On a map, the North Sea gives the impression of being a relatively small and sheltered area of water, extending from 51° to approximately 60° North, lying mainly in the lee of Great Britain against the westerly gales. Notwithstanding its northerly latitude, its waters never freeze in winter because of the influence of the Gulf Stream. Moreover, the North Sea is comparatively shallow, with depths not exceeding 80 fathoms, except close to the Norwegian coast. Its whole area is bounded by highly industrialized countries some of which boast of having the largest ports and dockyards in the world.
All this, together with promising geological structures beneath and the intensive interest sparked by the discovery of Holland’s young Slochteren gas field having at least 1,100,000 or more cubic meters of natural gas, makes the North Sea one of the hottest spots on earth, and quite obviously an ideal place for offshore drilling. The feverish activities of the many license holders who have started offshore exploration add to an already long, troubled, and tumultuous history of the North Sea, carrier of the densest maritime traffic in the world for centuries.
This history started when at the end of the last ice age the glaciers gradually melted, leaving behind enormous dumps of sand, boulders, and clay inexorably transported by the ice from north to south over countless centuries. A large part of this sand and clay desert was slowly encroached upon by the rising sea level. What is now called the English Channel was formed, and rather strong tidal currents were thereby introduced into the North Sea in statu nascendi.
But nature also worked in other ways. The rivers Rhine, Maas, and Scheldt transported enormous amounts of melting ice and rain- water from the Alps and the higher parts of Germany and France to the young North Sea and, with other debris, formed a large delta, later to be called the Netherlands. The combined influence of wind and tide closed this delta at the seashore with a gently curved wall of sand dunes leaving a number of gaps through which the river water could flow into the sea. From time to time this dune line was attacked by the sea under the influence of gale force winds. This is how the gaps in the dunes were widened and how, gradually, the low coasts from France to Denmark were formed and moulded by tidal action, wind erosion, and storm floods. (See Figure 1.)
There are some indications that from approximately the 10th to the 14th century the climate in Northern Europe was warmer than before or after that period. This was the time when Leif Erickson discovered the waste of land, now ice covered, that he named “Greenland.” This is also the time when the North Sea made havoc of the low lying countries and formed the Zuyder Zee and the large estuaries in the south of the Netherlands. These storm surges, one of which was called the “St. Elizabeth flood,” caused the destruction of many townships, ravaged or inundated much arable land, and drowned thousands of people. The building of dikes against the floods also dates back to this period. At present, about two-thirds of the Netherlands lies below sea level and is protected against the floods by dikes and against flooding by more than 2,000 pumping units that replaced the windmills, of which some dozens are left and preserved for posterity. More than 800 locks, sluices, and weirs regulate the water level in the Netherlands and at the same time make possible an intensive inland water traffic as well as maritime traffic.
The coat of arms of the province of Zeeland shows a heraldic lion with the lower part covered by water, bearing the motto: Luc tor et Emergo (I struggle and emerge). It is clear that their thousand-year struggle with the forces of the sea made the inhabitants of the Low Countries familiar not only with the peculiarities but also with the tremendous possibilities of the sea early in history. In a country in which the cheapest and easiest way of transportation is by water, a shipbuilding industry is apt to develop and a seagoing tradition is easily built up and maintained.
Lying on the crossroads of a slowly awakening Europe, the people in the Low Countries with their seafaring ability and their commercial disposition, soon developed into the “wagoners of all seas.” Around 1600, Holland had become the greatest maritime nation in the world and its 20,000 seagoing vessels surpassed the combined merchant fleets of the rest of Europe. In those days a merchant fleet could not survive unless it was self-protected or protected by a navy. Holland built such a navy, not because of military tradition, but out of sheer necessity, thereby fulfilling an old Dutch saying: “Cost comes prior to gain.” The early Dutch navy received its baptism of fire from the Spanish fleets and squadrons, as Holland, then known by its political name “The United Provinces,” had been waging war against Spain since 1568. Though this war, fought mainly for religious reasons, ended as late as 1648 with the signing of the Treaty of Munster, at sea it had already been won in 1639 when Admiral Maarten Tromp defeated the Spanish fleet under Admiral Oquendo.
During the whole of the 17th century the Dutch fleet was extremely active, mainly safeguarding its merchant navy, keeping the seas open for its trade, or fighting rival countries like England, France, Sweden, or combinations of these.
