The trouble in Vietnam commenced in the Mekong Delta Zone and this is where it must end. Consequently, Americans are on the move in the Mekong.
The Delta, lying east, south, and west of Saigon, covers nearly one-fourth of the Republic of Vietnam's entire area and is where about one-half of the country's total population lives. The area is dominated by a 2,500- mile network of rivers and canals, chief among which are the Mekong, Bassac, Saigon (Long Tao), and Dong Nai Rivers. The Delta is characterized by a flat, poorly drained, highly broken surface, criss-crossed by many streams and an intricate network of man-made canals. These not only serve to irrigate the rich and extensive rice fields, but also afford avenues for travel by small boat to Saigon and the innumerable small communities in the region. Extensive mangrove swamps dominate the peninsula in the extreme south and along the estuaries of most of the rivers. The area is cultivated principally in paddies and is the rice bowl of Vietnam. The Delta rarely rises more than 20 feet above sea level.
Situated on the northern edge of the Delta is the city of Saigon, with its twin city of Cholon. It is a city with a population of more than two million people, including some 350,000 of Chinese origin. Saigon lies on the west bank of the Saigon River about 45 miles upstream from Vung Tau on the South China Sea. It is the political and economic capital of the country; it is important as the market for rice, rubber, and tea.
The Rung Sat Special Zone is an area of mangrove swamp of provincial status, approximately 1,000 square km., 36 km. from north to south and 30 km. from east to west. It lies between Saigon on the northwest and the South China Sea on the southeast. Rung Sat literally means "assassins' forest" or "dense mangrove swamp," and received its name because of the bandits and rebels who once used this swamp as their base area; they stopped commercial boats, robbed the passengers, and levied taxes against them. The area is of vast importance to South Vietnam in that it encompasses the entire length of the Long Tao (Saigon) River, the only navigable deep-water channel leading to the port and logistical complex in and around Saigon. It is estimated that 60 per cent of the outside economic and logistical support is still brought into South Vietnam over this route.
The Zone is divided into two districts, Can Gio on the east and Quang Xu yen on the west (roughly divided by the Long Tao River). There are nine villages and 20 "New Life Rural Hamlets," as they are called, in the Rung Sat. Can Gio is the largest village in an area of small fishing hamlets. These villages and hamlets are scattered throughout the Zone, but the important ones are along the Long Tao and Soi Rap Rivers. There is only one road in the area, from Can Gio to Dong Hoa villages, a distance of 12 km., and it is in very poor condition and unusable. It is worthy of note that the only modes of transportation are by boat or helicopter, as the Rung Sat is actually 12 separate islands with no land connection to the mainland.
In 1954, Binh Xuyen, a Vietnamese pirate, occupied the area and made many secret supply bases. After 1954, the Viet Cong took the best of these bases for their troops. The dense forests concealed them from aircraft observation and made access difficult for government forces. The small size of the population, about 15,000, and the remoteness from the mainland permitted control of the people and provided secure bases. The Rung Sat's location on the China Sea makes it a useful area for the infiltration of weapons, ammunition, and supplies, and for sabotage operations, in the adjacent provinces of Long An and Go Cong on the west, Phouc Tuy on the east, and the city of Saigon to the north.
To seek the security and pacification of this vital area, the Vietnamese Navy in 1964 was assigned control of the Rung Sat, the only land area in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) under naval jurisdiction. The Naval Headquarters is located 15 km. southeast of Saigon at Nha Be on the Long Tao River. The task of clearing, securing, and pacifying the area is being accomplished by local, regional, and popular force troops assisted by Vietnamese Naval River Assault Forces, followed up by civic-rural reconstruction teams. A combined U. S. Marine, Navy, and Army advisory team is assisting in this important task under the supervision of the U. S. Naval Advisory Group Chief in Saigon. These advisors help in all facets of military and civilian life. This includes, for example, provincial budgeting, rural reconstruction, public health, education, irrigation, transportation, and psychological warfare.
The nature of the mission makes each yard of the river as vital as the next. The advisors and U. S. forces seek to keep the scattered RVN units as mobile and offensive as possible, the better to prevent infiltration. Frequent operations, almost exclusively small-unit in scope, are amphibious by necessity. Troops move by modern, conventional landing craft as close to their destination as possible. From there on, travel is an exhausting struggle through the deep mud of the swamps. Nonroutine operations are dessert to advisors; training of Vietnamese forces is the bread-and-butter of the advisory diet. The advisor recommends to his Vietnamese counterpart the operation orders for other than routine operations, usually limiting himself to the broad concepts to be employed. Advisors follow through by accompanying the Vietnamese on every operation. Understanding the Vietnamese by living their life and speaking their language is the key to successful advisory effort. In brief, this is the full scope of the counterinsurgency effort: combat, pacification, psychological warfare.
