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Destroyers at the Crossroads
Captain L. D. Caney, U. S. Navy (Commander, Destroyer Squadron Five)—For 25 years the U. S. Navy’s destroyer force has been dominated by a group of fast, rugged, versatile ships armed with reliable and powerful gun batteries as well as the maximum assortment of antisubmarine weapons available at the time.
Today that force is in a state of transition. From a force made up of more than 90 per cent general purpose destroyers of great versatility and flexibility, the U. S. Navy is moving steadily and irrevocably in the direction of a single-purpose, single-gun, singlescrew ocean escort (DE) as the mainstay of the destroyer fleet.
This prospective change in the over-all characteristics of our future destroyer force first began to take shape in the Fiscal 1962 Shipbuilding Program when construction of the single-screw DE was initiated on a significant scale: six were authorized that year. Eight more were authorized in 1963, ten in 1964, 16 in 1965, ten in 1966, and ten more in the 1967 shipbuilding program. This adds up to 60 ships, all of which will be replacements for destroyers now in the active fleet. Looking ahead, there is nothing in sight but more DEs. Sometime in the 1970s or early 1980s, if the present trend continues, over half of the destroyer force will consist of ships having less capability to provide gunfire support and deal with threats from the air and surface than the 20-year-old World War II destroyers, which constitute the backbone of the destroyer force today.
The DE, the replacement ship, has one 5- inch gun instead of four guns (a few DEs will have two guns, but these will have limited fire control capabilities); the DE will have two instead of four boilers; and the DE will have one instead of two turbines. The resultant reduction in fire power, speed, staying power, versatility, and flexibility is obvious. A wiped spring bearing in an ocean escort is a ship adrift. A jammed loader or an inoperative receiver regulator and a one-gun ship is at the mercy of a PT boat. Experience in Vietnam has demonstrated time and again that it takes more than one gun in a ship to provide effective fire support. Indeed, when it comes to the 5-inch/54-caliber gun, experience has shown that it frequently takes two guns just to keep one firing.
This shift to a single-purpose ship has been brought about by three factors: (1) the predominance of the submarine threat, (2) the requirement for large numbers of ships, and (3) high costs. Few will disagree that the most serious threat to control of the seas is the modern submarine. Whatever other characteristics a destroyer has, she must be given the
best attainable configuration to deal with the submarine. At the same time, regardless of the capabilities of this configuration, significant numbers of destroyers are required because one ship cannot be in two places at one time. Further, experience has demonstrated repeatedly that new weapons and detection devices (especially sonars) do not always provide a significant increase over previous capabilities. Thus, one new ship does not equate to two older ones. Costs are high for any kind of a ship. Destroyer costs in particular have always been high because the U. S. Navy has never been able to decide on a basic design to be produced in significant quantities. For example, the destroyer squadron which this writer commands has ships of six different classes. Costs could be reduced by settling on one basic design for the next decade, but, there is no refuting the fact that the cost of destroyers is high. When it comes to quality and fighting capability you always get what you pay for.
There are more than 150 World War II destroyers in the U. S. active fleet which must be replaced during the next 10 to 15 years. The proponents of the DE as the replacement ship for this large inventory of general purpose destroyers are prone to think of destroyers solely as escorts for other naval forces. Starting with this assumption, it is argued that attack carrier task groups require one kind of an
escort, ASW task groups another kind, and convoys and amphibious groups still another kind. This is what theoretical studies tell us, and results of war gaming of various task groups arrayed against various assumed threats tend to bear it out. It depends of course on the threats which are assumed. And the studies do not take into account the ubiquitous nature of the destroyer. Escort is by no means her only function.
The larger crises of the last 20 years— in Greece, Turkey, Korea, Lebanon, Suez, Taiwan, Cuba, Vietnam—reflect the type of conflict that undoubtedly will be with us until the turn of the century and beyond. These are the kinds of situations that destroyers must be prepared to support. In nearly all of these conflicts the presence of a respectable and convincing gun battery in our destroyers proved to be essential, either as part of the show of force or as the force itself. Similarly, in nearly all of those conflicts, control and coordination of aircraft have been of paramount importance. Destroyers play a vital role in this task and must be equipped accordingly.
