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During the latter part of the 16th century, three important naval campaigns took place in different parts of the world. They were in no way related as to location or forces involved. The first two—the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 and the Defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588—are well known. The third is virtually unknown to the Western world. Yet, the influence this battle exerted on the course of history is at least as significant as that of the other two.
By 1590, the Japanese Shogun, Heideyoshi, had brought all of feudal Japan under his control. The powerful daimyos or feudal barons were not, however, fully united behind him. Nor were the restless thousands of professional samurai warriors who, after they and their forbears had been fighting in civil wars for a hundred years, suddenly found themselves in a land of peace.
Heideyoshi had long dreamed of conquering the Ming Dynasty and bringing China into the Japanese Empire. The time now seemed most propitious. Such a campaign would unify the daimyos and the samurai behind him.
Heideyoshi blandly asked King Sonjo of Korea to assist him in the conquest of Korea’s suzerain, China. An outraged King Sonjo replied to Heideyoshi’s letter:
You stated in your letter that you were planning to invade the supreme nation [China] and requested our kingdom [Korea] join you in your military undertaking. ... We cannot even understand how you have dared to plan such an undertaking and make such a request from us . . . Moreover, to invade another nation is an act of which men of culture and intellectual attainments should feel ashamed ... We would conclude this letter by saying that your proposed undertaking is the most reckless, imprudent and daring of which we have ever heard.
Despite, or perhaps because of, Sonjo’s rebuff, Heideyoshi decided to attack China through Korea rather than risk the direct seaborne route through 400 miles of the Yellow Sea to the Chinese coast. An advance base was established on Tsushima, an island in the middle of the Japanese Straits only 40 miles from Pusan, the chief port of Korea. Here the main body of 137,000 troops was assembled. There were also 22,500 ready reserves on the island and an additional 75,000 reserves in Japan. The naval force numbered only 9,000 men. Provisions for 480,000 men were also collected at Tsushima.
The first division of 24,000 soldiers, most of whom were Christians under the Christian General Konishi, sailed for Pusan at the end of April 1592. The second division of like size, most of whom were Buddhists under the Buddhist General Kato, soon followed. This initial assault required 800 ships, and the force landed at Pusan almost unopposed. In reducing the local Korean garrison, the Japanese paused to take 8,000 heads before advancing 250 miles—in 20 days—up the Korean Peninsula to seize the capital city of Hanyang, now called Seoul.
The news of the initial Japanese landing at Pusan reached Admiral Yi Sun-sin at his base at Yosu, in the neighboring province of Cholla. He was admiral of this provincial naval force which was located in the southwest corner of Korea. On hearing the news, Admiral Yi at once made ready to sail to the aid of his countrymen at Pusan. His aides tried to dissuade him by pointing out that his primary duty was to protect their home province. But the Admiral understood the wider implications of the invasion, and persisted in his determination to attack the Japanese at the point of invasion in the Pusan area. His 80-ship fleet must have been in an excellent state of readiness—he conducted his first campaign before the Japanese invaders entered Seoul.
With only 80 ships against an 800-ship invading force, Admiral Yi faced enormous odds. Yet, among the Korean armada were the Kohbukson, or turtle ships, the first ironclads in history. And these unlikely looking warships would drastically reduce the odds.
The development of the Kohbukson probably commenced about 1000 A.D. King Hyonjong (1010-1031) of the Koryo Dynasty, ordered the construction of 75 “halberd” ships for use against Manchurian pirates who were raiding Korea with fleets of 40 to 50 ships, The halberd ships which routed the pirates were described by a contemporary Japanese as being constructed: “high, large, wide, and long; capable of carrying a great number of warriors and crewmen; the bow and sides are covered with iron plates, and on the surface of the plates, iron angles are affixed; and the halberd ship destroyed the wooden craft of the pirates by clashing against them.”
The halberd ship, not an ironclad, perhaps did use iron for protection. The Koreans had also developed tower ships, which carried troops for boarding. The large tower amidships served two functions: it provided height for troops to board an enemy, and, covered with wooden planks, protected the troops.
A most significant event occurred toward the end of the 14th century. A Korean named Choe Mu-son learned how to make gunpowder from the Mongols and brought this knowledge to Korea. In 1378, a new government agency, “the gunpowder office,” was created. Not only gunpowder, but also cannon and fire arrows were developed and manufactured. Later, during King Chung- jong’s reign (1506-1544), spear ships, which had large numbers of spears fastened to their tops, were used. These ships were decked over, obviously to keep the enemy from employing boarding tactics.
