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"The Merchant Marine: Subsidies and Competition”
(See pages 70-80, January 1967 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I commend the authors on their historical research. Also, two who can prove Mahan wrong have to be very good! The authors’ arguments, so far as they go, are partially convincing but there are too many points omitted for conviction: Examples:
1. No reference to balance of payments.
2. Ship subsidy money stays at home.
3. 85 per cent of the cost of shipbuilding goes to labor.
4. The Japanese work 60 hours a week and a six-day week (not much chance of our matching that!)
5. The private yards of the United States have spent about $400,000,000 in the last ten years in modernizing their yards. Several compare most favorably with any foreign yards.
6. What about the Russian menace? They are building 641 merchant ships.
The remarkable U. S. economic growth was built up on the principle of “protection!” which was and is a subsidy. Farming, aviation, space, just to mention a few industries, are built on subsidies either direct or indirect. There are many others involving tariff and quotas which are subsidies. My query is, “Why should the U. S. Merchant Marine be left out?”
In 1945, the United States was number one in shipbuilding and number one in shipping. Today it is number eleven in shipbuilding and far down the line in shipping. Also, it is sinking fast in both.
The authors recommend an operating subsidy for merchant shipping required for national defense. Who is to determine that quantity? At the present time it appears to be just one man. To show that his judgment has not been correct, let me quote some recent statements by Rear Admiral Ralph K. James, U. S. Navy (Retired), Executive Director of the Committee of American Steamship Lines (CASL). Admiral James’s association is comprised of 13 subsidized steamship lines with 270 regular scheduled cargoliners in U. S. foreign trade. The CASL lines are operating about 100 ships to Vietnam, including company-owned ships under government charter as well as ships from the aged Reserve Fleet.
"Hundreds of thousands of tons of merchant shipping are being built abroad today by U. S. citizens,” Admiral Land states. Here the Sasebo Heavy Industries in Japan uses modern techniques to build a merchant ship.
Admiral Sadayoshi Nakayama, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired)
“Our government has had instances where foreign-flag ships of allied countries refused to carry cargoes to Vietnam, yet the foreigners are reaping a harvest from our commerical trade routes,” he said. “While American ships are off to war, foreign ships are picking up about 10,000 tons of cargo a month from each of our ships taken off a trade route. They
While apathy toward the U. S. Merchant Marine is directing us on a “rudderless course to nowhere,” the Soviet Union is steaming full speed ahead with a program to become the world’s leading maritime nation. “Once their building program is completed, the ^oviets will have a merchant marine power- ul enough to control world freight rates, take over international commerce and strangle other nations’ shipping fleets unable to compete with them,” Admiral James warned.
are reaping many millions of dollars in revenues from customers in overseas markets— markets that American steamship lines have spent millions of dollars to develop for U. S. businessmen.”
As to the deplorable state of the American Merchant Marine, Admiral James said about 85 per cent of the 900-ship active, privately owned merchant fleet is 20 or more years old. The 1,500-ship reserve fleet is comprised mostly of World War II ships. “It’s like trying to get a Model-T to do a Mustang’s job,” he noted. “In spite of the facts, Secretary of Defense McNamara has steadfastly maintained m the past four years that the present merchant marine is adequate; that planes are the answer in moving troops to troubled spots around the world. But what has happened? The Department of Defense has reported that two out of three combat personnel are arriving in Vietnam by ship.” There can be more Vietnams in the future, Admiral James said, quoting a McNamara statement that reveals that 164 internationally significant outbreaks °f violence have occurred in the last eight years.
One large missing link in the article relates t° building U. S. ships abroad. Millions of tons of merchant shipping have been built u road by U. S. citizens in the years past.
undreds of thousands of tons of merchant ® TPing are being built abroad today by • ■ citizens. What are the results? The U. S. erchant Marine is at the bottom of “the otem pole” and is climbing no higher.
am well aware that these ships built road are not eligible for subsidy or for the °astal or intercoastal trade—nevertheless,
they have been and are being built abroad with results in no way proving the objectives claimed by the authors.
There has been considerable comment recently comparing the automobile business and the aviation business with the shipbuilding business. From a quality point of view this comparison may be reasonable. From a quantity point of view, it appears far less logical and far less reasonable. It seems difficult to make a logical comparison with millions of automobiles and thousands of aircraft with the 39 ships built in the United States in 1966.
I wish I had the optimism the authors outline in the labor-management unity field. With a two months’ strike in West Coast shipyards, a tugboat strike in Baltimore of equal duration, a tugboat strike in New York just settled, and a wild-cat strike by longshoremen in New York, not to mention the great row over where the Maritime Administration belongs in the U. S. government set-up—I find myself more confused than hopeful?
