The basic problem is that Polaris duty is monotonous, and the young officers who man the ships are searching for ways to escape the seemingly inevitable prospect of continuous Polaris patrols during most of their first 20 years in the Navy. It is no surprise that the year-in/year-out cycle of patrols is uninspiring. Instead of seeking out the enemy, Polaris submarines seek only to avoid him. The equipment is reliable and the operators are well trained. Polaris is a grave responsibility and the men who man the submarines are responsible individuals. There is a serious professional atmosphere and an aggressive effort to detect problems at the first possible sign so that they never restrict the mission.
The result is a very boring and unchanging routine.
When Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., was Chief of Naval Operations, he remarked that the Navy did not want to be saddled with any more SSBNs than were absolutely essential because of the type of duty involved. To an officer newly reported to the ultimate dreadnought of the 1960s, this seemed to border on heresy. But, after more than four years of duty on board our floating missile sites, the wisdom of his comment can now be appreciated.
We now have 41 ships, and may have more, depending on the deterrent needs of the country and the rate of development of better systems and countersystems in the future. Up to the present time, the 82 Polaris wardrooms have been formed using officers with a variety of backgrounds. The commanding officers have been extremely successful diesel submarine or nuclear attack submarine skippers. The engineering department officers have completed a year’s nuclear schooling and prototype training. The weapons and navigation department officers have previous diesel experience but no nuclear training. Under present policy, they may not command nuclear vessels and must return to diesel submarines for executive officer and command tours. Today, an all-out effort is being made to fill the wardrooms entirely with nuclear trained officers in order to return to the time- proven submarine principle that every officer should be able to stand watch in all areas of the ship and, eventually, should succeed to command.
Commanding officers of the first SSBNs were carefully selected. They endured much in obtaining their year of nuclear indoctrination and other schooling. They devoted themselves, at great personal sacrifice, to making Polaris work. But they had consolations that their successors will not have. They were pioneering in a new concept of naval operations with a unique and sophisticated ship requiring intelligent evaluation of every aspect of its operations and the solution of numerous problems. They knew that their tours of duty which started at the top would be short and that their knowledge and experience would be in great demand. As these talented men go ashore or to afloat staffs, they are rapidly closing the Polaris Staff Gap that has existed for the last seven years, because the psychology and problems of nuclear power, the two-crew concept, Polaris patrol problems, to name but three difficult areas, were not completely understood. A large percentage of these men will be—and ought to be—flag officers.
The Navigation and Weapons Officers, although frustrated by serving in a ship that they had no hope of commanding, found a significant plus factor as they directed the most advanced weapons and navigational systems in the Navy. They are rewarded with priority in the filling of diesel submarine executive officer and commanding officer billets, and with staff tours using their knowledge, and they have known that their Polaris sea tours would be short.
The engineering types, on the other hand, have been nuclear division officers first and then engineer officers. This is followed by an executive officer tour or tours and finally by commanding officer tours repeating the same patrol pattern. As one Polaris CO has remarked, “Junior submariners today do not want to be executive officers.” They do not approach leadership opportunities as XO or CO with the same feeling that their predecessors did. For too many officers, command is not anticipated as their finest hour but as their fate.
The Navy has funneled into the nuclear power area a large percentage of its potentially most promising officers, and it now contributes a large percentage of the top half of the Naval Academy graduating class each year directly to the program. These men would normally make outstanding contributions in a large number of areas in the Navy. They are energetic and have initiative and imagination, but most of them need a challenge. When they remain on board Polaris submarines for more than a few years, they feel stifled. They do not have a sense of personal satisfaction and achievement even though they understand that successful patrols are vital to the security of the Free World. They face years of the same repetitive routine and narrow exposure with concern. For they feel that their contemporaries, with normal career opportunities, will continue to develop professionally while the Polaris officers tend to stagnate.
The Navy will need some men with years of Polaris experience—but a relatively small number—for the normal career expectancy of such a group.
In the next few years the obligated service of the first large groups of “direct inputs” (men brought directly to submarine and nuclear power training without the traditional year of surface ship seasoning) will expire. Because many of these men have had a continual diet of Polaris duty, a large number will try civilian life. Other nuclear trained officers in Polaris submarines are scratching for a way out. Some are becoming Engineering Duty Only officers. Others are seeking special programs and specialty areas as a way to escape from SSBNs but still stay in the naval sendee. As more officers leave, the inevitability of tour after tour of this type becomes more certain for those who remain.
As the major bugs are worked out of Polaris ships and as fewer innovations are allowed because cost will not be commensurate with gain as the ships age, there is less need for imagination and initiative, and there will be fewer real problems to solve as long as the operators remain competent and vigilant. The Polaris routine has been formalized and standardized in practically every area. The need for quiet responsible service will not change, but the enjoyment of the work will be more and more forced. The narrow disciplines that now exist will become narrower.