These developments and more were incorporated into the turtle ships which, because they were built in various places by various people, had some variations in the design. They averaged from 90 to 110 feet in length and about 25 to 30 feet in the beam, giving them a length-to-width ratio of about four to one.
The turtle ships were propelled by oars, having seven to ten on a side. Mr. Horace W. Underwood, a long-time resident of Korea, who has conducted detailed studies of the turtle ship, believes that each oar was manned by two men, one standing and one sitting. These ships were faster than any Japanese ship of that era, and most importantly, they did not rely on the wind. Sails were used only when cruising.
Following the traditional oriental method of construction still in vogue today, the Kohbukson had no keel but had a bottom of ten heavy planks. Each also had the large, deep, heavy rudder that is still found on Korean fishing boats today. It took eight men to man the tiller of the turtle ship. In the bow was located a turtle head which was four feet long, three feet wide, and tall enough to hold an observer inside. The 24 compartments below decks were used for storerooms, magazines, and living compartments.
It should be emphasized that these were not blue-water ships. They stayed—and fought—close to the coast.
The chief defensive feature of the turtle ship was its armored turtle-back construction. Bulwarks were extended above the normally open top deck, and then this space was completely decked over and enclosed with 4-inch planks. These planks were further covered with armor plate. This was probably three-eighths inch wrought iron cut in hexagonal shapes and riveted together. When the armor plate was in place on the convex wooden covering, it gave the appearance of a turtle’s back. This armored covering completely protected the crew. The only openings were gunports and loopholes. Sharp knives, spear heads, and spikes were attached to the armored covering. This feature, and the sloping sides, prevented boarding. Occasionally these knives and spikes were camouflaged in order to lure an unsuspecting enemy to try boarding tactics. Some turtle ships did have narrow passageways running fore and aft; but these were of no use to enemy boarding parties.
The most important offensive armaments were cannon. According to Korean naval sources, four types of cannon were used. The first four characters of a contemporary Chinese schoolbook “CHON,” “CHI,” “HYON” and “HWANG,” were used to designate the type of gun. Their respective specifications are as follows:
CHON CHI HYON HWANG
Weight 660 lbs 630 lbs 200 lbs 170 lbs
Caliber 5.5 in 4.0 in 2.5 in 2.2 in
Length 6.5 ft 5.67 ft 4.1 ft 3.5 ft
Gunpowder unknown 1.7 lbs unknown 1.4 lbs
Material copper copper iron copper
The maximum effective range of any of these guns was probably not more than a couple of hundred yards, and their life was between 100 and 200 rounds. The turtle ship was fitted with large gunports and small loopholes through which these cannon and individual weapons could be fired. Most of these openings were in the bulwarks that extended above the main deck. This deck served as the gundeck and was covered by the turtle back. There were also loopholes in the turtle back where archers could further discourage boarders. In addition to one gunport on either side of the stem of the rather blunt bow, there were from six to 12 gunports along each side. Thus, each ship could carry up to 26 cannon, including two bow-chasers. There were also about 20 loopholes along each side, located between the gunports. These loopholes were primarily for the use of individual weapons.
The turtle head also contained another offensive weapon. This was a smoke generator wherein sulphur and saltpeter were burned, emitting great clouds of smoke. Psychologically, this first recorded smokescreen generator struck terror into the hearts of the superstitious enemy sailors and, more practically, it masked the movements of the ship.
The crews of these ships probably numbered at least 100 officers and men, not including troops. During normal cruising, the gun crews and troops alternated at the oars.
Early in May 1592, Admiral Yi proceeded with his fleet to Hansan Do, a small island southwest of Pusan that straddled the Tsu- shima-Pusan sea route and commanded the sea route between Pusan and the west coast of Korea. This strategic location later became Yi’s main base. On this first campaign he sailed from Hansan Do to Koje Do, a larger island just to the east. Off the east coast of this island—near Okpo—his 80 ships encountered a Japanese fleet carrying large numbers of troops to Pusan. He had the wind at his back, and, in the restricted waters where the battle was fought, this reduced the maneuverability of the sailing ships of the enemy fleet. Primarily by the use of fire arrows, he sank 58 ships. Following this action, he made a reconnaissance along the Korean coast in the vicinity of Masan. At Jokjimpo, a few days later, he sank an additional 11 ships. He then returned to his base at Yosu by way of Hansan Do. The results of this sweep made a large impact on both sides. For the Japanese, it was the first setback of a force which theretofore had met no opposition. For the Koreans, who had seen half of their country overrun by a ferocious enemy against whom their own army was completely ineffectual, it was the first victory.
