On 29 July 1964, a new breed of U. S. merchant ship stood out to sea. For the first time in U. S. maritime history, one man on the bridge executed the captain’s orders directly—by controlling the main engines and propeller himself. The ship was the Moore- McCormack Lines” SS Mormacargo.
By 1 July 1965, less than a year later, the Mormacargo had been joined by eight other automated/mechanized vessels which were by then fully operational in foreign trade. These ships comprise the vanguard of a new fleet of highly automated ships which, it is hoped, will help prevent the eclipse of the U. S. flag Merchant Marine.
U. S. shipping has for years been swamped by what Admiral David L. McDonald, U. S. Navy, has termed “a many-sided sea of troubles.” Describing this sea, Admiral McDonald has stated:
One of the sides is the obsolescence of ships. Another is the high building and operating costs. Another is instability in maritime labor affairs. Another is public apathy. Another is the lack of well-planned research and development.
But the really disturbing thought is that the plight of the Merchant Marine is a challenge to the American system itself. That is, the system of private ownership of ships which transport the products of privhtc manufacturers to the competitive markets of the world.
Noting that Russia had added more than five million deadweight tons of shipping in the last decade while “our own deadweight tonnage declined 765,000 tons,” Admiral McDonald declared that “it seems each generation of Americans takes a perverse delight in scuttling the Merchant Marine.” Along with these and other authoritative statements deploring the condition of the U. S. Merchant Marine, the necessity for a strong Merchant Marine continues to be emphasized. President L. B. Johnson has said:
A strong Merchant Marine is a guarantee of national security and a guarantee of economic stability. Some have called it the fourth arm of national defense.
To meet the challenge of foreign competition we need efficient vessels of advanced design with low operation costs. Today we carry less than 10 per cent of our trade in our own bottoms. That percentage must be increased.
Government studies have warned that, unless ships of the U. S. Merchant Marine become automated, they will be unable to compete on the high seas with foreign carriers. Management and labor agree that automation is the key to survival of the merchant fleet.
The United States pioneered in data automation. No other country can remotely approach the awesome labor-saving capacity of computer systems in this nation. In the general area of automation devices, no other nation has achieved as much in quantity, quality, and degree of sophistication as the United States. Yet, the United States has been woefully slow in applying these technological advantages to its Merchant Marine.
On both sides of the Iron Curtain, foreign countries have begun to automate their merchant vessels. Japan and Russia have large-scale shipboard automation programs underway that threaten to drive the U. S. Merchant Marine off the sea lanes of the world.
Shipboard labor costs are the primary reason to automate because they tend to increase at a faster rate than other costs. Dr. Harry Benford, Professor of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, University of Michigan, has stated:
While we are acutely aware of this situation [of rising labor costs] I believe it is even worse than generally portrayed. Most of us know that the average annual cost per crew member for wages and benefits is about $6,500 on a Great Lakes ship or about $10,000 on a salt water ship. What we tend to forget, however, are the less obvious crew costs, such as: Food, annual cost of investment in accommodations, cleaning and painting supplies, Protection & Indemnity insurance, hotel service, fuel, shipyard maintenance of accommodations, Holland Machinery insurance on accommodations, laundry, dishes, linen, medical expenses, repatriation, medical claims, overhead, and morale items.
Professor Benford emphasized that the gross sum of all these hidden costs was about twice the cost of direct wages and benefits. “In short, unlicensed crew costs are really three times as high as one might at first suppose.”
There are other compelling reasons to automate. The salient one, from a national point of view, is the recoupment of foreign exchange that the United States loses whenever it allows its export cargo to be carried in foreign flag ships. Even the minuscule percentage of export cargo that the United States carries in its own vessels earns about one billion dollars per annum in foreign exchange monies.
Additionally, the government would like to reduce the annual maritime subsidy bill of 216 million dollars for several reasons. But, whether or not the subsidy is reduced substantially, a depressed maritime industry as well as the maritime labor unions would prefer that the subsidy be expended to aid the building of new vessels that would allow the United States to compete more favorably and that would, of course, require staffing by union crews.
