Comment and Discussion

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"Cargo Ship Design”

(See pages 73-81, April 1967 Proceedings)

Eric Rath, FDLS Project, Litton Indus­tries—The author does not heed his own ad­vice, that is, to keep pace with improved cargo-handling technology. He has not men­tioned the FDLS Program at all. The FDLS (Fast Deployment Logistic Ship) type cargo vessel presents a breakthrough in cargo­handling technique today. From a transpor­tation man’s point of view, the FDL ship incorporates three features never before lumped together into one floating craft:

(1)     Significant to military transportation is the in-transit storage of ready-to-roll vehicles, lighters, and helicopters. This prin­ciple is a refinement of the floating forward depots that could maintain equipment on board for extended periods of time under dehumidification. The FDLS in addition allows servicing and testing in place, refueling on board and the discharge of an entire deploy­ment force for air-transported manpower within far less than a day.

(2)     Designed to discharge under non­assault conditions in almost any port and over almost any beach makes the FDLS an entirely new type of self-contained marine transporter. The application of this principle has been known during the assault operations of the Navy for a generation. But the FDLS applies this knowledge to a supply vessel and one with exceptionally good, deep-sea quali­fications. It is a ship of almost the size of the SS United States, with a sustained sea speed around 25 knots. It is capable of handling

[Editor’s note: Litton Industries was recently awarded a contract for the design and construction of the FDL; see pages 142-143, Notebook.] itself in bays and harbors without the require­ment of tug boats. It wastes no space for dual cargo-handling such as proposed in the barge ships.

(3)     The roll-on/roll-off principle of cargo­handling has been completely overlooked by the author. In effect for over 12 years, the roll-on/roll-off principle has been declared useless by many critics. Far from being dead, there are today almost twice as many of these ships serving the merchant marines of the world as there are container ships.

The FDL ship can accommodate all com­merce, vehicles, liquid cargoes, large and small containers, and over 1,000 tons of palletized cargo. The design concept handles all these with equal ease, either in the roll-on method or by flying same off the large heli­copter deck.

It has been said of the merchant marine-

Litton Industries

Salient features of the Fast Deployment Logistics Ship are depicted in this artist’s conception of the Litton Industries’ design, which has been selected as the proposal upon which to base further developmental effort in the FDL program.

»

Navy relationship by many authors that a reserve fleet requirement in readiness is the only way to secure fast deployment by surface ^craft in time of emergency. Even here the FDLS design is an exceptionally valid cargo ship development. The FDLS as designed for the Navy could serve very well as a combina­tion carrier.

Congress and the Maritime Administra­tion have made a wise statement requesting the Navy to make the results of the FDLS study availabe to the merchant marine. It is remembered that it was the military require- Hient, not commercial interests, that brought about the completion of the trans-continent­al railroads of the United States. It could be quite likely that the American Merchant ■Marine will be indebted to the U. S. Navy as author of the first roll-on-container com­bination ship, the FDLS.

Early Command—Who Wants It?

Lieutenant Commander T. B. Shemanski, U. S. Navy—The statisticians at the Bureau of Naval Personnel have reported that only 17 per cent of the line lieutenant commanders will command ships while they hold that rank. Even a smaller proportion of lieutenants and lieutenants junior grade will have such an opportunity. At the same time, feedback from the Bureau indicates that there is a shortage of qualified officers to fill the relatively few junior commanding officer billets available.

Several of the author’s contemporaries have been told that although due for relief, they will be over-toured, and that they stand far down on a long list of junior commanding officers waiting for relief. Command-qualified lieutenant commanders, they were told, are simply not available and a number sufficient to take care of waiting mine sweepers and

destroyer escorts are not in the pipeline. This may come as a shock to the many lieu­tenant commanders in their 11th, 12th and 13 th year of service, who would give their eyeteeth for a ship of their own.

It is time to examine some of the reasons why this situation exists. At the very least, those officers who would like to wear a com­mand star should examine their past officer preference cards to discover if they have ever told their detailers that they think they are ready for the responsibilities of command. They might also review conversations with their past commanding officers to discover if they have ever indicated a preference for early command which could have been put into a fitness report. I think the story in most cases would be that no such preference was ever indicated.