★ ★ ★
Collateral Duty: CCO
Commander J. W. Henderson, SC, U. S. Navy The USS Northampton’s (CC-1) ex
ecutive officer decided that something different was needed to inculcate his officers with an adequate knowledge of, and an inclination to observe, the customs, etiquette and standards of deportment expected of the “Compleat Wardroom Officer.” A wealth of written word, from The Naval Officer’s Guide and Amy Vanderbilt to Service Etiquette and a Northampton Instruction, left a gap, despite the assignment of required reading supplemented by the “fatherly advice” from more senior officers in response to junior officers’ questions. It seemed the meaning of the classic John Paul Jones quotation, “It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner ... ”, was being lost in the reading, while the “gentleman’s club” standard as established in Lovette1 had been overtaken by the fact that few present-day
1 Leland P. Lovette, Naval Customs, Traditions and Usage. (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1959.) naval officers are affluent enough to enjoy the personal experience of membership in such a club.
The executive officer decided that an “All Officers Lecture” might help and the supply officer was volunteered as the lecturer. In an effort to keep his recitation of “do’s” and “don’ts” from striking so close that they might be taken as personal criticism by the audience, he kept the general mood of the presentation lighthearted and included a few farfetched items, such as a plea for accuracy when using the spittoon!
Billed as a “Wardroom Orientation,” the talk was whimsically titled “The Vice Admiral Leland P. Lovette Lecture” in recognition of that gentleman’s pre-eminence as an authority. In content, the talk ranged from the manual of the toothpick and the hierarchy of seating at the evening movie, to the ground rules for the leaving of calling cards and the host’s responsibilities when he has lady guests aboard for dinner (e.g., discreetly check in advance when guests wish to use the powder room—the same space also serves as the shower for senior officers!).
The talk was received in the constructive spirit in which it was intended. The supply officer was pleasantly surprised to receive a few expressions of appreciation.
Army and Air Force officers, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Team embarked in the Northampton, were especially interested and grateful. And because it did appear to produce some beneficial results, it was repeated once or twice a year.
It wasn’t long before the supply officer heard that the ship’s junior officers had awarded him the designation of “C.C.O.”— Couth Control Officer. In an effort to respond to this accolade, he, in turn, proposed a new motto for Northampton's, wardroom, “couth, Kempt, and Shevilled!” but fortunately that
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
earth-shaker never got off the ground. So, gathering his finger bowls and calling cards, the C.C.O. folded his tablecloth and silently stole away, leaving in his wake a happier Exec, and a more polished wardroom!
"SS Naess Voyager—Flag of Convenience Ship”
(See pages 157-159, October 1966 Proceedings)
Neil H. Lambert, Second Officer in the SS Nashua Victory—With reference to Admiral Hayes’s apologia for the so-called flag-of-con- venience ships, his statement shows that the so-called benefits from these ships accrue entirely to the owners of these vessels. It has never been proven that these vessels will be available if and when needed. History does show that when times of stress come and there is danger of losing some of the benefits, there is a concerted rush to get these ships under the U. S. flag to gain protection and insurance coverage.
The Naess Voyager can easily be duplicated by many ships under the U. S. flag. Victory Carriers, Inc., of New York City has four tankers of the same size, equally efficient and always available to the U. S. government. At least two of the Victory Carrier fleet are now under charter to the Navy on the Persian Gulf-Japan shuttle. There has never been an instance where an American crew has refused to carry cargo to Vietnam, but there have been numerous refusals by foreign flag crews.
In considering the welfare of the United States as a whole, probably the most important factor is the avoidance by these companies of U. S. taxes. Not only do the ships fail to pay the ordinary taxes on the vessels, but even more important is the fact that the companies receive profits from these ships free and clear. These profits can be spent in any way desired without paying taxes, unless the profits are transferred back to the parent corporation in the United States. And, of course, the crew members do not pay any U. S. taxes, while American flag crews pay their share. It has been proven that over 70 per cent of the wages paid to U. S. crews remains within the frame of the American economy, while over 70 per cent of the wages paid to foreign seamen leaves this country.
The comparison that Admiral Hayes makes with an American merchant vessel is wrong and cannot be cited as typical. At most, only one company still operates Victory ships under subsidy programs. That company is rapidly phasing out its older ships and soon will have its new fleet of modern cargo ships. They are equally well run, and their crews are equally efficient. Any of the American dry cargo companies such as U. S. Lines, Grace, or American President Lines would be happy to give the Admiral a tour of their efficient new cargo ships. Many of these ships have been actively engaged in the sealift to Vietnam. And there are equally comfortable American-flag tankers that would be happy to have Admiral Hayes for a coastwise voyage, and he will find that these vessels are a credit to this country.