Around the beginning of the 18th century, Holland was not only exhausted by war, but also gradually had lost the power and disposition to enter upon new adventures. The riches to be gained in commerce, even as a second-rate nation, were more enticing than the fitting out of such mighty fleets as had hitherto kept the sea at great cost. Holland, at last, was ready to accept lesser returns, provided at lower cost. This attitude, lamentable as it may seem, was accelerated by the practical joke nature played in silting up ports and harbor entrances, a phenomenon that gradually made itself felt just when the trend in 18th century shipbuilding was towards an increase in tonnage and deeper draught. Thus, nature began to succeed where the fury and the guile of Holland’s enemies had failed.
Throughout that century Holland slowly lost ground and its commercial shipping, though still very important, began to lag behind that of England and France. The coup de grace to most shipping, but definitely to that of Holland, was given by Napoleon. Under his continental system, the Dutch ships, of smaller tonnage and shallower draft, rotted away in port, unless they were fitted out for invasion.
When peace was finally restored in 1815, a new era began for the whole of Europe. New canals were dug and locks constructed, harbors were made to accommodate the largest vessels, and once more the North Sea became the center of maritime activity. The application of steam engines for marine propulsion gave extra impetus to the maritime commercial resurgence and at the same time provided the means for dredging ports and harbor entrances whenever they started to silt up. England, France, and the Netherlands, in that sequence, were large colonial powers and engaged in more or less peaceful competition. Much of the shipping to and from distant continents had its origin in or near the North Sea.
Twice during the first half of the 20th century, world commercial shipping was nearly annihilated and barely survived. Once again the navies had the task of protecting their merchantmen. The years following World War II saw developments in shipping size and methods inconceivable in 1939. Today, in 1967, we are earnestly investigating the possibilities of 300,000-ton tankers with a draught of about 72 feet and what must be done about the North Sea, more than ever a shallow sea, to accommodate such giants.
Having waded with seven-league boots through some of the history of the North Sea as seen through the eyes of a Dutch naval officer, we now arrive at the present. However much the historic narrative may have been colored by national feelings or pride, one thing has been made clear, that is, the tremendous importance of the North Sea for commercial transport, which explains why this sea shows the highest density in maritime traffic decade after decade. Special lanes for ships of deep draught are contemplated, and a set of traffic regulations for the southern part of the North Sea and for the English Channel are under consideration at the moment by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. But, other developments have taken place that are already affecting the present and which will undoubtedly change the future of the North Sea beyond recognition. These developments concern the discovery of oil and natural gas.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the demand for oil and its derivatives has gradually risen. Industry as well as land and maritime transport became ever-growing users. The two world wars increased the demand many-fold. The United States of America at the moment is the greatest producer as well as consumer of petroleum. It is interesting to see what happens elsewhere. In 1963, approximately 20 per cent of the world’s total energy production was consumed in Western Europe and about 34 per cent in the United States. Of the total energy consumption of Western Europe in 1963 about 57 per cent was still from solid fuels, 2 per cent from natural gas and 37 per cent from oil. In Western Europe about 45 per cent of all solid fuel and oil necessary for energy consumption had to be imported, whereas the United States had to import only 7 per cent of its energy.
The 4 per cent annual increase in demand for energy in Europe is higher than the increase in America. This increase mainly stems from industrialization and has, so far, influenced only the European need for oil. But since 1963 natural gas has been gaining rapidly in importance as an energy source. As far as the Netherlands are concerned, it is estimated that the gas reserves found so far will be sufficient to cover the increase in Dutch demand until 1975 and perhaps will even cause a decrease in importation of energy sources. In proportion to Europe, however, the Netherlands’ gas reserves tell a different story.
Of all the gas reserves found up to the present in the Netherlands, the one in Slochteren (Groningen), with 1,100 billion cubic meters, is by far the most important. Lying within a distance of 300 miles from every important industrial center in Europe, with some 150 million inhabitants, it has a tremendous potential market next door. In the United States, with about 185 million inhabitants, the daily consumption of natural gas is 1.4 billion cubic meters, i.e., approximately 500 billion cubic meters annually. If the population of Europe were to use the same amount of gas per head as America, The European need would be about 425 billion cubic meters annually. The Slochteren field, consequently, would not be able to cover such demand for more than two and a half years.