It is apparently a fact that most officers do not indicate a preference for command until they are full commanders. This is apparently not so of officers with previous enlisted ser­vice; they do request and are assigned to early commands in numbers disproportionate to their share of numbers in the Navy. They at least know what they want and have the cour­age to ask for it.

Why in the world do competent junior officers with diversified backgrounds, with drive and ambition, and with aspirations to command wait to ask for the most rewarding of all duty assignments? Fiction: Fitness re­ports written by senior officers have more weight than those written by juniors. Fact: Most selection boards are more interested in the demanding nature of duties performed than in the rank of the reporting senior, and it is likely that an excellent fitness report writ­ten by a commander observing a lieutenant commander C.O. will carry more weight than the same kind of fitness report written by an admiral. Fiction: Relatively junior unit

ENTER THE FORUM

Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval or maritime interest for possible pub­lication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of im­portance to the Navy can be exchanged.

commanders write poor fitness reports be­cause they feel that the performance of their subordinate units reflects intimately on them. It is risky to be a commanding officer until your unit commander is senior enough to be safe and secure himself. Fact: You are as likely to get an honest and objective evalua­tion from a junior unit commander as you are from a senior; the junior is more likely to understand the magnitude of your problems and make allowances for them, since it is likely that he was quite recently in the same boat that you are in. Fiction: It isn’t safe to command a ship as a junior officer because you won’t have any competent help; your inexperienced junior officers will foul up and the Navy will hold you responsible. Fact: Command entails some risk to a career, but at least in a small ship you can know your men, exercise personal leadership and con­trol, and train your inexperienced subordi­nates to your own standards of excellence. Fiction: The best enlisted men are inevitably assigned to new construction and nuclear sub­marines, so that a junior commanding officer will have to command a crew made up of the dregs. Fact: Some of the best enlisted men in the Navy are assigned to or gravitate to smaller ships by choice. They are the type who accept responsibility and authority and exer­cise both with courtesy and ease. Fiction: As a junior commanding officer, you would be over-supervised and would not be allowed to exercise initiative, judgment, or command. Fact: Practically the only ships ever allowed to go their own way without a senior monitor­ing their every movement, action, and engage­ment are the small ships.

The author saw his unit commander only twice in seven months of Market Time Patrol in Vietnam. His operational commander was over a hundred miles away in Saigon. Such decisions as whether to board or search or not, whether to shoot at the enemy on the beach or not, whether to enter dangerous waters or not, whether to fire support missions for beleagured friendly forces or not, were left to the discretion of the commanding officer.

Until you have filed your own movement report and headed out alone across several thousand miles of trackless seas, arranged your own logistic support, approved your own work requests, inspected your own gun crews and led your individual ship in action at the peril of your own life and that of every man on board, you haven’t really lived the life you ^S1gned up for when you accepted your first commission. If you don’t experience it in a small ship, the odds against your doing it while in a larger one become progressively greater.

The author holds no brief against “mus­tang” officers who receive so many assign­ments to junior command. Their maturity, their five rows of campaign ribbons and their obvious willingness to assume responsibility must recommend them both to the detailer ^and to their prospective unit commander. The fact remains that most of them are near­ing the end of the trail.

The pattern of always being a follower, in­stead of a leader, prevails. The undemanding billet where one can spend more time with one s family becomes more attractive; tigers turn into pussycats, and the whole great or­ganization suffers from a plethora of undis­tinguished performance, of limited horizons, and eventual disillusionment.

While the author was teaching at the U. S. Naval Academy, he asked his classes for a show of hands as to who was striking even­tually for the job of Chief of Naval Operations. No midshipman ever put up his hand volun­tarily, because to do so would be “greasy,” and yet he who would have the job should have started with the goal in mind as soon as he was able to recognize the strains of “Navy ^Rhie and Gold.”

In place of the truisms discussed above, I offer some substitutes which may have more validity:

(1)     No matter what your career pattern is, that time spent in command is never wasted.

(2)     A successful commanding officer has a distinct advantage over contemporaries who have not had command when a selection board meets to evaluate them.

(3)     The ability to command is a quality which must be demonstrated; it will not be assumed to be present by evaluating seniors.

(4)     Early command is, by every meaningful criterion, a desirable thing for an unrestricted fine officer to have.

(5)     Command of a garbage barge is more Personally satisfying than being somebody’s executive officer.

