Having risen like a phoenix from the ashes of World War II, the Empire of Japan is today the industrial giant of Asia. No country—not even the burgeoning Federal Republic of Germany—equals Japan in the consistent pace of her postwar industrial expansion. Moreover, this process of growth has been accompanied by a fundamental transformation of the very nature of the Japanese economy and industry. Japan has now shifted the basis of her industrial structure from light to heavy industries, concentrating upon machinery, chemicals, and electronics. Qualitatively, the products of Japanese factories now equal, and often excel, goods from any other nation.
Modern Japan thus possesses the industrial base to support substantial armed forces— with the potential to become the greatest military power in Asia. In the future, she might indeed rank as a major military power in the world arena.
An appraisal of the armed forces of Japan indicates that their present strength is now quite modest. It must be clearly understood that Japanese forces now operate within the context of a 1946 Constitution which, in Article Nine, specifically renounces war, denies the threat or use of force as a sovereign right, and circumscribes Japanese military preparation to defensive measures. Such defensive arrangements are sanctioned by a Japanese Supreme Court ruling of 1961, holding that a nation possesses an inherent right to defend itself against attack. Thus, the various military branches are styled Self-Defense Forces. Under the circumstances, weaponry is limited to armament primarily defensive in nature. And, of course, Japanese troops are not committed to operations overseas.
A fairly ambitious expansion plan is now underway, however, spanning the period from 1967 to 1971. This program envisages the expenditure of more than eight billion dollars, two-and-a-half times the previous defense budget. The new plan will substantially enhance the conventional strength of the Self-Defense Forces. And it will lay a basis for possible deployment of defensive nuclear weaponry.
The London Institute for Strategic Studies indicates an array of 13 divisions in the Japanese Army—12 are infantry units, one is mechanized, and there is also a paratroop brigade. Japanese troops are equipped with approximately 380 tanks. Many are light American models, M-24 and M-41. Some are 35-ton medium tanks of Japanese design and manufacture. The Japanese tank features a 600-h.p. diesel engine and a 90-inm. high velocity gun. Light and medium cannon, up to 203 millimeters, of U. S. pattern are deployed with the field artillery brigades. Two battalions of American Hawk missiles, approximately 140 weapons, provides a minimal anti-aircraft rocket defense.
Under the new budget, Japanese troops will be furnished with a new and more heavily armed main battle tank, again from Japanese factories. Infantry units will be supplied with a Japanese designed and produced armored car. Anti-aircraft defense will be augmented by the quantity production of a Swiss, twin-barrelled, automatic, radar-guided 35- mm. cannon. Hawk battalions will expand twofold, raising the number of missiles to 280. Eight of the divisions will be buttressed with levies of additional manpower; some 16,000 men are earmarked for this purpose.
Helicopter strength will be markedly increased. The number of Japanese-built Bell Iroquois troop-carrying craft will rise from 16 to 106. Ground forces will also be furnished with 60 Hughes reconnaissance and command helicopters.
At present the Japanese Maritime Self- Defense Force is a more formidable arm than the Ground Force, as befits an island empire that is heavily dependent upon the sea lanes both for imports of vital raw materials and the immense export trade so necessary to sustain her economy. The Japanese Fleet, concentrates primarily upon antisubmarine warfare, tactics and weapons designed to cope with the underwater menace to seaborne traffic.
Jane’s Fighting Ships lists Japanese naval strength in 1967 at seven submarines, 22 destroyers, 18 frigates and escort vessels, and 20 patrol craft and submarine chasers. Under the last five-year defense plan, from 1962 to 1966, Japan has programmed four destroyers of 3,000 tons, seven destroyers with a displacement of 2,000 tons, five 1,600-ton submarines, and an experimental hydroplane.