One problem of atomic energy is the need for rigid central control. The requirements of standardization, meticulous care, and doublechecking in both the atomic weapons and nuclear power disciplines call for a number of attributes, but imagination and initiative are not among them. In some instances, unnecessary requirements and restrictions have been levied and in others the element of common sense is missing. A Polaris commanding officer has an ever increasing set of requirements to enforce, but he has less latitude than practically any other commanding officer in the Navy. Although it is as important and responsible a command as there is, Polaris command does not appear to a junior officer as an attractive or desirable goal.
The Polaris patrol routine is a potent promoter of busy work. The officers want to make a contribution and they like to keep busy. In a ship with a variety of missions, there is no time to do the many things that can be done in a Polaris submarine. A situation exists that must be similar to the one which at the start of World War II is reputed to have caused Admiral Ernest King to direct that half the typewriters on board ships and shore stations be impounded.
The solution to the problem of Polaris is difficult and complex. A beginning solution must include rotation of persons in the nuclear program to shore assignments in a manner more closely resembling that of their classmates. The great effort of several years ago to bring senior surface officers into nuclear power has only partially solved the problems. There were not enough officers brought in and many of them were not volunteers. Commencing with year group 1962, officers were selected for the program in sufficient numbers to provide a reasonable sea/ shore rotation unless there is an unusually high resignation rate. In the Polaris submarine wardrooms at the present time there are many extra officers. In addition, other nuclear trained officers have been sent to diesel submarines upon completion of schooling. More officers could be transferred from existing Polaris crews and some of the extra newly trained men put in their places. The experienced officers will have to take their belts up a notch and give that little extra effort that prevents inexperienced officers from making mistakes. One serious consequence of too many officers in a particular ship is that there is not enough for them to do and they do not feel valuable or needed. Commanding officers and detailers for SSBNs will have to take a hard look at their real needs and move excess officers to tours that will provide broad growth and a group of men eager to return to sea assignments.
The rush to man all SSBNs with nuclear officers is not essential. It can be slowed to allow more nuclear submariners a chance to have a normal sea/shore rotation and variety of sea duty. Diesel submarine officers are being forced out of the submarine force at the executive officer level because billets do not exist. These officers could help fill the Polaris officer gap as they have in the past for a few more years to come.
Concurrently, in the last few years, the Navy has not been able to find qualified persons to meet projected needs for billets requiring graduate school training. A recent study of the failure to get more than half of the officers needed in three high-demand areas, oceanography, operations analysis, and digital computers and programming, showed that over 80 per cent of those not available were in the nuclear power program. Since its inception, the graduate school candidate list has looked like a Who’s Who in nuclear power. If more officers are released from Polaris duty, this can help relieve the graduate candidate shortage. The gain would be valid only if officers were available in sufficient numbers to fulfill obligations at sea and return to shore billets in graduate subspecialties. Over and over the question is asked among frustrated nuclear trained officers, “Why are they sending my classmates to graduate school and not me?” The need for graduate training in the modern Navy has been emphasized again and again; however, the urgency for this duty among nuclear trained officers is also because of what Vice Admiral Lot Ensey, U. S. Navy, has aptly described as a need for a “therapeutic for career constipation.”
Another solution in the detailing area is to make every effort to rotate submarine officers from SSBNs to attack boats instead of to another SSBN. The mission of the attack submarine is offensive in character and is constantly changing and challenging. The work is exciting and enjoyable, but with 82 Polaris crews versus some 30 attack wardrooms, there is obviously not going to be a 50-50 opportunity to rotate officers between types of ships for some time. The present nuclear attack submarine construction program is progressing at a slow, five-a-year pace. But, too often in the past, the need to vary tours has not been given enough weight by detailers and splendid opportunities have been missed. With extra effort this rotation pattern can be improved upon. In so doing, it would help to provide nuclear trained officers with the attack and shiphandling skills that they have little opportunity to obtain during Polaris tours.
A hard look must be taken at what capabilities an officer must have for any special programs in the Navy. The Navy cannot afford to let one particular effort, like running the engineering plants of nuclear submarines, drain a disproportionate amount of talent from other Navy efforts. Considering the high potential of men who enter the U. S. Naval Academy and NROTC programs, it is surprising that a lower relative class standing cannot be used in screening officers for special programs if the college courses are adequate. Requirements for personnel should be carefully re-evaluated once programs are running smoothly. The cost of excessive requirements or the failure to meet realistic ones will result in problems similar to those which will face Polaris numerous times in the future. How, for example, are we going to man the engineering departments of nuclear surface ships if we make the shift from fossil fuel to nuclear power rapidly, as we certainly should? In every developing long-term program sufficient emphasis must be given to guaranteeing broad growth and development for its officers. Smart men will not turn down dead end streets more than once.