A further argument for automation is the greater efficiency that mechanized, automated control offers compared to human control. The Bailey Meter Company, which installed the automatic burner control mechanism aboard the SS William G. Mather on the Great Lakes, contends the system can save vessel operators as much as one million dollars in fuel, maintenance, and other costs during the life of the ship. Automation savings are particularly significant in Great Lakes vessels because these vessels have a 50-year economic life, twice that of the ocean-going counterparts.
Automation would also eliminate many errors of human judgment. Some 100 general cargo ships sustained in a year about $250,000 in machinery damage that was attributable to “crew negligence.”
A summary of current automation progress of some competing countries will convey an idea of the technical standards being established by foreign competitors and the speed with which automation of the U. S. merchant fleet must advance. Sadly, some of the foreign advances indicate that the United States no longer possesses the technological superiority that, once called into play, could act as a panacea for all our myriad maritime problems. If this is so, if our bag of technological tricks is no more awesome than that of foreign competitors—and they enjoy the added advantage of low labor costs—U. S. chances of regaining its lost maritime preeminence are slim indeed.
Japan. The Idemitsu Tanker Company of Tokyo has recently completed the construction of an automated 1,122-foot long, 205,000 deadweight-ton tanker. This tanker requires a crew of only 32 men or 10 fewer men than staff the 130,000 deadweight-ton Nissho Maru, her largest predecessor. The Idemitsu Maru, is powered by a highly automated engineering plant developing 32,000 horse power and has a speed of 16.75 knots.
Denmark. Since April 1964, the 55,750- deadweight-ton tanker Selma Dan has been running with no watch in the engine room. The main diesel engine is controlled from the main engine console on the bridge. If trouble develops in the engine room, an alarm sounds to summon engineers. Since no watch is maintained in the engine room, there is no need for a control room there.
Finland. The dry cargo vessel Finnmaid, fourth of a series of five 7,500 to 9,500-dead- weight-ton ships for O/Y Finnlines’ services, carried improvements over her three predecessors. The Finnmaid is fitted with automated equipment for remote control from the bridge, or from a separate control room and with complete data recording and extensive alarm systems. The vessel’s machinery is designed to run unmanned through the night.
Norway. The new automated Norwegian motor tanker L. R. Johnson, has been designed for experimental operation with a reduced crew. She will have a crew of only 20 men compared with the normal crew size of 27 for similar motor tankers. A sound-insulated control room in the engine spaces will be linked with the bridge by a two-way loudspeaker system. Propelling machinery will be operated by push button controls on the bridge with only emergency maneuvering controls located in the engine room. Equipment includes automatic lubrication of bearings and a two-way television monitor between the bridge and engine spaces.
United Kingdom. Ellerman’s Wilson Line, Ltd., . Hull, has received delivery of the 2,378-deadweight-ton Salerna, first of five sister ships being built for Scandinavian and Mediterranean service. These ships, so designed that they can be used as completely containerized cargo carriers, have bridge control of the main engine, bow thrust units, deck cranes, side-loading doors, and fork-lift trucks. The crew will total only 17, with but one man in the engine room while the vessel is at sea.
Soviet Union. While at present behind the West in ship design, the Soviet Union is advancing rapidly in all phases of marine technology in their fleet, the Russians are saving the time and money incurred in experimentation. They are also, however, developing new concepts independently. Currently the Soviets are stressing shipboard automation and modern cargo-handling gear, and they may have outdistanced the Free World nations in the design of and experimentation with gas turbines and hydrofoils.
The Priboj, a prototype dry cargo vessel for the fishing fleet, is as highly mechanized as any automated ship afloat today. She has direct bridge control of the main engine by a system designed for easy operation by one man. In the engine room there is a central control desk containing remote control gear and monitoring instrumentation for the complete machinery installation. This includes, but is not limited to, automatic control of the compressors, boilers, diesel generators, and the oil, water, and fire pumps. The automatic and remote control system is monitored by electrical signals to comply with the requirement for data-logging on strip chart recorders. Other types of vessels are being equipped with similar mechanized features. Russian ship automation runs the gamut from such innovations as bow television to facilitate docking to hydraulically powered hatch covers.
Experimentation in automation has further resulted in the world’s first unmanned, remotely controlled vessel. The Inzhener A. Pustoshkin, a “push button” river tanker, operates between ports without a crew on board. Although now operating only on a restricted route, this vessel demonstrates the extent of Russian penetration into the field of marine automation. (See Progress, p. 147.)