Should this give the impression that Slochteren is, after all, not that spectacular, the following comparison may serve to bring such faulty inference back to its proper perspective. In the United States the natural gas reserves are of the order of nine thousand billion cubic meters against a consumption of 500 billion annually by a 185 million population. This means that at the present rate of consumption, known reserves will be exhausted after 16 years. If, with 12 million Dutchmen and natural gas reserves of around 1,100 billion cubic meters, consumption per capita in the Netherlands would be the same as in the United States, the Slochteren field alone would last another 34 years. Consequently, assuming equal rates of consumption in the United States and the Netherlands, the Slochteren field only provides a natural gas reserve for the Netherlands that is twice as big as the total reserve in the United States. This is one of the reasons why part of the Slochteren gas is made available for export, thereby strengthening the position of the Dutch Treasury.
The fact, however, that the Slochteren field alone would not be able to sustain the combined European industries for more than a few years serves as an explanation for the feverish activity taking place, not only in the Netherlands, but also all over the North Sea. More than 25 different oil companies are exploring and wildcatting on land as well as at sea. This automatically brings us to the problem of a country’s sovereignty over parts of the sea bottom. The “Convention on the Continental Shelf,” signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958 by 46 nations gives the internationally agreed solution to this problem in principle.
In article 1 of this Convention it is said that the term “continental shelf” is used as referring:
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas;
(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
Article 2 of the Convention consists of four parts. In the first part the Coastal State is given sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. In the second part it is said that these rights are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not make use of its right, no one else may do so. The third part of this article states that the rights of the Coastal State do not depend on occupation or on any express proclamation and in the fourth part a definition is given of the term “natural resources.” These consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to the sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the har- vestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
Whether lobsters belong to the natural resources of the continental shelf, apparently, depends completely on their system of propulsion, that is whether or not they are in constant physical contact with the seabed. The answer to this biological question is of high importance to fishermen of one nation who would like to catch lobsters on the continental shelf belonging to another nation. A different problem will arise under the provisions of part (a) of the first article when future technology will make it possible to admit the exploitation of natural resources on or under the seabed at a depth of, say, 3,000 meters.
The articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Convention say something of the legal status of the high seas over the continental shelf, the laying of submarine cables or pipelines on it, the avoidance of unjustifiable interference with navigation or fisheries when constructing or maintaining installations on the continental shelf, safety zones around such installations and the prohibition to establish installations where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.
An extremely important article, however, is article 6 in which rules are given for the determination of the boundaries between parts of the continental shelf belonging to different States. Of the three parts of which article 6 consists, the first will be quoted verbatim.
Article 6
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
The second part of article 6 is nearly similar to the first part, with the one difference that the words of the first part: “ ... or more States whose coasts are opposite each other,” in the second part are replaced by the words: “adjacent States.” In the third part, provisions are given for drawing boundary lines on charts that exist at a particular date and for reference to be made to fixed permanent identifiable points on the land.
Those who attended the Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva in 1958 will remember that the principle of median line and equidistance was introduced by the United Kingdom Delegation to that Conference and was outlined by Commander R. H. Kennedy, O.B.E., Royal Navy (Retired). The median line is a broken line, consisting of a number of turning points which are connected by shorter or longer straight lines. Every such straight line is also a median line and is the perpendicular bisector of the connecting line between two points, one on each coast, that are either nearest to each other in case the two states are opposite each other, or are the nearest to the median line, one in each State, in the case of adjacent States. The principle is shown in Figures 2 and 3, one for opposite States and one for adjacent States.
It will be observed that the first and second part of article 6 of the Convention mention first of all the possibility of determining the boundary by agreement. The “equidistance” principle is mentioned in the article for cases on which there is lack of agreement. It is, therefore, interesting to see that in the North Sea all boundaries on the continental shelf determined so far are determined by agreement between the States concerned, but that the subject of this agreement always was the use of the “equidistance” principle.
Under these agreements the parts of the continental shelf in the North Sea belonging to the Coastal States are bounded by median lines. The division of the North Sea according to this “equidistance” principle is shown in Figure 4.
Under this formula, the United Kingdom has sovereignty over nearly half of the total area available. A special circumstance worthy of remark is the fact that the trough near the Norwegian coast has been disregarded when establishing the median line between England and Norway, even though this trough shows depths of over 500 meters.
