The Genesis of the Modern Navy

In reporting out the Armed Forces Appropriations Authorization Bill 1966, which subsequently became the Act of 11 June 1965, authorizing a construction program of 50 new ships and 12 gunboats, the House Armed Services Committee issued the following policy statement:

“It is considered desirable that the Congress recognize that the Vinson-Trammell Act was, in effect, the genesis of the modern U. S. Navy, and to declare that, not-with- standing its virtual suspension, it is in the intent of Congress that the United States shall continue to construct and maintain a Navy of modern, underage warships second to none, with full consideration for the naval strength of rival maritime powers.”

In December 1964, the Honorable Carl Vinson, for 18 years Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, retired from the national scene. He was widely known as the Navy’s steadfast advocate. He was also a man of incomparable vision, of great depth and versatility in his knowledge of defense matters.

The Vinson-Trammell* Act of 1934, as amended through 1942, embodies much of Mr. Vinson’s philosophy of sea power. During the years of World War II, it was the cornerstone of U. S. naval strength. Most of the Navy’s warships of today, including our nuclear-powered ships, were built under its authority. Yet, following World War II, there was increasing pressure to modify its basic principles by a newer approach.

What are the principles underlying this famous statute which generations of naval personnel have regarded as the charter of U. S. sea power? First:

The United States must build and maintain a Navy of modern, underage warships second to none, on a true and reasonable parity with the navies of rival maritime powers. Determinations must be made on a long-range basis, as to the numbers, types, and tonnages of warships to be laid down each year to maintain this underage strength. Any surface ship over 20 years old, except a battleship, is obsolete and of no military value. Large numbers of overage and obsolete ships on hand may mislead policy-makers and planners as to actual naval strength. Such a situation can be disastrous in the face of a large building program by an adversary nation . . . Only after sea power requirements for national security are established is the cost factor considered. Sufficient warship replacement programs will be financed from year to year to prevent mass obsolescence, to maintain a constant and adequate strength in underage tonnage and to lower costs through repetitive construction.

The second principle of the Vinson-Trammell Act is:

To build alternate warships in the naval shipyards, unless such action is found in any year to be inconsistent with the public interest. (Although the naval shipyards are responsible for accomplishing ship repair and conversion work, they also require substantial new construction in order to maintain logistics capabilities vital to Fleet readiness and to provide a yardstick for private yard costs.)

The third principle of the Act is:

To limit rigidly the profit of private shipbuilders (and their subcontractors) on naval ship construction.

In the years following World War I, the United States was completing a massive warship building program, begun in 1916, and designed to ensure U. S. naval supremacy for many years to come. Then came the Washington Conference in 1922.

As a result of the treaty that followed, this country scrapped 800,000 tons of battleships and battle cruisers, a total of 31 ships, including 15 still under construction, without any comparable sacrifice by the other signatory powers—Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. The Treaty fixed the allowable strengths in capital ships (battleships and battle cruisers) and aircraft carriers. In 1930, the Treaty of London, signed by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, fixed limits for other warship categories, i.e., cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

The Treaty strengths prescribed were in terms of underage tonnage, rather than in numbers of ships (except in the case of certain first-line or capital ships). Replacement was authorized, within treaty limits, when ships became lost, accidentally destroyed, or overage. Overage was defined generally as 20 years for the large surface warships, 16 years for smaller surface ships (not exceeding 3,000 tons), and 13 years for submarines.

In the 11 years following the Washington Treaty, the United States found that unilateral naval disarmament, as an example to other countries, was both dangerous and unsuccessful. The Washington Treaty in 1922 had established a 5-5-3 ratio in battleship and aircraft carrier strength for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, respectively. However, until approval of the London Treaty in 1930, there was no limit to the construction of other major combatant ships such as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

Within six years after the Washington Treaty, the Japanese had constructed or were constructing a larger tonnage of modern cruisers than the United States. Great Britain’s underage cruisers tonnage was three times that of the United States. These other signatory powers, although former allies, had diverted funds and plant capacity saved by limiting construction of capital ships and aircraft carriers into cruiser, destroyer, and other types of construction. By 1934, the United States, preoccupied with domestic programs, belatedly found itself far inferior in underage naval strength to the other great powers.

The treaties permitted the United States to have warships of the various types totalling 1,186,000 tons. This country had 372 ships, aggregating 1,038,660 tons as of the end of 1933. At first glance, this ratio might seem reasonably close. Of these 372 ships, however, 288 ships or 77 per cent (including practically all U. S. destroyers and submarines) totalling 330,110 tons, were overage. Underage U. S. ships totalled 84, with a tonnage of 708,550.