His description of the crew of the “typical” Victory ship is absolutely incorrect. I will gladly donate $100.00 to any Navy charity fund, if he can furnish two certified crew lists of American-flag vessels that have a crew as elderly as he describes. True, we do have many middle-aged men among the crews. Many are Navy, Army, and Air Force veterans, who are spending their retirement years using skills they developed in the Armed Forces. Many U. S. seamen are foreign born, but so are many members of the Armed Forces or any other segment of the U. S. Population. The main fact is that they have become American citizens and do serve their country in these ships and by their taxes help ^upport the government and the economy.
hey will be here in time of trouble. These are flag-of-convenience ships for the owner, ut certainly not for the United States.
★ ★ ★
(R^ar ^m*ra^ JOHN D. Hayes, U. S. Navy etlrec0—My article was not an apologia for t e American Committee of Flags of Necessity t onvenience) but simply a report on one ? T; to inform officers of the U. S. Navy who uow so little about what “flag of conve-
wifl106 anC* < effectlve U. S. control” means. I 1 agree with you that American ships are e most efficiently run and safest on the seas. ^ °reover, the U. S. maritime unions have im- roved the lot of seamen everywhere. But
havCriCanS not §° to sea—fbey don’t e to. And this is why the age of American
ships is going up. This has been confirmed by Helen D. Bentley, the well known maritime editor of the Baltimore Sun, now in Saigon.
The flag of convenience has many faults. But I am certainly happy that at least 40 per cent of the ships that bring in our vital cargoes of oil and ores are American owned, even if it be impossible that they are American manned or fly the American flag.
"Those First Impressions”
(See pages 104-105 January 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander H. E. Smetheram, U. S. Navy—The present system of mess cooking needs a thorough re-evaluation with some appropriate action taken. Even though new recruits reporting aboard their first ship are not to be assigned as mess cooks during their first few months on board, this requirement is oftentimes not adhered to very strictly. And all too often division officers have a tendency to send their problem children to mess cooking duties. The result is that we have a group of dispirited men performing chores in the mess decks. Since the job itself is temporary, not glamorous, and no tangible goal to achieve something better is available, the mess decks suffer from work that is generally not the best a man is capable of performing.
Positive action must be taken to improve these conditions. Food service must be made more attractive. Rewards in the form of promotion, and better and more responsible jobs should be available as a goal to men assigned to the mess decks. Food service personnel should be awarded the opportunity to advance in rate to cook or to associated rates. As a further step, we should establish a food service rating. Another possibility is to open the way for mess cooks to aim for the job of mess decks master-at-arms or that of jack-of- the-dust.
The concept of temporary mess cooks with nothing to look forward to but the completion of their tour means that our mess decks will continue to suffer from uninspired efforts and general inattention by the personnel charged with making the mess decks a habitable dining area. An advance is required from this old concept which tends to be self-defeating. It is hoped that those ships which are experimenting with permanent and voluntary food service personnel can establish a workable and meaningful system and thus influence a decision to incorporate this system into an official program for all Navy ships.
"Damage Control—Ready or Not”
(See pages 33-39, January 1967 Proceedings)
Robert L. Bridges—There is insufficient emphasis on damage control. The flash fires and explosions on our carriers caused by the welder’s torch gives us food for thought. I believe that all Damage Control men should be given refresher courses frequently. In civilian life, the volunteer fireman must go to a fire school for six weeks, city firemen for two months. How many weeks of fire fighting does a DC man get?
It is too late when the ship is in some great emergency to train DC men. It must be a constant part of day by day drill to become a part of the very life and thoughts of the crew.
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Commander Frank T. Nemits, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—Having been a Damage Control Assistant during the early 1950s, it is indeed discouraging to note that so little progress has been made in recognizing the problems, and more importantly, in doing something about them.
Commander Nemits suggests that "changes in shipboard organizations” and that the Navy "work toward a meaningful solution” to give damage control its proper emphases. Off Vietnam, crewmen of the aircraft carrier Oriskany battle a blaze.
Commander Simon not only pinpoints the needs in very direct style, but also states several concrete suggestions for their solution.
I feel certain that most officers will not disagree with the basic problem. Changes in shipboard organizations in this area are long overdue, and I would like to add my voice to that of Commander Simon urging the appropriate departments of the naval establishment to work toward a meaningful solution.
"The Career Dilemma of the Naval Reserve Surface Line Officer”
(See pages 50-55 January 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander P. W. Garber, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—The reserve counseling boards and selection boards ought to agree on criteria for Reserve officer participation in drilling units. Too often the realities of the Reserve officer’s situation are overlooked. I refer to only two problem areas, but there are certainly more.
