Roughly halfway around the globe from the present power centers of the Free World lies the power vacuum of the Indian Ocean. This vast expanse of water, covering some 28 million square miles, constitutes one- seventh of the earth’s surface and along its edges live some one-third of the world’s people. Despite its size and close proximity to both of the Communist giants—the Soviet Union and Red China—this area today represents the weakest and most vulnerable segment in the rimland containment chain which the West has fashioned around the Eurasian “Heartland” during the past 20 years of Cold War struggle. This vulnerability is both a reflection of internal problems within the region and an acknowledgement of the continuing threat of Russian and Chinese expansion into this area.
The nations which border on the Indian Ocean (including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf) range in character from long established monarchies to newly emergent democracies. However, most were formerly in some type of colonial status. Militarily, few of the neutral or allied nations of the Indian Ocean region possess any superfluity of strength; certainly none are judged presently capable of withstanding alone an attack by either the Soviet Union or Red China. A few are even incapable of maintaining order within their own boundaries. India and Pakistan have the greatest military potential in the area (excluding Indonesia), but they mutually weaken themselves by their continuing hostility toward each other. While the ultimate defense of the Indian Ocean may well lie in their hands, for the immediate future their influence remains small in comparison to the magnitude of the problem. Dissipation of their military strength through overt conflict reduces this influence still more to the point where external aggression is tacitly invited. Further, it should be noted that considerable military strength, including naval power, is to be found in United Arab Republic and Indonesia. These nations occupy strategic locations in respect to the Indian Ocean and neither can be regarded as completely sympathetic to Western interests.
The internal weaknesses and problems of this area together with the external threat of great power intervention have long obliged the West to maintain military forces in the Indian Ocean. During the colonial period, this role was successively assumed by Portugal, France, and Great Britain; the latter’s influence has been particularly significant and it continues today, though in a drastically diminished form.
Present British military strategy for the Indian Ocean embodies the concept of keeping land forces permanently stationed East of Suez, primarily in Aden and Malaysia. They are supported by naval and air units and can be reinforced from the United Kingdom by air and sea lifted reserves. With these forces British power can be projected into those areas of the Indian Ocean requiring attention and British commitments of a continuing nature can still be honored. Currently, most of these forces (including a portion of the strategic reserve) are stationed in or near Malaysia to counter the Indonesian threat. The size of these forces is due to a considerable buildup against this threat and should not be regarded as a true measure of British strength in the Indian Ocean. This is particularly true in respect to current ground force strength and the presence of two attack carriers.
British responsibilities in the Indian Ocean include her Commonwealth associations with Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. The East African nations of Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi are also members but the current status of Tanzania is doubtful. While the Commonwealth is not a binding treaty of defense, it is probable that Great Britain would respond to a request for assistance from any of the members. Additionally, Britain is joined in alliances with Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia, and has treaty obligations in the Persian Gulf including Kuwait and various sheikdoms. Finally there are still outposts of the British Empire in the Indian Ocean and Africa including Rhodesia, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, Chagos, and Mal- dive island groups although changes are currently being effected in this area too. Britain also still administers three trust territories in Southern Africa, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland.
Thus, it may be seen that British commitments extend the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean. While current British strength appears adequate to deal with a threat in any one area, there is a distinct possibility of simultaneous outbreaks. In such a case these forces will be strained and the normal level of forces would be overtaxed. Lest this possibility be regarded as remote, it should be noted that had the 1961 Kuwait incident occurred in 1964-65 while the Malaysian buildup was in progress, prompt and effective action on the scale required might not have been possible. Additionally, it is questionable as to how long the current large force levels East of Suez will be maintained.
Other than a brief period during World War II, the United States has not attempted to maintain major permanent forces in the Indian Ocean. This policy was both an acknowledgement of British hegemony in this area and the requirement for heavy commitments elsewhere. No criticism of this policy is intended; earlier in the Cold War the Indian Ocean was a backwater of international conflict and British strength was rightly regarded as being sufficient at that time to deal with any immediate problems. American resources for defense are not unlimited and there is no doubt that areas such as Europe and the Far East were and remain the more important regions in which the Communist threat must be met. However, the very success—and failure—of Western strategy in these other areas has now brought the problems of the Indian Ocean to the fore.
The current U. S. posture in the Indian Ocean is as follows. Actual forces on the scene are few: at the moment they consist of a converted seaplane tender and two or more destroyers in the Persian Gulf, maintenance crews on MATS staging posts, and military missions in the CENTO and SEATO countries and in India, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia. Additional forces could be obtained from either the Sixth or Seventh Fleets but such a policy presupposes not only that the entrances to the Indian Ocean such as Suez Canal will be open but also that these units can be spared from their primary tasks elsewhere. At best this is a highly doubtful proposition on which to base strategy and it does not adequately take into account the excessive reaction time required due to the distances involved.