The United States had grossly neglected a cardinal principle of the treaties: sea power consists not of numbers of ships, but of modern, underage warship tonnage.

The Vinson-Trammell Act merely authorized the replacement of obsolete ships up to treaty strength—it was not intended to increase the number of U. S. ships—and declared for the first time the U. S. policy to henceforth maintain an underage Navy at any limits fixed by treaty or other international agreement.

In his justification of the bill on the House floor, Mr. Vinson pointed out that “the policies of the Government cannot be maintained and supported with obsolete ships,” and urged that a “logical orderly plan” for ship replacement be adopted. He said that:

overage ships, with inferior gun power, with slower speed, with deteriorated hulls and machinery, will truly be “floating coffins” if they are sent to battle against modern ships. We keep them today because they are better than nothing at all, but they are not ships on which to send the youth of this country to battle with an enemy. No country has a moral right to demand that her sailors go into battle with strength and equipment inferior to an opponent’s. Yet, unless we prepare adequately in times of peace, that is the inevitable necessity when war comes. In general, it is true that a naval war must be fought with the ships that are in existence when the war breaks out.

Mr. Vinson then went on to say that this situation “lulls the people into a false sense of security and may have the most disastrous consequences.”

Congressman (now Senator) Everett Dirksen pointed out that, with every passing year, the burden of keeping our obsolete ships “in even an operational condition becomes heavier and heavier.” He said that each year “the expense of upkeep is greater, more time is required to effect repairs, the burden of which falls largely upon the personnel of the ships themselves. These obsolete ships have already served their life of usefulness and are worn out, as all things must wear out in time.”

The bill was criticized for not including any limitation as to the amount of the authorization, the sky being the limit insofar as cost was concerned. This criticism was overruled on the basis that the bill was a statement of policy that the U. S. Navy would be built up to treaty limits and that the “relative naval strength” of this country would be maintained, cost being a secondary consideration.

At a late hour of the debate, Congressman Charles C. Thompson of Illinois introduced an amendment to the bill which provided, in effect, that the first and each succeeding alternate vessel in each category, and the main engines, armor and armament for such vessels, be constructed or manufactured in “the Government navy yards,” ordnance plants, arsenals, etc. This amendment was attacked by Mr. Vinson as a revival of the “Dallinger amendment.” In 1928, Congressman Frederick W. Dallinger of Massachusetts, who had both the Boston Naval Shipyard and the Watertown Arsenal in or near his District, had succeeded in tacking essentially the same amendment on a cruiser construction bill. Congressman Dallinger’s argument was that naval ship construction had been a government function during most of our country’s history and that in the interest of economy, existing government facilities, built at great cost, should be utilized, instead of the plants of private corporations organized for profit.

Dallinger pointed out that the Navy for some years past had flagrantly violated the 1924 mandate of Congress that ship work be done in government yards “when time and facilities permit” and when no appreciable increase in cost would be involved. The Navy, he said, had been building most of the new ships in private yards. Yet, some private yards had closed. Dallinger argued that “it is better for the U. S. government to retain control of its industrial, naval, and military experience and facilities than it is to rely upon the contingency of private individuals remaining in business.” The naval shipyards were described as an integral part of national defense, to be ready always to respond in emergency. There was some discussion of comparative costs as between naval and private yards, but this issue was not clearly resolved.

In Senate testimony on the “Dallinger amendment,” it was brought out that “one reason for the establishment of these naval shipyards (beginning before 1800) was that the private yards would not have it all their own way.” Competition between naval and private shipyards was considered essential. There was a discussion of comparative costs. Naval experts claimed, with general assent of senators, that there were two broad categories of overhead charges at naval shipyards. The first, “statistical and military overhead” was necessary to keep the yards going, perform essential military activities, and maintain excess capacity for an emergency. The second, “industrial overhead,” applied to construction, repair, and other industrial work.

Testimony by representatives of the Navy brought out that “it is very difficult to establish the correct proportion of the total overhead expenditure that should be charged against the actual industrial work performed in a particular naval shipyard, because every one recognizes that a naval shipyard is primarily an establishment intended to be developed at great capacity and efficiency in time of peace, for emergency purposes in time of war, and the actual capacity must be necessarily very much greater than peacetime demands.” More vital cost factors were described as “efficiency of the plant, organization, labor, supervisory force, methods of employing men, etc.”