Pacifying an area includes not only the elimination of the enemy, but also the maximum effort to maintain security, the re-establishment of local administration, the reconstruction of the economic, social and political aspects in order to bring a peaceful and better life to the people. The pacification plan includes four phases: search and destroy, clearing, securing, and development. Development, the final objective, is to intensify public support of the government in reoccupied areas, and, by raising the public living conditions in the social and economic aspects, to demonstrate to the people the differences between the regimes of the Republic and the Communists. The Provincial Chief (Rung Sat Commander) is responsible for co-ordinating all military and civic operations necessary for the effective implementation of the pacification project. He has the primary responsibility of protecting public lives and property and of raising the people's living standards in the economic, social, and political aspects.
Projects for the year 1966 in the Rung Sat Zone fell into ten categories, and ranged from building more New Life Rural Hamlets to animal husbandry.
- New Life Rural Hamlets. As an area was recovered from the VC, more people returned to the area, necessitating the construction of new hamlets (protected villages) and provision of Vietnamese police to protect them.
- Relocation. Certain areas which were impossible to support either economically or militarily because of their remoteness, required the movement of friendly civilians into government-controlled areas, with compensation being made for the abandoned property.
- Self-Help Programs. These programs for villages provide things such as fishery pens and small footbridges, for which the materials are furnished. The village chief and the people do the work themselves.
- Transportation. Since there are no usable roads in the Rung Sat, it is necessary to have water taxis under armed patrol to permit the Vietnamese safe passage to and from the city.
- Storage. Since the VC have destroyed many buildings, new storage must be provided for food and supplies as protection from the daily heavy rain and hot sun.
- Education. A population increase caused by repatriated VC "returnees" and by a rising birth rate required additional schools and teachers in the villages.
- Piers. Since there are no roads in the area, boat piers at many villages were needed to cope with the increased traffic and the damage resulting from storms.
- Chieu Hoi (VC Defectors). Funds to support rewards given to defectors who bring ' in weapons, and for psychological warfare, are needed.
- Irrigation. In this salt-water tidal region of the South China Sea, there are only three fresh water points in the 1,000-km. area of the Rung Sat. Therefore, barges must be purchased to haul water.
- Animal Husbandry. The VC have stolen most of the animals, so pigs and chickens are purchased by the United States.
Gaining the support of the people of the Rung Sat is an obvious key to success. In order to gain their support, however, adequate protection for them must be provided, and the government's capability to improve their living conditions must be exhibited. And, wherever established, the capability must be advertised as part of a concerted effort to aid the people.
The medical assistance program has reaped the most dividends in this disease-stricken Zone. Apart from training and assisting the Vietnamese medical personnel assigned to the Zone and accompanying U.S. advisors on all operations, U. S. medical personnel have ministered to more than nine villages and 20 hamlets. Villagers have many superstitions regarding disease, such as the affixing of headbands to drive out the evil spirits which cause headaches, and, after working among these people, the medics have taught them that the teams are not there merely to pass out pills and leave. For example, a child with worms and scabies needs more than one treatment. Besides the task of treating illness, the medics need to establish a program of preventive medicine in order to control communicable diseases and epidemics.
The governmental structure (GVN) in the Rung Sat Zone parallels the military chain of command; but, due to a recent change in administration, logistical support, and hence local living conditions, have been improved by placing the Zone under a government agency closer to Saigon than is the Bien Hoa Province. Administration and logistic support was placed under Gia Dinh Province, which is adjacent to Saigon. This action was fostered by the advisors as part of an over-all plan to improve both the military and civilian situation in the Zone. The recent increased interdiction of the main shipping channel and other incidents indicate that the VC recognize this move as a threat to their cause.
The National Police are an important element in the GVN structure within the Rung Sat. The men in this force appear to be dedicated and sincere in their efforts. The district chiefs bring local police into their plans and operations. The police are very active, and their operations are varied to include: family census checks, fixed land and river checkpoints plus mobile police points, and river and land patrols. Truly, the governmental realignment has resulted in the VC experiencing more difficulty in using the area as freely as they had in the past and it is expected that a definite improvement of the living standards of the people in the Zone will occur.
