The split between the two giants of the Communist world—the Soviet Union and China—has created a new situation in the realm of international relations. This situation places in a new perspective for the West not only problems of diplomacy, economics, and politics, but also problems of counteraction to Communist subversive activities.
Although the ultimate common goal of militant Communism—world revolution—- remains unchanged, the Soviet theory and practice of revolutionary movement and Communist expansion vary greatly from the Chinese. They vary in spite of the fact that the leaders of both countries insist that their concepts are based on the same Marxist- Leninist ideology. This phenomenon appears because the “scientific” character of Marxist- Leninist theory gives neither an orderly or exact interpretation of the socio-historical process nor a particularly accurate definition of the prerequisites and conditions necessary for revolution. Indeed, the views expressed by Marx have been supplemented and corrected by Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and other Communist leaders in conformity not only with their respective experiences in “class struggles,” but also with logical thinking and their national interests.
Marx's Theory. Karl Marx thought primarily along economic lines. He considered that class struggle was the result of irreconcilable social contradictions. This struggle in capitalist society inevitably and automatically transforms the working class into an organized and moving force of socialist revolution. The Communist party, consisting primarily of intellectuals often not even of proletarian origin, has the task of enlightening the workers regarding
their role in the socio-historical process, and raising their class consciousness to such a level that they recognize the possibility and necessity for socialist revolution. When this task is accomplished, the party may lead the insurrection, but at the same time it must realize that “insurrection, like war, is an art” and is subject to the following maxims:
• Never embark on a course of insurrection unless the necessary readiness and resoluteness exist.
• Before embarking on the course of insurrection, it is necessary to have sufficient forces to overcome a well organized, disciplined enemy who “possesses traditional authority.”
• At the beginning of the insurrection, it is necessary to take the enemy by surprise before he can consolidate his strength.
• Once the insurrection has started, it is necessary to act decisively and aggressively. Defense is the death of insurrection.
• Daily successes must be attained in order to maintain good morale on the side of the insurrection and in order to attract to it those wavering individuals who always join the stronger side.
Lenin's Theory and Practice. Nikolai Lenin, in contrast to Marx, thought primarily along pragmatic political lines. He theorized that the party must actively direct the class struggle of the proletariat, serve as its vanguard, organize and lead the assault on the capitalist regime. He accepted the Marxist maxims of insurrection and in addition defined those objective factors, that in their entirety represent a revolutionary situation, namely:
• A significant deterioration in the material living conditions of the people.
• An increased dissatisfaction among the majority of people and their active desire to change the existing regime.
• A governmental crisis during which the ruling class is no longer able to rule the country “the old way.”
Lenin added the tenet that revolution does not necessarily flow from every revolutionary situation, but only from those in which objective factors are joined with subjective. By subjective factors he had in mind:
• The presence of a well organized party of professional revolutionaries;
• The careful preparation of a plan, headquarters, and armed forces to support the insurrection;
• The active agitation of the masses by the use of popular slogans and promises; and
• The application of conspiracy and terror against those resisting the insurrection.
Lenin was not inclined to await passively the development of the objective conditions necessary for revolution, spontaneous insurrection, or civil war. He considered that even in a period of crisis, the “bourgeois government” would not fall unless it was overthrown by force. He further stated that all means used by Communist parties for “class struggle” are moral and just and that Communists must support any civil war against the bourgeoisie, even if the war is started under leadership other than their own and has little chance for success. He recommended that they learn and gain experiences from their failures. In this manner, Lenin introduced the elements of strict organization and voluntarism into the theory of Communist revolution and civil war.
In actual practice, Lenin followed these principles in seizing power in Petrograd and Moscow in 1917, and in extending this power over all Russia, and in ignoring the national governments of the White Russian, Ukrainian, Caucasian, and Central Asian Republics which had declared their independence from the Communist government in Moscow. In 1919, he formed a headquarters for world revolution—the Comintern—which, through its apparatus, Communist parties and specially created international organizations, carried out subversive activities in the democratic countries and trained national, political, and military cadres to that end. Communist power was established by the Red Army in
Outer Mongolia (1921), and before that a similar attempt was made in Poland (1920). By means of conspiracy and the activities of Comintern agents and armed workers’ detachments, other unsuccessful attempts were made in an attempt to carry out Communist revolution in Finland and Austria (1918), Hungary (1919), Germany (1919-1920), and Bulgaria (1922-1923).
