Since 1960, the Russian merchant marine has doubled in size. A year ago it surpassed the active U. S. merchant fleet in numbers of ships. It is scheduled to double in size in terms of deadweight tonnage by 1970 and to grow considerably more by the end of the next decade.
The current sea power surge of the Soviets coupled with their recent oil offensive and forced entry into the Baltic Shipping Exchange reveals their probable objective. By astutely combining merchant shipping pressures and price and labor controls, they may attempt to create economic chaos in the world market place once they are able to transport their oceanborne trade.
In the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s deliberate maritime buildup is extremely important. Their burgeoning merchant marine is providing them with a weapon that is at the same time military, political, economic, and psychological. No other nation has matched, proportionately speaking, the Kremlin’s creation over the past ten years of one of the world’s largest merchant fleets.
As of 1 May 1966, the Soviet Union had on order 585 merchant, fishing, and special service ships totaling over 5,641,361 deadweight tons. Of merchant ships under construction throughout the world on that date, the Soviet orders represented over 30 per cent of the total number. By contrast, on 1 May 1966, the United States had only 39 merchant ships totaling 534,435 dwt. tons under construction or on order.
Between 1951 and 1965, the Soviet merchant marine grew from 560 ships of 2.6 million dwt. tons to 1,250 ships of 9 million tons. During the same 14-year period, the active U. S. maritime fleet dwindled from 1,955 ships of 22.4 million tons to about a thousand ships of nearly 15.5 million tons.
An analysis of these figures reveals a simple but startling truth. While the United States is still ahead of Russia in deadweight tons, the Soviets today have more ships in their merchant fleet than we have in ours.
Since 1958, the Soviet Union has advanced from 21st to seventh place among the maritime nations. It has acquired some seven million tons of shipping, most of which is modern, fast, and soundly designed. This figure is being increased at the rate of nearly a million tons annually. Under a series of plans, Russia will have by 1980 a fleet of between 20 and 30 million tons—almost double the U. S. merchant marine of today. By that time, assuming that the present decline of Western shipping continues, the Russians may have the largest, most modern, and most diversified merchant marine afloat. Indeed, one must regard this program as a major success of political significance.
Until recently, the West scarcely noted the speed and success of the Soviet maritime expansion and its incursion into the trading patterns that for several hundred years had been virtually Western monopolies. How did it all happen?
Russia has done it the hard way. Neither geography nor history has favored the development of Soviet maritime greatness. Of the four basic coastlines of Russia, two are on, almost landlocked seas, with entrances and exits controlled by other countries; two have access to the open seas only through ports closed by ice for a part of each year. From the beginning, any Soviet plans of naval or maritime power had to consider wide dispersal of forces to areas thousands of miles apart—in the Black Sea, in the Baltic, in the Arctic Oceans, and in the Pacific.
What we are now witnessing in the growing threat from Soviet merchant power is the result of a long and carefully planned maritime development. Almost forgotten is that in the 1930s Stalin determined to make Russia a great maritime nation. At that time Russia was without an aggressive maritime doctrine. In 1938, speaking to the Supreme Soviet, Vyacheslav Molotov declared: “The powerful Soviet state must have a sea-going and ocean-going fleet, consistent with its interests, worthy of our great task.”
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Russia had gradually improved the size and quality of her merchant fleet. By September 1939, the Soviets had a merchant marine of approximately 1.1 million gross tons or about 2 per cent of the world gross tonnage. Although Russia was one of the few countries with more ships after the war than before, its 9 per cent increase in postwar over prewar tonnage amounted to only 102,000 gross tons. Despite this increase, however, the Soviet Union’s position among the world merchant fleets continued at 2 per cent of the entire gross tonnage.
In 1946, the Soviet merchant fleet totaled about 500 ships of 1,000 gross tons or over, aggregating 2.5 million dwt. tons. Of these, 83 were U. S. Lend-Lease vessels of 785,000 dwt. tons, which represented two-fifths of the total tonnage. These vessels are still under Soviet registry today.