Despite the shortcomings of this policy, it has served throughout the post-World War II period until the present. Implicit in it has been a dependence upon British power in this area as shown by the assignment of responsibility for this geographical region as a collateral duty to the U. S. Naval Commander Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINC- NELM). It was no coincidence that the headquarters of CINCNELM were in London in close proximity to the British Admiralty.
In late 1963 this situation was changed. Early in the 1960s the Department of Defense had established a new unified commander, CINCSTRIKE, whose forces presently consist of eight Army divisions plus the U. S. Air Force’s Tactical Air Command. These forces are based in the continental United States from whence they can be airlifted wherever they may be needed. Tactical air support would fly in the same time and bulk logistics would follow by air and sea.
CINCSTRIKE’s mission was expanded in 1963 when he was given additional responsibility as CINCMEAFSA, Commander Middle East, Africa South of the Sahara, and South Asia. In keeping with the standard policy of assigning world areas of U. S. interest to unified commanders, this placed the Indian Ocean littoral (with the exception of Southeast Asia which remains under CINCPAC) under CINCSTRIKE. This responsibility also includes the waters of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Naval forces in the Persian Gulf were also transferred to CINCSTRIKE from CINCNELM as was supervision of the various military missions in the area. This was purely a paper transfer, however, and resulted in no change in the forces actually present in or near the Indian Ocean. While this change belatedly and partially recognized U. S. interest in this area, it should be noted that CINCSTRIKE’s area does not include the Indian Ocean itself. This is divided between CINCLANT and CINCPAC who presumably will provide any naval support required by CINCSTRIKE in addition to his own air-lifted forces. Current U. S. presence is now provided by infrequent cruises through the area by forces from the Seventh Fleet or more recently, by a nuclear powered task force transiting this region while on a circumnavigation of the world.
There is no sign of any impending change to this concept. Thus, it would appear that the United States intends to continue its reliance upon Great Britain to provide standing sea power in the Indian Ocean and to play the major role in this zone. CINCSTRIKE can provide air-lifted troops into the area if required; alternately, either CINCLANT or CINCPAC could introduce a carrier task force and amphibious force if needed (and subject to the limitations of time and requirement elsewhere already mentioned). But there appear to be no plans for increasing existing forces in this region. There is a communications station being built at North West Cape, Australia, and there is discussion concerning another facility in the Western Indian Ocean, probably in joint occupation with the British. There is also the possibility that the SOLANT AMITY cruises, which provided amphibious ships and two or more escorts to make courtesy calls on African nations, may be conducted again.
No other proposed changes are mentioned in the Fiscal 1966 Defense budget. This is in spite of recent conferences with Great Britain which are alleged to have included a request for increased American participation in the Indian Ocean. Certain improvements in the logistical readiness of deployable forces such as expansion of air lift, improvement of sea lift, and more prepositioned equipment, is planned but there has been no indication of any change in our basic concept.
This then is the current military situation in the Indian Ocean. When weighed against the West’s interests in this region, the external threats which menace this area, and the internal weaknesses and conflicts of the indigenous nations, definite shortcomings will be observed. It is to these deficiencies that we now turn with some suggestions as to how they may best be overcome.
Current Western strategy in the Indian Ocean region has as its objective the exclusion of Communist influence from this area and the maintenance of peace and order so that the littoral nations may develop free from both outside pressures and internal tensions. It is felt that in achieving this goal, the West will also realize the additional strategic aim of maintaining its accessibility to this area, both as a source of raw materials and as an avenue of communication. Further, it is hoped that in time the region will become self-sufficient and able to withstand alone the external and internal threats while at the same time increasing its ties and interdependence with the Free World.
The global conflict now being waged against Communism has caused the defenses of the West to be spread very thin, however. Lacking the resources to combat Sino-Soviet aggrandizement by the time-honored means of maintaining forces at every potential trouble spot, the West has turned to several alternatives. One, of course has been the system of alliances which have been established in the postwar period. These, when bolstered by military and economic assistance, have proven to be relatively successful. But the overwhelming power, primarily in ground forces, of the Communist bloc has required additional direct military backing from Great Britain and the United States. This backing took the form of “massive retaliation” at one time and relied on the ability of the West to deliver nuclear strikes in response to Communist aggression regardless of whatever form such aggression might take.