Having suffered these reverses in Europe, Lenin began to seek a new path for Communist expansion. In this search his glance soon fell on the East. He was drawn by the fact that a “national-liberation movement” by the people of this part of the world could be used to undermine the position of the West and consequently speed up the process of world revolution. In 1923, he summarized his views on this question as follows:
In the final analysis the outcome of the struggle depends on the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., make up the overwhelming majority of the world’s population. In recent years this majority has, with unusual swiftness, been drawn into the struggle for its liberation and there cannot be a shadow of doubt as to what will be the final outcome of the world struggle. The ultimate victory of socialism is completely and unconditionally guaranteed.
Since the Communist parties in the Eastern countries were weak, the Comintern, on Lenin’s suggestion, adopted the following tactic of revolution: the Communist parties were to enter into temporary alliances and coalition governments with the national bourgeois parties who were themselves striving for independence (the first step of revolution). These alliances and coalitions were to be used by the Communists for infiltration of the government and public organizations. It would allow them to spread Communist propaganda in order to attract to their side not only the workers, but also the numerous peasants of these countries and ultimately create a revolutionary army. Having reached, by these means, a definite level of influence and strength in their countries, the Communist parties must proceed to the second and decisive step of revolution—armed insurrection.
It should be noted that one of the most distinguished Communist figures of the time, Leon Trotsky, took an even more radical position. He believed that world revolution must develop quickly and without interruption. To obtain this end, Communist parties should not enter into alliances with the bourgeois parties and the peasants, thus omitting the first “bourgeois-democratic” step of the revolution. He also considered that the international Communist movement and the Soviet Union must assist Communist parties by all possible means, including armed intervention. Lenin, who felt that “the revolutionary must have a warm heart and a cool head,” was against such revolutionary extremism, however, unless the external and internal situation in the given country favored such tactics.
Stalin’s Views and Practice. Josef Stalin strove for the fastest possible industrialization of the Soviet Union in order to create a material and moral base for world revolution. Simultaneously, he applied Lenin’s concepts concerning the utilization of various means of subversive and military activities to further Communist expansion. During the years 1924-1927, both the Chinese Communists and their Soviet advisors in the Kuomintang and its army tried by means of infiltration and “people’s war” to secure power for the Chinese Communist party. A standing Kremlin directive to all Communist parties declared: Communists must organize insurrections, partisan detachments, and civil wars in all countries where conditions are favorable, and especially in those countries where war is being carried on. During this period, the activities of the Comintern were continually extended and developed.
During the middle 1930s, the tactic of “the popular front” was formulated. The Communist parties were to strive for participation in coalition governments of “the popular front,” and the Communists themselves were to join bourgeoisie and fascist organizations in order to legalize Communist subversive activities. In 1935, the 7th Congress of the Comintern adopted a resolution in which this tactic was cynically called the tactic of the Trojan horse, and in Communist jargon the combination of legal-illegal party structure was called “the iceberg method.”
This is not to say that Stalin rejected the principle of exporting revolution by means of armed aggression. The Soviet Union took an active part in the Spanish Civil War (1936- 1939), giving various types of aid to the pro- Communist Republican government. The aid took the form of war material, international Communist brigades, military advisors, instructors and even aviation, armor, and artillery forces. In 1939-40, using its armed forces, the Kremlin annexed and established Communist regimes in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia, and parts of Poland and Finland. Then, in the course of the war with Germany, it added the countries of Eastern Europe.
After World War II, Stalin actively continued to support Communist-inspired overthrows. For co-ordination of these activities he re-established, in 1947, an international Communist organ, the Cominform (replacing the Comintern which was abolished in 1943). Also, between 1945 and 1949, various international Communist organizations, including trade unions and groups of women, students, lawyers, journalists, and youths were formed, all with the purpose of spreading Communist influence.