After World War II, the Soviet Union concentrated its efforts primarily on naval construction and on rebuilding shipyards destroyed by the Germans during 1941-1944. This dual pressure, restoring shipyard facilities while at the same time creating a strong naval force, retarded domestic merchant ship construction. Thus, by the start of the Korean conflict, the Russians had even fewer merchant ships than in 1948—525 vessels of 2.5 million dwt. tons.
When national priorities for naval construction were finally relaxed, the government directed more attention and effort to expansion of the merchant marine. Table 1 shows past growth and long-range predictions for the Soviet merchant fleet.
The growth of the Soviet merchant marine is inextricably linked to its aims. Soviet maritime policy is committed to the development, maintenance, and expansion of a strong merchant marine capable of accelerating Russian domination of the world. The essential goals in this maritime growth are to have Russia’s goods-carrying capacity in overseas trade parallel its economic growth; to earn badly needed foreign exchange; to dispense with the use of foreign tonnage; and to solidify and expand foreign alliances.
In order to achieve its maritime policy, Russia embarked on an extensive long-range shipbuilding program. This fleet build-up became fully apparent shortly after 1953. The entering wedge had been driven. Between then and 1959, Soviet tonnage increased by about 80 per cent to 3.6 million dwt. tons. Subsequently, the Russian maritime fleet sustained an even higher rate of growth.
The Soviets included maritime fleet expansion goals in their various over-all Year Plans. In the Seven-Year Plan that ended in 1965, the Russians exceeded their original targets in about five years, and then revised the goals to a more ambitious level. Fleet tonnage was increased by over 175 per cent rather than the initially planned 100 per cent expansion.
The Soviet Union is currently investing between $350 million and $600 million annually in its maritime industry. An exact figure for vessel procurement is difficult to ascertain because of the secrecy shrouding Russian transactions. An estimated $125 million of this amount is spent for vessel procurement in non- Communist countries. Because naval programs pre-empted domestic construction in the early years of its maritime expansion, Russia had to rely for merchant ship construction on foreign shipbuilders. Vessels were and continue to be constructed not only in the Communist-bloc countries of Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, but also in the Free World nations of England, Japan, Finland, Sweden, and Italy.
Table 1 GROWTH OF SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET |
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Year End |
No. of Ships |
Deadweight Tonnage |
1939 (Sept.) |
354 |
1,594,900 |
1946 (June) |
500 |
2,500,000 |
1950 |
530 |
2,500,000 |
1955 |
700 |
3,200,000 |
1958 (June) |
760 |
3,900,000 |
1960 |
900 |
4,700,000 |
1962 |
1,000 |
5,800,000 |
1964 |
1,200 |
8,200,000 |
1965 |
1,250 |
9,000,000 |
1970 |
1,800 |
14,000,000 |
1975 |
2,000-2,200 |
16,000,0000-18,000,000 |
1980 |
2,300-2,500 |
22,000,000-30,000,000 |
Note: Russian fleet expansion in 1965-80 projected in accordance with tonnage goals set by the 22nd Communist Party Congress. The trend toward larger size ships will enable tonnage goals to be met with fewer ships than number listed. |
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration: Engineering/Log Yearbook Issue, June 15, 1962 |
Table 2 RUSSIAN VESSELS ON ORDER AS OF 30 APRIL 1966 |
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Type |
Number |
Deadweight Tons |
Dry cargo vessels |
407 |
3,574,556* |
Tankers |
122 |
1,909,305 |
Bulk carriers |
7 |
157,500 |
Liquid petroleum gas carriers |
4 |
8,000 |
Passenger and specialized vessels |
45 |
Not available |
|
—— |
——————— |
Total |
585 |
5,649,361 |
*Included in this figure are 44 vessels of 179,200 gross tons, which total has been converted for purposes of this table to 250,880 dwt. Tons. |
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Source: Fairplay Shipping Journal, Quarterly No. 7, May 1966. |
Although the Soviet shipbuilding industry continues principally to construct naval vessels, particularly submarines, it is increasing production of merchant vessels in its domestic shipyards. Approximately 40 per cent of its future merchant vessel tonnage is scheduled to be produced in Russia. This production, plus production by foreign shipbuilders, explains the commissioning of Russian merchant ships at the rate of more than two a week. In the next six years the Soviets hope to add over a million deadweight tons annually to their merchant fleet. The Soviet Union has already surpassed the United States in the number of active or operational vessels and is scheduled to surpass it in tonnage by 1972.