The Rung Sat is economically poor and VietCong actions have further impoverished the people. A small amount of farming is done in and near the hamlets, but it is insufficient to support the population's needs. Rice must be imported into the area. What little industry exists consists of woodcutting and fishing. It is difficult to take fish and charcoal wood to market because of the limited transportation and security. Potable water is in very short supply. There are a limited number of wells; water sells for four piasters (about three cents) per bucket. This, of course, is a large sum of money for these people. The VC have declared extensive woodcutting areas out of bounds in an effort to choke off their main economic resource. Because of these poor economic conditions and the coercive action of the VC, the inhabitants are forced into dealing with and selling to the VC. One readily sees, therefore, that the support of the people is proportional to the stability of the economy and the extent of the military protection. Lack of economic support for the Rung Sat can result in the area being used freely by the VC.
Religion represents a blending of many beliefs, native and foreign, rational and naive. Within this complex, however, three pillars of thought are present: Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism. Vietnamese literature is filled with references to the harmony of the three. All teach the goodness of man. Cao Dai is the predominant religion in the Rung Sat. It is a synthesis of Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and Christianity, and came into being at the beginning of the 20th century, but actually did not take root until 1925. Cao Daism considers the principal founders of religion to be the successive reincarnations at different times, in different countries, of one and only one deity Almighty God. There are many temples throughout the Rung Sat. Catholics are also represented as the largest minority in the Far East, approximately 10 per cent. Religion plays an important role in many decisions, both civilian and military.
The sparse population of the Rung Sat Special Zone has for the most part been consolidated into 20 New Life Rural Hamlets. Half of these hamlets are considered pacified and under effective GVN control. The other half will continue under pacification until they are rid of VC control.
Military support to the Vietnamese forces in the Rung Sat is provided through the advisory team. The normal level of support includes: aerial observation, with one advisor up over the area; close air support for troop operations; naval gunfire support with observers; medical evacuation; flare ship support; helicopter trooplift; command and control ships, and radar and photo air coverage.
The introduction of a large number of U.S. river patrol craft (PBR) last year was the first positive step towards controlling the waterways of the Rung Sat and protecting the transportation of civilians on a round-the-clock basis. This meant that the VC could no longer travel freely on the water avenues at night, thus being denied the night initiative. In effect, a group of islands that can be sealed off, the region is conducive to systematic pacification operations to free the people of VC domination.
The first amphibious operation in the Delta by the United States consisted of U. S. Marines in Operation Jackstay in the Rung Sat Special Zone and was the first concerted, large-scale, search-and-destroy operation to reduce the threat to shipping on the Saigon River and to destroy VC bases, supplies, hospitals, factories, and training and rest areas. The operation was a tremendous success. Several months later, the U. S. Army (trained and assisted by advisors) landed in the swamps for their first semi-amphibious operation, Lexington, to mop up after the Marines, again throwing the Viet Gong off guard with great success. The key to these operations was a combination of rapid reaction to recent intelligence and advisor guidance and assistance throughout, plus secrecy and surprise.
A considerable amount of support has been contributed to the civilian population by the many relief groups in the United States, such as CARE, Catholic Relief, private clubs, and even individuals. It is not surprising that a small item in the Marine Corps Gazette brought from wives of U. S. Marines a large donation of clothes for children.
The only requirements of the relief agencies were that donations be distributed to the needy through a single representative, the advisor, and that the priority of eligibility be in this order: widows and orphans of GVN personnel, disabled veterans, non-military orphans, refugees, and others.
The distribution of commodities was made on the basis of two months' ration per individual; rosters were kept and identification card numbers of family heads were recorded. A typical ration consisted of cooking oil, bulgar wheat, beans, flour, corn meal, and powdered milk, as well as clothing.
These supplies were the advisors' key to success on many occasions, when a village had been recaptured or a refugee center had been established and the people did not have sufficient supplies. Care was taken to inform the recipients that the supplies were gifts of the people of the United States and the GVN. It is important that these gifts not be used to compete with existing GVN programs, but that they be used only to supplement them where no program exists.
In summary, another dimension has been added to classic warfare as we have heretofore known it. It has become multi-dimensional; it has been difficult to find a set piece battle situation occurring in Vietnam. War now entails the tactical disposition of troops within and among the civilian population; there will be no environmental vacuum to be filled by purely military operations. It is necessary that this environment, this "sea of people," be favorably disposed, or at least be neutral, toward the troops and their efforts.
There are many paths to arrive at this goal, among these are: securing the safety and livelihood of the population, bolstering the position of the host government, and making our position known by presenting our military, paramilitary, and civic action achievements in the most favorable light.
Of the various barriers found here, language is the most important. A tonal language is much too alien for an untaught English speaker to handle in a few months. Therefore, formal training is necessary and must be given to key personnel. These people then can teach on a local level along with those Vietnamese who speak English.
Winning this war requires patience, but already events in the Mekong are evolving in our favor. The war commenced in the Mekong Delta, and this is where it must end.