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Who can say that a given amphibious group or ASW group will not run into threats of unexpected magnitude requiring high performance escorts to assist in air defense? Or, on the other end of the scale, who can say that air and submarine threats to task groups at sea will not lie dormant (as they have in
Vietnam), while 50 miles away the ground forces will be begging for destroyers with guns to help in the land campaign. Here is a case where, if the task group escorts have a suitable gun battery, naval gunfire support requirements can be filled quickly and economically. Under reduced threat conditions, nearby task groups can spare a few destroyers, thereby aiding the war effort where the enemy is and taking a reduced posture where the enemy is not. This means versatility and flexibility. Without these factors, more resources are required in the long run.
The same reasoning can be applied to an infinite number of situations. One can never predict when a requirement will develop in a matter of minutes for stationing a picket at a distance from a task group. High speed, gun power, and missile power are the characteristics needed for such an assignment. These characteristics are not found in the DE.
In Vietnam the Navy has found increasing requirements for stationing destroyers along the enemy coast for rescue, surveillance, antiair warfare, anti-PT boat operations, helicopter refueling, and navigation reference points. Destroyers so assigned must be able to take to the offensive as well as to defend themselves against % any form of attack. One-gun ships have limited capabilities for handling these assignments, yet more than half of the ships now assigned this duty are slated to be replaced by the DE construction program. Are we making a prediction that no similar destroyer assignments will be necessary in 1975 or 1985?
A further reason for maintaining a strong fleet of general purpose destroyers is related to the number of ships available in forward areas at any given time. That number bears no resemblance to the total number of destroyers in the active fleet. Cold and limited wars go on for years. They are not one-shot, one-engagement, one-campaign affairs. Under these conditions the Navy cannot, for example, afford to commit all Pacific destroyers to the Seventh Fleet at one time to fight the Vietnamese War.
To carry the example further, of every 60 destroyers the Navy builds about 30 go to each ocean area. Of the 30 in the Pacific only about ten are on the front lines around the clock, 365 days of the year. Six to nine months away from home port every year, year in and year out in the prolonged kind of conflict in which we are engaged is all we can demand of our crews. Only in the most unlikely eventuality of general war should the total resources be committed.
This is not to say that there is no place for the DE in the modern U. S. Fleet; the contrary is true. The escort ships have an important ASW role, and, in the case of later classes, expanding roles in other areas as well. In the final analysis it is a matter of achieving the proper balance. If the United States continues to build single-purpose ships to the exclusion of “destroyers,” it will upset the balance by cutting into the hard core of destroyer power and strength. The present trend, which is gathering momentum, foretells a decidedly unfavorable balance in the years ahead.
The time to reverse the trend is now. The development and construction of a versatile, general purpose ship must be resumed if the U. S. Navy is to maintain its strength at sea.
Back to the General Purpose Destroyer
(See pages 126-127, June 1966 Proceedings)
Dan London—I disagree with several points of the general purpose destroyer proposed by Lieutenant Kelly. First, I take issue with his complete confidence in three 5-inch/
54-caliber guns to shoot down modern aircraft. If the ship is engaged by a Soviet destroyer or torpedo boats and high-performance MiG aircraft appear, how can the U. S. destroyer defend herself? Lieutenant Kelly proposes to have three DDs and one DDG in each destroyer division, but what if the DDG is sunk or a DD is ordered to proceed on an independent mission and is attacked by aircraft?
The addition of a short-range, surface-to- air missile, such as the British Seacat, should not be too difficult. In addition, the shore bombardment capability could be greatly increased with the use of a short-range weapon such as the French Nord SS.12. The latter missile would also be useful in a coastal patrol situation.
Also, if the hull of the proposed destroyer were proportionately longer two manned helicopters could be accommodated instead of one. A clamshell hanger instead of a collapsing hanger would be more durable and would stand up better in heavy seas. It could be similar in design to the one on the French guided missile destroyer La Galissoniere. My proposed modifications to Lieutenant Kelly’s design are shown in Figure 1.
"Don’t Envy the Enemy”
(See pages 49-59, November 1966 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy—In dealing with China we can not merely add up comparative statistics of our separate power bases and conclude that because Communist China appears to be a paper tiger—“hardly more than the biggest among the undeveloped nations”—we need not concern ourselves with China’s ability to try and hurt or intimidate us in the near future. There are considerations which should dissuade us from such a view.
The Communist Chinese leadership, while getting long in tooth, continues to be fired with revolutionary zeal. And, as happened in Soviet Russia, China’s brand of Communism already is showing signs of nationalism. But where the Russians traditionally have looked upon the outer world as hostile and superior, China has been the “Middle Kingdom” to its people for centuries, a kingdom surrounded by barbaric tribes (including “Russians”) awaiting enlightenment. Thus, Mao and his comrades most probably are motivated by this combination of Marxist fire and an historical sense of superiority to seek a position of leadership in the world. They undoubtedly share hopes of achieving this position in their collective lifetime, spurred on by the fantastic success they had in becoming masters of their own land so soon after the disasters leading to the Long March of 1934-1935.