As stated previously, Russia at present has on order or under construction approximately 585 merchant vessels of 1,000 gross tons or over, totalling well over 5.6 million tons (see Table 2). Included in this total are 45 vessels, mainly passenger and specialized ships, for which no deadweight tonnage figures are available. The net increase in dry cargo ships on order world-wide, from 31 January 1966 to 30 April 1966, was 2,110,000 dwt. tons. Of this net increase, nearly 1,500,000 tons were for the Russian flag.
The three categories of ships in which Russia has placed the largest orders are dry cargo, tanker, and passenger and specialized vessels. These are the three categories which can most readily effect Russian aims.
Dry cargo vessels constitute the largest number on order—and for good reason. A nation’s commodity distribution system begins at the point of production and continues to the point of final need or consumption. This axiom holds true both for a nation’s internal and external trade. In Russia there is no more important vessel-type than the dry cargo carrier for transporting Soviet commodities from points of production to points of consumption.
Dry cargo carriers already comprise the principal segment of the Soviet maritime fleet. At the start of 1966, the Soviet Union had an active merchant fleet of 925 dry cargo vessels with a deadweight tonnage of 5,300,000. Additionally, as of 1 May 1966, the Soviet Union had 407 dry cargo vessels of more than 3.5 million total deadweight tons on order or under construction. This new tonnage represented over one-third of the world total of dry cargo deadweight tons on order.
The largest and most modern of these dry cargo vessels is the 16,040 dwt.-ton Leninsky Komsomol class. The Russians began quantity production of this type in 1959 in their own shipyards. At least 12 of these vessels are already operating. They have a 556-foot length over-all, 72-foot beam, and 32-foot draft. A 13,500-h.p. turbine produces a service speed of 18 knots. With a crew of 42, this type of ship is self-sustaining for 40 days under normal operations and has a 12,000-mile cruising radius. Maximum profits from use of ships of this class, because of their size, can be derived only by using them over long runs on tight schedules, with full cargoes available at both ends of the run.
Many prototypes of dry cargo carriers are already in operation; others are constantly being developed. Most of the vessels designed for overseas trade are in the 12,000-12,500 dwt. range. The Russians have been producing the Poltava class, a 12,500-dwt. carrier in their own shipyards since 1962. Ten of these were scheduled for delivery from Polish shipyards in 1965. These vessels have an overall length of 510 feet, beam of 67.5 feet, and speed of 17 knots at a loaded draft of 29.5 feet. They have a Sulzer engine, single screw, and double deck. Because of large ballast tanks which can be used for carrying fuel oil, the Poltava-class vessel has a high sea endurance. This factor and her exceptionally long No. 4 hatch, which is well suited for carrying bulky military cargoes such as ballistic missiles, made her suitable to transport military supplies to Cuba.
The Krasnograd, Pula, Murom, and Vyborg classes are in the same 12,000-12,500 tonnage range, and have speeds and drafts similar to those of the Poltava class. They are powered by Burineister & Wain and Sulzer-Mann diesels with a capacity of 8,000-12,000 h.p. These vessels are being built in Russian, Finnish, Yugoslavian, Polish and East German shipyards.
Recent increases in the export of timber to Europe and the Far East have resulted in an increase in timber carriers. At the start of 1965, the Soviet merchant fleet was operating approximately 89 timber carriers of 446,000 dwt. tons. Poland is building for the Soviet Union a timber carrier prototype called the Belomorskles class. This 60,000-dwt.-ton vessel has a 406-foot length over-all, a 55-foot beam, and a 5,450-b.h.p. Burmeister & Wain diesel engine. At a draft of 23 feet, she has a speed of 15 knots. The Vytergrales type represents another class of timber carrier. These vessels are Russian-built, single-deck, and singlescrew, and have a 9,600-ton displacement. The engines are diesel with a rated output of 5,200 h.p. at a speed of 14.5 knots. A smaller timber carrier designed for short voyages to Europe is the Keyla class, with a 1,200-ton carrying capacity. These single-deck motor vessels are currently on order with Hungarian shipyards, and 43 of them are scheduled for delivery sometime between 1965 and 1970.