However, massive retaliation and its successor, graduated deterrence, while still a vital weapon in the West’s arsenal, has proven to be ineffective in the face of the new Communist strategy of supporting “wars of national liberation” and subverting governments friendly to the West. The effective countering of these tactics is still an unsolved problem for the West, but it is clear that any solution will involve the use of conventional forces, initially on a limited scale. Hence the question has now become one of how best to provide the requisite military strength in the correct quantity at the appropriate time and place, or what Neville Brown has termed “Strategic Mobility.”
It is not the purpose of this article to take issue with the basic concept of strategic mobility or to enter the lists on either the side of air lift or sea lift per se; both have their applicability in today’s global strategies. Given current problems such as “gold flow” and the increasing political difficulties in keeping forces on foreign soil, it is quite evident that some other means of providing military support throughout the world had to be developed. But it should be recognized that the concept of strategic mobility constitutes a supplementary means of introducing force into an area rather than an end in itself. It is not doubted that air-lifting of strategic reserve forces overseas to troubled locales can be made to work; what is questioned is the applicability of this strategy to the Indian Ocean region.
Several tests of the strategic mobility of Strike Command’s forces have recently been conducted. These tests emphasized deficiencies already known to exist and have further revealed new ones. Chief among these is the problem of logistical support of air-lifted forces, particularly in the provision of heavy support equipment and bulk stocks such as fuel and ammunition. In Exercise BIG LIFT, which was the first large-scale test of the air-lift concept, use of prepositioned stocks in Europe was necessary in order to achieve rapid readiness of the deployed forces. Another exercise, QUICK RELEASE, also dealt with the use of prepositioned stocks, however, in this case said stocks were contained in forward floating depots. These specially configured merchant ships which are stationed in a forward area appear to be a promising idea, and it is noted that the 1966 Defense budget contains provision for more of these vessels, including “roll-on/roll-off” types and the Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) type.
Prepositioned stocks have several disadvantages. One of these—their unavailability in the event of a change in the political climate—can be overcome by using forward floating depots. But other disadvantages still remain. Equipment stored in this fashion is out of use, either for training or for employment elsewhere. It tends to lose material readiness and special maintenance efforts are required. Unless by chance it happens to be stockpiled or positioned in the right spot, a further logistical problem arises in mating this material with the arriving troops. Finally, there are inherent disadvantages in taking personnel into combat with unfamiliar equipment even though this equipment may be comparable to that used at the home base.
A second deficiency lies in the availability of adequate landing sites. The type of aircraft used for the airlift normally requires a fairly substantial airstrip. Despite promising research and development efforts with VTOL and STOL aircraft, this situation is likely to continue for some time. Although actual construction facilities such as the runway itself can be kept to a minimum, there is no substitute for such requirements as communications, navigational aids, and ground support. Unless the target area is equipped with an airfield which already has these facilities (and there are few of these in the Indian Ocean area), alternate arrangements will have to be made. Further, it is questionable if any but the best of reinforced concrete runways can stand up for long under the continual beating inherent in the round-the- clock air support which strategic mobility entails.
A third problem may be the weather. As the time and place of a crisis cannot be picked in advance, there is the possibility that weather may preclude immediate landing of forces even were a suitable field available. Only a slight delay in what must inevitably be a closely timed operation could be disastrous, and there is difficulty in holding the aircraft overhead until the weather changes. Another requirement, often overlooked, is the need for the receiving area to be friendly or at least not overtly hostile. Advance operations, therefore, appear to be
almost a sine qua non to any successful large- scale operation airlift.
In summary, the concept of air-lifting forces to the crisis area has many problems. These problems are not unsolvable, and this is not to infer that the concept itself is not a useful and valid one. But it is felt that it is mainly designed for other areas, primarily Europe and the Far East, and that its utility in the Indian Ocean is questionable. Airlift is best employed to reinforce units already in place. It depends heavily on prepositioned stocks, and hence its geographical potential is circumscribed by the location of these stocks. Advance operations and the availability of an adequate landing site are also regarded as essential. Finally, to borrow a term commonly associated with nuclear warfare, such a concept lacks credibility. Unless periodically deployed in training exercises to each of the Indian Ocean sub-regions, this force would be of little value as a psychological deterrent against the area’s would-be troublemakers.
But if nuclear retaliatory power is inappropriate, permanent basing of troops unwise, and air lift of strategic reserves beset with difficulties, how then is the West to maintain the military presence so clearly needed in this area? The answer must be sea power. Sea power has been the controlling factor in the Indian Ocean from the beginning of recorded history. Sea power made possible the British hegemony over the area prior to the postwar period and has fulfilled requirements up to the present. Sea power will continue to make possible the realization of Western strategy in this vital maritime region.