A second factor that should make us most wary of Communist China is population. Colonel Clapp noted that there will be an estimated one billion people in China within 20 years. He also stated that the present balance between food production and consumption is extremely fragile. The situation already is out of balance and threatens to overrun even the stopgap measures of food purchases in the West. This is a problem of such vast proportions that there is no foreseeable way for China to solve it within the country’s own resources. It is an increasingly explosive situation wherein the national leadership must find solutions or, if it is to survive, otherwise siphon off growing population pressures.
Again, there is no way for China to solve her problem internally; whatever solution is chosen will, in some way, be extra-territorial in nature. Massive inputs of foreign technical and material assistance might be able to bring about rapid gains in the agricultural sector, but acceptance of such aid is extremely unlikely in view of current leadership attitudes. The solution might be nuclear blackmail for food or food-producing areas; or, it might be outright invasion of contiguous countries. Whipped to a frenzy by the powerful propaganda machine, China’s masses could vent their frustrations and dissatisfactions on alien peoples. The pressures would be further eased by the losses incurred, perhaps by a bloodbath greater even than that suffered by Soviet Russia in World War II. There would be a winnowing out of the burgeoning population.
To Western observers, the “Great Leap Forward” of 1958-1960 was an irrational act of economic near-suicide. Mao had hoped to use the program to bring China into the modern world and achieve some sort of balance between the population and its requirements. The internal experiment failed miser-
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ably. Might not there be another project— this time at the expense of the “barbarians”? Win, lose, or draw, for the present aging leadership it would be a magnificent throw of the dice and a face-saving act.
The Chinese are said to have one or two ballistic missile submarines similar to the Soviet G-class, each capable of carrying three missiles.[1] The Red Chinese recently conducted their fourth nuclear test, reportedly employing a ballistic missile as the delivery vehicle. Can the marriage of the two then be ten years in the future as Colonel Clapp predicts? I do not have his confidence.
Given the pressures and irrationality noted above, it behooves us never to forget that even a small tiger has claws and can hurt.
Lieutenant Barry S. Jaynes, U. S. Air Force Reserve—Colonel Clapp has given us a superficial paper which widely misses the mark. The Colonel very strongly makes the point, and I think fairly, that an accurate evaluation of a problem cannot be had by merely focusing on one side. He makes the point and then proves it by focusing, somewhat poorly, on one side, in this case the enemy’s; he has in fact failed to accept his own premise.
The facts and figures that he gives are in large measure meaningless. For example, the author gives the desertion rate for the Viet Cong as 10,000 for the first half of 1966. Is this figure one per cent or 50 per cent of the total number of Viet Cong? We do not know because the Colonel fails to relate the figure to either total Viet Cong strength or the desertion of South Vietnamese forces. The result is meaningless. To his credit, the author does give the past desertion figures of the Viet Cong, but again, in relation to what?
One of the major points of Colonel Clapp’s article is that Red China is dominate in determining the course of the war in South Vietnam. He pictures North Vietnam as being only a “junior partner,” carrying out Peking’s orders. This view appears to run counter to the great weight of authority, including the President of the United States, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and a diversity of views of experts such as Frank Treager, Bernard Fall, and Jean Lacoutre. Colonel Clapp offers no documentation or analysis for his position. He also takes no note of the fact, that the major reason the United States is bombing North Vietnam is the belief that North Vietnam alone determines what the Viet Cong do in South Vietnam, and therefore if we convince North Vietnam that it cannot win in South Vietnam the aggression will cease.
Further, the Colonel takes no note of the Soviet Union or of its aid to North Vietnam, which has more than doubled in the last year. North Vietnam has received its anti-aircraft missiles and MiG-21 fighters from the Soviet Union, not China. Certainly, China has influence in North Vietnam, but so does the Soviet Union. The sharp increase of Soviet aid to North Vietnam would indicate an increase in influence and a strengthening of the Moscow-oriented wing of the Communist Party of North Vietnam. In the past, Hanoi has sought to be independent of both Moscow and Peking. It has accomplished this by balancing its support of each, so that a North Vietnamese delegation sent to Moscow will stop in Peking on its way home.