"Hitler’s Flattop—The End of the Beginning”

(See pages 41-49, January 1967; and pages 126-127, May 1967 Proceedings.)

R. Eric Nielsen—I completely disagree with Mr. Reynold’s thesis that the Graf Zep­pelin was an “absurd attempt to imitate a naval weapon peculiar to great naval nations.” Actually, if the carrier had been completed in 1940, she would have imposed a tremendous threat to Allied sea power, whether she was used operationally or not. This fact alone rules out the possibility that Germany’s at­tempt was “absurd.”

What in fact the Graf Zeppelin does symbol­ize is the vacillation on the part of the German High Command as to the use which should be made of aviation in naval warfare. The nu­merous halts, then corresponding resumptions, on the construction of the carrier attest to this fact. The ship also symbolizes the extent to which the lack of integration on the part of the High Command—as exemplified by the power struggle between Raeder and Goring for the control of naval aviation—can injure the military power and policies of a nation.

Mr. Reynolds fails to deal with the his­torical aspects of German naval aviation. It must be remembered that during World War I, Germany had no need for carriers because her extensive naval Zeppelin service fulfilled most of the functions of naval avia­tion. The combination of the obsolescence of the Zeppelin as an instrument of war and the restrictions on military aviation at the Treaty of Versailles left Germany in a dilemma as to the future development of a naval air service. The development of an aircraft carrier was further complicated by the fact that only three German vessels—the raider Wolf (one small seaplane), the converted cruiser Seyd- litz, and the converted merchant ship Santa Fe (which acted as a seaplane tender) carried aircraft during World War I.

In fact, a number of aircraft were con­verted or built for service on the Graf Zeppelin and only awaited her completion. Some 50 Bf-109Ts and quantities of Ju-87 dive-bomb­ers were finished and assigned to Marine Trager Gruppe 186, the unit designated for service on the Graf Zeppelin. When work on the Graf ZepP^e^^{n was} terminated, these aircraft were assigned to other units.

Hindering completion of the Graf Zeppelin, after it was decided to resume work on her later in the war, was the fact that much of her machinery had been sent to Italy to be in­stalled on Italy’s aircraft carrier Aquila, also under construction. At one time during the war, Hitler even considered fitting her with additional fuel tanks and using her as a blockade runner to Japan!

"Alliance Diplomacy in Limited Wars”

(See pages 52-57, April 1967 Proceedings)

Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, Royal Navy (Retired)—G. F. Eliot states: “It is by no means impossible that a Soviet purpose may be crystallizing to use the nuclear submarine as a means of restricting the oceanic freedom of action of the sea powers; not so much by overt acts as by the existence of a means by which—for one example—forcible resistance might be offered to the establishment of blockades in the absence of a declared war.”

I find some difficulty in visualizing the kind of situation he has in mind. How is it possible to restrict freedom of action without the use of force? The shot across the bows was a warning. The submarine, whether nuclear- powered or conventional, is at a great disad­vantage in attempting to enforce action upon a surface ship, as their operation in both World Wars has shown. She cannot fire a warning torpedo, and if she surfaces or ap­proaches too close to a surface ship, she endangers herself.

Russia is expressing mounting opposition to American action in Vietnam, but is it not her uncertainty regarding American response to action, such as Eliot suggests, that has so far restrained her from taking it? It must surely be a belief that it might call down the full weight of U. S. retaliatory power that has prevented her from interfering with the oceanic freedom of the Western powers. Once, however, the idea gains credence that nuclear war is impossible except in reply to a direct threat to the U. S. homeland, then Eliot’s theory and those of Admiral Peter Gretton become much more probable.

The matter is of particular interest at this time, because there is a major conflict of opin­ion in Europe today between those who be­lieve that the U. S. deterrent power is still effective in preventing direct participation by

Russia in disputes such as that in Vietnam, and those, who like the French, consider that it has lost much of its potency in this respect.

When the late President John F. Kennedy substituted a policy of flexible response for that of massive retaliation, he effectively blurred the dividing line between nuclear and conventional war, which up to then had ap­peared clear cut, and, as a result the size of conventional forces, became once again a matter of prime importance.