In order to provide transportation for the rapidly developing areas along the northern sea route, the Soviets have developed icebreaker transport vessels. These ships have specially reinforced hulls and bows, and are capable of navigating Arctic waters with minimum use of icebreaker escort. The Amguema is a prototype of a new series of Arctic cargo carriers begun in 1960. These vessels are single-screw, two-decked, and diesel-powered. They are 438 feet in length, 62 feet in beam, and have a speed of 15 knots with a 25-foot draft. They carry a deadweight tonnage of 6,300, and can transport 5,000 tons of general cargo.
The Priboj is the first in a series of ten multifunctional refrigerated transport carriers which are intended principally to aid the Soviet fishing fleet. These ships are designed for the long-range transportation of processed or frozen fish either from the areas of catch at sea or from shore installations. They also are to serve as a supply vessel for fishing trawlers. These refrigerated vessels are 9,500 dwt. tons and have three decks and five holds. With Gotaverken diesel engines, these refrigerated transport carriers can make 17.5 knots. They have a 515-foot length over-all, 70-foot beam, and 24.5-foot draft.
The second most numerous vessel type in the Soviet merchant marine in terms of numbers on order is the tanker. In recent years, through acquisition and industrial expansion, the Soviet Union has developed its oil resources to the point where the Kremlin’s top planners now possess an economic weapon which can be internationally exploited. The Soviet Union has become a major petroleum producer and exporter. By 1960, it had displaced Venezuela from second place in petroleum production and, in 1962, Russia was exporting 33.5 million metric tons of oil to the Free World, a six-fold increase since 1955.
Allen W. Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, foresaw over a decade ago the possibility of the Soviets practicing dumping as a form of economic subversion against the West. He summed up the threat: “ . . . they [the Soviets] will buy anything, trade anything, and dump anything if it advances Communism and helps destroy the influences of the West.”
In 1961, an estimated 200 to 300 million barrels of Russian oil—a small amount as oil exports are measured—were shipped overseas from the Soviet Union and were sold at prices 10 to 20 per cent below that of the world market. The effect was striking: the oil shipments dislodged Western suppliers from long-established markets, won economic footholds for the Russians in neutral and new nations, aided Soviet political and ideological penetration, and obtained the necessary raw materials or industrial and technological equipment required for Russia’s industrial- military expansion.
Russia’s rapidly expanding tanker fleet represents its primary means for moving Soviet oil over the world’s troubled waters. Within the past decade, the Russian tanker fleet has had the fastest rate of growth of any such fleet in the world. Russia has moved from the unlisted category to sixth in the world in number of tankers and ninth in tanker tonnage. Since 1953, the Soviet Union has multiplied the number of its tankers five times and its tanker tonnage over ten times. Soviet tankers now represent approximately 3.7 per cent of the world capacity and 6.2 per cent by number of tank ships. These percentages, moreover, can be expected to escalate rapidly because the Soviet Union now ranks first in the number of tankers on order and fifth in the amount of tonnage on order.
This rapid rate of growth in the Russian tanker fleet has paralleled the increased Soviet production of oil and penetration of the world oil market with Russia’s most marketable commodity. The fleet has been built for the most part in the past ten years, and the average age of a Russian tanker today is less than eight years.
The Soviet tank ship has generally been small in size, the averages being 9,300 dwt. tons in 1953; 13,000 dwt. tons in 1963; and 15,650 dwt. tons on order. By comparison, Liberia with 32,700 dwt. tons per tanker had the largest average tanker tonnage in 1963. The United States in the same year averaged 20,300 dwt. tons per tanker.