Unless some effective detailing mechanism can be provided, either at the group commander or commandant level, there is little impetus for an officer in a pay billet to move out, especially where the availability of billets in the lieutenant commander and commander ranks makes the active Navy pyramid look squat by comparison, and where the officer must do his own legwork against a prevalent
(See pages 118-119, February 1967 Proceedings)
uie who would have preferred a different type °f shore assignment utilizing their subspecialty, one that perhaps would be more operationally oriented. On the other hand, I have encountered an equal number of officers who ave a strong desire to make education their
and understandable “let’s-take-care-of-our- own” attitude.
The great problem of the Geographical Imperative operates in deadly fashion against the Reserve officer. Even if a billet is available, it may require him to make a weekly round trip of hundreds of miles, at great expense. He gets no dislocation allowance or quarters at the new duty station.
The citizen-sailor is primarily a citizen. Unless the Navy is prepared to do without his services entirely, some consideration must be given to him. It is easy to forget that the demands upon the truly able people tend to increase with time, so that the best Reserve officers are more than likely to be unable to spare time for long trips to training centers. The probable, indeed predictable, result is that the second rate people will be the only ones who can stay the course.
It seems to me that a first step is to provide some mechanism whereby a Reserve officer to be rotated from a billet can be assured of fair and rational treatment. I see no inherent vice in an officer staying in a particular unit for years on end, provided that the unit has a vital training curriculum and requires the officer to qualify for naval officer billet codes for his own and higher ranks. Combined with the most flexible and varied active duty for training, the problem of geography may be partially overcome.
But it is about time that the basic differences between Regular and Reserve realities were taken into consideration, primarily for the Benefit of the Navy.
Professional Officer Educators”
Lieutenant T. C. Grzymala, U. S. Navy- It is my hope that further study of the profe sional officer educator will be made by tho: w the personnel management branch of tf
While serving in an education-oriente Billet, I have seen several officers serving wil specialty, augmenting their teaching assignments with summer duty billets as Lieutenant Commander Cummings suggests.
Teaching to many is an extremely rewarding career. By enabling an officer to be an educator, the Navy would certainly profit by having a dedicated individual filling an instructor’s billet. On the other hand, the individual concerned would be realizing his true ambition. For the Navy and the officer, such a career would best use time and talent.
By establishing an officer corps of education specialists, those unrestricted line officers who are now assigned to teaching positions that they do not especially desire, would become available to fill the many other positions in the naval establishment.
This concept is worth noting especially in view of the low personnel levels in the aviation, surface, and submarine officer communities. In addition, the number of resignations submitted by officers who leave the Navy to become civilian educators would decrease substantially if they had the opportunity to be educators in uniform.
Lieutenant Commander Cummings has presented an excellent suggestion in his article and, as he states, “further study of this matter is warranted.”
"The North Sea”
(See pages 20-32, January 1967 Proceedings)
Anthony Harrigan, military correspondent, the News and Courier, Charleston, S. C.—- Rear Admiral W. Langeraar, Royal Netherlands Navy, performed a valuable service in focusing attention on the problem of national sovereignty over parts of the sea bottom. The technology of wet mining and drilling, as he indicated, is developing at a rapid rate whereas legal concepts governing national control of portions of the ocean floor are moving forward at a snail’s pace. As the Admiral explained, the situation may be out of control before an international agreement has been reached on questions of sovereignty. The United States, as the leader in undersea technology and submarine development, should pioneer in developing legal concepts that add to the security of the American people. Failure to assert American rights to submerged lands as well as inadequate development of a legal framework for our national claims, could result in a hurtful situation for the United States.
One task for the United States is to make a clear distinction between historic freedom of the seas and the matter of sovereign rights to the sea bed. The high seas must remain as highways for ocean commerce, but the undersea areas are territory which will be opened for use and economic development.
Some observers may conclude that undersea boundaries cannot be determined and that attempts to draw national lines on the ocean floor will create political havoc. This attitude is defeatist. Indeed, undersea boundaries along national lines seem inevitable on many parts of the sea bed beyond the continental shelf. Without boundaries, all would be chaos and strife in areas of mining and drilling. It is very disturbing to consider what would happen if, in the years ahead, the Soviets endeavored to conduct oil drilling operations in the Caribbean not far from U. S. territory.
The crucial question in undersea border matters is what principles would govern in the division of the sea bed. Perhaps the most logical approach would be employment of the sector system, which has been devised for Arctic ice jurisdictions.
The argument already has been advanced that submarine lands should be under international control. Yet the practical difficulties in the way of such a system seem to render the theory untenable. It is virtually impossible to envision multiple and simultaneous use of submerged lands in the Mediterranean by the complex of antagonistic states along the rim of that sea. There is also the basic legitimacy of national claims to the adjacent sea bed. In 1945, the United States laid down the principle that the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf contiguous to the United States are subject to its jurisdiction and control. If new deepdiving submarines and new mining and drilling techniques enable the United States to gain access to the sea bed at far greater depths than are found on the continental shelf, then it follows that the United States should also extend its jurisdiction and control to these more deeply submerged lands.
