Occasionally in the history of the U. S. Navy certain officers have stood apart from their contemporaries for reasons other than their abilities on the quarterdeck or in corresponding naval activities. These men were important because of a prescience on issues and ideas that proved them to be well in advance of their day.
Such a man was Captain David Porter (1780-1843), hero of both the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812, later an admiral in the Mexican Navy and, ultimately, American Minister to the Ottoman Empire at Constantinople. Ironically, his greatest claim to fame in our time is that he was the father of Admiral David Dixon Porter. But the elder Porter's contribution, aside from these aspects of his career, was that he was the first American naval officer to recognize and attempt to implement his country's strategic advantage in the Pacific Ocean.
As early as 1811, Porter had forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy a plan to destroy British commerce in the Pacific, principally whalers, in the event of war with England. More important, he suggested that, if the opportunities for preying on English shipping did not materialize, there were possibilities of exploration and discovery, with the hope of the annexation of new islands valuable to the United States. The Secretary's reply was guardedly noncommittal, although Porter later wrote that the plan had been approved.
When the War of 1812 began, Porter commanded the 32-gun frigate Essex. Given a wide latitude of action, he was ordered to harass enemy shipping in the Atlantic. By January 1813, he had failed to meet his squadron commander at each of three appointed rendezvous and by this time was far down the coast of South America. "The commodore's instructions now left it completely discretionary with me what course to pursue," he wrote, "and I determined on that which not only met his approbation, but the approbation of the then Secretary of the Navy." First, he purchased as many provisions as he could, noting that thereafter "the prizes we should make ... would supply us with such articles of naval stores as we should require."
Porter entered the Pacific in order to destroy the English whaling fleet, but by the same token, he added: "I had another object in view, of no less importance, which was the protection of the American whaleships." Proceeding with his plan, he took 12 English whalers in the vicinity of the Galapagos Islands between April and October 1813.
As a result of the operation, Porter reported to the Secretary of the Navy: "I had completely broken up the British navigation in the Pacific; the vessels which had not been captured by me were laid up and dare not venture out ... I had afforded the most ample protection to our own vessels, which were on my arrival, very numerous and unprotected. The valuable whale fishery there is entirely destroyed, and the actual damage we have done them may be estimated at two and a half millions of dollars, independent of expenses of vessels in search of me."
Shortly thereafter, Porter received word that a British squadron was seeking his ship, and he decided to sail to the Marquesas, 1,800 miles to the west, "to clean my ship's bottom, overhaul her rigging, and smoke her to kill the rats." The Essex, accompanied by several of her prizes, arrived at the group in October and anchored off Nukuhiva, staying until the middle of December 1813. This was the first visit by a U. S. naval vessel not only to the Marquesas, but to the entire Pacific Ocean as well.
Almost at once Porter became embroiled in the affairs of the natives who seemed to him to be continuously at war with one another. Trouble began when the dominant tribe of the area menaced the sailors at work caulking the Essex. Porter first attempted to intimidate the natives by musket fire, but with little result. "Seeing that these strange people were resolutely bent on trying the effect of their arms against ours," he explained, "I thought that the sooner they were convinced of their folly, the better it would be for themselves and us, as it would relieve us from the constant apprehension of an attack from them ..." In the short operation that followed, a ship's party led by an officer routed the Marquesans, killing five while losing none themselves.
Unfortunately, this victory further enmeshed Porter in local affairs, because now the nearby tribes insisted that as their conqueror, he was also their defender. They were particularly afraid of a warlike tribe of one of the mountain valleys called the Typees - the subject of Herman Melville's novel some 35 years later. Porter attempted to resolve the conflict peacefully, but a small party he had sent to negotiate with them was forced to retreat precipitously. He now had to move in force against the Typees or face the possible loss of his allies and the supplies that they had been providing. Mounting a more elaborate attack than before, he was again successful and dictated peace terms. From then on, the men of the Essex had no further trouble with any of the Marquesans.
Porter at the time deplored the use of his muskets against the clubs and rocks of the natives and he felt "repugnancy ... for the necessity which compelled me to make war against these happy and heroic people." Nevertheless, he clearly stated his philosophy when he wrote that "the natives should either be conciliated or overawed." He added that, in this case, he had "tried the former and failed."
However, the most important result of the visit strategically was Porter's annexation of Nukuhiva for the United States. Although expediency had partially dictated the act because he wanted to build a fort to protect several of the prizes which he was forced to leave, strategic considerations were uppermost in his mind. "I believed," Porter wrote, "that the possession of this island might at some future period be of importance to my country, and I was desirous of rendering her claim to it indisputable." He based the annexation on the right of prior discovery by two New England captains independent of each other in 1791. Porter published a declaration of annexation on 17 November 1813, in which he noted this, and added: "the natives to receive themselves that friendly protection which their defenseless situation so much required, have requested to be admitted into the great American family, whose pure republican policy approaches so near their own."
When Porter left in December, he detailed a complement of a midshipman and 21 men under the command of a Marine lieutenant to "remain until my return, or until they could receive further orders from me." This group stayed until the following May when they were forced by the Marquesans and the English prisoners to destroy their fort and leave. After a long, hazardous voyage in a small boat, they sighted the neutral haven of Hawaii, only to be captured by an English warship lurking in the area. Porter himself sailed to Valparaíso where he eventually was forced to leave and fight superior-gunned British warships waiting for him. The Essex was destroyed, and Porter and his men were captured and later paroled.
The U. S. government never officially took cognizance of the annexation of Nukuhiva, although Porter lobbied strenuously for approval. As late as February 1815, he was writing President James Monroe: "I have the honor to enclose you the original declaration of taking possession of Madison's Island (called by the natives Nooaveeva) situated in the South Pacific Ocean." He continued, "The climate, fertility, local situation, friendly disposition of the natives, and convenience of this island promise to make it at some future day of great importance to the vessels of the United States navigating the Pacific."
The U. S. government, however, completely ignored Porter's concept and his work, and the Marquesas were not visited again by an American naval vessel for over a decade. Porter himself ended the War of 1812 as one of its great naval heroes and subsequently turned to other facets of his brilliant career.