The views that have been publicly expressed by labor and management regarding ship automation are surprisingly similar.
Examination of the individual views of leading maritime unionists is the most valuable source and is necessary in any attempt to determine a “union position.” The following excerpts are considered to be representative of union statements on automation.
In a speech before the Symposium on Automation at the Baltimore Propeller Club, 17 November 1964, Mr. Joseph Curran, President of the National Maritime Union, said:
We are prepared, and I can safely say that this is true of all the Maritime unions, we are prepared to co-operate on questions of wages, on questions of manning, on all the other questions involved—provided that all the elements —government, shipowners, everybody connected with the industry and the economy— will agree to co-operate . . .
Mel Barisic, Automation Director for the NMU, stressed the need for greater automation and more ships when he said:
We can’t have a Merchant Marine unless we get new ships. Eighty percent of our ships today are 17 or 18 years old. Any large-scale replacement program must have government assistance and the government has made it clear it will not put out any money for ships unless the plans include advanced automated features.
William W. Jordan, Jr., a Vice President of the Seafarer’s International Union of North America, said that any attempt to use automation simply to “increase profits of ship companies while at the same time cutting jobs, and eliminating seamen” would be short-sighted and self-defeating.
The purpose of automation will be defeated if in the process we allow American jobs to be destroyed under the guise of achieving efficiency. A larger American flag fleet, a healthier fleet, a more competitive fleet, a fleet with increased job opportunities for American seamen and other maritime workers should be the true goal of automation.
The Masters, Mates, and Pilots’ view on automation is perhaps best expressed by Maurice J. Weiss, Public Relations Director of the group, who maintains that little has changed in the past 200 years to cause any substantial impact on the basic nature of the deck officer’s craft or the distinguishing features of the professional group of seafaring personnel. His group argues that merely placing radar, smoke detection apparatus, or direct engine control mechanisms on the bridge does not of itself constitute automation. It appears that the MMP would strongly resist any manpower displacement on the bridge resulting from automated/mechanized techniques.
The Marine Engineers Beneficial Association failed to answer the author’s queries seeking its views on shipboard automation. The failure to reply may have been due to the frequent embroilments of this union in strikes and other work stoppages.
Verbally, at least, most seafaring unions, with the exception of the Masters, Mates, and Pilots, seem to exhibit a straightforward and positive approach to automation. There are, however, customary restrictive clauses in work agreements in the shipping industry that make the future of automation less certain.
Traditionally, shipboard personnel are divided into two groups: the unlicensed crew members and the licensed officer group. Unlicensed crew members are further divided into those working on deck, those in the engineering department, and those in catering or the steward department. Unlicensed personnel in all three departments of a given vessel generally have the same union representation except for the Pacific Coast where unlicensed personnel are organized into separate unions according to their job specialty. Licensed personnel are grouped as deck officers, engineering officers, pursers, and radio officers. They are organized into separate unions depending on their specialty.
Despite the fact that unlicensed crewmen in all three departments in the U. S. flag Merchant Marine may be represented by the same union, those crewmen working in one department are not required to do work normally performed in another department. The introduction of automation/mechanization devices would result in fewer jobs on any given vessel. Of the remaining jobs some would probably be entirely new because they would evolve from a combination of duties that would intersect both departmental lines and lines of union jurisdiction.
The word “automation” as used in the maritime industry is interchangeable with the word “mechanization” and is so used throughout this discussion. In general, “automation” includes any feature installed on vessels that effectively eases or eliminates crew operating duties, reduces ship upkeep and maintenance, or improves habitability standards for the smaller crews of automated vessels.
The special equipment can be functionally divided into two groups: mechanization equipment, which replaces human muscles; and automation equipment, which replaces human sensing, control, and recording.
An analysis of ship automation is best undertaken by categorizing innovations according to the three major shipboard departments: the deck, engine, and steward departments. A fourth category, personnel berthing spaces, is treated separately because automation in this area does not affect the traditional shipboard organization for work.