What manner of Japanese ships were these that crumbled beneath the fire and iron of the turtle ships?
The Japanese vessels were neither as large, as fast, nor as well armored and armed as the turtle ships. Although the Japanese had large, three-decked troopships, their average warship was about 50 feet long with a beam of about 20 feet. This gave them a length-to- width ratio of about 2.5-to-l, which compares very unfavorably with the four-to-one ratio of the turtle ship. Since the Japanese traveled as far as Indonesia, their sailing ships undoubtedly were more seaworthy than the Korean ships which stayed close to their peninsula. Each ship carried only one or two cannon. In addition, they carried crude launching machines, probably similar to the catapults developed in China during the Sung and Chin Dynasties. One Korean account states that the Japanese used “iron balls and stones as big as rice bowls.” The Japanese did have one advantage over the Koreans; they had muskets. These were acquired from the Portuguese who first came to Japan in 1543. They provided arquebuses as well as cannon to the Japanese. Because of the nature of the civil wars that had been raging in Japan for generations, the Japanese concentrated on the manufacture of muskets. By 1600, one Japanese soldier in ten had a firearm. These weapons had a range of about 80 yards. They proved to be of great value to the Japanese Army but were of little use in the war at sea against the turtle ship. On the other hand, this type of weapon was unknown in Korea until 1589. During this year, a Japanese envoy presented muskets to the King of Korea while trying to negotiate for Korean assistance in the forthcoming Japanese attack against China.
It is also interesting if not germane, to note that in 1590 Heideyoshi attempted to buy or lease two large, well-armed Portuguese ships that were then in Japan. The Portuguese refused to accept the offer, and thus was lost the opportunity to pit Western ships against the invincible turtle ships.
Admiral Yi’s second cruise took place during the latter part of May and early June. He sailed northward from Yosu to Noryang and then eastward along the rugged Korean coast. In the sea of Sachon he engaged a Japanese flotilla and sank 12 ships. Although slightly wounded in this battle, he continued eastward and three days later engaged another enemy fleet at Tang Po. Here he sank 21 of the Japanese ships, and it is reported that not one Korean was killed in this battle. He continued along the coast from Tang Po to Tanghang Po where he encountered a third enemy fleet. Here he fearlessly maneuvered to within close range of the three-decked Japanese flagship. The Japanese admiral in a dazzling uniform stood under a resplendent awning. The best marksman in the Korean flagship killed him with a single arrow. Without their leader the enemy fleet became disorganized, and 30 ships were sunk by the Koreans in the ensuing battle. From Tanghang Po they sailed onward to Yulpo on the island of Koje, not far from the scene of the first victory at Okpo. Here, seven more enemy ships were sunk. The remainder of the second cruise was spent in reconnoitering as far east as Kadok island, less than 15 miles from Pusan.
Admiral Yi returned to Yosu by way of Tang Po. On this cruise, 70 Japanese ships had been sunk, bringing his two-cruise total to 139 Japanese ships. The purpose of this second cruise had been the same as the first—to keep the Japanese from landing reinforcements along the Korean coast. But, by the time this second sweep was completed in early June, the invaders had captured Pyongyang—the present capital of North Korea—150 miles north of Seoul, and Korean morale was at a verly low ebb.
The two campaigns of Admiral Yi were the only bright spots of an otherwise disgraceful Korean resistance to the invader.
In Pyongyang, Japanese Generals Konishi and Kato paused until communications with the homeland could be assured. Supply and reinforcement, they knew, would be effected by sea from the vicinity of Pusan. This meant that the Japanese supply ships would sail westward along the south coast of Korea, and then turn northward through the Yellow Sea along the western coast of Korea to the vicinity of Pyongyang and the mouth of the Yalu River.
Once supplies and reinforcements were on hand, it would be a simple matter for them to march the 500 miles to Peiping, and crush the northern capital of China.