Agreements between the Coastal States concerned are either under way or have already been ratified. Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, however, negotiations are subject to the difficulty that Germany claims a larger share of the Continental Shelf than indicated by the division according to the median line principle.
The main reason behind the German claim must be found in the wording of Article 6 of the Convention where it is said that division of the Continental Shelf according to the “equidistance” principle shall be applied only when no agreement between the States concerned can be reached, and when such disagreement is apparent the median line will constitute the boundary “unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances.” According to the Germans, such circumstances are present as was made public on 13 March 1964 in the German periodical, “Stahmers Oil Information Service.”
The Federal Republic has signed the Geneva Convention but has not ratified it, as the “equidistance” principle is highly disadvantageous for a country with a concave coastline as is the case in the German Bight. As the above-mentioned periodical put it, Germany would only get a “wet triangle” the size of which cannot be considered to be in accordance with the research this country has carried out in the North Sea already, nor with the length of its coastline, its population and some more parameters considered relevant that will be given below.
In the 13 March 1964 issue of the weekly “Stahmers Oil Information Service” the following justifications were given for a German claim on a larger share of the seabed:
1. Since 1957 Germany has carried out geophysical research in the North Sea from the German coast to Dogger Bank after having developed the necessary seismic instruments;
2. German Oil Companies have carried out exploration drilling near the North Sea coast, in the Wadden Sea and at Heligoland for the past decennia that, together with the geophysical research, can be considered to be an important condition for the exploitation of natural resources under the sea bed;
3. When dividing the Continental Shelf in the North Sea, the length of the coastline, the ports and harbors, the size of the country and of its population of the Coastal States should be taken into account and
4. Application of the equidistance principle would make it impossible for the German part of the shelf to border on the British part as this would be prohibited by the fact that the Dutch part borders on the Danish part, a state of affairs claimed to be unacceptable to Germany.
It need hardly be stressed that these reasons for a larger share of the sea-bed meet with considerable resistance in the Netherlands and, as a matter of fact, can be countered point for point:
1. Geophysical research in the North Sea by the Dutch Professor Vening Meinesz started prior to 1930; sedimentological investigations were begun in 1933 with the assistance and financial backing from the Netherlands Ministry of Transport and Waterways and a detailed geophysical survey of the whole North Sea area was carried out in 1955 and 1956 with the assistance of the Royal Netherlands Navy.
2. Since 1938 in a strip along the North Sea Coast and on the Wadden Islands, Netherlands’ Oil Companies have drilled some 30 deep holes with a total drilled footage of 185,875 feet. Moreover, another four holes were drilled in the North Sea having a total depth of 29,750 feet.
3. If the length of coasdine were considered as a suitable indication for the share of the shelf to be allocated, Germany, with 310 kilometers of coastline, would fall short of Holland with nearly 400 kilometers.
It is not clear how ports and harbors can be brought into relation with the intended share of the continental shelf, especially as the waters over the shelf are part of the High Seas and not subject to sovereignty. But, apart from that, the combined Dutch North Sea ports have a capacity that is approximately three times as large as that of the combined German ones.
Furthermore, if it is the German view that country size and population should be taken into account, the only suitable parameter with which to do so in a sensible way is the population density. As of the 1st January 1962 this density is given as:
|
Area in sq. km. |
Number of inhabitants |
Population density inhabitants per sq. km. |
Netherlands |
33,580 |
11,096,000 |
379 |
Federal Republic |
247,975 |
54,399,000 |
219 |
4. The German wish that its part of the continental shelf be bordering on the British part is perhaps understandable, but has no more firm foundation than the Netherlands’ wish that the Dutch part of the shelf border on the Norwegian one.
In the Proclamation of the Federal Republic of Germany of 20 January 1964, no indication is given as to the extent of the area of the continental shelf Western Germany lays claim to. Nothing more is said than that Germany will exercise its sovereign rights with regard to the exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources in that part of the shelf over which it will acquire jurisdiction eventually.
On 1 December 1964, however, the Netherlands and Western Germany concluded a treaty in which the boundary of the continental shelf between the two countries was established from the territorial waters to the latitude of 54° North. This treaty was ratified by the Netherlands on 18 September 1965. A similar boundary was established between the parts of the Continental Shelf of Western Germany and Denmark, from the territorial waters to a point 30 nautical miles west of the island of Sylt. A remarkable feature of both these partial boundaries is that they were established according to the equidistance principle. The Netherlands as well as Denmark is of the opinion that the remaining part of their respective boundaries with Western Germany should also be established according to that principle. The special circumstances invoked by Western Germany, and prohibiting so far the establishment of the complete borderline on the shelf, have never been recognized either by Denmark or the Netherlands.