Deck Department. In the deck department, crew duties are concentrated primarily on docking and undocking, stowage of cargo, and painting and preservation of all surfaces exposed to weather. The deck department is also responsible for a certain amount of interior maintenance.
One new feature that reduces or eliminates ship upkeep and maintenance in the deck department is the inorganic zinc coating that is applied to all steel surfaces exposed to weather. This protective overlay eliminates most painting. Additionally, solid vinyl tile and terrazzo deck coverings to reduce upkeep, and colored marine veneer interior bulkheads designed to eliminate painting have been installed. Fiberglass plastic lifeboats which need little maintenance are becoming the accepted standard. The new automated ships use aluminum extensively for gangways, ladders, and hand-rails above the main deck and also use stainless steel tubing on weather- deck hydraulic hatches to reduce maintenance.
Improvements to deck department cargohandling equipment include new power- operated cargo gear with monel grease fittings to reduce replacements and assure more positive greasing. Additionally, hydraulic hatch covers have been installed to facilitate operation and to eliminate the use of tarpaulins, battens and other extensive handwork operations performed by the crew.
In anchoring, docking, and undocking, a hydraulic anchor windlass allows simple one- man operation. Automatic tension mooring winches, fore and aft, are also installed in many vessels for the purpose of assisting in docking and undocking.
Engine Department. Of the changes in all parts of the new automated ships, the greatest changes are in the engine room operation. A central control station, automatic data logger and bridge control station are the three main elements. Their effect on the customary duties of engine department personnel is revolutionary.
The heart of this engine department automation equipment is a console that furnishes remote controls for engines, boilers, and auxiliary equipment. Orders are received by a data logger that automatically records information concerning operating components in the engine room and that provides a printed record for reference and comparison. At sea, a vessel so automated can be operated from the bridge by an officer who can control the engine room throttle directly from the bridge or can relay orders by conventional telegraph system.
Only one engineer is needed on watch to observe dials and to record the functioning of the engineering plant. Even this engineer’s duties could be assumed by an officer on the bridge manning a control system that complements the engine room control system. The modern automated engine plant is becoming virtually independent of ship size.
The new engine department duties entailed in automated ship operation require added skills and knowledge. The experience achieved standing watch in the engine room of conventional vessels is no longer sufficient. Because of sophisticated control mechanisms in automated ships, a knowledge of the basic principles of electricity will be important. At least one union, the National Maritime Union, has instituted training programs that will provide unlicensed engineering personnel with the opportunity to secure the necessary knowledge. Additionally, some new ratings will be established, such as Deck Engine Mechanic and Engine Man.
Steward Department. In automated vessels, steward department spaces, equipment, materials, and methods have been arranged in such a way as to make optimum use of low- maintenance materials and economical foodhandling processes. Mess rooms have been relocated next to the galley. Chill boxes, thaw boxes, and freeze boxes have been located in the galley proper. Storage rooms, have in most cases been located on the same level as the galley.
Personnel Berthing Spaces. Generally there is one man to a room in automated vessels, and heads and showers are adjacent to all rooms. In each room there is a call system. The oncoming watch can be called from the bridge and from the engine room. Such calls eliminate the waking of each watch by a crewman.
The foregoing review of the kinds of changes effected by automation indicates how and to what extent the tasks of personnel in the Merchant Marine are being transformed or converted. A seaman who previously spent a portion of his time chipping and painting, preserving standard rigging, lashing down cargo, and manually steering the ship is being technologically displaced by equipment that requires greater technical proficiency for proper operation and especially greater engineering skill in its maintenance. Thus, crews will require a new inventory of skills. Many of these skills will be acquired by retraining of already employed personnel.
Of the nine automated/mechanized U. S. vessels operational in July 1965—Mormacargo Mormacvega, Mormalynx, Mormacrigel, Mor- macaltair, Mormacdraco, American Racer, American Rover and American Ranger—six are Moore- McCormack Lines’ ships and three operate in foreign trade for United States Lines. These ships have essentially the same length, beam, carrying capacity, and speed. Additionally, the over-all contract price per vessel is almost identical. Since, as shown in Table 1, these competing lines’ vessels are so similar in nearly every detail, one vessel—SS Mormacargo—will represent all for purposes of establishing manning comparisons with a conventional cargo ship, the American Challenger, Table 2.