At the end of the war, the Kremlin delayed the removal of its forces from Iran, while infiltrating and arming the Kurdish movement in the country, thus planning to bring about an insurrection which would be advantageous to the Soviet Union.
The Communist parties in Indochina and Greece, supplied with Soviet weapons and instructions, waged partisan wars for several years. (In the case of Indochina, they managed to subjugate North Vietnam.)
In Czechoslovakia, where the Communists were unsuccessful in gaining complete control by “peaceful” means, a coup d’état was staged in 1948, with Moscow’s active intervention. At the same time, in Finland, the Communist party planned a similar coup d’état. It was averted only because the Minister of Interior, Yzjo Leino, a Communist, betrayed the plot to the Minister of Defense, General Sihvo. In 1950, the Soviet Union actively aided armed aggression against South Korea.
Shortly before his death, Stalin called the Soviet Communist party the “shock brigade” of the world revolutionary movement and called on all Communist parties to direct their strength to uniting the masses around them in order to isolate and undermine the positions of the bourgeoisie in their countries. He also proclaimed that as long as imperialism exists, so, too, will the inevitability of war. Thus, a definite factor of voluntarism permeated the activities of the Soviet Union and all Communist parties in every type of subversive work and in their spread of Communism.
During the Stalinist era, however, the problems of revolution and civil war began to be considered in terms of the Soviet Union’s national interests rather than “revolution at any cost.” Consequently, Stalin did not support the position of Mao Tse-tung regarding peasant revolution, nor did he consider the Communist parties of Latin America strong enough to bring about insurrections or coup detats. He did not see the possibility of carrying out any kind of Communist activities in Africa. Under the pressure of events (not the least of which were the policies of the United States), the Kremlin withdrew its forces from Iran and Manchuria in 1946. Stalin even thought that Mao Tse-tung should be satisfied with Manchuria—that he was not strong enough to seize power in China, due to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek’s army was well armed and receiving aid from the United States. The Soviet Union stopped aiding the Communist partisans in Greece, and the civil war there ended with their defeat in 1949. No aid was given to Communist partisans in Malaya (1948-1954) or in the Philippines (1949-1955).
After Stalin’s death, the leaders of the Soviet Union did not repudiate the well- known policy of voluntarism. They actively conducted various types of subversive activity in other countries—propaganda, espionage, “economic war,” sabotage, diversion, terror, and the training of armed partisans. Leonid Brezhnev, in a speech to the 23rd Communist Party Congress (March 1966), said that “Communists are standing at the head of partisan detachments and underground revolutionary groups in the countries where armed struggle is being waged against the bourgeois dictatorship.” Both the program of the CPSU (adopted in 1961) and Brezhnev have declared a policy of moral and material support for the “national liberation movements” in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
In practice, these are expressed in the following events:
• The Communist revolt in Guatemala (1954), prepared with the aid of Soviet weapons and instruction;
• The supplying of weapons to the Algerian partisans (1954-1962) and to the partisans in the Cameroons (1957-1960);
• Moral and material aid to the extremist and demagogue, Patrice Lumumba, in the Congo (1960);
• The organization of the “liberation army” and insurrection in Portugese Angola (1961);
• Attempts through Fidel Castro in Cuba to create a wide “popular front” and to inspire partisan activities in the countries of Latin America;
• The use of several countries in Africa as a base for the infiltration and extension of Soviet influence on that continent;
• Creation in Cairo (1958) of a secret Communist co-ordinating headquarters—the Executive Committee (ISPOLKOM) of the “organization for the solidarity of Asian and African peoples” to replace the defunct Cominform (dissolved 1955). This Executive Committee was transferred to Havana in 1966 when its sphere of activities was extended to Latin America.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin leaders, to a greater degree than before, are displaying prudence and caution in their evaluation of revolutionary situations and the possibility of expeditiously exploiting them. With this in mind, they are proceeding on the basis of the following considerations: objective and subjective factors are necessary for the success of insurrection or revolutionary war in any country; experienced cadres, together with sufficient means and communications, are necessary for aiding the “national liberation movement” from outside the country; the international situation and the national interests of the Soviet Union must be taken into account when waging a civil war in the given country.