As the United States has an immensely long sea frontier, it has a vital stake in developing a legal doctrine that will give it sovereign rights over adjacent submerged territories. President Harry S. Truman, in his continental shelf declaration, charted the way. In the 22 years since he made that declaration, means have been created to reach into deeper waters than our statesmen of the 1940s ever imagined possible. A follow-up to the Truman declaration is now in order.
★ ★ ★
Dr. F. K. DeVos—While Admiral Lan- geraar’s article on the North Sea deserves commendation, the uncommitted reader does get the impression that he has not quite succeeded in countering point for point the four justifications advanced by Stahmers Oil Information Service, in favor of a boundary that would be more generous to Western Germany than the one produced by means of the simple median line principle.
Specifically, although he shows the Dutch and German coastlines to be in a ratio of “nearly 400 kilometers” to 310 kilometers, Admiral Langeraar fails to proceed to the next logical step and to compare this ratio to the 62,000:22,000 sq. km. ratio of continental shelf ownership proposed under the equidistance principle.
Secondly, while confirming that “the waters over the shelf are part of the high seas and not subject to sovereignty,” he fails to relate this valid statement to his subsequent description of the virtual easements. In other words, those countries using and requiring these waters for the traditionally primary purpose of navigation cannot claim them because they are “not subject to sovereignty,” but those wishing to exploit the bed under these waters may clutter up the shipping lanes with drilling structures?
Finally, Admiral Langeraar fails to justify his arbitrary choice of population density as “the only suitable parameter” and yet, even if such a choice were justified, again he is content to rest his case solely on the absolute superiority of the 379 Dutch over the 219 West Germans per square kilometer.
Unless the North Sea states can agree to guarantee unobstructed navigation along the normal main deepwater tracks to German and other North Sea ports in perpetuity, the state having a concave coast (in this particular case West Germany) should perhaps be offered some kind of compensation for the probable impairment of its navigational rights that will result.
The compensation could take place along two lines of practical approach, based essentially on a compromise between the medianline principle and the sector principle. The two proposed techniques, incidentally, could be applied equally effectively to any other marine boundary problem in the world such as may well arise eventually in the Arctic Ocean, if and when technology improves sufficiently to allow deeper seabed exploitation than is now feasible.
The present equidistance principle could be maintained unchanged as between “States whose coasts are opposite each other” as well as between adjacent states, provided the resulting boundary lines between the adjacent states end at a boundary line with a state whose coast is opposite. Examples of the latter are France and Belgium and Holland; Norway and Denmark.
However, in cases where as a result of peculiar headland configurations, two non-adjacent states would prevent an enclosed mutually adjacent state from touching the boundary of a state with an opposite coast (in this case, either the United Kingdom or Norway). It is obvious that these examples are merely illustrations of the principles involved and that details would have to be worked out in negotiations between pairs of adjacent states:
1 • Straight lines could be drawn from certain Points offshore on the median line boundaries to the point where Dutch, Danish, and British ownership boundaries meet; or
2. Curved lines could be drawn either between the same points, or between the territorial waters limit on the median lines and the Dutch, Danish, and British intersection.
As even a quick glance at a map of the Arctic Sea will clearly show, the simple “median line principle” would heavily favor the U.S.S.R. and Canada at the expense of the United States in that area. Indeed, the solutions proposed would appear to point the way to a sensible compromise between two opposite extremes: the median line system and the system based on sectors converging at the North Pole.
The Rambler
(See cover and page 3, October 1966 Proceedings, and page 97, January 1967 Proceedings)
Howard I. Chapelle, Curator, Division of Transportation, Smithsonian Institution.— The comment on the painting of the Boston letter-of-marque Rambler again brings up the confusing brigantine-hermaphrodite argument. I have recently completed a study that dealt with this debate.
The original brigantine rig was apparently developed in England. So far as pictures go, the rig is often shown in drawings of Royal Navy sloops of war, 1720 to 1750, in which there were two masts, the fore rigged square to at least topgallants and the mainmast with a boomed gaff mainsail. The pictures of this class that I have seen do not show a main gaff topsail but do show a main topmast, so I think they had such sails. This is the classic brigantine rig of modern times—two-masted, square-rigged on fore, fore-and-aft on mainmast, and this is not an hermaphrodite.