Table 1.
|
||
|
American Racer |
Mormacargo |
Length Over-all |
534' 9" |
550' 9' |
Maximum Beam |
75' |
75' |
Bale carrying capacity (cu. ft.) |
546,050 |
615,303 |
Builder |
Sun Ship building |
Ingalls Shipbuilding |
Over-all Contract price (5 ship bid) |
$10,590,000 |
$10,375,000 |
Liquid capacity (cu. ft.) |
54,980 |
51,992 |
Speed (knots) |
20.8 |
21 |
Manning (subject to change due to strikes or collective bargaining) |
37 |
35 |
Table 2. |
||
|
SS American Challenger |
SS Mormacargo |
Complement |
49 |
35 |
Base Wages |
$26,415.32 |
$26,092.58 |
Overtime (46%) |
12,151.05 |
9,242.59 |
Pension and Welfare |
4,234.80 |
3,147.15 |
Vacation |
4,843.10 |
2,817.17 |
Federal Old Age Benefits & Subsistence |
1,320.77 |
1,004.63 |
Totals |
$48,964.04 -37,304.12 |
$37,304.12 |
|
||
Saving Per Month |
$11,659.20 |
|
Per Month (rounded) |
$11,660.00 |
|
Projected To One Year |
$139,920.00 |
|
Projected To 25 Year Life |
$3,498,000.00 |
|
|
||
Subsistence Per Month (rounded) |
$3,087.00 |
$2,205.00 |
Projected To One Year |
$10,584.00 |
|
Projected To 25-Year Life |
$264,600.00 |
The operating economies that can be realized from automation are considerable. Manning reductions of 28.5 per cent (from a complement of 49 personnel in a conventional ship, to 35 in an automated/mechanized ship) cut monthly wage expenses from $48,964.04 to $37,304.12—a reduction in wages of 23.8 per cent.
Projecting wage cost reduction in accordance with data given in Table 2 to the normal 25-year life span of each vessel yields wage cost savings alone of almost 3.5 million dollars per ship. Adding the savings on subsistence over a projected 25-year period saves another quarter-million dollars.
Since each ship initially costs approximately 10.3 million dollars, for every three ships built enough savings would be realized through automation to finance the construction of a fourth automated vessel. This fourth vessel could absorb crew members previously displaced by automation and could add another new and highly competitive vessel to the U. S. Merchant Marine.
Most experts agree that crew size reductions in U. S. merchant ships have scarcely begun.
A 1964 publication by Messrs. Tangerini, Dillon, and Fixman, of the U. S. Maritime Administration, lists five automation projects now underway that are expected to improve the competitive position of U. S. flag vessels— and, of course, reduce crew sizes:
• The development of a self-regulating steam generator in which air flow and oil flow are proportioned to required steam flow by means of a small turbine in series with the superheater. This turbine drives the forced draft blowers and fuel oil metering pump so no other automatic controls are necessary.
• The development of a “look-out” assist device. This device will operate independently of ship’s radar and will serve as a proximity warning indicator.
• The development of improved mooring systems so that the operation of handling ships’ mooring lines can be automated.
• A study of the reliability and maintainability of merchant ships’ machinery and systems.
• A parametric study of maneuvering propulsion devices such as bow thrusters, to determine the requirements and economics of these devices.
Once these projects are accomplished, the following engineering features will ultimately be effected in U. S. merchant ships:
• Full and completely automated boilers, using self re-cycling controls.
• Full and complete automation of all main engine auxiliaries.
• Full and complete automation of all ship service systems.
• Remote control of all fuel and ballast systems.
• Integration of all monitors and ship condition equipment into a ship operations office adjacent to the bridge and reasonably accessible to the engine room.
• Rearrangement of spaces to provide for close integration of the functions of the operations office and the bridge.
Technically, a ship design incorporating all these features could be operated by as few as 17 men, with more reliability and safety than present ships, and without a major increase in construction cost. Crew size reductions in the U. S. flag Merchant Marine have not, therefore, been as drastic as present engineering technology would permit. Neither have crew size reductions in the fleets of foreign maritime competitors kept pace with advancing technology.