In general, Soviet leaders presently are striving to avoid any sharp Western reaction or direct confrontation and are preaching the non-inevitability of war. Taking into consideration the tremendous changes in military technology and in the character of war, they have become more cautious in attempting to export revolution. They now proclaim that by virtue of their own example, the socialist countries are able to influence to a greater degree than previously the world-wide revolutionary process.
The Kremlin leaders go on to define these concepts as they relate to various countries of the world. In the countries of Latin America, the activities of the Communist parties are based primarily on the principles of the early Comintern—draw support from the workers and intelligentsia, while attempting to create a wide “popular front” with the participation of the peasants and the petty bourgeois parties followed by infiltration, conspiracy, terror and, under favorable conditions, insurrection. In view of this, the purveyor of revolution in these countries has become Fidel Castro, a proponent of these radical methods, and partisan cadres, saboteurs, and terrorists trained by him.
In the countries of Africa and Asia, where Communists and the working class are almost nonexistent, the Soviet Union relies on those petty bourgeoisie, radical, and “progressive” leaders, and their organizations who are prepared: to accept Soviet economic and military aid; to rule their countries by means of a one-party dictatorship; to nationalize their economy, and direct it by central planning, and in this manner to “build socialism,” bypassing the capitalist period of development while also bypassing armed insurrection if possible.
Since 1960, countries in which the Soviet Union is striving to carry out such policies and thereby extend its sphere of influence are called “countries of national democracy.”
In the highly developed industrial countries, the Communist parties attempt to create “popular fronts” by joining with all leftist parties (socialist and social-democratic). They then carry on a “peaceful” struggle for the gradual transition of the economy and society to socialism by means of social, agrarian, and educational reforms together with the nationalization of industry. In these countries, revolution in the classical Marxist-Leninist meaning simply is not on the agenda.
Brezhnev, in the above-mentioned speech to the 23rd Party Congress, noted that in recent years Communist parties have adopted new programs which take into account not only international, but also national problems and interests. He then went on to explain the position of the CPSU concerning revolutionary movements in the following manner:
Direction of the class struggle is a great and complex art, and in our time perhaps even more complex than ever before. Communist pardes are fighting under extremely varied conditions. The revolutionary struggle now encompasses new social groups and peoples having various traditions, economic conditions and experiences in this struggle. All this leaves its mark on the activities of the parties. The experience of the revolutionary movement in recent years has again confirmed that success will be achieved by those parties which are guided by the proven Leninist principles of strategy and tactics and which realistically consider the existing situation. Departures from the Marxist- Leninist line are especially dangerous when they are associated with nationalism, great- power chauvinism and hegemonism.
Brezhnev’s statement was not only an explanation of the Soviet position, but also a criticism of the Chinese strategy and tactics of revolutionary warfare. Moscow rejects the position adopted by the Peking leaders, claiming that their policies are Trotskyite and ultra-left adventuristic and do not realistically evaluate the situation and are therefore harmful and dangerous methods of revolutionary activity. The disagreement is not concerned with the question of whether or not it is necessary to struggle for world revolution, but, rather, how this struggle should be conducted. Moscow accuses the Chinese leaders of not understanding how to do this, of leading only by subjective conceptions and by striving to become the leader of the Communist movement at any cost.
Actually, the Chinese leaders proclaim the idea of permanent revolution by means of force only and they consider it strategically necessary to accomplish this in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (the rural areas of the world). They would thereby encircle and isolate North America and Western Europe (the metropolitan areas of the world), which in turn would not be able to resist for long the advance of world Communism. Tactically, the Chinese believe that revolutions and civil wars must be inspired everywhere and supported as actively and boldly as possible. If a revolutionary situation does not exist in a given country, then one must be created. Infiltration, conspiracy, agitation, terror, and partisan activities become the catalysts of revolutionary situations. The employment of all leftist and extremist groups (not only Communists) in the country becomes the method of creating the subjective factor of revolution. One need not fear the risk of a general war since the “imperialists” will not be able to employ nuclear weapons against “national liberation movements” (the “paper tiger” concept).