Early in July, a Japanese fleet carrying supplies and 100,000 (sic) troops sailed west from Pusan in an attempt to effect the planned resupply. At about the same time, Admiral Yi sailed eastward from his base at Yosu. His first day at sea was spent in exercising his fleet. This fact alone establishes him as a tactician centuries ahead of his time. On this third cruise he again went to the Sea of Sachon. Finding nothing there, he sailed southeast to Hansan Do. At Kyonneryang, near this island, he met and defeated a large enemy convoy. For the first time, in this battle he used the “crane wing” formation. This formation has been described as a fish trap or inverted “V”. The smaller scouts and patrol craft were in the van at the open ends of the “V” and the heavy ships were grouped at the vertex. As the formation approached the enemy, the scout and patrol craft forced the enemy inside the “V” where they were trapped and destroyed by the heavy ships. In this manner, he sank 71 ships at Kyonneryang.
After this battle, the Korean fleet continued eastward and met another Japanese conyoy at Ahnkolpo. Here, different tactics were employed. The Korean ships pretended to flee. When the Japanese were strung out in pursuit, the Koreans reversed course and easily defeated the enemy who were too far separated from each other to provide mutual support. In this battle, 20 Koreans were killed while the Japanese lost 48 ships. These two battles forced the Japanese to give up any idea of resupplying their armies in northern Korea by sea. After the Korean fleet returned to its base at Yosu, the King of Korea heaped many honors on Admiral Yi Sun-sin and also appointed him Admiral of all the Korean Navy.
Although the Japanese were unable to reinforce their armies in the North—and in fact could no longer bring large reinforcements anywhere into Korea—they still maintained a large base at Pusan. Admiral Yi was determined to eliminate this vital enemy headquarters. The fourth and final campaign of 1592 had as its objective the recapture of this vital port.
On an earlier trip to Masan, Admiral Yi had planned a joint ground and sea campaign against Pusan with the Korean Army commander in the area. Admiral Yi sailed in late August from Yosu to carry out the naval portion of this plan. At this time the Korean Navy consisted of 166 ships, of which 74 were classed as large and 92 were considered small. When this fleet penetrated the harbor to mount the attack, there were 500 enemy ships present. The Korean Navy entered, using a column formation. When the enemy tried to escape destruction by anchoring in shallow water, Admiral Yi sent divisions of small ships after them. Each division would approach to within range, fire its cannon and withdraw, to be replaced by another division. Thus, in the 16th century, was salvo fire demonstrated.
In this battle, a close friend of Yi’s had rammed his ship into the middle of the Japanese fleet, and as a result, this officer and most of his crew were killed. When the Admiral perceived what had happened, he charged his flagship into the fighting, grappled the battered hulk that had been his friend’s ship, and successfully withdrew it. When the battle of Pusan Harbor was over, more than half of the Japanese ships were sunk. Lamentably for the Koreans, the Korean Army achieved no similar success elsewhere, and the land assault against the fort at Pusan never materialized. Admiral Yi was forced to withdraw his victorious fleet and return to his base at Yosu.
The Pusan expedition was the last major campaign of 1592. The naval actions of 1592 had isolated the Japanese armies far up the Korean Peninsula, however, and by the end of that year, the Korean land forces had developed relatively effective guerrilla tactics, and were continually cutting off small bands of enemy troops on foraging expeditions. Also by the end of the year a Chinese army had crossed the Yalu River to aid the Koreans in the land campaign.
The Japanese evacuated Pyongyang in January 1593 and withdrew from Seoul by mid-April of the same year. By May the invaders had retreated to a line of 20 to 30 camps along the south coast of the peninsula.These camps were at least ten miles apart, so that each garrison could live off the surrounding country and at the same time offer each other mutual protection. This Japanese disposition of troops illustrates the totality of their isolation from Japan.
In September 1593, the main Chinese force returned to China. The entry of the Chinese into Korea had been a mixed blessing. While the Chinese had provided military assistance, at the same time they had required great quantities of supplies from a land that already had been laid waste by the enemy. Thousands upon thousands of Koreans had died of starvation during the winter of 1592-1593.
The war, confined to the southern part of the country, dragged on until 1596. This was a period of political maneuvering and intrigue between the Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese. Finally, in May 1596, 46 Japanese regiments embarked at Pusan to return to Japan. Four regiments remained behind to protect their base at Pusan. Along with the returning troops went both Chinese and Korean envoys. Their peace mission was less than successful when it was ascertained by Heideyoshi that the Chinese Emperor was offering to make Japan a vassal of China.
