Somewhere on the high seas, a destroyer making a solitary transit crosses paths with a merchantman. The young Officer of the Deck notes her trim, modern lines, but, because she is grimy and a little rusty, he decides she couldn’t be so new that the Fleet Commander’s staff didn’t already know she was in the area. No report is submitted. The publications that might have influenced his decision rest securely in someone’s safe.
There exists in the Navy today a wide gulf between the Intelligence organization in Washington and the forces afloat. To date, only a few tentative, largely unco-ordinated steps seem to have been taken to capitalize on the rather considerable collection potential inherent in the Fleet’s world-wide operations. Furthermore, seagoing personnel are not anywhere near as aware of available Intelligence as they could be.
The duties of shipboard Intelligence Officers are, with few exceptions, assigned on a collateral basis to someone in the Operations Department. Often, the CIC Officer or his assistant will be given the responsibility because it appears to be closely allied to his concern with “combat information.” Other reasons are that the Operations Officer has cognizance of all operations plans and orders and shouldn’t be burdened with publications control and maintenance, the Communicator is being snowed under by burgeoning message traffic, and the Electronics Material Officer has quite enough to do keeping his equipment in top operating condition.
Whatever his primary assignment, the collateral duty Intelligence Officer is expected to ensure that his ship receives all the finished Intelligence due it, study all Intelligence received, prepare and maintain adequate plots and files, conduct official and personal liaison on a continuing basis, and provide pertinent general Intelligence training to the command. These are his duties as a “consumer.”
He also is responsible for the ships’ routine Intelligence collection program, and possibly for any particular collection effort levied on the command by higher authority. The young officer who is designated as his ship’s Intelligence Officer must be prepared to expend time and effort if he is to do his job well.
By way of example, let us take a look at a destroyer’s Intelligence Officer. He holds a rank somewhere between ensign and lieutenant and, as noted above, has a primary billet in the Operations Department. He probably is still trying to qualify as a CIC Watch Officer, Officer of the Deck, Evaluator, Command Duty Officer, and/or for the next senior position in the organization (Division Officer, head of department, or Executive Officer). Since he is quite junior, and may well be new to destroyers, the chances are good that the Type Commander’s requirements include his taking one or more shipboard study courses designed to familiarize him with his primary duties and such operational skills as OOD, that he is expected to acquire.
The attributes that determined his assignment as Intelligence Officer, beyond being the CIC Officer, most likely were a light work load in relation to his brother officers in the department, and perhaps a personal attraction to matters labelled “Intelligence.”
Preparatory to assuming his duties, he has conducted an inventory of the Intelligence publications held by the command and has cursorily examined their contents. He probably has not attended any courses on the subject, nor has he received a general briefing by anyone with experience in the field.
Considered as a consumer of Intelligence, the ideal shipboard IO’s main concern will be that of keeping personnel with a “need to know” informed on the contents of the latest products from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence, or other higher authority. He will be a briefer, and perhaps a co-ordinator of a continuing program of Intelligence awareness in the command. It is unlikely that he will have to make analyses or evaluations to determine trends and estimate future events. His main effort may be in toting voluminous and often highly classified Intelligence materials to those officers he feels “need to know,” hoping they will be in a position and mood to sign the necessary control documents and exercise the requisite security safeguards. He undoubtedly will have to see some people on his proposed routing several times because they haven’t the time immediately available to peruse the proffered items, or because their limited safe stowage won’t admit another parcel. It is a frustrating job.
The publications themselves are models of erudition and expertise. Distributed throughout most levels of the service, they are dull and necessarily detailed, and require the utmost concentration and dedication when read. A study of guided missiles currently in being in the world might not only provide photographs and basic information on operational characteristics of immediate import to the shipboard officer, but go so far as to note minor details which have no effect on the weapon’s capabilities and are of interest only to a specialist on the subject. Granted this is a fine testimonial to some anonymous analyst’s abilities and diligence; it is also a deterrent to the study of such a publication by a seagoing officer whose time already is at a premium.