The Colonel has missed the basic nationalist character of both the Vietminh and the Viet Cong which would mitigate against outside control by anyone. The Colonel goes on to analyze China in terms that are not put in a useful context. The Colonel dismisses the Chinese Army as being largely a “horde of walking riflemen,” failing to remember that this horde, at a much earlier stage in its development, drove the Marines from the Hungnam Reservoir in North Korea. He
makes no mention of the fact that this horde is equipped with the 7.62-mm. AK-47 rifle, which some arms experts consider superior to both the M-14 and M-16 of U. S. ground forces.
Colonel Clapp refers to a major change taking place in the Chinese armed forces when rank was abolished in the summer of 1965. This was of importance, but not of major importance, when one studies the historical relationship of the Chinese Communist Party to the Army. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of 1953 was a party-dominated operation, with political commissars exercis- mg more power over the troops than did the officers. In 1954, due in part to an aid agreement signed with the Soviet Union and Soviet guarantee of nuclear protection for China, the decision was made to allow the Army to develop as a traditionally based or nonrevolutionary force. This meant a downgrading in the direct party control of the Army. In 1957, after the Soviet Union refused to give a blanket nuclear guarantee to China, the decision was made by Peking to develop Us own nuclear arsenal. This decision necessitated a reorientation of economic resources and manpower. It also meant a shift in foreign policy to avoid a major war until the nuclear arsenal was ready. This, in turn, meant a reassertion of Party dominance of the PLA, which has continued since 1957. The abolishing of rank was just one more step in complete Party control of the PLA.
The author further states “North Vietnam is likewise tremendously vulnerable to determined air attack, as recent missions against the Hanoi/Haiphong oil storage installations Proved. So restraint on the part of the United States is all that has permitted her national survival so far.” Few would debate that U. S. air power has made North Vietnam vulnerable to attack. But to use this as a premise to conclude, without further explanation, that only the restraint of the United States allows North Vietnam to survive as a nation is folly. Does the Colonel mean air attacks with conventional or nuclear weapons? The ability of North Vietnam to survive would be determined by this choice. The theory that bomb- lng a nation’s industry with conventional weapons could force that nation into submission is only valid when the nation being bombed values its industry more than the
object for which it is fighting. The validity of this theory has yet to be proved in Vietnam. There is every indication that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese leaders value control of South Vietnam more than factories.
Colonel Clapp cites the success of the government of South Vietnam in building a nation and gaining the support of the people, referring with great emphasis to the successful land reform program. The land reform program was a complete failure. The worst land was selected for distribution and only marginal funds were appropriated to carry it out. The program also became fraught with corruption.
Vietnam is a complex question, demanding the utmost care in analysis and conclusion. Colonel Clapp failed to bring that requisite care to his article “Don’t Envy the Enemy.”
"The Ph.D. in Uniform”
(See pages 70-77, November 1966 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Robert C. Steensma, U. S. Naval Reserve—The armed forces, and particularly the Navy, must do everything possible to make a service career more stimulating and rewarding for the officer who is willing to exert the tremendous intellectual effort and make the great personal and financial sacrifices necessary to win the Ph.D. The officer with the doctorate, no matter what his specialty, is a much better and more flexible leader by virtue of his wearing the hats of both the military man and the scholar.
Commander Edelson’s suggestion that each service “embark upon programs of selection of the most promising students for graduate work and support their studies” is timely and should be effected as soon as possible. But one further step is necessary: The officer with a Ph.D. must be placed on an equal-pay basis with his contemporaries in the medical and dental corps. Obviously, his degree is as respectable, valuable, and scarce as theirs, and in the long run his contribution to the Navy may have far greater consequences. The present system of additional pay for physicians and dentists is discouraging to the Ph.D. who would like to make the service a career. It will be tragic if the Navy fails to recognize the immediate and long-range contributions of the Ph.D. in Navy blue.
Captain Charles H. Coder, U. S. Naval Reserve (Chairman, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Bucknell University)— I agree with Commander Edelson that the Navy and other branches of the armed forces should examine the potential of having officers equipped with the education represented by the Ph.D. However, there is a large discrepancy between the number of engineering graduates estimated by Dr. J. H. Holloman for 1975, as quoted in Commander Edelson’s article, and the number of engineering graduates estimated for the same period in the report “Goals of Engineering Education— The Preliminary Report,” published in October of 1965 by the American Society for Engineering Education. This report estimates that the number of persons to receive the engineering bachelor’s degree in 1976 is 75,000, compared to the 50,000 quoted in the article. The same report estimates that 6,000 persons will be awarded the doctorate in engineering in 1976 rather than 12,000, as quoted in the article.