The question then arises: what type of sea power and are not current forces sufficient? The answer to the latter is clearly no. The insufficiency of the British forces has already been mentioned. Suffice it to state here that while their continued presence is essential and their role unique, British forces are no longer capable of maintaining Western interests in this area singlehanded.
Likewise, neither the Sixth or Seventh Fleets can be viewed as a ready Indian Ocean force. The flanking positions of these fleets are established for reasons external to the Indian Ocean and they face threats which directly menace Western security. Hence, their commitment to these objectives is overriding. Dependence upon these forces to provide military presence in an emergency is to offer the Sino-Soviet bloc the opportunity to draw off our forces from their primary interest areas by fomenting discord in the Indian Ocean. Such a policy could result in a weakening of Western power in either Europe or the Far East and thus invite aggression in these vital areas. It should therefore be recognized that the Sixth and Seventh Fleets are not deployed for reasons of Indian Ocean strategy and any attempt to use them in this region is to degrade their primary role.
It is therefore apparent that the United States must take on a new committal and a peculiarly naval one at that. This proposal is made with a full comprehension as to what this additional burden would entail. But circumstances and strategy offer no choice. If the West is to maintain its viability in this section of the world, it must be continually prepared for Communist challenges, challenges which will either create or utilize conditions of potential conflict to achieve their ends. This additional naval force, however, need not be on the scale of either the Sixth or Seventh Fleets; in fact, such strength would be inappropriate in this area. The new force should be tailored to a threat which appears at present to be chiefly one of “brushfire” or “police” actions rather than one of large- scale conflict.
For this reason, an amphibious task force is suggested. Such a force could be built around one Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH), either one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) or a Dock Landing Ship (LSD), perhaps an LST, an embarked Marine force, and suitable escorts which could also provide AAW, ASW, and gunfire support. It is realized that any specific delineation of forces is open to argument, so it should be made clear that the actual composition of this force is variable within the parameters of availability and mission. Likewise the problem of command relationships will not be covered. What is important is what this force will do and the method of accomplishment.
To begin with, it should operate jointly with British forces in the area. Although such a suggestion steps out of the military field, it is essential to the proposal. American and British interests in this area are sufficiently similar that a merger of policy is thoroughly feasible (as well as militarily essential). British experience and knowledge of the Indian Ocean far surpasses that of the United States; joint action is fully contemplated in the event of large-scale warfare; therefore, why not full co-operation now? Exercises in the Atlantic have shown that such tactical integration is completely feasible and use of British support facilities would be invaluable. Further, the pre-existence of a unified force would make the transition to large-scale combat that much easier were it ever required. Joint action would also demonstrate allied solidarity to the nations of this region and to any potential aggressors.
Secondly, this U. S. commitment should remain small. A large force, complete with dependents and exchange facilities, is not required in the Indian Ocean. The primary mission would be one of “presence,” of being able to quell small conflicts and outbreaks of violence before they develop into larger wars. Should this prove unsuccessful, then it will be necessary to use the other features of Western strength. Then forces may be airlifted to the scene and floating stockpiles may be called into port. The vital difference would be that they would be met by units already established in the area, units with a thorough knowledge of local conditions, for which no intelligence briefing can substitute—units which are “acclimatized.”
A further reason for restricting the size of this proposed force lies in the field of logistics. This area is remote from the United States and Great Britain, and logistics will be a problem despite use of British and Australian facilities. A partial solution to this problem lies in the use of forward floating depot ships which should be stationed in any case in the Indian Ocean to provide for the potential needs of the air-lifted forces. These ships, suitably configured and periodically resupplied, could also serve the current needs of the amphibious force, particularly for those items peculiar to the American units such as ammunition and spare parts. Emergency support could be obtained from either Sixth or Seventh Fleet logistic forces or air lifted from the United States if need be. Fuel should not be a problem so long as the Persian Gulf remains open to Western shipping.
A final word on logistics. The types of ships envisioned for this force do not include complex attack carriers or missile cruisers. The ships to be deployed in the Indian Ocean should be only those with proven capabilities and thoroughly tested equipment which does not require a part to be delivered from the manufacturer every week or a monthly visit by a “tech rep” to keep it operating. Insofar as is practicable, standardization of type is desirous to permit possible cross servicing. Too often modern ships are immobilized by the inability of ship’s force to repair certain equipment, either from lack of ability or lack of parts.
These ships must be prepared to operate exclusive of shipyards, tenders, or any but the most limited support during their tour. Adequate time for maintenance and upkeep will be provided as the anticipated tempo of operations is not heavy, but reliance on shore facilities must be kept to a minimum.