The potential impact of the total reduction in jobs per vessel depends primarily on two factors: the degree of automation in each vessel, and the rate at which such vessels are placed in service.
It is reasonable to assume, then, that manpower displacement will be held to 14 personnel per vessel, and that the vessels will continue to be placed in the service at the current average rate of 13 per year. It thus follows that a total of 14 times 13, or 182 personnel of various skill categories would be displaced by automation each year if automation continues at the present pace.
As indicated earlier, attrition of the work force through natural causes is a highly significant factor in any discussion of displacement of personnel by automation. For the purpose of this discussion, natural causes include retirements, deaths, voluntary separations, or any other reason that may cause seafaring personnel to leave the work force. Reduction resulting from natural attrition alone might be sufficient to compensate for job losses caused by automation.
Unfortunately, no meaningful work force attrition figures were available from the U. S. Maritime Administration. Neither were the unions nor the individual companies able to provide such figures on a detailed and system-wide basis. The Maritime Cargo Transportation Conference (MCTC) was, however, able to provide data on maritime work force attrition. The MCTC, a non-profit research organ of the National Academy of Sciences, has done research directed toward improvement of U. S. water transportation.
At present, the MCTC is undertaking an impartial evaluation of significant proposed shipboard improvements to determine their economic worth and to estimate and evaluate their impact on the interests of management, labor, government, and the general public. This evaluation is called the Shipboard Mechanization and Manpower (SM & M) Study. The study covers all categories of shipboard labor and all classes of U. S.-owned merchant ships. It also includes the related shoreside functions of the system that husband the ships while they are in port.
At the 24 November 1964 MCTC Board Meeting, Dr. P. B. Buck, then Technical Director of MCTC, made the following comments regarding work force attrition:
. . . we can project what will happen if we assume that what has been happening to the work force from 1959 to 1962 will continue to happen. On this basis, we have already projected each work category of the work force using Coast Guard records. They have indicated the number of men dropping out of the system each year from 1959 to our study year of 1962. The records also tell us how many new men actually got jobs over this period so that we are able to get a net attrition figure. By applying this net attrition figure for each age and date of entry group to men observed in our study year and assuming a new group comes in every year equivalent to that entering over the past three years, we can estimate what will happen in the future. ... All groups are declining at a rate greater than Jive per cent per year. In ten years all will be reduced to one-half or less of their 1962 size.
Natural attrition alone, therefore, will more than cover the number of seagoing jobs lost each year under existing automation/ mechanization programs. It appears, moreover, that automation could progress much further in degree, rate, and kind without adversely affecting the socio-economic status of the U. S. seafaring work force.
The above projections show the vital role natural attrition will play in cushioning or erasing the impact of worker displacement due to automation. At the same time these projections raise the serious problem of potential shortages of personnel in the higher skill levels of the seafaring work force. These shortages are daily becoming more acute due to the rapid expansion of the merchant marine to meet the demands of the war in Vietnam.
Although large-scale manpower displacement in the seafaring work force due to shipboard automation is not foreseeable, the balance of jobs by work categories as earlier discussed is bound to be affected. Through retraining, upgrading, and internal shifting of personnel it appears possible to adjust many imbalances. Such a program would depend upon the unions’ co-operation and resiliency on matters like work rules and crew sizes.
According to Dr. Buck:
Work rules and crew sizes cannot be carved in stone. They must be treated as adjustable items, Upgrading and transferring seamen from one rating group to another should be facilitated, not only by providing training and re-training, but also by making pension rights transferable. While a man may be considered to have a right to his job, similar to a property right, the job cannot be deeded as unimprovable, untransferable property with inflexible boundaries.
Convincing union leaders of Dr. Buck’s argument that work rules, crew sizes, and rating specialties are adjustable items will not be an easy task. The difficulty lies in the fact that maritime union leaders, like all other union leaders, depend for their financial well being on the dues paid by their members. To ask a maritime union leader to adjust work rules and scale crew sizes downward is tantamount to asking him to take a cut in pay.
Neither is a maritime unionist apt to allow one of his specialty-labeled mariners to perform work that would cross departmental lines, lines of union jurisdiction, or lines of work specialty. The reason, once again, is the potential loss of dues.