I noted with interest and concern that Commander Edelson did not provide an answer to the question of how to provide the financial incentive to attract and retain officers having the Ph.D. The 1964 issue of “Professional Income of Engineers,” published by the Engineering Manpower Commission, reported that the median starting salary for new Ph.D. graduates with no experience was 11,500 dollars.
"The Civilian Navy”
(See pages 99-105, November 1966 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James J. Mulquin, U. S. Naval Reserve—Commander Featherston states “Almost half-a-million military billets in the Department of Defense are earmarked for conversion to manning by civilians. It is not difficult to envisage a day in which the man in uniform will only be the operator who, because of some design shortcoming in the weapons system, must on occasion die in battle.”
This carries the implication that such “conversion” will, of itself, deprive the Navy of that technical proficiency which constitutes the difference between success and failure. I doubt very much if the author intended to convey this impression for, with his background, he certainly appreciates the fact that engineering/scientific competence is a function of the man and not his affiliation. If the billets in question were ultimately filled by dedicated, talented, and able civilian professionals, there would probably be far less likelihood of that “design shortcoming” occurring than there is now.
The key to excellence in any endeavor will always be the individual, and failure to recognize and profit by this knowledge is all too often a characteristic of large organizations.
I believe the author correctly anticipated the deterioration that would result from the relief of any group of qualified specialists by unqualified replacements, and that his position was actually directed at relative skill and ability rather than a military versus civilian comparison. A traditional Navy strength has been the regular exposure of the civilian professional staff to a “bit of salt” as a former Chief of the Bureau of Naval Weapons once expressed it. This is viewed as a mutually rewarding and a wholly beneficial association by Navy professionals, officers and civilians. The emphasis should, perhaps, be placed on quality, imagination, versatility, and an energetic sense of responsibility, be it found in or out of uniform.
"Needed: A Credible Presence”
(See pages 52-61, March 1966;
pages 114-116, August 1966; and
pages 126-128 November 1966 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert Reny, U. S. Naval Reserve—Any military or strategic advantage that would result from the stationing of a major U. S. naval force in the Indian Ocean would not be worth the adverse political repercussions that would surely follow. India and Indonesia, the two major nations in the area, are on record as being opposed to joining any power bloc, and the presence of a U. S. Indian Ocean Fleet would be a constant irritant and would provide partial proof to many uncommitted nations that “U. S. imperialism” does stalk the world, as Communist news media insist.
The United States has no treaty obligations to justify such a fleet. SEATO, unlike NATO, has no force structure in being. Even naval support of Pakistan would not require a per-
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manent fleet, nor would naval support of Pakistan be worth the probable deterioration of U. S. relations with India and Indonesia.
If there is genuine concern over freedom to use the Indian Ocean or over the lack of naval support to Indian Ocean nations, I would suggest: (1) holding discussions with defense officials of the nations rimming the Indian Ocean to persuade them to consider forming an Indian Ocean Fleet, and (2) if those nations agree that such a fleet is necessary, the United States should offer to help finance the venture by the transfer of mothballed ships and the provision of advisory personnel. It should be emphasized that the proposed fleet would belong to the Indian Ocean nations and that its existence would be for their security.
With this procedure, the United States could secure the presence of a responsible naval force on. the Indian Ocean, give the Indian Ocean nations a viable force that they can control and be proud of, strengthen the needed concept of regional defense arrangements not dominated by the United States, and free U. S. Navy units to continue to support commitments under existing treaties.
The United States has no political advantage to gain by thrusting U. S. naval power into the Indian Ocean at this time, particularly without an invitation to do so from the two major Indian Ocean nations.
"FADAP”
(See pages 70-79, August 1966,
and page 126, November 1966 Proceedings)
Commander J. L. O’Brien, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, USS Runner, SS-476) - Unquestionably the gathering and processing of ASW data are valuable tools for assisting in the evaluation of ASW capabilities. However, we must be wary of conclusions stemming from the hasty accumulation of data under the guise of reconstruction and analysis. There appears to be a growing tendency in the Navy to impart an unwarranted degree of authenticity to any data which bears a reconstruction and/or an analysis label. More succincdy, we seem to be fostering a concept that to err is human, to reconstruct divine.