But, being an Intelligence Officer means wearing two hats: he is a collector as well as a consumer. Obviously, he will not acquire personally all the information higher authorities have required of his command. He will, however, be the focal point in the organization. To function efficiently, he must have a full knowledge of the directives establishing continuing requirements for information collection as they may pertain to his ship in its travels. Secondly, he must understand thoroughly any particular requirements higher authority may have levied as a result of his ship’s projected employment. While steeping himself in what he is to try to collect, the IO must also become knowledgeable with regard to the reports to be made: to whom, by when, and in what form. The nature of the desired information may be such that it can be forwarded in a format that permits rapid submission and evaluation. If so, the Intelligence Officer will spend some time preparing suitable forms for use by watch officers and others assisting in the collection effort. Properly done, they will ensure maximum acquisition of desired information and will facilitate the preparation of the report to be submitted.
His groundwork completed, the IO must next brief those personnel who will assist in the collection effort. He will pass on the requirements, emphasizing the key elements of information desired in the subject area, and perhaps assign acquisition priorities to each. Next, he will alert his people to foreseeable problems and probable best means for circumventing or minimizing them. The assistants will be briefed on the form in which they are to submit their “take,” and will receive a schedule to meet.
Preparing the report is the final duty of the IO collector. He must take the raw information acquired and put it in the required form, or in a logical exposition that will provide the remote reader with a clear set of facts. Furthermore, he may feel it is necessary to elaborate on the situation obtaining when the information was gained, to give an evaluation of his collector’s abilities of observation and any propensity for exaggeration, and perhaps forward his impressions and opinions of the subject as an on-the-scene observer. In other words, he will want to give the reader(analyst) every element possible on which he may base his conclusions. This is always a very important element in the IO’s duties, and at times the most difficult one to accomplish objectively.
The shipboard Intelligence Officer’s duties and efforts never will have the glamor of 007’s exploits, nor will they require the multitudinous skills of that fabled individual. They do, however, require that he know what the position entails and how best to do it. Without this basic knowledge, countless opportunities for the collection of valuable information every day are being lost to the Navy and the nation. For considerably smaller expenditure than that needed for more exotic systems, we can close this Intelligence gap between the specialists in a few high level commands and the majority of collectors/consumers on the world’s oceans.
Perhaps the most pressing need is that of a clearcut relationship between ONI at one end of the spectrum and the collateral duty Intelligence Officer at the other—a line of coordination that would guide the training and the work of the latter. At the top, ONI might monitor the training programs provided by lower echelons to ensure standardization between Fleets, as well as to control the subject matter to be covered and the emphasis placed on each topic. Controls are needed on reporting requirements, too. Where information is likely to be of interest to more than one commander, the directives causing submission of reports should be co-ordinated so that a single form can be prepared to satisfy all concerned. This is particularly true of reports of information that is susceptible to data processing techniques, and ONI appears to be the logical co-ordination point within the Navy. These examples serve to illustrate the type of leadership and guidance required of that office.
The production and distribution of Intelligence is an area where ONI can do much to increase the use of materials and at the same time, reduce the security stowage and control problems onboard ship. It has been stated already that most products of the analysts are of top quality, as complete as it is possible for them to be. Most, however, contain far more material than is needed by the individual ship. Let us say, for example, a volume has been published concerning a particular nation’s merchant marine. It contains infinite detail on the many organizational, economic, and political factors that characterize the industry and provides the data on which to base an estimate of its value to the parent country, how it compares to other merchant fleets, and what its role will be in the future. Furthermore, listings of all its ships, together with carefully selected line drawings and photographs will be provided to assist in identification at sea. Now, the only part of this volume that is of immediate use and interest to our warship is the identification section, and a one or two page summary of how this merchant marine stacks up internationally and its importance to the economy of the mother country will more than satisfy the shipboard consumer. If the publication were reissued on this basis, it would result in a slimmer volume and probably, since the bulk of fine detail has been removed, it could be classified at a lower level. This would result in a book that could be handled with greater ease and be of more obvious use (and interest) in our typical destroyer. As for the details we have omitted that are of interest to the community of analysts and high level staffs, a separate study containing that information could be issued to this rather limited group. (And a saving in the cost of publication may be realized through the requirement for less paper.)