It is the reluctance to face this change which fully justifies Eliot’s anxiety about the reduc­tion taking place in British capabilities and lodgements in the Indian Ocean area. Since it appears that nothing short of a major inter­national crisis is likely to halt this trend, his suggestion for a tripartite conference between Britain, France, and the United States to de­cide how best to defend our interests in the area with the available forces, is most welcome.

★ ★ ★

Sub-Lieutenant John Howard Oxley, Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (Retired)—G. F. Eliot truly sees the value of the Royal Navy as an important element in planning Far Eastern policy. How credible this naval strength is, is another question, for it is strength on the decline, with aging ships which will not be replaced, and a home gov­ernment policy which assists this decline.

The present Labour Government in Brit­ain is quite clear on this point: there is to be a reduction in military strength, and a with­drawal from foreign bases. This is not merely a financial matter, but also a matter of popu­lar will. The prevailing mood in England is one of withdrawal from global affairs and an attempt at European communality.

Focusing upon the Southeast Asian situa­tion, Eliot rightly eschews any direct British aid in Vietnam. Looking at recent history, the British situation in Southeast Asia has been one of gradual withdrawal. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, in World War II, advocated that the British take the Southeast Asia flank in the final drive against Japan. The British decided to give direct aid in the Central Pa­cific Theater instead. Since that time, the British in reality have only fought a rear-guard action in Southeast Asia as the Empire has been dissolved. The momentum of with-

drawal evident in recent British governmental policy will be hard to reverse, especially as far as the British public is concerned.

If some form of the old “special relation­ship” i_s t₀ b_e resumed, it must be made clear °f what service this will be to British inter­ests. The sad experiences which Britain has Previously had in the last decade of her alliance with the United States (when truly shocking blunders were made) has, to some degree, jaundiced the general British views on this subject. When one considers the difficul­ties which Britain must face with the Com­monwealth over Rhodesia; with the adverse balance of trade and its consequences; and With the general tenor of life, where Carnaby Street seems to have replaced 10 Downing as the center of national consciousness; the suc­cess of a proposal like Eliot’s seems less likely, unless immediate action is taken. That it is a most appealing proposal, both in general and specific aspects, cannot be denied. One thing ^ls sure, Britain’s problems (and those of any other possible European ally which the United States might seek in a limited war) are going to become more severe, and more self­absorbing, as time goes on.

Ship Manning: How Far Should We Go in Cutting?”

(See page 116, March 1967 Proceedings)

John J. Clark—One does not have to be ^an experienced seaman or a college professor to recognize some economic facts of life rela­tive to the merchant marine. Specifically:

(1)     The central problem of the U. S. ^lerchant Marine is not the high cost of tabor per se, but the failure to match labor costs with comparable advances in produc­tivity. Unfortunately, the American Mer­chant Marine (management and labor) has ⁿ°t seriously and aggressively moved to raise Productivity. In this connection, the subsidy system provides small incentive to the more efficient operator.

(2)     The fact that “the [maritime] unions do not look with favor upon the reduction of manning scales ...” does not invalidate

rofessor Benford’s proposals in the Marine Engineering/Log.

(3)     Captain E. B. Perry notes that before costs can be reduced on U. S. merchant ships, we must have “enough ships to provide reasonable job opportunities for those men who elect to make seafaring their career.” The argument puts the cart before the horse. We will never have enough ships and job opportunities unless we succeed in reducing costs. The product has to be made competitive before it will sell.

(4)     Apropos of the last point, Captain Perry’s criterion of size for the merchant ma­rine is a large order and would set an unusual precedent in the field of industry-govern­ment relationships. The limits to the size of any industry lie in its economic worth or relative contribution to national income, not in the personal preferences of those who may seek a career in the industry.

One of the most discouraging aspects of the present debate on the future of the American Merchant Marine is that proposals for change (work rationalization, automation, standard­ization in shipbuilding, etc.) so often emanate from outside the industry. The FDL program with its implications for the modernization of U. S. shipbuilding techniques illustrates the point. The parties in interest, on the other hand, seem always to content themselves with demonstrating why this or that proposal will never work. They offer few positive sugges­tions and these mostly involve extending the subsidy system. The consequence is a slow- moving, hidebound, and high cost industry which has failed to keep pace with the balance of the nation’s economy.