The Soviet Union’s ocean-going tanker fleet is composed in large part of the mass-produced Kazbek-class vessel. This type resembles the famous U. S. wartime T-2 design and has been called the “work horse” class of Russian tankers. Construction of these vessels started in Russia in 1951, and it is estimated that 50 or more of them are in operation. Also making up a sizable part of today’s tanker fleet are the Lisichansk type. All 18 vessels of this class, built in Japan, are high quality tankers of 35,000 dwt. tons. These tankers have a draft of 35 feet and are powered by 18,000-h.p. Sulzer-type engines that permit a speed of 17-18 knots when loaded.
As of 1 May 1966, the Soviet Union had 122 tankers of 1.91 million dwt. tons on order or under construction. For ocean routes and between Europe and Far Eastern ports, Russia is building primarily 15,000-to-50,000- ton tankers powered by steam turbines; for coastal navigation and short voyages abroad, primarily diesel-powered tankers of from 1,500 to 4,500 dwt. tons. Four 48,000-dwt.-ton tankers are reportedly being built in Soviet yards, and delivery of these was expected by the end of 1965. According to a recent report, the Soviet Union can now construct super tankers of 100,000 tons displacement, and several of them will be delivered to the fleet in future years. These vessels will be capable of carrying 75,000 tons of cargo.
The Leonardo da Vinci and the Sophia represent two classes of tankers that are rapidly becoming familiar to foreign ports. The Leonardo da Vinci is the lead ship of a series of six 48,000-dwt.-ton vessels constructed in Italy. Sister ships are the Raphael, Giuseppe Verdi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Giordano Bruno, and the Galileo Galilei. These vessels are 745 feet in length, have a 102-foot beam and a draft of 38 feet, and are diesel-powered with a speed of 17 knots. The Russians have called the Sophia class the flagship of the Soviet tanker fleet, and it appears that the Soviet shipbuilding industry is concentrating on construction of tankers of this type. The Sophia class is 756 feet long and has a beam of 102 feet and draft of 38 feet. Because of the reduction of some 14 per cent in the weight of the steel used in construction, the Sophia-class tanker is able to carry 45,800 tons of oil at a speed of 17 knots. Design has stressed mechanization and automation, and the size of the crew has been reduced to 51. The main features of this prototype were determined by the low transportation and operational costs and the possibility of recouping investment speedily. It was remarked in the Naval Engineers Journal that it costs half as much to ship petroleum products in this type of tanker to Cuba, for instance, as it does with the old 10,000-ton tankers.
The Cities class or Pekin class is another prototype tanker, several of which are already operational. These vessels have a 665-foot length over-all, an 85-foot beam, and a 35- foot draft. They displace 31,000 dwt. tons, and are steam-turbine powered, with a speed of 18.5 knots. Built with three separate holds specifically designed to carry both crude oil and various refined petroleum products, vessels of this class have a cargo capacity of 27,000 tons. They can be unloaded within 12 hours. These modern tankers are considered ideal for refueling naval ships and for supplying military bases.
Russia received its first two liquified petroleum gas tankers from Japanese shipyards during 1965 and is now participating in the ocean transportation of liquefied gas cargoes. These vessels, the Kegums and Kraslava, are 2,415 dwt. tons and have a draft of 16 feet and a speed of 13.5 knots. This class of vessel has four dome-shaped tanks down the centerline for carrying liquefied petroleum gas. The over-all length is 317 feet, breadth is 49 feet, and the main engine is a diesel of 2,400 b.h.p. Four additional liquid petroleum gas tankers of 2,000 dwt. tons are under construction in the Soviet Union. These vessels are being used primarily in the Baltic.
The Soviet oil offensive of 1961 demonstrated that the Soviet tanker fleet can be used as an instrument of economic warfare against the West. The Soviet Union’s entry into the Baltic Shipping Exchange during 1965 strengthens the possibility that the Soviet will engage foreign tank ships to carry Russian import-export trade and will use the Russian foreign trade fleet to compete against Free World vessels for Free World oil cargoes. Should the promised Russian trade war follow this pattern, the nations of the West may well regret that they did not at least maintain parity with the rapidly expanding Russian tanker fleet.