There are some who will say that there are people in the field, that is, aboard ship, who are desirous of learning about the ins and outs of the Merchant Marine in our example. True, there undoubtedly are a few who, by inclination or background, are interested. For them, and in an effort to broaden professional knowledge generally, articles on such subjects should be produced in periodicals from the Intelligence community. These could be made attractive as well as informative, and by their nature could be retained or discarded without reference to any publications requirements list. Liberal use of photographs and eye-catching drawings and diagrams will stimulate reader interest and aid retention of the information presented.
Volumes of material of Intelligence collection requirements on various subjects have been issued delineating needs to a minute degree and indicating, in general terms, the relative importance between items. If our destroyer’s collateral duty IO were to feel inspired to collect information during his ship’s next port call, he would soon find himself confronted by a dishearteningly long list of requirements. So, more often than not, this is what happens: awed by the scope, the IO will decide that even if he gave up all his liberty time he could not begin to satisfy the need. He will store his good intentions away in the safe with the requirements list, and we will have lost another opportunity through the absence of realistic guidance. To gain maximum benefit from the many occasions Fleet units can acquire good, basic Intelligence information, we must have good people co-ordinating and guiding the collection effort from a level that is more aware of capabilities and limitations. Someone, possibly on a Type Commander’s staff, should be cognizant of the whole Intelligence acquisition picture at the ship level. Using the collection opportunities presented by our ships’ varied schedules, he could make specific requests to the units, tailoring them so as to make minimum demands on the time of the collector while still gaining a meaningful jot of information. Over the long term, using pieces gathered from many such requests, this staff officer could fit together a rather comprehensive report on the particular subject. Once this has been done, subsequent ship visits can be employed to verify and update the study, if the need for information on other topics doesn’t take priority. Port studies are the most obvious candidates for this sort of development, but the same principle can be applied to many other subject areas.
At Fleet and Type Commander levels, staff Intelligence Officers should be charged with furthering seagoing Intelligence awareness, both as collectors and consumers. One of the efforts most needed at this level, working in conjunction with training commands, is the establishment of short-term schools to furnish collateral duty Intelligence Officers a basic awareness of the nature of Intelligence, its uses, the philosophy of collection, and practical sessions in observation, evaluation, photography, and report preparation. A two- week course probably would fill the bill. It could be made still more useful by “packaging” it in two one-week parts—theoretical and practical—thereby making it of interest to unit commanders, commanding officers, and executive officers who might be willing (and should be encouraged) to spare a week to get a broad brush introduction to the subject. Attendance at such a course would, naturally, be required of all non-specialists assigned as shipboard Intelligence officers.
A natural adjunct to any formal schooling would be the development of one or more correspondence courses tailored to the seagoing environment. Prepared and administered by the Type Commander’s staff, a course would provide the neophyte Intelligence Officer with primary indoctrination in preparation for attending the school; or it might be slanted toward broadening the knowledge of a graduate, emphasizing those elements particularly pertinent to the areas in which his ship is most likely to operate and the situations or opportunities most likely to be encountered.
Force Intelligence Officers should be zealous salesmen of their specialty. It would be highly desirable for them to conduct periodic briefings for force senior officers and for their subordinate Intelligence Officers. For the former group, such meetings might include analyses of events in their area or potential area of operations, evaluation of force Intelligence readiness, or discussion of recent developments in Intelligence production and/ or collection programs. Whatever the content of these briefings, their most important product would be a realization of the need for Intelligence. With the latter group, the Force Intelligence Officer would want to be more technical and provide the ships’ IOs with collection program co-ordination, reporting guidance, and helpful hints to improve their capabilities within the limited environments of their parent commands. The opportunity to deliver a few words of encouragement or inspiration that such a meeting offers should not be overlooked.