Despite their traditional opposition to making changes in work rules, crew sizes, and job transferability, seafaring labor unions may soon find themselves in a new and incongruous role. Recognizing the futility of trying to halt technological change and recognizing that technological change may, in fact, mean the difference between jobs or no jobs for American mariners, unions may find it necessary to concentrate on training their members and encouraging them to change jobs on shipboard or find new jobs ashore.
An analysis of the foregoing compels the following conclusions:
• The lack of a positive government program that would safeguard the future U. S. Merchant Marine has weakened the chances for any wide-scale adoption of shipboard automation. Seafaring labor unions regard automation as inevitable and have taken some positive steps to cope with its effects on their membership. Management, too, has adopted a positive view regarding automation and speaks candidly about its use in merchant ships. Government, on the other hand, appears to be motivated towards automation mainly by a desire to reduce the level of maritime subsidy. By failing Co adopt a program that would ensure the future of the Merchant Marine, the government has failed to provide the positive atmosphere wherein labor and management can come together and draft meaningful long-term automation agreements.
• The need for labor stability as a condition precedent for inaugurating any large- scale or long-range automation programs has been widely publicized. Observers of the maritime industry regard as senseless any plan to invest millions of dollars in federal and private monies if the industry continues to be plagued by strikes, work stoppages, and inter-union rivalries. Only integrated arbitration machinery embracing all maritime unions and associations of shipowners will create the stability needed.
• Any manpower displacement problems created by the orderly introduction of automated ships into the U. S. flag Merchant Marine would be more than erased by natural attrition of the seafaring work force. An analysis of labor force statistics provided by the Maritime Cargo Transportation Conference and the U. S. Maritime Administration indicates that natural attrition not only is cushioning or erasing the impact of automation on manpower displacement, but also it will be causing some serious manpower shortages in the higher skill categories.
• Restrictive clauses in shipboard work agreements coupled with uneconomic manning practices have an inhibiting effect on shipboard automation. Management must be given some leeway for action in combining or changing jobs of seafaring personnel if automation is to achieve its designated goals. Crew sizes can be made more flexible if unions will allow upgrading and transferring of seamen from one rating group to another. Providing seafarers with training and making pension rights transferable will facilitate the filling of new positions created by automation.
• Projecting wage cost reductions due to automation to the normal 25-year life span of a typically automated vessel shows that wage cost savings of almost 3.5 million dollars per ship are possible. Adding to this amount the projected savings of subsistence over a 25- year period saves another quarter million dollars. Since each ship initially costs 10.3 million dollars, for every three automated ships built enough savings would be realized to finance the construction of a fourth automated vessel.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the following recommendations are suggested:
• The U. S. government should adopt a positive program that would safeguard the future of the Merchant Marine. The adoption of such a program would facilitate for labor and management the drafting of meaningful automation work agreements. Without such agreements, no progressive program of shipboard automation can be undertaken.
• The U. S. government should set up integrated arbitration machinery embracing all maritime unions and associations of shipowners in order to create labor stability in the maritime industry. The need for labor stability as a condition precedent for any meaningful large-scale shipboard automation program has long been recognized. The plans for such integrated industry-wide arbitration machinery already exists. It remains for the President of the United States to ensure that these plans become policy and further to ensure that policy’s implementation.
• Restrictive clauses in shipboard work agreements should be changed to permit the upgrading and transferring of seamen from one rating group to another. Uneconomic manning practices should be discontinued. Work rules and crew sizes should be made more flexible if maximum benefits are to be realized from automation.
• Seafaring labor unions should promote the expansion of training and retraining programs now in operation. Such training and retraining should be financed by government, the industry, and the unions and should focus on upgrading workers to higher skill categories; through such an approach shortages of skilled maritime personnel may be readily filled from within the pool of maritime manpower. If pension rights should be made transferable, seamen temporarily displaced by automation may find new jobs both at sea and ashore more readily.
• Monetary savings realized from ship automation should be applied to the building of new vessels. New vessels so built would serve the dual purpose of absorbing any crew members previously displaced by automation and of adding new and highly competitive vessel assets to the U. S. Merchant Marine. Linking of monetary savings with future vessel expansion would also serve to spotlight benefits which so accrue as well as and to improve public understanding of the Merchant Marine.