The brigantine went through a development during the last half of the 18th century. In this period, brigantines carried square sails on the main topmast and topgallant mast, and royals on both masts were occasionally seen. Now the brigantine was a brig except for one thing—the mainmast of a brigantine was long and no square mainsail or “main course” was set when main square sails were being used.
What was the brig? The word brig was an abbreviation of brigantine in the mid-1700s, but became recognized as a rig when main courses were employed in the Royal Navy brigantines after the Revolutionary War. In one case, at least, this resulted in two main yards—a spread yard and a cross-jack being in use on the mainmast; the spread yard spread the foot of the topsail while the crossjack spread the head of the square course. The purpose of this complication was to allow the yards to come to deck without having to lower the spanker.
The next step was to add the snow’s trysail mast to the mainmast of the brig and to shorten the lower mainmast. In this stage of development, nearly all naval full-rigged brigs were, in fact, snows. But early in the 1800s, brigs had grown to such size that it was no
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longer practical to raise and lower the heavy lower yards, so these were fixed aloft as in ships and the main trysail mast was removed— the result being the modern brig rig having course, topsail, topgallant, royal, and occasionally a skysail on both fore and main masts. In the 1840s, American brigs set a loosefooted fore gaff sail, often on a trysail mast on the fore—producing an hermaphrodite!
But before we go farther with this new rig, let’s take a look at the schooner rig. The two- topsail, or fore-and-main-topsail schooner came into existence somewhere about 1730, and was part of the American contribution to the development of the schooner rig to make it suitable for offshore work. The fore-topsail schooner, with topsail and topgallant on the fore, was the first step in this. The schooner was distinguished by her long lower masts. Hence, courses had to be excessively deep so that they could not be furled aloft, and therefore the sail had to be rigged to furl on deck, and this was true of both the single topsail and fore-and-main-topsail rigs. The schooner rig is described in my History of the American Sailing
Navy, pages 326-330, in detail and so need not be repeated here.
Sometime between 1800-1810, a new rig developed. In this, the original brigantine rig, with short lower foremast was the basis of design, with square sails, from course to royals on the foremast and, also a loose-footed fore gaffsailwas set, schooner fashion. About 1830, the foremast was also fitted with a trysail mast snow fashion, for the fore gaff sail, then becoming known as the “spencer.” The mainmast of the new rig had a large boomed gaff mainsail, or spanker, and a gaff topsail with, in some vessels, a square topgallant sail, having topsail and topgallant yards for the purpose. See the Neufchatel. The mainmast was long, schooner-fashion, or modern brigantine fashion. Now we have the hermaphrodite.
For a purist in nautical language, there could be no “hermaphrodite brig” nor “hermaphrodite schooner,” since the hermaphrodite was neither one nor the other, though of the same species or family of rigs.
The rig name seems to be a British atrocity. At any rate, in 1815-16 the Americans called a hermaphrodite such as the USS Prometheus a “brig,” but the British captors of the Prince de Neufchatel called her an “hermaphrodite” in their reports. The Prometheus’’ rig can be seen on plate X in my History of the American Sailing Navy and the rig of the Prince de Neufchatel on page 147, The History of American Sailing Ships. One thing is certain, the various authorities who confuse brigantine and hermaphrodite rigs are wrong. The half-schooner or halfbrig, the Jackass brig and cutter-brig that one sees mentioned are still matters of argument and doubt.
So far as the painting of the Rambler is concerned, there seems to me to be only one notable error. She is shown close-reaching in light weather with her mainsail tack partly triced up and is backing her squaresails to stop or slow her to pick up from, or discharge into, a boat alongside. The error is that the lee leg of her mainstay is set up, and even if this were set up well outboard in the bows, the fore gaffsail would not stand properly, I think. Pictures of hermaphrodites show that the lee leg was brought aft and secured to the foot of the mainmast, rather than merely allowed to stand slack, so far as I can determine.
The gaff-headed fore topsail I have seen in one drawing, but the gaff-headed main gaff topsail was not unusual. The French hermaphrodite La Gazelle is shown in the plate facing page 143 of The History of American Sailing Ships. She was designed on American ideas by Marestier and is shown with the weather leg of the mainstay set up, the lee one apparently brought to the mainmast.
The slaver, Dos Amigos, shown in plate VIA. page 162, The History of American Sailing Ships, might be called an hermaphrodite by most people but to me she is a fore-and-main-top- sail schooner! Why? Because her lower masts are so long (particularly her foremast), schooner-fashion.
I trust this information will settle the matter, with uniform and utter confusion for all.
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Ensign C. R. Pellett, U. S. Naval Reserve—I agree with Lieutenant Commander Hodges that the Rambler is not a brig. She is another of the many versions of the topsail schooner. I do not, however, agree that she could not have been rigged as shown. The rig shown in the painting is very similar to that of the schooner Prince De Neufchatel. The sail plan of this ship is shown in The History of American Sailing Ships by Howard I. Chapelle and was reproduced in the July 1963 Proceedings.