My submarine recently participated in ASW exercises which underwent a modicum of reconstruction and analysis. A “quick and dirty” summary of the ASW action, based on the results of the “reconstruction and analysis” effort, was promulgated by the ASW commander. The contents of summaries done in this manner have frequently been at considerable variance with the accounts of individual participants. To an extent this is understandable, for the reconstruction/analysis team must collect and collate the reports from a variety of sources in order to reduce the inaccuracies and determine as nearly as possible what actually transpired. However, basic conflicting data was resolved by a group which was not representative of all the interests involved in the exercise.
If it is a truism that reconstruction and analysis should enlighten and not delude, then it follows that impartiality must be an essential ingredient. Subjective reconstruction and analysis of ASW exercises may result in misinterpretation of the facts and unfounded conclusions concerning ASW capabilities. This could eventually be detrimental to the Navy’s ASW effort.
As Captain Dombroff has pointed out, the user must determine how the data are to be employed. The fallacy of using data “as inputs into study programs and also as confirmation of the study results,” should be readily apparent. Further, the Navy should look askance at the end product of a program that has been prosecuted at feverish tempo and which is so highly evolutionary that it changes from exercise to exercise.
Additionally, I believe, the Navy should examine in detail the results of those exercises which have been tailored to gather specific information. This type of data-gather- ing evolution may lead to the introduction of artificial factors which could nullify or at least grade the results. We must be careful not to spawn doctrine on the basis of these “canned” exercises.
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
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The foregoing remarks should not be constructed as a condemnation of FADAP. My aim is to reinforce Captain Dombroff’s comments concerning the programs’ capabilities and limitations. We must not apply the recon- struction/analysis tag to evaluations of exercises in which the vested interests of all participants are not represented. Nor should we rush into exercises oriented to gather data, lest the value of the results be obviated by the artificial factors introduced.
Professional Officer Educators
Lieutenant Commander J. D. Cummings, U. S. Navy—The U. S. Navy’s traditional concept of the officer instructor has been that of a line officer who is ordered to a tour of duty as an instructor, provided brief training in teaching techniques, and then is placed in the classroom. This concept can no longer be accepted as valid.
It requires time, training, and a special ability to be an instructor at the college level, both for undergraduate and graduate instruction. The period since World War II has been one of scientific, technological, and managerial change in the art of naval warfare which is unparalleled in history. Training officers to exploit these advances properly, as well as providing a broad educational base, requires a new breed of officer instructors. The recent Board of Visitors to the U. S. Naval Academy urged three- or four-year tours for military members of that faculty. This is an admirable suggest'on for it would give military faculty members an opportunity to become more proficient in the art of teaching, with the attendant benefits to the midshipmen receiving instruction. I would carry the Board of Visitors’ recommendation one step further and establish a professional instructor sub-specialty for naval officers.
Law and naval intelligence were considered a part of the unrestricted line officer’s duties not too many years ago. Further, there is an historical precedence for such a professional specialty. During the last century, officers with the rank of Professor of Mathematics taught at the U. S. Naval Academy.
I would envision such a program as follows: A junior officer completing his first sea tour could apply for this program, leading to his eventual designation as a professional specialist. If accepted, he would be ordered to postgraduate school for training in the field of his choice, or to an NROTC unit as an instructor trainee. If ordered to postgraduate school he would be expected to complete all requirements for a master’s degree in his chosen field within a two-year period. He would then be ordered to an instructor’s billet within his field for a two-year tour. The officer ordered to an NROTC unit would be assigned for a four-year tour. During that tour he too would be expected to complete the requirements for a master’s degree in his chosen field.
Upon completion of the above academic tour the officer would be ordered to sea for a normal tour.
The evaluation of the officer’s academic performance and performance as an instructor would determine whether or not the officer would be assigned the designation of professional specialist and again be ordered to instructor duty. If not so selected, the officer would continue in a normal career pattern with the advantage of his advanced degree. Officers chosen to continue in the program
would be ordered to graduate work leading to doctorates in their chosen field. They would then assume the duties of instructors at such activities as the Naval Academy, NROTC universities, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College, Armed Forces Staff College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. As professional educators they would keep abreast of the operating Navy by summer duty assignments and by professional reading.
Few, if any, of these officer educators could hope to reach flag rank, except perhaps as head of one of the naval schools on a twilight tour as a reward for especially meritorious service. But they could become department heads with the rank of captain. Would our present junior officers sacrifice the opportunity for command at sea for the satisfaction of giving our future officers the finest training possible?
Further study of this matter is warranted.
"Admiral Makarov: Attack! Attack! Attack!”