The Soviet building spree, centered around dry cargo vessels and tankers, has all but obscured the less spectacular but no less important expansion of the passenger ship segment of the Russian merchant fleet. The Western tendency to overlook Russia as a contender for the world’s passenger trade is natural. Until recently, the Soviet Union’s passenger tonnage was composed largely of former German passenger liners built prior to 1941. These vessels, representing approximately 135,000 tons, have long since disappeared from the major world trade routes. Because of their age, they are restricted almost entirely to the domestic passenger trade along the northern Pacific coast of Russia. Allowed to decline since World War II, the passenger fleet segment of the Soviet merchant marine has only recently shown signs of expansion.
An impressive and tangible example of that expansion was provided the West last April when the 20,000-ton passenger liner Alexander Pushkin arrived at Montreal, Canada, from Leningrad via European ports. Named for the poet, the Pushkin was built in East German shipyards. The scores of visitors who flocked to the Montreal docks to inspect the new Soviet passenger liner found a beautifully streamlined vessel, comfortably outfitted and appointed with a gay decor consisting of much glass, decorative metals, and pastel artwork. On the engineering side, the ship was found to be sturdily built with a specially strengthened bow area for fighting through ice. The vessel, in addition to being able to carry 666 passengers, can also carry 30 automobiles and 1,500 tons of general cargo. Visitors and passengers alike were pleasantly surprised to find that the Pushkin's Soviet masters have even abandoned all pretense of the classless society in offering both first class and tourist accommodations.
Although the Pushkin is one of the newest and most publicized Soviet passenger liners, she operates in respectable, if elderly, company. The largest operational liner in the Soviet passenger fleet is the ex-German Sovetsky Soyuz at 23,500 gross tons. This vessel is 646 feet in length; has a breadth of 72 feet; and can accommodate 1,250 passengers. The ship was built in 1923, sunk during the war, and later raised by the Russians. Most of the other ex-German vessels range from approximately 7,000 to 15,000 gross tons, and all have been thoroughly modernized and rebuilt in East German shipyards.
Other operational prototypes are the Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko (sister ships of the Alexander Pushkin) and the Mikhail Kalinin. The former are 19,000 gross tons 557 feet long, with accommodations for 750 passengers. Three additional vessels of this class are being built in East German yards. The Mikhail Kalinin is a 4,500-gross-ton vessel with accommodations for about 330 passengers. Approximately 20 of these vessels are already in operation. These new vessels, expected to take the place of the older ex- German vessels, show that the Russians regard ocean-going passenger traffic as important to their future plans.
More importantly, the proliferation of the Pushkin and ships like her are part of a conscious plan on the part of the Soviets to collect the hard currency of Western tourists. The Pushkin was, in fact, specifically designed for regular passenger sailings between Leningrad and Montreal via European ports. A sister ship, the Ivan Franko, which began her tourist trade during 1965, is now on a year’s charter with a French vacation enterprise to carry Europeans on low-cost cruises to the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. Still another Soviet passenger liner will take British school children on crusies to the Scandinavian countries. These runs, in addition to their prime mission of collecting hard foreign currency for the Soviet Union are providing powerful advertising for the Moscow brand of Communism.
The arrival on the international scene of ships like the Pushkin, the Franko, and the Shevchenko serve advance notice that the years ahead will be years of stiff competition for Western nations engaged in the international passenger trade. Any champagne corks that pop on board new Soviet liners on their maiden voyages undoubtedly will be to toast the Soviet dream of one day dominating that trade.
The proliferation of Soviet dry cargo ships, tankers, and passenger ships has been stressed as being vital to the accomplishment of the Russian goal of dominating world trade. Yet, the mere fact of the existence of these vessels does not ensure Soviet success in effecting our national burial at sea. ft is rather their employment as exporters of political and economic subversion that poses the real threat of Soviet success in the Cold War.