The Takatsuki, launched in 1966, may be taken as representative of the larger destroyers constructed under the plan. Built in Japanese yards and equipped with machinery and radar of Japanese manufacture, the vessel is furnished with 5-inch guns of the U. S. pattern and the American octuple Asroc antisubmarine rocket system. Sonar detection gear is supplied by the United States. Provision is made as well for a drone antisubmarine helicopter. Sleek and swift, the Takatsuki can make 32 knots. Three more ships of this class are scheduled. The emphasis upon submarine warfare is also reflected in the lighter type of destroyer. Completed in 1966, the Makigumo is notable for its Japanese-built diesel engines, which afford very quiet operation, a 10 per cent higher cruising speed than turbine- powered vessels, and a 10 per cent longer range of operation. Main armament includes 3-inch cannon of U. S. Navy type, the eight- tube Asroc missile launcher, and American sonar. Another ship of this class is operational and five more are programmed. It should be noted that the Japanese outfit these vessels with four-barrelled depth charge launchers, antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and ASW torpedoes of their own manufacture.
A new departure in Japanese warship types is to be seen in the Amatsukaze, a 3,050-ton guided missile destroyer commissioned in 1965. Flush-decked, with high freeboard and clean lines, the vessel is rated at 33 knots. Her maneuverability and handling ease have earned high praise. The Amatsukaze is armed with the U. S. Tartar anti-aircraft missile system, as well as a secondary battery of 3-inch guns. A helicopter can be carried and operated by the ship. A little more than two years in the building, the Amatsukaze undoubtedly represents the prototype for a new class of missile-firing warships in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.
Recently launched, the Asashio is the seventh submarine built in Japanese yards since the war and the second in a program of six modern 1,600-ton boats. These are the first submarines in Japanese service capable of deep diving. The Asashio is armed with eight 21-inch torpedo tubes.
The Japanese Fleet enjoys the support of a relatively powerful antisubmarine air arm. Maritime patrol and the early warning mission are other key roles undertaken by this air component. Fifty-five U. S.-built Grumman Trackers and 60 Lockheed Neptunes, some procured from the United States and the rest manufactured in Japan under license, constitute the backbone of the naval air branch. They are augmented by about two dozen Sikorsky Sea King and Sea Bat helicopters.
A substantial expansion of the Japanese fleet air arm is envisaged for the five-year period 1967-1971. The Navy will obtain 90 new ASW patrol aircraft and 60 Sikorsky Sea King helicopters. Sixty-eight maritime reconnaissance and patrol aircraft are on order from the Kawasaki Company, a name highly respected in World War II annals for the prowess of its fighter planes. Moreover, initial design studies are already underway at Kawasaki for a four-engine, turbofan-powered successor to the present machine. Along with the Soviet Union, Japan will be one of the few air arms to operate patrol flying boats. Shin-Meiwa Industry will supply the fleet with 22 four-engine, turboprop flying boats, the first of which is expected to fly in 1967. The Japanese company also hopes to meet a further naval requirement for some 20 airborne early warning aircraft, a further development of the flying boat.
Another effective Japanese military branch is the Air Self-Defense Force. The London Institute for Strategic Studies assesses total Japanese air strength at 1,100 aircraft and two Nike-Ajax groups of 72 anti-aircraft missile launchers. There is a first-line operational combat strength of 19 squadrons, comprising 570 combat aircraft, plus additional reserves.
Some 265 North American F-86F Sabres, assembled in Japan by Mitsubishi, serve in the day fighter role with eight squadrons. The Sabre is also employed by a reconnaissance squadron of 15 planes. Four interceptor squadrons fly the all-weather F-86D; 90 of these machines were supplied to the JASDF by the United States.
By far their most formidable aircraft is the Lockheed F104J—the Eiko or “Glory,” as it is termed in the JASDF. Manufactured by Mitsubishi and Kawasaki, 200 Eikos are flown by seven squadrons in the all-weather interceptor role. Swift—1,320 miles per hour —fast-climbing—50,000-feet-per-minute initially—and very maneuverable, the sleek, needle-nosed F104J is a superlative air superiority fighter. But its extraordinary performance and electronic complexity demand excellent maintenance standards, thorough training, and piloting skill of a very high order. Versions of this American Starfighter, widely employed by many nations, have fared badly in other hands. In West German service, the machine has won the unenviable sobriquet of “the Widow-Maker.” The superb Japanese record with the F104 may therefore be taken as a key index of the operational ability of the Air Self-Defense Force. An additional 10 Eikos will be supplied to the JASDF during 1967, thus completing the F104J program.