It is realized that there is a fine line between ships which have proven capabilities and ships which are aging and subject to frequent repairs, but possibly a requirement for increased reliability would influence the U. S. Navy’s construction program, which seems to provide an increasingly diverse number of complex vessels requiring proportionately greater support.
The mission of this force does not require the most modern and sophisticated of material, but dependability is essential. The vast reaches of the Indian Ocean and the variety of problems posed along its rim predicate the additional requirement of flexibility for this proposed force. While it must of course be trained for operations involving use of its capability en masse, it is highly probable that simultaneous outbreaks of violence may require division of forces. Therefore groups and units within the force must be established to permit tailoring of military power to the situation at hand.
Each of the amphibious vessels insofar as is practicable should be capable of mounting a complete landing force of Marines applicable to the problem as it is entirely possible that situations will arise that require only one such team with a support destroyer to restore order. Overcommitment of forces is to be avoided, not only to realize economy and effectiveness of force but also for political reasons as well.
Finally, this proposed force lacks air power other than the helicopters carried by the amphibious assault ship. No apology is offered for this omission. Any air support which would be needed in the event of an “escalated” conflict could initially be supplied from present British forces. While fully recognizing the essentiality of air power in the modern Navy, the author deplores the tendency to employ a 60,000-ton attack carrier in the role of a turn-of-the-century gunboat. Should opposing forces develop in this region of sufficient strength to warrant commitment of a carrier, then this would be a different situation. This situation does not exist now. Likewise, the provision of other usual support forces such as patrol and ASW forces (other than a minimum number of escorts) should be avoided. It must be remembered that the Indian Ocean is still essentially a Western ocean; the problem is not to let it become otherwise by default.
The problems of the Indian Ocean region are not simple. Despite the tone of this article, they will require far more than purely military solutions and are certain to take a long period of time. It is most unlikely that the West will ever return this area to conditions of security such as existed prior to World War II. It is also extremely unlikely that the West will ever solve all of the internal problems of this region, certainly not through force or without the active co-operation of the nations within this area. Therefore Western strategy must embody far more than just military measures.
The optimum situation for the West lies in the emergence of internal strengths which will in themselves preclude both overt and covert pressure from Communism and internal dissension. Viable democracies of the size of India and Pakistan coupled with the economic development of all of the nations of this region will form a far more effective barrier to Communist expansion than the West can ever erect by military force. Such a future is possible. This region contains the resources for great power status, including both population and raw materials. India, Australia, and South Africa are already making notable strides toward industrialization on a modern scale, and promising conditions exist elsewhere. Great undeveloped natural wealth is available to finance further improvements, but outside assistance is required for initial development. Democratic practices have made a promising start in many of the nations, and it is encouraging to note that for the most part these are also the potential regional leaders. Given time for development, this area can evolve into a valued friend of the West.
But time is one of the resources which this region does not have in abundance. The Communist powers have their own concept of the future of this area and it is not favorable to Western interests. To attain their goals, it is clear that the Communists will thwart wherever possible orderly and peaceful development unless it is accomplished on their terms. Further, there are elements in this region who have ambitions which are equally inimical to Western strategy and who likewise will attempt to preclude development under terms other than their own.
Therefore, Western military strategy must provide this time which is required for supplementary Western economic and political strategies to bring about sufficient internal strengths for the region to stand alone. To accomplish this military aim, the West must maintain order and prevent interference by an outside threat. This has been the traditional role of Great Britain, and one which she has admirably accomplished heretofore. But British forces are currently strained to their utmost, and the problems of the area are drastically increasing. Assistance is needed, and the United States is the only nation that is able to provide it.
This military assistance should take the form of sea power. The region is a vast ocean area rimmed by weak nations—ideally suited for naval operations. Political considerations make it inadvisable to station forces at permanent bases and economic considerations make it equally desirable to keep the size of any forces in this area small. Hence, mobility and flexibility are major requirements, requirements which can best be fulfilled by the deployment of a small amphibious force with embarked troops. This U. S. naval task force should supplement, not supplant the British forces already present. Full use should be made of British experience and facilities so as to achieve maximum economy of force by both countries. Joint operations are essential, not only to achieve this economy but also to demonstrate to both the nations of the region and to any external aggressor that the West has an overwhelming interest in this vital region and that the West intends to remain.
Western strategy recognizes the importance of the Indian Ocean. Western political and economic efforts in this region have reflected this recognition. British military power has heretofore made these efforts worthwhile. But as Western efforts have increased, so have the threats and the internal problems. Hence, U. S. military presence in the credible form of sea power is now needed to obtain time to permit the full realization of Western aims.