In the light of current happenings in the Gulf of Tonkin and in the Caribbean, one is reminded of a study entitled “Sea Power and Soviet Designs for Expansion” by Mr. M. H. Hellner,1 printed in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
At that time he said: “The Kremlin’s sea power, like Hitler’s land power, is no less dangerous because it is seemingly unconventional.” He noted that for nearly a decade the Soviets have used their merchant ships to trade on trouble from Guatemala to Dutch
New Guinea, with arms and strategic goods coming out of the hatches, and volunteers and technicians going down the gangplanks in Egypt, Indonesia, Yemen, Algeria, Guiana, Syria, and Iraq. That was written in 1960, but the same observation could be applied to Cuba and Vietnam today.
The pattern described by Mr. Hellner has indeed become familiar. A large merchant marine provides Russia with a built-in capability for exporting economic and political subversion. The sea lanes are free, and Russia can use them by way of its merchant marine to gain footholds with goods or weapons in foreign lands.
Russia’s recent entry into the Baltic Shipping Exchange deserves examination. The Baltic Exchange is a London-based, blue ribbon, European shipowners’ club. The Soviet Union became a member during September 1965. The circumstances of their entry into the club are somewhat less than savory. Victor Bakayev, Minister of the Soviet Merchant Marine, boasted that he had forced the unwilling “high navigation aristocracy” to let him into the Baltic Exchange, which he referred to as a “capitalist fortress.”
Moreover, the Soviets are making no secret of their modus operandi. On 18 November 1965, Bakayev boasted of how he had forced the unwilling Baltic Exchange leadership to let Russia into the Baltic Exchange only after he had boycotted it into suffering “big losses.” Bakayev’s boast proves the dangerous economic power that the Soviet merchant marine wields over the West. The Kremlin’s fleet expansion coupled with its forced entry into the Baltic Exchange places Russia in a position to manipulate ocean freight rates. This is borne out by the 18 October 1965, Maritime Transportation Letter, published by the German Shipowners Association. The newsletter described, in part, some of the details of Soviet bloc rate-cutting by stating that the rates quoted by the shipping companies of the bloc often lie from 25 to 40 per cent below Western Conference rates. With a seat on the Baltic Exchange and the ability to exert influence on world maritime freight rates, how much easier in future years it will be for the Kremlin’s masterminds in Moscow to export with the aid of a powerful merchant fleet political and economic subversion.
In summary, the Russian merchant fleet’s total of more than 1,300 ships now exceeds in number of ships the U. S. privately-owned fleet, but not in deadweight tonnage. By 1980, with between 2,300 and 2,500 Soviet ships, Russian superiority over the active U. S. fleet would be about 50 per cent greater in terms of deadweight tonnage. Moreover, two-thirds of the vessels in the Soviet merchant fleet are less than ten years old. Russia’s massive maritime buildup has not been matched in the West.
The active fleet of the U. S. merchant marine has declined from 2,332 to about 1,000 ships in less than 20 years; it now carries only 13.9 per cent of American export cargo instead of the over 50 per cent carried after World War II. Even when the differences in volume between American and Russian trade are taken into account, there is still an awesome reversal of role and ambition here.
Russia has shown a strong awareness of the value of a vigorous merchant marine. Russia has expanded its merchant fleet more than three-fold in the period 1956-1966 inclusive. This expansion enables the Soviet Union to carry approximately one-half of its own foreign commerce and has permitted the Soviets to use the merchant fleet as a Cold War instrument of economic and political subversion.
The aforementioned 1961 sale of oil on the world market at prices between 10 and 20 per cent below established rates undercut Western suppliers in traditional markets and amounted to a form of economic blackmail. In 1962, the Russian merchant marine made possible the Cuban crisis, thereby exacerbating an already tense international situation.
Should the Soviet Union maintain its present rate of maritime growth, it should be able to transport two-thirds of its oceanborne trade in 1970.
As the Soviet merchant marine continues its rapid expansion, Russian economic and political offensives against the Free World are apt to occur more frequently and become more pronounced. The threat of the Soviet merchant ship as an instrument of decisive military, political, and economic importance is very real and lethal.
1. See M. H. Hellner, “Sea Power and Soviet Designs for Expansion,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1960, pp. 22-32.