"Master Mariner to Master Submariner”

(See pages 40-51, April 1967; page 106, August 1967 Proceedings)

Captain R. J- Dzikowski, U. S. Navy, Project Officer, Deep Submergence Vehicles Program—The determination by the Coast Guard that the U. S. Code Title One, Section 3, defining “vessel,” is applicable to submersi- bles is questionable. This section specifies that a watercraft that is used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water is defined as a vessel. The key word is “on.” Assuredly, a submersible will be on the surface a portion of the time while entering or leaving port, while being launched or retrieved by a support ship, or during replenishment at sea.

While surfaced, the present rules, appli­cable to_ vessels as defined, do govern. Upon submergence however, either in or outside continental waters, whether carrying passen­gers or cargo, if operating shallow (less than 40 feet below the surface) or deep, the rules are not very specific. The intent of these rules traditionally is for surface vessels.

Private submersibles are designed for both surface and submerged operations. The re­view of Title One and Title 46 reveals that they refer to safety on the surface of vessels that carry cargo and passengers; no reference is made to safety of vessels submerged. The Load Line Acts do not even make an excep­tion to submersibles, where a “load line” would have to be defined in a different context.

The present rules, by which the Coast Guard has authority, evolved over the years and have been codified. Similarly, there is evolving a new set of rules for submersibles which must be codified, if the Coast Guard is to have authority over their certification sim­ilar to surface vessels. Assuming that legisla­tion will be enacted which cover inspection and operation of submersibles, classification and marine technology societies can provide a valuable service by promulgating standards which can be adopted by the Coast Guard within its regulations. Presently, the American Bureau of Shipping is actively engaged in

A possible use of the Navy’s deep submer­gence search vehicle (DSSV), the retrieval of lost spacecraft, is suggested in this artist’s drawing. Award of the construction contract for the DSSV, which is designed to operate at a depth of 20,000 feet, is planned for mid-1968.

Westinghouse

establishing rules for classification of sub­mersibles.

Certification of submersibles should not be limited to any tonnage or length restrictions. If the object is to protect lives at sea, then laws should be enacted that cover all sub­mersibles—cargo, passenger, research, and pleasure. Surely rescue operations will be un­dertaken for all in peril and, therefore, as­surance must be had that the submersibles are constructed, outfitted, operated, and main­tained to provide reasonable safety to em­barked personnel and other craft, both sur­faced and submerged.

Rules of the Road will require revision to account for operation and navigation of sub­merged vehicles in coastal and international waters. It may be necessary for appendages that aid navigation, location, rescue, and salvage to be specified.

Legislation is required immediately that will adequately cover classification of all sub­mersibles, before an accident occurs, with possible loss of lives. Interpretation of existing rules will make compliance difficult and may not encompass all submersibles. As the author so aptly stated, “in order for any submersible to be inspected and certified by the Coast Guard, the plans must be approved and sub­mersible constructed under the supervision of Coast Guard marine inspectors.” This im­plies possible non-certification if any sub­mersible is constructed prior to passage of en­abling legislation. The Navy recognized the need for certification and established a cer­tification procedure that can be used as a guide by the classification societies and the Coast Guard.

★ ★ ★

A. Neilson, American Bureau of Shipping —The article requires considerable clarifi­cation and updating, since it appears that the information in the article was gathered in mid-1966, though it appeared in April 1967.

A key statement in the article must be cor­rected. “The role that a classification society might have in the future in the construction of commercial submersibles is not known.” The American Bureau of Shipping, a leading in­ternational ship classification society, has been formally involved in developing standards for commercial submarines since 3 November 1966. At that time, the ABS Special Committee on Submersible Vehicles held its first meet­ing. It was formed at the suggestion of the U- S. Navy to develop standards for the cer­tification of commercial deep submergence vessels.

Its membership encompasses every disci­pline required to construct, inspect, sustain life, and maintain a craft beneath the sea. Included are oceanographers, naval archi­tects, marine engineers, designers, builders, and operators experienced in this specialized field, as well as representatives of the U. S. Navy, U. S. Coast Guard, and the Marine Technology Society.

Under the direction and assistance of this Committee, the Bureau is preparing a guide for the construction and maintenance of sub­mersible vehicles which will include: design criteria for the pressure hull; view ports; superstructures and appendages; buoyancy ^and stability considerations; mechanical equipment; electrical and other power source systems; materials, welding, and fabrication requirements; control systems; life support systems; emergency systems, and survey re­quirements.