If one removes the Prince De Neufchatel'% main royal and substitutes her main-topmast staysail for the gaff topsail on the Rambler's foremast, the two ships are rigged exactly the same. The Baltimore Clipper by Chapelle also shows original sail plans of ships that are similarly rigged. Many of the later full-rigged ships also carried fore and aft gaff-rigged sails called spencers” on their fully square-rigged fore and main masts.
Admiral Makarov: Attack! Attack! Attack!”
(See pages 57-67, July 1965, and pages 119-120, e ruary 1967 Proceedings)
Captain R. T. Sutherland, Jr., U. S. wavy (Retired)—Dr. Mitchell, Admiral esche, and Commander Podhorsky, are entirely ^correct in their statements that the erm popovka” was in use prior to Livadia and the 1880s.
A ElE' ^ouHeff, then a Lieutenant of Naval rc itects, Imperial Russian Navy, read his
paper, “On Circular Ironclads,” before the Institution of Naval Architects on 6 April 1876. The closing paragraph reads (italics mine):
“Such ships, then—I mean those with slightly elongated bow and stern—could no longer be called ‘circular ironclads,’ nor would the name of ‘cyclads,’ or any other such term, be any longer available, but that of ‘popov- kas,’ which name was graciously given to this class of vessels by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.”
A possible interpretation of the quotation is that only very broad ships with elongated bow and stern are popovkas. However, if that was GoulaefTs intent, it must be conceded that he violated the definition several times earlier in the paper, by referring to the circular ironclads as popovkas. May I plead nolo contendrel
Several individuals, now interested in popovka material for a variety of reasons, will appreciate learning of the additional references cited by Admiral Wesche and Commander Podhorsky.
"Postgraduate Education and Promotion”
(See pages 56-61. January 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant A. H. Robbins, U. S. Navy— The article totally ignores the effects of commissioning and education programs (NAVCAD, OCS, integration, augmentation, five term, and the “V” programs) on the education level of the various year groups. As of now, Navy policy requires all entering line officers to possess a bachelor’s degree.
For years, postgraduate education has been given the hard sell to obtain sufficient candidates. This year people were selected who had indicated no previous interest in postgraduate school.
Postgraduate training first became available for senior lieutenants. Consequently the one, two, or three years’ education represented blank fitness reports for the promotion boards trying to select the best qualified man. Under the new method, most officers are being selected while still quite junior and promotion is virtually automatic.
Referring to the 1 January 1966 Navy Register, I investigated the two ends of the spectrum emphasized by the authors. The table below indicates where the senior officers (U. S. Naval Academy graduates only), who have advanced degrees, may be found.
Although promotion through lieutenant is virtually automatic, the second table below is included because it disagrees strongly with the article. At least 28 per cent, 21 per cent, and 62 per cent of line ensigns, lieutenants junior grade, and lieutenants respectively received not only their advanced education but also their bachelor’s degrees at Navy expense. These percentages will increase for the following reasons: (1) Change of NESEP, in 1961, to a full four-year program. (The result already shows in the ENS and LTJG columns.) (2) New Navy emphasis on formal education. (3) Postgraduate school selection coincident with first shore duty tour. (4) In-service G.I. Bill availability.
The Register does not indicate the original source of augmented officers. If one were sufficiently interested, it would be possible to compare an older issue with the 1966 Navy Register to determine the original source and whether the degree was obtained in the interim.
RESTRICTED LINE AND STAFF CORP NAVAL ACADEMY GRADUATES HOLDING ADVANCED DEGREES (MASTERS AND DOCTORS)
Grade | EDO AEDO CEC | Crypto SDO | Supply Total | |||
RADM | 12 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
CAPT | 74 | 37 | 18 | 1 | 34 | 174 |
CDR | 129 | 57 | 53 | 3 | 68 | 310 |
LCDR | 107 | 22 | 25 | 4 | 41 | 199 |
Totals | 322 | 122 | 100 | 8 | 143 | 705 |
JUNIOR LINE OFFICERS HOLDING ADVANCED DEGREES
All Others
Grade | USNA | NROTC | NESEP | (Including Augmentation) |
ENS | 0 | 4 | 30 | 87 |
LTJG | 2 | 14 | 15 | 144 |
LT | 95 | 84 | 3 | 117 |
LT (doctorate) 8 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
"Hitler’s Flattop—The End of the Beginning”
(See pages 41-49, January 1967 Proceedings)
Commander E. E. Wilson, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Doctor Clark G. Reynolds’ timely article on Nazi Germany’s lubberly approach to naval aviation adds a new chapter to the history of the aircraft carrier. At the same time, it re-emphasizes the ever present complications which are induced by government over-centralization.