(See pages 57-67, July 1965,
and pages 121-123, August 1966 Proceedings)
Dr. Donald W. Mitchell—Captain Southerland makes two general criticisms concerning my biography of Admiral Makarov. First, he objects to my describing the Russian circular ironclads Novgorod and Vice Admiral Popojf as “completely worthless” and that they could be “used only as fixed forts.” He also contends that these two ships were not “popoffkas,” a name which he reserves for the Royal yacht Livadia, built in 1880.
Secondly, he states that the Russian sea forces were in point of fact much stronger than indicated in my article, since the Russians had available both internal rivers and canals (other than in winter when they were frozen) and sea routes by which he infers the Russians could have reinforced their Black Sea forces.
On the first point, Captain Southerland brings forth many quotations regarding the alleged good qualities of the two vessels concerned. To the extent that these two vessels, employed as coastal batteries, added to the seven land batteries at Ochakov, nine at Sevastopol, three at Odessa, and one at Kerch (all under the command of the Russian Navy), actually strengthened Russian coast defenses, I would concede that my description of them
as “completely worthless” was perhaps too sweeping. As to the two ships concerned not being “popoffkas,” I can only reply that they were referred to as such at the time in Russian and other naval publications. Quite possibly this was a popular instead of a technical use of the term.
On the second point, I feel that the criticism is wholly wrong. The Russian Government went to war against Turkey in 1877 not because it was strong at sea but because it expected to overwhelm the Turks on land. The latter expectation was fully realized. That the tiny Russian Black Sea Fleet performed brilliantly was an additional dividend that could not reasonably have been anticipated. At the beginning of any war, how likely would it be for a 28-year-old lieutenant to evolve and be able to apply a new and devastating system of warfare?
So far as naval strength is concerned, the possibilities of reinforcement mentioned by Captain Southerland were not open to the Russians. The Russians started the war with seven sea-going batdeships, one of which remained at Spezia in the Mediterranean throughout the war while the other six were in the Baltic. An attempt by any of these to enter the Black Sea not only would have constituted a violation of an existing treaty, but would have been militarily impossible. Any reinforcements to the Black Sea Fleet would have had to pass through the Dardanelles, a move certain to bring on war. They would doubtless have been destroyed in the attempt since they would have been subjected to prolonged short-range fire from numerous land batteries.
The movement of any large ships by rivers and canals between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea was also not feasible since the battleships had too great a draft for the transit. Some movement of smaller vessels might have been undertaken, but even if successful they would hardly have redressed the balance of force favoring the Turks. The ■ Russians did ship by rail from St. Petersburg a number of torpedo launches which were employed by Lieutenant Makarov and his colleagues.
It is perhaps apropos to note that the Russians have at times made considerable use of their canals and railroads in transferring
small craft from one body of water to another. During the Russo-Japanese War they shipped a number of early Simon Lake submarines to Vladivostok via the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Later, during the civil war which followed the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks used canals and rivers to transfer torpedo boats, submarines, and other small craft from the Baltic to the Caspian, Volga, Northern Dvina, and other bodies of water where they gave Communist units naval superiority over the makeshift flotillas of the various White Russian forces. Finally, during World War II there was a sizable transfer of submarines from the Baltic, where submarines were hemmed in by the German mine and net defenses, to the Arctic where they could be active. Four submarines were also transferred from the Baltic to the Caspian for training.
Rear Admiral H. H. Wesche, Royal Danish Navy—In regard to Captain Southerland’s comment concerning the Russian extraordinary “ships” Novgorod and Vice Admiral Popoff, in my possession is a book on the history of shipbuilding published in 1879 by Captain, J. C. Tuxen, a Danish naval officer and former instructor at the Royal Danish Naval Academy in Copenhagen. In discussing coastal defense ironclads, he wrote (my translation):
Among the coastal defence craft of other naval powers should further be mentioned three types, namely the Russian circular batteries known as “Popofka’s,” the German. . . .
These first types of ships have caused a certain stir in the naval world, pardy because of the high position of their inventor, pardy because of the praise given them by the famous British shipbuilding engineer Reed. . . .
Thus, it should consequently be clear that the ship mentioned in Captain Southerlands’ comment as the true popoffka could not be known to the author when he wrote about popoffkas. The name the Czar a year later gave to another ship is therefore without bearing on the subject.
All of Captain Southerland’s other statements can be corroborated from the text.
In connection with the comment on the possibilities of transfering of ships from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the book further states that the popoffkas were built in sections in St. Petersburg and assembled in Nikolaev at the confluence of the Bug and Ingul Rivers.