Japanese defense authorities are now planning the acquisition of a new supersonic fighter. A wide array of aircraft are under consideration, including the General Dynamics F-lll, Lockheed F104S and YF-12A, and the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II. Designs from Japanese manufacturers are also under scrutiny. A decision is expected by June 1968 and initial orders for 54 aircraft will be placed in 1969. The program will presumably be completed in the next budgetary period, the purchase of as many as 72 additional aircraft being anticipated.
More immediate steps are now in hand, however, for modernization of the force. During 1967, the F-86Ds, supplanted in their role by the Eikos, will be gradually phased out. It is reported that some of the F model Sabres will be replaced by 50 Northrop F-5Bs, which will serve the purpose of supersonic flight training as well. The Japanese will come into possession of Nike-Hercules missiles, offering the option of a defensive nuclear weapon. Training in the United States, Japanese crews have achieved an average accuracy record of 98.6 per cent. Most important of all, perhaps, Japan will install a comprehensive, computer-centered, control and command system, analogous to the SAGE System employed by the North American Air Defense command.
It is clear, however, that this Japanese military expansion will not even dent the country’s economic potential. Only 2 per cent of the national income will be channelled into defense expenditures. No more than 10 per cent of the budget will be devoted to the armed forces.
The power and influence of a nation in the present era are not based solely upon divisions of troops and squadrons of warplanes, however. Industrial prowess and technological achievement play a more signal part than ever before in the leadership a nation can exercise in international affairs. Hence, an examination of the Japanese economy and industrial production is of central relevance in understanding the weight and persuasion that a nation can bring to bear in her strategic and foreign policy.
Since 1955, Japan has had the fastest growing gross national product in the world. Generally, the growth rate has averaged a spectacular 10 per cent per year. Recession in 1965 slowed the pace for that year to a low of 4.7 per cent. Resurgent in 1966, the Japanese attained a 9 per cent growth rate. The 1966 gross national product totalled 98.7 billion dollars, placing Japan fourth in the world and exceeded only by the United States, the Soviet Union, and West Germany. A 10 per cent GNP expansion rate is expected in 1967.
Another significant feature of the Japanese economy is the world’s most rapidly expanding foreign trade. In 1964, total Japanese foreign trade was valued at 14.7 billion dollars. Total Japanese exports between 1957 and 1964 skyrocketed 132 per cent.
Traditional patterns in Japanese foreign trade have been dramatically altered. Im-, ports, reflecting the demands of the new heavy industries, emphasize petroleum, coal, and iron ore. Exports which, prior to the war, stressed textiles, now highlight metal products, precision machinery, and chemicals. Southeast Asian countries in the era before the war purchased 60 per cent of all Japanese exports; today they account for only 20 per cent of Japan’s sales abroad. Japanese trade patterns have shifted sharply to North America and, to a somewhat lesser degree, Western Europe. The largest foreign market for Japanese goods is now the United States, importing more than a quarter of all Japanese exports, a trade valued at 1.8 billion dollars in 1964. After Canada, Japan is the most substantial American customer, importing, in 1964, 2.3 billion dollars worth of goods. The balance of exchange thus favors the United States. Trade with Japan is especially vital to American agriculture, which finds in the island empire the biggest cash market for wheat, feed grains, soy beans, and cotton. Much U. S. coal is also imported. One hardly need belabor the significance of this trade pattern for American-Japanese relations.
The dominant position of Japan in world shipbuilding is the most dramatic symbol of her postwar resurgence. In 1956, Japan forged into first place in the world shipbuilding race. Since then Japanese yards have rapidly widened the gap between the Empire and her competitors. In 1965, Japanese yards launched 5,363,232 gross registered tons, 43.9 per cent of the world’s total. Sweden, with 1,170,048 tons, occupied second place, and Great Britain, producing 1,073,074 tons, was third. In fourth place, with 1,023,429 tons, was West Germany. More than half the vessels from Japanese ways have been ordered by foreign buyers; shipbuilding thus looms large in Japan’s export earnings.
The shipbuilding industry also underlines the sharp rise in technological standards characteristic of postwar Japanese industry. Japanese yards have pioneered in prefabrication, block assembly, advance fitting out, massive use of advanced welding techniques, design of the unique and less costly “economical hull form,” and many other original and modern methods.