An apt illustration of the consequences of over-centralization, and the benefits of diversification, is available in a Proceedings article by Captain Donald Macintyre, Royal Navy.* Speaking as an eyewitness, he ascribed the swift decline of Great Britain as a world power and the coincident rapid rise of the United States to that status, to the fact that whereas Great Britain had over-centralized British air power, the United States had diversified American air power.
Historically, the Japanese likewise avoided the British error. Had the U. S. Navy relinquished control over its air arm in 1925, Japan might well have succeeded in her drive for command of the sea, conquest of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and, indeed, world-wide pre-eminence.
Hence, Captain Macintyre was on firm ground when he declared that those Americans who, during the 1920s had refused to centralize their air power in a single independent department of defense, “may have saved the free world.” As a result, Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, upon undertaking to create a viable Department of Defense, was able to co-ordinate military aviation without centralizing commercial aviation, thereby diversifying the art.
Doctor Reynolds’ paper points up the naturally diverse viewpoints which divide the military thinking of continental land- powers as distinguished from that of maritime powers. As Admiral Alfred T. Mahan has pointed out, maritime doctrine is determined by such basic principles as “geographic position”; “character of populations”; “character of governments”; and other distinctive
* See Donald Macintyre, “Point of No Return,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1964, pp. 36-43.
traits of maritime commerce and industry.
From the foregoing, it seems clear that Doctor Reynolds has paved the way for philosophical studies of such principles as govern not only communication by land, sea, and air, but also under the sea and in outer space, wherein, as yet, no rule of law prevails. For, freedom under law, the basic principle of maritime doctrine, is actually a principle of co-existence throughout the universe which must govern humanity if mankind is to survive in the space age.
Application of this principle throughout all media of communication and transportation is a task for philosophers. And this task, as Professor Charles E. Lucke, of Columbia University pointed out to his Navy Postgraduate Class of 1915, is one of “Engineering the Flumanities.”
"A New Course for the NROTC”
(See pages 80-84, February 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (jg) Alexander Monroe, U. S. Naval Reserve-R.—As a 1964 NROTC contract graduate of the University of Virginia, and currently a law student, I maintain my Reserve status. I cannot agree with Ensign Popp’s thesis that an NROTC degree is diluted.” I encountered no difficulty in gaining admission to a good law school. The dean explained that he was quite anxious to admit men who had served their country as officers, Particularly in the Navy.
The beginnings of any course of study leading to the practice of a learned profession can be unappealing and are often drudgery. I experience this phenomenon every day at law school.
If anything, the scope of the naval orientation course should be broadened to provide more instruction in seamanship, so that the nomenclature so peculiar to ships is not an u“er mystery to the newly commissioned officer. Mastery of flashing light and semaphore should be mandatory.
Rather than include a course in meteorol- °gy or oceanography, the current weapons program should be altered so that it would Present a more intensive treatment of the * avy s operational missile systems. I have alWays felt that my training in navigation and use of the maneuvering board was entirely adequate, and that the problems were workable enough to make the practical course that Ensign Bopp suggests unnecessary. However, I do think that films, showing the use of the B-2 tactical trainer, would be useful.
The Navy also ought to make an effort to solve the “psychology problem.” At my own university, students in the college of arts and sciences were forced to pursue a year-long course in psychology to satisfy the Navy’s requirement of a one-semester course prior to the fourth year. For some of us, this worked a hardship, since we could not take upper class subjects in which we might be contemplating a major.
In my opinion, the Engineering Course should remain unchanged. There are many of us, and as an English major I was one, for whom a “nuts-and-bolts” course was a good solution.
Finally, the basic issue that Mr. Bopp presented at the opening is the veiled suggestion that the Navy should climb on the “scholarship” bandwagon. I feel that the Navy acts as more than a competitor in the academic market place. It offers educational assistance and a way of life that includes the privilege of serving one’s country.
January 1967 Cover
Captain J. A. Baldridge, U.S. Navy—For many years, the U. S. Navy specified modified forms of the Napoleonic Eagle in the devices and insignia used to distinguish the various ranks and ratings of the officers and enlisted men. This eagle in its several forms usually was cast, stamped or embroidered looking or facing left, that is to say, to its own left, and the same practice was followed in the Navy. Why the Napoleonic Eagle faced to the left or why our own naval insignia followed the same rule is not known.
According to heraldic rules, an eagle should face right toward the wearer’s sword arm or if worn on the sleeve or collar or shoulder, to the front—in other words, always towards the enemy. Since 1941, the U. S. Navy eagle has faced dexter (right) instead of sinister (left) as heretofore.
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