The total area of the Continental Shelf in the North Sea is approximately 513,000 sq. km. Divided by the equidistance principle, the Norwegian part is 131,000 sq. km., Great Britain equals 240,000 sq. km., Denmark 54,000, Western Germany 22,000, the Netherlands 62,000, and Belgium 4,000 sq. km. Now that we know what the coastal States possess and how the division has been done, it is worthwhile to consider the various laws governing the exploration and exploitation in the different coastal States.
Let us begin again with the Netherlands where the situation is rather complex, with different laws applicable on land and at sea. The Mining Law for the Continental Shelf has been subject to several changes and, consequently, it is still under consideration. The Mining Law on land was introduced by the Imperial Decree of 8 November 1810 during the French occupation of the Netherlands. The influence of this French mining law, which came into force 21 April 1810, on mining rights in the Netherlands has been tremendous. Only partial revision of this law has been carried out and it can be said that exploration and exploitation on the Netherlands’ territory (including territorial waters) of mineral and bituminous resources is still done mainly according to the views laid down by Napoleon.
The French mining law exhibits three deficiencies which make it unsatisfactory as a mining law also governing the exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas:
No exclusive rights can be granted during the exploration stage,
The successful explorer has no guarantee that a concession will be granted, and
The conditions under which exploitation is to take place cannot be agreed upon before an exploitable amount of oil or gas has been found.
It is disappointing that, although new oil and gas legislation, called the “Wet Mining Law” of 1965, has passed through the Dutch Parliament, the Regulations belonging to this legislation have been delayed. Long discussions on its provisions were renewed after a change in government, when a coalition was formed of which the Socialists became one of the major partners. It is in accordance with socialistic views that they introduced a new provision in the Regulations giving an option to the government to participate to the extent of up to 50 per cent in any offshore production scheme for either oil or natural gas. This clause met with serious objections in Parliament and the controversy was settled at last by amending it in such a way that, every time the government intends to participate in production, special legislation has to be introduced and approved by Parliament. Under this “Wet Mining Act” the area of the continental shelf belonging to the Netherlands is divided into blocks of 400 sq. km. for production licenses. Licensees will have to carry out exploration in accordance with a minimum work program, and will be entitled to exploitation rights in the event of a discovery of oil or natural gas, unless the government thinks the circumstances of the licencee have changed in such a way as to make a production license contrary to the public interest.
In the United Kingdom, the Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations of 14 April 1964 are based on the Continental Shelf Act of 15 May 1964 and contain the conditions for offshore petroleum operations, exploration as well as production. Between 20 May and 20 July 1964 requests could be made for obtaining production licenses, to which purpose a chart containing blocks of approximately 250 sq. kin. each was published. The criteria according to which licenses were granted were the following:
Licenses are only issued to British companies or to companies resident in the United Kingdom.
The extent of the contribution the applicant has made towards the British economy, especially energy production.
Financial and technical specialization of applicants, especially regarding offshore work.
Priorities for different blocks applicants had stated at the request of the government.
A production license gives exclusive rights on exploration and production to the area granted. Rights apply for six years with further option for 40 years more, after 50 per cent of the original licensed area has been handed back to the government at the end of the six-year period. A second round of production licenses was officially granted by the British government on 24 November 1965. The number of grants totalled 37 licenses comprising 127 blocks, which, together with the 346 blocks granted during the first round, cover an area of approximately 117,500 sq. km., or nearly equivalent to the entire land area of England itself. An innovation introduced during this second round is the possibility for the U.K. National Coal Board to participate in production licenses for which the Dutch government participation has probably stood as a model.
In Western Germany the following criteria for granting licenses are handled:
Existing activities in the field of exploration and production of oil and natural gas in Western Germany.
The extent of the contribution that has been and is made towards the energy production of Western Germany.
Technical ability, especially regarding offshore work.
Financial capacity and the capability of starting exploration at sea at short notice.