Although there were no major naval campaigns in this intervening period, Admiral Yi and his fleet were not idle. In July 1593, he had moved his base from Yosu to Hasan Do, which interdicted the important sea routes used by the Japanese. There, in addition to building a new base, he had his men make salt—which he sold to finance construction. Furthermore, he offered protection to the ships of Korean merchants for a price which also helped to defray his operating expenses.
In the latter part of 1596, Admiral Yi became engulfed in the intrigue of the Korean court and almost lost his head. The court was rent with factionalism and its attendant intrigue and treachery. During the war, several of Korea’s best generals had been beheaded because less successful and envious men had turned King Sonjo against them. This was one of the chief reasons why the Korean Army performed so pathetically. Admiral Yi’s triumphs had also created foes in the court. These enemies, thinking only of personal gain, were probably also secretly incited by the Japanese, who realized that this redoubtable admiral must be disposed of before they could mount a second invasion.
As a consequence, Admiral Yi was ordered to take his fleet by a specific route to intercept a reported Japanese invasion force. Knowing that this was a trick and that the waters through which he must pass were very treacherous, he refused to obey the order. He was immediately accused of failing to carry out the King’s orders and of “stealing the hearts of the people and attempting to usurp the throne of the King.”
He was taken to Seoul in chains, tortured, and tried. The King intended to put him to death, but relented when reminded of the Admiral’s great services earlier in the war. Instead of being beheaded, he was stripped of all rank. He accepted his fate and went to work as a common soldier. In a land where “face” and position were all-important, a lesser man than Yi would certainly have committed suicide.
With the intrepid Admiral out of the way, the stage was now set for the second Japanese invasion. It occurred in January 1597. This force was about half the size of the first, and numbered about 100,000 men. The purpose was not to attack China, but to punish Korea for having prevented the Japanese invasion of China in the first place. This time the invading force had to dispose of a Chinese garrison that remained at Namwon near the south coast, on the route to Seoul. This mission accomplished, the invaders headed north toward the capital, expecting the same easy success that had marked their march north in 1592. The unsuspecting Japanese were ambushed by a strong Korean force at Chiksan, some distance south of the Choryung Pass, which was the one mountain pass leading to Seoul. The remnants of the Japanese army that survived this trap fled southward and the remainder of the war was fought in the southern provinces. That this was a particularly vicious war is evidenced by the fact that on Heideyoshi’s orders, cargoes of salted and pickled Korean noses and ears, taken from killed or captured Koreans, were sent to Japan. These mementos were buried in the Japanese capital of Kyoto, and the place of interment can still be visited. Chinese reinforcements were much more prompt in arriving during this invasion. They also brought provisions and money to pay for supplies.
In the early stages of this new invasion, the fortunes of the Koreans were also reversed at sea—in this instance with disastrous effects. Yi Sun-sin was now a common soldier in the Army of General Kwon Yul, and Admiral Won Kyun, one of the conspirators against Admiral Yi, had assumed command of the Korean fleet. Yi’s laboriously built base at Hansan Do took on a new complexion. The Admiral’s harem was housed in the council house, and Korean sailors were tortured for the amusement of the Admiral and his Kiesang girls. In the late spring of 1597, Won Kyun was finally ordered to sea to interdict Japanese supplies and reinforcements. His fleet rendezvoused at Kadok Island, where they were immediately attacked by the enemy. The Korean fleet was badly beaten, and the surviving ships fled the scene. The Admiral tried to escape by beaching his flagship on an island and fleeing ashore. He was soon overtaken by the pursuing Japanese and forfeited his head. His ears and nose were probably in the next shipment to Japan.
The Koreans panicked and burned their base at Hansan Do, destroying all of their own supplies. When news of this debacle reached the court, there was a great hue and cry that Yi Sun-sin must be restored to command. The King reinstated Yi to his former rank and position, but by the time the Admiral had resumed command, his fleet consisted of a total of 10 ships.