The first submarine to be certified by a ship classification society is under construction in Switzerland. The 130-ton PX-15, being built for the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Cor­poration, will be certified by the American Bureau of Shipping after submergence tests this autumn.

Despite the author’s assumption that a sub­mersible must carry cargo to be considered ‘commercial,” the 48.6-foot PX-15 will be a commercial submarine in every sense of the Word. Though the vessel’s first task will be in the realm of research, it will be modified for ^a variety of commercial tasks, such as salvage work, protecting cables and pipelines, chart- ^lng, undersea construction, and drilling on the sea floor.

Currently, the Bureau’s role includes de- f^lgn approval by the Bureau Technical Staff m New York. The surveyors in the field wit­ness tests of every plate of the special high strength steel going into a submersible. In nddition, Bureau surveyors will witness ultra­sonic and X-ray tests of the hull and oversee the vessel’s fabrication. Before a certificate can be issued, a Bureau surveyor will partici­pate in the required series of test dives.

"Postgraduate Education and Promotion: A Significant Relationship?”

(See pages 56-61, January 1967, and pages 107-108, June 1967 Proceedings)

Theodore Ropp, Professor, Duke Uni­versity—My own graduate teaching experi­ence suggests that the proposed master’s de­gree two years after commissioning might be more useful in the exact sciences, where it is more important that the student not have lost his undergraduate skills, than in graduate work in the social sciences or the humanities.

Our tools are our attitudes toward our ma­terials and some niceties of footnoting. For­gotten facts are more easily recoverable. An officer assigned to a graduate school 10 years after he has left one of the service academies is not at any real disadvantage, and may even be better qualified for a civilian graduate school than one coming directly from schools which train professional soldiers, not pre­professors. The hyperconfident, entering grad­uate students, with whom he must compete, have a few more facts and all the latest jargon. But much of this garbage spoils easily, and professorial jargon varies from professor to professor, even in a given department. The exact sciences have to have an agreed lan­guage. A humanities or social science depart­ment which has a “party line” on anything except certain standards of intellectual hon­esty, professional courtesy, and housekeeping is to be avoided.

The officer and his family must make the usual readjustments to student and civilian life, but this is quite easy. They must learn to cope with local, student, and professorial idiosyncracies (the root word is not that for idiot, but for one’s own personal mix). I would personally recommend that they start in a summer term, where the circus aspects of campus life are less evident and can be taken in smaller doses. This also means that the officer can finish any local language or statis­tics requirement, get a good start on a more carefully-tailored thesis project, and finish a master’s degree in a calendar year.

In short, I would strongly urge that the ser­vices not try to standardize graduate work, except perhaps in the exact sciences, and that they send people in the social sciences and humanities to civilian graduate schools. In such schools an officer ought to have three

advantages over the average civilian begin­ner: greater maturity, greater ability to ex­press himself verbally, and a bent for logical organization of his materials. The passage of time is a great aid to maturity. Languages and statistics also happen to be subjects which can be kept up or studied in one’s spare time in some active duty billets. If he wants to add to his stock of information and ideas, at least in preparation for work in history, I would also advise an officer to read in the social sciences rather than to try to keep up with the latest viewpoints on particular historical issues.

"The Mine as a Tool of Limited War”

(See pages 50-62, February 1967; pages 103-105 June 1967; and page 107, July 1967 Proceedings)

Captain J. S. Cowie, G.B.E., Royal Navy (Retired)—Regarding the matter of the “moral stigma,” Commander Meacham ques­tions whether there is any true historical ba­sis for the adoption of this attitude, and he is altogether correct in so doing. My own re­search, into the background of earlier charges that the mine was an “ungentlemanly weapon” to the use of which no self-respect­ing nation would stoop, tends to show that the people who subscribed to this view simply

were not interested in mines at all, and had

never made any sort of attempt to evaluate their potentialities.

This was, in fact, the thinking of the mem­bers of the so-called “blue-water school,” who considered it to be a perfectly gentlemanly performance to batter the topsides of a ship to smithereens, and to consign a high proportion of her crew to perdition, but who considered it to be the work of uneducated thugs to create a hole in her hull below the waterline. In other words, those who propounded the “stigma” theory regarded it as a reason for taking the line which they did, whereas it was in fact little more than an excuse.