Newsletters are a very popular medium in the Department of Defense to “get the word” on a myriad of subjects to people in the field who might have an interest. They can be put to good use sustaining and expanding the interest and enthusiasm generated by the courses and briefings. A newsletter from ONI, for example, might discuss that office’s views on the various aspects of Intelligence, as well as point out problem areas noted in reports being received from the field. Such items as factors in evaluating sources, keeping facts and opinions clearly separated, and errors in the use of provided report forms would be pertinent. At lower echelons, while further guidance on these subjects might be forthcoming, emphasis could be better placed on problems common to the Fleet or force and, very importantly, on keeping all hands apprised concerning what the units were accomplishing in the area of Intelligence. A newsletter on a commanding officer’s desk is a ready, rapid reminder of how well his unit is performing Intelligence functions relative to others in the force, and can be a spur to greater efforts.
Encouragement and inspiration—incentives—are important to everyone, regardless of his occupation; but they can be key factors when the deserving individual is pursuing two or more jobs simultaneously. This is not to say that a medal or other formal recognition is necessarily expected, but anyone who has taken the time to collect and submit information would appreciate knowing he has made a positive contribution to the body of knowledge on a particular subject, and this would tend to stimulate further efforts. Commands and staffs regularly receiving raw information should have systems established for issuing appropriate acknowledgements of these reports. It is suggested that the bulk of these could be handled through the medium of form postcards or letters. One card might be available stating the report submitted “added to the body of knowledge available on the subject;” another might indicate that the report was “the first information received on this matter;” a third acknowledgement might note that “your report confirmed previously held fragmentary information.” Whatever the phraseology, the response would engender a feeling that the effort was worth it, and, hopefully, create a desire to repeat it. Reports that obviously required an abnormally large amount of work to produce (in terms of the shipboard situation), or that reflect particularly alert collation and evaluation always should be individually reviewed and acknowledged by specially prepared correspondence, not a form. The originator may have sacrificed some well-deserved liberty time to gather and report the information; surely the recipient can slow down administrative processing slightly and respond in kind to this extra effort.
Nowhere is it truer that “a picture is worth a thousand words” than in the field of Intelligence. Nothing can convey size, color, and spatial relationships of a material subject as readily as a good photograph. Generally, only ancillary data such as date, place, time, camera settings, and circumstances surrounding the taking of the picture need be added to enable an analyst to make maximum use of it in minimum time. With these advantages, it is a pity that so little photography is received from the operating forces. Two circumstances combine to foster this unfortunate situation: first, a severe shortage of suitable equipment in ships’ allowances; and second, the lack of an efficient system to encourage the use of personally owned equipment. The first problem requires considerable sums of money for correction and hence will not be solved immediately in these days of economies and other, more pressing, tremendously expensive programs. The second situation, however, can be solved quite easily by making it possible for a commanding officer to direct his supply officer to reimburse immediately, in kind, individuals using privately purchased film for the taking of official pictures. The essential element is the immediacy with which the debt is liquidated, and therein rests the deficiency in the present system that otherwise provides the same result. A person will be more willing to use film budgeted for a planned liberty outing to take Intelligence pictures if he knows he won’t have to cancel his plans or dig deeper in his pocket to have film available.
We have pointed out some deficiencies that exist between the Intelligence community and the Fleet—an Intelligence gap. This is not a new situation. Further, organizational changes in recent years have caused many of our problems to become lost in the period of adjustment to new responsibilities and relationships. It is time now for these problems to be brought out into the open and for corrective steps to be taken. As new products are forthcoming, or older ones revised, they should be carefully screened to ensure that the Fleet gets the materials needed, in the most desirable arrangements. And more importantly, positive steps should be taken to indoctrinate seagoing personnel in Intelligence matters, to train Intelligence Officers in their duties, and to take full advantage of the collection potential offered by our wide- ranging ships.