Commander Rene Podhorsky, Royal Yugoslav Navy (Retired)—I take issue with Captain Southerland’s statement that the circular ironclads Novgorod and Vice Admiral Popoff were not popoffkas. It may be that the Livadia was also called a popoffka, but so also were the circular ironclads. J. F. v. Kronen- fels’s Das Schwimmende Flottenmaterial der See- mac hte, the father of all naval handbooks, published in Wien (Vienna, Austria) in 1881, refers to the warships as popoffkas.
The Law of Diminishing War Power
Captain John C. Ten Eyck, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The military difficulty being experienced by the United States and its allies in Southeast Asia is explained, in part, by a logistic phenomenon as old as the written history of war. Herodotus, “the father of history,” wrote how Cyrus the Great of Persia, in the 6th century, B.C., after many years of brilliant military success, undertook an over-extended campaign against a primitive Asiatic horde located more than 1,000 miles from Cyrus’ home base. There his diminished forces were severely defeated by an inferior foe.
The military phenomenon which explains this defeat might be termed the Law of Diminishing War Power. With the expenditure of a certain amount of effort and resources the amount of power that can be exerted at the end of a line of communication and supply diminishes as the length of line, the difficulty of transportation, and/or the vulnerability to enemy interdiction increase.
In almost every incident in the history of war where a powerful nation has been defeated by one far less powerful, one of the principal reasons for the defeat has been that the intrinsic power of the greater nation has been diminished by distance, by transportation difficulties or enemy interdiction.
This logistic phenomenon has been evident in classical, medieval, and modern times. The following campaigns of the 20th Century may be cited in support of this proposition. In each case an over-extended supply line was an important contributing factor to the defeat of the more powerful antagonist.
During the Russo-Japanese War of 19041905, Russia could put into the field a reasonably well-equipped army ten times as large as Japan could muster. However, because of the great distance across Siberia and because of the lack of adequate transportation facilities, Russia could never attain more than numerical equality in Manchuria. In the war at sea distance also played an important part. Russia had three fleets: one at Port Arthur, one at Vladivostok, and one in the Baltic. In numbers of comparable ships these three fleets were, in total, twice as great as the Japanese Navy. However, the division of these fleets made it possible for the better trained and equipped Japanese Navy to successively eliminate the two smaller Russian fleets before the Russian Baltic Fleet could complete the eighteen thousand mile journey around Africa to the Far East. The poor condition and morale of the Russian Baltic Fleet after this long journey also contributed to its defeat at the Battle of Tsushima. Distance made its contribution to the defeat of the larger Russian Navy as well as the larger Russian Army.
The defeat of the British and French Expeditionary Force by backward Turkey in the Gallipoli Campaign was due, in large part, to the distance of the campaign from the British and French home bases and to its proximity to Turkish sources of manpower and supply.
Prior to World War II the relatively large but poorly equipped Nationalist Chinese Army was able to withstand the assault of the far better equipped and more powerful Japanese Army by withdrawing to the interior. There the Japanese lines of communication were extended, diminishing the amount of power Japan could bring to bear in the hinterland to a point where it was insufficient to defeat the Chinese.
The United Nations armies in Korea were defeated by the more numerous but poorly equipped Chinese forces which had crossed the Yalu River. This was due, in part, to the fact that each arm of the two-pronged Allied attack into North Korea was badly overextended. Only by over-extending its power was it possible for the Allies to suffer a military defeat at the hands of the inferior Chinese.
The defeat of the French forces at Dien- bienphu was due entirely to the inability to supply these forces there by air power. Nor was it possible to evacuate this grossly overextended segment of French power; France chose the best possible way to suffer defeat at the hands of an inferior enemy.
The United States, by far the most powerful nation in the history of the world, and its Allies are today experiencing surprising difficulty in Vietnam. The U. S. difficulty against an inferior foe is due, in part, to the tremendous effort required to transport its power across the Pacific to distant Asia and to problems of supply after the Southeast Asiatic mainland is reached. The United States would be at an even greater disadvantage in any general land war on the mainland of China because of the vast spaces and distances that would be encountered there.
nRVRL
LOGISTICS
By Vice Admiral G. C. Dyer, USN (Ret.)
A basic text in logistics written for the naval officer seeking knowledge in this critical field. Emphasizes applied logistics within the Navy, describes joint, national, and international logistics planning. List Price $7.50 Member’s Price $6.00
The Law of Diminishing War Power is obviously a logistic phenomenon to be reckoned with in all distant political and military commitments.