There are a number of things that can be done to make the Polaris experience more interesting and valuable for the officers involved. Projects of special concern and interest on a flag level can be assigned to specific junior officers or wardrooms for investigation and solution. This does not mean the rewriting of existing manuals but an examination of areas where pioneering efforts, follow-up action, or breakthroughs are needed. All of the Navy’s problems should be examined. In contributing to the solution of problems, Polaris officers would achieve an increased sense of satisfaction with their careers and make a visible demonstration of growth.
Commanding officers can do much to pass on their valuable experience to their juniors. On one SSBN patrol, a great deal of time was devoted to a series of submarine war games, including planning of strategy and tactics, a study of enemy and friendly submarine and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and battles of opposing forces complete with umpires. The lessons in warfare that resulted from thorough critiques were extremely interesting and valuable. Individual officers have taken War College, USAFI, and Harvard extension courses. If a whole wardroom participated, the course would become more stimulating and it would be a major deterrent to busy- work programs. An essential part of programs of this type is an examination of present demands on officer time and elimination of those things that are not worthwhile.
The challenge of getting the most out of existing equipment has not been completely answered. In some cases, we have not achieved optimum performance where it is possible, and there are numerous refinements that still should be made. The restless striving for perfection in the operation of equipment is a dominant element of the Polaris philosophy. The comments of the Commander of Atlantic ASVV forces some years ago apply today to our most sophisticated submarines. He found that, with a special emphasis on grooming and peaking equipment, remarkable gains were achieved in equipment performance. In many cases the effectiveness of Polaris submarines is only measured and evaluated by objective and aggressive investigations of the ship’s performance by its own officers and by the enemy. In a complex new technology, the operators sometimes accept limitations without recognizing the possibilities for further improvements in the existing technology. We must not easily forget the great lesson of the loss of the attack submarine Thresher—we learned too much about how to improve the safety of submarine operations and use existing systems to their full potential in the investigation of her loss.
The challenge to keep our operators, as well as their equipment, at their peak will increase as the glow of publicity and recognition that accompanied the early years of the program shifts to other aspects of naval operations. The amount of money available for habitability and support facilities, alterations and improvements, and even repairs and maintenance will undoubtedly be slashed to provide funds for the next priority project of the Navy. The adoption of Polaris was brought about at great sacrifice of surface force funds and talent. As our enemy becomes more advanced in submarine warfare the challenge of avoiding him will increase. The technological advantage that Polaris submarines now enjoy over potential enemy attack submarines will be reduced with time if Polaris sensors and platforms remain in their present state.
One seemingly simple solution to personnel problems would be to do away with the two- crew concept, thus doubling the number of trained men available. Although this may be a long-term solution if the strategic need for Polaris missiles is lessened by development of a better delivery system, it is not a solution for the foreseeable future. Commitments are likely to increase as the Chinese develop a credible nuclear threat. A return to single crews would have to be coupled with a drastic reduction of the number of missiles on station. The off- crew time at home with families is an essential benefit of the two-crew program and loss of it would drastically affect the Polaris enlisted section which presently enjoys the highest reenlistment rates in the Navy.
The growing pains of Polaris provide many lessons for the future implementation of crash programs that are inevitable in an age of rapid military breakthroughs. The problem of Polaris officers should be carefully considered as we make going to sea in a certain type of ship a specialty. We cannot afford to specialize out the variety of experience that is so appealing in the U. S. Navy without developing attractive new career patterns. A long-term solution to programs like Polaris that make unusual demands on our manpower pool is to work towards automation and decreasing the numbers of persons needed to operate the systems that we develop. So far, there is no computer than can simulate the decision-making flexibility of the human brain, although it is now within our technical capacity to reduce the number of officers required.
The problem of SSBN manning underlines one of the great challenges of the military today—how to retain capable people in programs which require numerous safeguards, reliability, and routine work and yet demand constant vigilance, intelligence, and dedication. As the spotlight centers on the effort in Vietnam and the role of the Navy-Marine Corps team in conventional warfare, we must not lose sight of the need to retain the technological advantage which has always been a significant factor in American military success, and we must not overlook the dedicated efforts that are carried on in numerous areas of our military complex that do not receive publicity because they are managed efficiently and manned by able, ever vigilant persons.
In the final analysis, the officers serving in Polaris submarines must rededicate themselves to a life of service, realizing that for the good of the service sacrifices are often necessary. The Navy traditionally has been served by men who are willing to give and who seldom ask, “What’s in it for me?” At the same time, the Navy must strive to use the full potential of its people and to prevent newly developing programs from becoming unnecessary endurance contests of dedication.