In general, the mine is one of the less in­humane types of weapon, in that it is capable of sinking a ship, or of putting her out of ac­tion for a significant length of time without directly causing any loss of human life.

Another allegation is that the mine is an “anonymous” weapon, incapable of distin­guishing between friend and foe, and that its use may thus give rise to grave problems of a political nature. I doubt whether very many people are, in this day and age, even aware of the existence of the Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, signed at The Hague in 1907. In any event, this was an unsatisfactory document from the practical point of view. Nonetheless, the principles which it attempted to embody were perfectly sound ones. There seems little reason why those principles should not be adopted by any power seeking to integrate the use of mines into its over-all strategy. Put shortly, the Convention could have been re­duced to one simple sentence, i.e., “No Power shall lay mines without taking adequate steps to ensure the safety of neutral shipping.” The operative word here is “adequate,” and ex­perience has shown that this can be done.

It is, of course, of equal importance that the laying of mines should assist and not em­barrass the operations of one’s own forces, or those of an ally, but, both the political and the operational problems associated with the em­ployment of mines do no more than call for “good management;” they cannot be re­garded as being valid arguments against such employment.

"The Escort Ship”—Challenge to the Ship-

handler

(See pages 130-134, March 1967; page 107, August

1967 Proceedings)

Captain G. C. Leslie, O.B.E., Royal Navy—I have commanded a British frigate of the Blackwood class for nearly two years. The

Blackwood class is very similar to the USS Dealey class except that the Blackwoods have a single large rudder in line with the screw. They are also slightly smaller and have cor­respondingly less power (1,500 tons displace­ment, 15,000 s.h.p.).

While agreeing broadly with all that Com­mander Denton has to say, I was surprised that he did not make more mention of the anchor as an aid to shiphandling. Where tugs are not available, the anchor becomes most valuable.

An anchor can often be of the greatest help both coming alongside and leaving a jetty, and it is a good practice to start with the idea of using an anchor. It is important that enough cable is laid out to prevent the anchor from “coming home.” A minimum of 75 fathoms of cable would be normal.

All possible combinations of wind and tide should be visualized. Usually, when leaving a berth, it will be an advantage to have an anchor down, but there are occasions when this is not so. There are places, particularly in naval ports, where anchors cannot be used and the normal type of alongside approach is then appropriate.

When approaching a pier with a medium to strong wind (or tidal stream) anywhere be­tween right ahead and the beam, the proce­dure is as follows: bring the ship into a posi­tion abreast the jetty and about a ship’s length off. Drop the outboard anchor and sail the ship across the wind (or tide), laying out the cable carefully. The heading of the ship can be adjusted by using the engine slow or half ahead and astern with appropriate use of the rudder. Just before the bow arrives at the J^etty, the cable is snubbed and the ship is under perfect control. Although this method pf going alongside is not spectacular, the feel- tng of control and time in hand is, and it does save repair bills.

When approaching under normal condi­tions, an approach is made to the jetty and the outboard anchor is dropped about a ship’s length before arrival in the berth. ^rhe ship can be stopped by a combination of braking the cable and going astern on the engine. The reduction in astern power re­quired means that the stern does not kick so strongly to port. When berthing starboard ^S1de to, the braking of the port cable tends to swing the stern into the jetty, particlarly if a swing to port has already been imparted by the rudder. Once the headrope is on, the ship ts under perfect control, using the cable as a backspring.

This method is also applicable when berth­ing with a strong wind on the outboard quar­ter. The anchor can be used as a spring and a short burst of half ahead with the rudder hard over will prevent the stern from swinging in too fast.

Celestial Navigation Is Basic

Captain P. V. H. Weems, U. S. Navy (Re­tired)—With billions being spent on modern navigation systems, we must not forget that the Earth itself is a more accurate gyro than man can build, and that astronomers have determined the geographic star positions to within about 20 feet. Also, a skilled navigator with a marine sextant and a timepiece should know his position continuously within a mile, provided one almanac body and a clear 24- hour horizon are visible.

If these statements are correct, our efforts go to provide positions for times when a celes­tial body may not be observed on the horizon. Whether using celestial navigation or any other method, we are governed by physical laws. With the near-miraculous performance of the electrically suspended gyro (ESG or “Star in a Bottle”) and other modern naviga­tion aids, research programs should encom­pass celestial, inertial, ESG, and other systems. By proper trade-offs, we might supply ele­ments which would reduce cost, weight, and complexity for our required self-contained systems.