Japan also ranks first in the world in production of cameras and photographic equipment. Lenses made in Japan are now considered superior to German handiwork. The photographic and optical industry is a key index of Japanese ability to design and manufacture first class precision equipment.
The most spectacular and rapid growth of all sectors of industry has been registered by electrical machinery and electronics. Military aspects apart, Japan ranks second in this field, exceeded only by the United States. Heavy electrical machinery, turbines and generators, flows from Japanese assembly lines. In electronics, production focuses upon transistor radios, television sets, transistors, electronic computers, and automation equipment. The present era is often considered the age of the transistor and the computer. Japan is second only to the United States in the employment of computers. Much American computer equipment is of Japanese design and manufacture. In a highly developed electronic industry, Japan possesses the key to a thriving economy and expanding national power. The crucial part played by electronic gear in modern weaponry, tactics and strategy underscores the military significance of a flourishing electronic industry.
In automotive production, Japan has concentrated upon trucks, buses, tractors, and construction machinery. Only the United States outstrips Japan in these items. Trucks alone accounted for more than half of the 2,000,000 motor vehicles manufactured in Japan during 1966. Japan, in 1966, vaulted into third place—behind West Germany and the United States—in total production of vehicles of all types. Automotive production capacity is, of course, directly relevant to outfitting modern, highly mechanized armed forces.
Since 1964, Japan has ranked third in world steel production, a step ahead of West Germany, and substantially outdone only by the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1965, some 41.1 million tons of steel flowed from the mills of the island Empire. Japan is also third in the manufacture of stainless steel. Coke consumption per ton of pig iron, an index of steel technology, is much lower in Japan than in the mills of other large scale producers.
A significant and rapidly expanding new segment of the Japanese economy is a widely diversified chemical industry. Japan stands first in the production of synthetic textile fibers and among the top four in world output of basic chemicals—caustic soda, sulphuric acid, carbide, and ammonium sulphate. Increasingly, however, the industry is expanding into the field of synthetic organic chemicals. An immense program is underway in petrochemicals—those isolated or derived from petroleum or natural gas—which may rise to half of all chemical production by 1970. Over-all, the Japanese chemical industry ranks third in the world.
Spectacular though Japanese achievements may be, there are many problems which severely handicap her military development. Japan is the most crowded nation in the world. Her 100,000,000 people are crammed into a total area smaller than the state of California. Overwhelmingly mountainous, only 16 per cent of the land is arable, even with the most painstaking and intensive utilization. Japan suffers a ratio of more than 4,000 people per square mile of arable land. The strategic vulnerability of Japan to naval blockade, especially the depredations of the submarine, can readily be seen. The decisive submarine campaign waged by the U. S. Navy in World War II underlines this flaw in the Japanese strategic situation.
The vital industries and cities of Japan are very highly concentrated. In a narrow coastal strip from Tokyo south to the northeastern end of Kyushu—540 miles in length—are jammed all of Japan’s metropolitan areas and heavy industries. In an age of nuclear weaponry, such concentration could be a fatal strategic liability.
Suffering a paucity of natural resources, Japan must import the great bulk of its raw materials. Eighty per cent of all wheat, salt, and sugar must come from abroad. Virtually all Japanese needs in cotton, wool, rubber, oil, bauxite, and iron ore must be supplied from overseas. From other countries Japan must seek 90 per cent of her lead, 75 per cent of her tin, and 66 per cent of her zinc. Japan is compelled to import half of all her important coking coal, and much else in the way of coal for rapidly expanding thermoelectric power plants. A commodity of critical importance to the Japanese economy is oil, brought in gigantic supertankers from fields in the Middle East. Japanese dependence upon oil from the Middle East underscores the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean sealane.
In the light of all these circumstances, it is clear that foreign trade plays a vital role in the economic life of Japan. She must export profitably to foreign markets in order to finance the imports upon which she is utterly dependent. In a very real sense, Japan is at the mercy of world trade, its vagaries and vicissitudes. International trade is a delicate balance, easily upset.
