °ff] Jtlan military officers arrive at their ISt.Ces at 9:00 a.m. Cairo time (8:00 a.m. tjnae * time). By striking at 8:45 a.m. Cairo rank' ’ am- Israeli time), many high Cq lnS Egyptian officers and operational tjj . tTlanders would be caught on the way to lr offices and other activities. Third, in the
> over much of the Nile, the Delta, and fy 7-tn
the ' ’ a‘m' lsraeE time. And by 8:00 a.m., bj[jt'veatb>er is usually at its best. The visi- Slltils excellent because of the angle of the tant an<^ t^e a^r *s a^most calm—most impor- \va 1 ^°r tbe highly accurate bombing of run- "s and the destruction of aircraft on the
ant reveille at midnight or no sleep at all to fl ni^ht—with many Israeli pilots having ri|..: eight or more sorties that Monday. By pi] *n^ tbe initial strikes at 7:45 a.m., Israeli could sleep until about 4:00 a.m. a|re“igence: Israeli knowledge of enemy
0rce, army and naval locations and de- ari, °b bases; the deployment of enemy forces etl(, aircraft; the location and details of tyj/'A radar and missile sites; and the de- gr a capabilities of enemy aircraft and
р] e^Jn<^ and naval equipment was most com-
Israeli pilots had even flown the MIG 21. Per lsracb knowledge of the Arab, including s„-;al habits and idiosyncrasies, was
n^:xihl%; The ability to absorb and im- $0latc'lv integrate new information—as Cas it became available—into the over-all
с] clent'al strategic plan and to relay effi- pUntly new information and new targets to
°ts in the air and to tanks and artillery on
the ground played a vital role in the success of the entire operation.
Mobility and Firepower: With the Arab nations’ armed forces’ employment of Russian- type defense-in-depth (good for certain European terrain), the Israeli concept of mobility (enabling flanking attacks and attacks from the rear) plus firepower, proved fatal in the Sinai Desert and devastating for the little Maginot Line on the Syrian heights and for King Hussein’s Arab Legion on the west bank of the Jordan River.
Training: The execution of the over-all plan reflected many, many years of intensive training in peacetime exercises. The Israelis had been practicing for exactly this sort of war for 11 years. The quality of manpower and the extremely high level of training played their part in the air, on the ground, and on the sea. Each and every Israeli in uniform—every civilian, too—knew exactly what he had to do, and also the reasons why.
Deception: As described in earlier sections of this account, the Israeli Air Force, Army and Navy all played vital roles in the deception of the enemy—and all ruses achieved their objectives.
The “No Alternative''' Philosophy: For this the Egyptians are primarily responsible— with their constant threats to drive the Israelis into the sea, to eliminate them from the face of the earth in a holy war. As the result of the continuous Egyptian promise of annihilation, there developed an Israeli philosophy that might be expressed as: “Our backs are to the sea and there is nowhere to go if we lose. We must win.”
Calculated Risks: The Israelis took many calculated risks which the armed forces of other nations probably would not take. For example, during the initial air strikes, the Israelis kept only eight aircraft protecting the skies over Israel, with just four aircraft in reserve. Not one of their calculated risks backfired.
“Black Boxes”: Sophisticated equipment systems—so-called “black boxes”—were held to an absolute minimum. The accent was placed upon the individual—upon his will to win and upon his judgment.
Surprise: Perhaps most important of all, the cumulative effect of the preceding nine factors, capped by the element of surprise, ensured victory for Israeli forces.
[1] he Air Phase. By and large, the greater ,art of the Egyptian Air Force was caught on I e ground. (The only Egyptian aircraft air- °rne at the time of the initial Israeli strike as a training flight of four unarmed aircraft ..!'wn by an instructor and three students.) ae primary objective of the first strike was