Since celestial methods are basic, and man­made aids merely extend, speed up, automate, and display inputs of time (given by rate of earth’s rotation), and positions (determined by star observations), why not decrease ac­curacy-cost-weight demands on modern aids by increased time-availability, improved equipment, and better trained observers for celestial navigation? Are we not demanding

too much from man-made aids and too little

from man himself? Have we not reached the condition where more effort is required to produce the aid than to accomplish the mis­sion without the aid? After all, we have not been able to reproduce the capability of the human eye-brain, or if we approached such a performance, the aid would cover the earth.

Once we know star positions and move­ments with sufficient accuracy, we can use the best available aids to extend this basic infor­mation to human needs. Therefore, near­miraculous modern aids do not displace, but supplement celestial navigation. Here is a wide open field for research to seek a means to increase time-availability for making celes­tial observations. The obviously needed physi­cal improvements are in observing equipment, application of the calculus as suggested by E. J. Willis, and new horizon references sug­gested independently by Commander Mike J. Trens, Staff, CinCPac, and by Philip R. Burton of Australia. The report of the USS Vancouver test of the Burton concept, while not conclusive, recommended further tests.

FAHEY'S EIGHTH EDITION

THE SHIPS

AND

AIRCRAFT

OF THE

U S. FLEET

Compiled and Edited by James C. Fahey

An up-to-date listing by name and type of over 2,000 ships and 120 aircraft and missiles. Over 400 illustrations. 64 pages. Paperbound. List Price $3.50 Member's Price $2.80 A U. S. Naval Institute Publication

The writer, aided by the crew of the SS Atlantic, tested the Burton device, and sub­mitted the results to the U. S. Naval Institute, recommending further research.* In the wri­ter’s opinion, the principle of the Burton in­vention appears to be correct, while the ac­curacy depends on the skill of the observer.

One fact is obvious—more skilled naviga­tors are urgently needed at sea, in the air, in space, and, most urgently, in inner space. *(See pages 162-164, April 1966 Proceedings.) "Not Enough Good Men”

(See pages 88-96, May 1967 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Robert Carney Powers, U. S. Navy—It is ironic that a navy should have a uniform and pay system that places its surface ship forces at a disadvantage; a disadvantage in prestige, group identity, esprit de corps, and all of the other must items which appear in a leadership text. The surface community has somehow been beaten into submission and convinced that they really are of secondary importance, and, therefore, not deserving of pay or prestige belonging to their under or aboveseas comrades. There are officers who are primarily interested in surface ships, and the glory of going to sea is known only to surface sailors. It is also a fact that the major­ity of the Navy still floats. The officers and men that man these ships cannot be treated as poor cousins.

The intent of the Surface Combatant Officer School is good, but its implementation is loaded with traps. Group identity is the goal, to be obtained by requiring completion of some qualification program. The Reten­tion Task Force also expected some sort of surface line insignia to evolve from this qual­ification program.

Administratively, the following procedure would be convenient and expedient: Send all new ensigns to Surface Combatant Officer School and upon completion give them a surface combatant insignia and designator. If the surface line officers of today permit such a procedure, they will have lost their chance for increased prestige and identity.

The Surface Combatant Officer School is misnamed. It should be called the Division Officer School. It would instruct prospective division officers. Qualification as a surface combatant officer must have more meaning. Some general goals for this qualification are: it must be equally applicable to all surface ship types; it should be attained at a time cal­culated to influence positively a Navy career decision; qualification should be noted by an increase in prestige, brought about by insig­nia, increased pay, or both; qualification should be administratively simple.

A possible set of requirements for qualifica­tion as a Surface Combatant Officer is: serve on board a commissioned, Navy surface ship for a continuous period of not less than 18 months; serve successfully as a line depart­ment head for a period of not less than six months, (for destroyer types or larger, the commanding officer may qualify division officers who have successfully served for a period of not less than 36 months); qualify as an officer of the deck on the ship type as­signed, being capable of performing all ship­handling and operational evolutions nor­mally required of the type. The commanding officer is the one who will determine when an officer has met the qualifications.