Inflation, driven by the sheer thrust of economic boom, also deeply concerns the Japanese. Price levels in 1966 rose by 6 per cent. To keep pace with the skyrocketing cost of living, wages increased 10 per cent. Sharply rising price levels also strike with critical impact upon Japan’s competitive position in world markets.
All obstacles duly weighed, however, it is amply clear that Japan possesses an immense and widely varied industrial, technological, and scientific base, upon which advanced and powerful armed forces could readily be mounted. It is apparent as well that Japan ranks among those nations technically capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons.
The noted authority on nuclear proliferation, Leonard Beaton, states that “The third decade, 1965-75, might see the creation of three new nuclear powers: Japan, India, and Israel.” Between 1957 and 1964, 14 research reactors have been completed and brought into operation in Japan. They represent the development of a substantial nuclear research and construction industry. Japan now possesses a reactor of industrial scale in the Tokai-Mura power station. This plant is capable of furnishing plutonium sufficient, according to Beaton, for 32 atomic weapons per year. Another substantial power plant is planned in the Osaka area, this station will employ fuel enriched in a gaseous diffusion plant. This industrial reactor is scheduled for completion in 1968 and could supply 60 atomic bombs a year.
Some notion of comparative standing can be gleaned from the calculations made of other countries’ potential in this field. Canada could produce 44 atomic weapons per year. Fifty bombs could now be manufactured an-weapons, have drawn back from such awesome commitment and heavy investment. To be truly effective, moreover, a nuclear force must be much more than a handful of bombs. It is necessarily varied in its elements and highly complex. Development of doctrine to govern the employment of atomic weapons is new ground for the strategist, riven with much controversy and no little confusion. Much of what passes for nuclear strategy is necessarily speculation. And deterrence, the key role envisaged for nuclear weaponry, is psychological as well as technological in nature. Essential in the strategic deterrent role as nuclear weapons may be, they represent no universal antidote. Nuclear power affords no sure guarantee against conventional war of the Korean type, the eruption of guerrilla conflicts, or internal subversion.
Unique to the Japanese situation are a number of restraints which significantly inhibit Japan’s will to become a nuclear power. Memories linger of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Revulsion greets the thought of mass destruction. Aggressive—and unsuccessful -militarism is deeply unpopular. Recent polls show that only 20 per cent of the Japanese people support the development of atomic weapons by their country. Such a program might well engender a sharp and bitter internal conflict, extremely divisive, and possibly quite dangerous to the political stability of the nation. In the light of all these considerations, an alternative to a national nuclear program would surely be welcome to the Japanese government.
Many of the ingredients for such an alternative are already present. It may prove true that the capacity to produce nuclear explosives is, in itself, no mean bargaining counter. A new element may appear in the diplomacy of the nuclear era, the nation that balances its atomic potential against quite substantial political concessions won as the price of continued nuclear abstinence. A case in point may well be seen in the evolving relationship between West Germany’s status as a nuclear power and the question of German reunification. We have heard of “nuclear blackmail”; we may yet hear of “non-nuclear blackmail.”
It may also be argued that, given the improvement and continued effectiveness of the U. S. nuclear deterrent, Japan can enjoy a wide latitude for independent action. The U. S. nuclear umbrella can shelter a considerable range of independent policy by an ally.
France, Roumania, and even tiny Albania, are all examples of this ironic facet of the nuclear balance. De Gaulle, it is true, has backed his independence in foreign policy with some degree of nuclear power, but Roumania and Albania can hardly be accused of nuclear pretensions. This course of action is much less expensive than the acquisition of an independent atomic force. As Henry Kissinger incisively comments, “Influence can now be achieved by using another country’s protection even for policies not in accord with the ally’s preferences.”
An increasingly important aspect of our present era is the rapidly growing significance of economic and technological considerations in the total weight of a nation’s power, prestige, and diplomatic influence. Lieutenant General James Gavin, U. S. Army (Retired), even claims that “Economic strength and technological change, not war, now have the greatest impact on foreign affairs.” Within limits, Japan might prove to be a case in point. The immense Japanese economic capacity and remarkable technological prowess make the island Empire a weighty, and perhaps decisive, counter in the balance of power, both in Asia and the world.