In fact, Peking goes significantly further than Moscow in openly advocating subversive activities. After the murder of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1960, the Soviet Union decided against supporting his successor, Antoine Gizcnga. Realizing that future material aid to the civil war would be very difficult and would mobilize the United Nations against Soviet policy, they voted to dispatch U. N. troops to the Congo and recognized the new central government of Cyril Adoula. China, however, continued to support Gizenga. In 1964-1965, it organized and supported the partisan war against Moise Tshombe’s government. In the eastern provinces of the country, “The People’s Liberation Army of the Congo” headed by the extremists Gaston-Emile Soumialot and Christophe Gbenye, was armed and received instructions from the Chinese Embassies in Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville.
In 1960, the Soviet Union ceased giving aid to the partisans in the Cameroons, which aid, in the course of a number of years, had been unproductive and had strained its relations with France. But Peking continued to help them with weapons, instructors, and terrorists. The Soviet Union did not openly help the Algerian partisans for fear of harming its relations with France, but Peking even established diplomatic relations with the partisan government of Algeria in exile. In 1965, the emissaries and terrorists of Peking took part in the preparation of revolts in the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Dahomey, bribed several of Jomo Kenyatta’s cabinet ministers in Kenya, and armed the radical elements in Zambia, Malawi, Somalia, Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique. Further, the Chinese leaders are conducting in Asia an aggressive policy against India, Indonesia (where a coup d’état was attempted in 1965), Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam, even though this policy does not correspond to the more cautious tactics that emanated from the Kremlin.
The two basic reasons for the divergence between the Soviet Union’s strategy and tactics of world. revolution and those of China are: first, the various stages of their internal revolutionary process, and secondly, the different levels of their economies. In conjunction with these factors, the historical traditions of China also play a role, namely the image of the “Middle Kingdom” and the trauma of humiliation by the white race.
Every revolution has a more or less extended period of momentum during the course of which its pathos, enthusiasm, spirit, and dynamism play a significant role in the formation of the domestic and foreign policies of the country. This is the “childhood disease” period of revolution. That China still suffers from this disease after 17 years of Communist rule is not at all unique. Forty years passed before the Soviet Union’s internal policies and the strategy and tactics of its subversive activities abroad evolved to the point of moderation, and thus it became a more or less prudent great power.
Mao and his generation of revolutionaries are still infected with the virus of dynamism and permanent revolution. Moreover, the “revisionism” of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the failure of Chinese subversive activities in Africa and Asia inspired the Chinese to create a revolutionary atmosphere within China itself so that the revolution would not lose its momentum. In order to accomplish this end, they fell back on the traditional methods of agitation and exaltation of the masses. In addition, China at its present stage of economic development does not have the industrial, technical or financial means to extend its political influence to the lesser-developed countries, as does the Soviet Union. Therefore, the single remaining avenue of approach is to preach fanaticism in the “national-liberation movements” and revolutionary wars.
It is possible that the next generation of Chinese leaders will think differently, will be less militant and therefore follow a more liberal course in the conduct of their foreign and domestic affairs. This possibility will become more likely as the industrial level and living standard of the country are raised, demanding the normalization of relations with the other great states.
Among the Chinese leaders there already exists disagreement about their country’s future course. This is demonstrated by the continuous campaigns, such as “A Hundred Flowers” (1957), and “The Great Leap Forward” (1958-1960) which were accompanied by shakeups in the highest circles of the country. It is further demonstrated by the present campaign, “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” which is being accompanied by a purge of the elite party structure. Even if the ultra-left leaders emerge victorious in this campaign, it does not necessarily mean that evolution towards moderation of the Chinese Communist regime will not have a place in the future.