German legislation has not yet been introduced in its final form. On 24 July 1964, a law was passed containing provisional regulations regarding the rights on the continental shelf. These regulations have to be brought into their final form before 1969. During this period it has to be decided whether such regulations should be drawn up by the States (Lander) constitutionally, or by the Federal Government. Consequently, licenses granted so far are provisional and valid for a period of three years, with a possible extension of two years in case final Regulations are not ready by 1969. Also, these licenses give no guarantee of renewal nor of a definite license for exploration and production.
Denmark was the first North Sea country to ratify the 1958 Geneva Convention, on 14 March 1963. Sovereign rights on the Danish part of the continental shelf are in the hands of the King, including the right to issue licenses for the exploration and production of oil and natural gas. In 1963, a sole license holder, Dansk Undergrunds Consortium, was appointed for all the land area and for the continental shelf. In this consortium, 40 per cent is held by the Danish shipowner A. P. Moeller and 30 per cent each by Gulf Oil Corporation and the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. The license is granted for ten years with an option for 40 more years in the event oil, natural gas, sulphur or helium are found.
In Norway, the Law of 21 June 1963 laid the rights to the mineral resources in the Norwegian part of the continental shelf in the hands of the government. The Crown was authorized to issue exploration and production licenses and to lay down special Regulations. After intensive seismic surveying, the first offshore concessions were granted in 1965. A chart was issued with blocks of 500 to 550 sq. km. bounded by lines of the geographical graticule, comprising the whole of the Norwegian part of the continental shelf south of the 62nd parallel. This area contains 278 blocks, of which 74 blocks had been granted to nine company groups in 1965.
It is clear that the North Sea, after having played its role as a traffic carrier for more than a millenium, is making ready for yet another equally important role, that of a tremendous oil and gas area. New problems will arise when shipping and oil activity expand in the same maritime area. One of those problems will be the shipping lanes for deep-draught-vessels, where these lanes cross areas that are particularly promising for exploitation of hydrocarbons.
The situation is not yet as bad as in the American offshore area in the Gulf of Mexico between Lake Charles, Louisiana, and Houston, Texas, where the continental shelf over a length of 300 miles and a width of 100 is covered with some 4,800 structures, of which 1,590 are located in or near the coastwise steamship lanes. These shipping lanes were established at a time when oilmen were sure they would never drill in water deeper than ten fathoms, and ten fathoms was just a comfortable depth for almost every type of ship.
Oil techniques as well as shipping have changed. Drilling in 100 fathoms of water is possible and ships with a draught of 12 fathoms are contemplated. The situation must be avoided in which one government agency grants a license on account of exploration results, while another government agency denies that licensee the right to erect a structure on account of navigational hazards. In the North Sea, the tracks of these shipping lanes have been established provisionally by the North Sea Hydrographic Commission for surveying purposes, taking into account the views of shipping companies employing tankers. There are but few alternative tracks possible because of the limited depth of the North Sea. Also the width of these lanes will be important. Tanker captains favor a width of ten nautical miles whereas oil companies would rather see shipping lanes not wider than half a mile. Drilling techniques allow horizontal displacement by directional drilling of approximately one to four at the moment, albeit at appreciable extra cost, which means that with resources at a depth of 5,000 feet, horizontal displacement of between 1,000 and 1,500 feet can be reached. Shipping lane width, therefore, will be a compromise between safe navigation and the development of resources at the least financial burden and to the maximum possible extent.
Contrary to the situation in the Gulf area, the problems in the North Sea will have to be solved by international co-operation. Shipping lanes will cross parts of the continental shelf belonging to several coastal States. Navigational aids, fog signals, lights, widths of shipping lanes, and buoyage should be coordinated and similar all over the area. Mines will have to be swept, target areas will have to be shifted, wrecks, telephone and telegraph cables as well as pipelines will have to be charted carefully, and traffic regulations will have to be established in the shipping lanes.
All this is gradually taking shape but, the human mind being what it is, one fears that real action will be taken only when the situation threatens to get out of control. Offshore drilling has only just started and the density of structures so far does not threaten navigation at all. Within five years, however, a completely different picture will be visible, and five years is a short time in which to conclude international treaties.
Whatever the developments will be, however, it can be safely assumed that an extraordinarily interesting scene will become visible. Whether we will be quite happy or satisfied with it is a different question. One reassuring thought is that the future is not in our own hands, but in the hands of Him of whom Psalm 77 says:
Thy way is in the sea, and thy path in the great waters, and thy footsteps are not known.