His first battle with the Japanese took place in mid-September 1597 in the vicinity of Chin Do island, off the southwest coast of Korea. At this time he had only 12 ships, while his enemy numbered about 300 vessels The first phase of this action took place at night, when the Korean Admiral placed his small fleet in the shadow of Chin Do, which lay in the path of the approaching foe. While the enemy fleet was passing the hiding place, Admiral Yi maneuvering his ships in column, cut the Japanese fleet in two, firing on both sides as he penetrated the opposing formation. Believing that they were being attacked by a large fleet, the Japanese broke their formation and fled in all directions. The second phase took place the following day when Admiral Yi boldly sailed his small fleet into the middle of the enemy flotilla. Surrounded by the milling enemy, he succeeded in sinking 30 enemy ships before the remainder broke and fled. According to one account, additional Japanese ships were sunk in the river near Mokpo when they ran into submarine cables that the Koreans had placed in a narrow section of the river. A comparison of this engagement and the one earlier in the year at Kadok Island would seem to confirm the thought that men, not ships, win battles.
During this second invasion, the Japanese did not move their troops through Pusan, but used ports along the central southern coast. As the base at Hansan Do had been destroyed, Admiral Yi shifted his base to Kogum Do in February 1598. From this island off the southwest coast, his small fleet could more easily cope with the enemy. As before, his crews made salt and taxed seagoing merchants to pay the bill. Thus, almost a year passed before he fought his last major battle of the war, although during this time he annihilated a fleet of 26 enemy ships using his “crane wing” formation. It was also during this period that the sagacious old Admiral had to prove himself in yet another manner.
In early 1598, the Chinese Emperor sent Admiral Chin Lin, a vain and willful man, to Korea to be in charge of naval operation. Admiral Yi gained Chin’s confidence by giving the Chinese credit for victories that he, Admiral Yi, had fought and won. After the arrival of Admiral Chin Lin, Admiral Yi did the planning, the Chinese Admiral gave his assent, the Koreans did the fighting, and Admiral Chin Lin took the credit; for the selfless Korean Admiral put love of country far above any thoughts of personal power or glory.
The last sea battle of this war took place in November 1598. The veteran Japanese General Kato, with a large force, was besieged at Sunchon on the south central coast of Korea and General Yu Chung, who commanded the Korean and Chinese forces, asked Admiral Chin Lin to attack from the sea. Unfortunately the Chinese Admiral, in making the attack, failed to consider the ebbing tide, and his fleet was embedded on the mudflats just below the fort. The Japanese troops sortied and destroyed 48 ships of the Chinese-Ko- rean fleet. The Chinese Admiral was forced to escape by small boat.
As the campaign wore on, the wily General Kato was able to bribe both General Yu Chung and Admiral Chin Lin to allow him and his troops to escape. Admiral Yi Sun-sin could not be bribed, however, and the Japanese decided to try to slip past the Korean Admiral in the darkness just before dawn. Again, Admiral Yi was prepared and in the early morning battle he sank 50 ships. While running down the few remaining survivors, word reached Admiral Yi that a fresh Japanese fleet was attacking Admiral Chin Lin’s fleet in the vicinity of Noryang, which was just to the east. The Korean broke off the chase and hurried to the aid of his commander.
In this encounter, Yi again used entirely different tactics. He circled the Japanese fleet and drove the ships closer and closer together. When this maneuver was completed, the Koreans used a new weapon. This has been described both as a punt’ong, a type of flame thrower and also as a ho chon, a small cannon with a shell shaped like an arrow. The head of the arrow contained an incendiary charge. Regardless of which description is correct, this weapon was used to set the enemy fleet afire. Hundreds of ships were burned to the water’s edge.
At the moment of his greatest victory, Admiral Yi inexplicably took an exposed position in the bow of his flagship and, in the final action of his engagement, was struck by a bullet.
Thus died Korea’s greatest hero.
It can truly be said that this man, to whom King Sonjo awarded the most esteemed posthumous title “Loyal Valorous Lord Yi,” held back the conquest of the Far East by the Japanese for 300 years.
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1941, Captain Hagerman was assigned to the USS Lea (DD-118), 1941 to 1943, and USS Wadsworth (DD-516), 1943 to 1945. During the Korean War, he commanded the USS Wren (DD-568). He served in the USS Boston (CAG-1) from September 1956 until April 1958, and then, for 14 months, headed the Field Training Group, Naval Section, MAAG, Germany. He then attended the NATO Defense College in Paris, after which he served on the Joint Staff, JCS, from March 1960 until February 1962. On the staff of CinCLant from 1963 until 1965, he was Assistant Chief of Staff J-5, U.N./U.S. Forces Korea from March 1965 until July 1967. He is presently Director of the Military Assistance Program Division (Op 63) of OPNAV.