Subsequently, in a memorandum submitted in March 1927 to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, with regard to the costs of constructing cruisers and other ships in naval shipyards, the Navy acknowledged that the cost of such work in a naval shipyard “will be necessarily higher than that in a private shipyard.” Reasons advanced included:

• Organization in a Navy yard is not primarily oriented toward shipbuilding.

• Civil Service restrictions make it impossible to “hire and fire” as necessary, thus increasing the cost of production.

• Wages paid are higher than those in private yards.

• The government pays full wages, without work, for 44 days a year, including annual leave and holidays; whereas a private contractor pays only for work done.

• Limitations exist on the authority to institute piecework.

• There is lack of continuity in work due to drawing off the men from time to time as they are required for repair work in the yard.

The Navy’s memorandum concluded that if the government should embark on a fixed policy of continuous and extensive new construction at one or more of its naval shipyards, construction could be carried on more efficiently, although still at greater cost than at a private yard for the reasons already stated.

In a subsequent report comparing cruiser construction costs, in April 1928, to the same Committee, the Navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair pointed out that in some cases naval shipyard-built ships cost more, and in other cases, cost less than in private yards, depending on the yards involved. In conclusion, the Bureau expressed the opinion that, as material costs would not differ greatly in both types of yards, any cost differential would consist of differences in labor and overhead costs. If overhead required at a naval shipyard regardless of whether the ships are built or not, is excluded, then naval shipyard construction costs would be somewhat less than those of private yards. If all overhead involved is included, however, then, due chiefly to the more liberal fringe benefits in naval shipyards, construction costs in these yards theoretically should be greater than those in private yards. The Bureau concluded, however, that the “factors applying to individual plants such as conditions of employment and efficiency of plant, management and labor, are really the governing factors in the determination of cost,” and, therefore, no definite conclusion as to comparative costs could be reached.

Although Mr. Vinson attacked the “Dal- linger amendment” when it was proposed for inclusion in what became the Vinson-Trammell Act, he agreed in principle that one-half of the ships to be built under the legislation should be constructed in naval shipyards. He pointed out that, “as a matter of fact, you can build these ships a great deal cheaper under competitive bids in industrial yards, but it is highly important to retain the Navy yards to act as a leverage on the industrial yards.” Mr. Vinson’s main objection was that the provision was too inflexible, that it would require new construction to be placed in yards crowded with overhauls or battle-damage repairs. This was also the view of the Navy Department, which preferred to continue handling all Navy repair and conversion work in naval shipyards, giving first priority to this work rather than to new construction.

Mr. Vinson’s substitute provision, however, which would authorize one-half the work to go to naval shipyards, at the discretion of the President, was defeated. Advocates of the naval shipyards stressed the need to use the $2,000,000,000 investment in naval shipyards to the fullest, pointing out that other great powers construct their naval vessels in government yards, and emphasizing the need to maintain the Navy yards and their workers at a high standard of readiness and efficiency for an unforeseen emergency. The “alternate vessel provision” finally approved as part of the Act included, however, the now famous “public interest” proviso which authorized the President to vary the alternate assignment pattern when such assignment was determined to be inconsistent with the public interest.

As the House neared a vote on the Vinson- Trammell bill, Congressman Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire introduced an amendment limiting profits of shipbuilders and other manufacturers to ten per cent. The memory of World War I profiteering was still vivid, and reference was made to “inordinate profits” and to practices “not only unethical but . . . absolutely scandalous ... a black page in the history of this country.” After some quibbling, the amendment was adopted.

The last provision of the bill authorized the President to suspend naval construction provided for in the bill, as necessary to bring the naval armament of the United States into accord with any future international agreement to which this country is signatory. This reflected the willingness of the United States to meet any internationally agreed upon disarmament goals, without in any way diminishing its determination to build its Navy to treaty strength. As stated by Congressman Colgate W. Darden, Jr., of Virginia, “there is no greater incentive for war than great inequality in the armed strength of those nations which are daily in competition along the trade routes of the world.”

Remembering, however, the inglorious scrapping of battleships under construction following the 1922 treaty, a prohibition against such practice was included in the “international agreement” provision.

Summing up, until enactment of the Vin- son-Trammell Act, the United States lacked a clearly defined naval building policy. Naval ship construction was provided for in much the same manner as public works programs, with a new appropriation bill and matching authorization bill enacted each year. Broad long-range goals established by legislation were lacking. The Vinson-Trammell Act represented a declaration of naval policy that, in the years ahead, the United States would build and maintain a Fleet second to none. In Mr. Vinson’s words, the bill would provide the United States with an orderly shipbuilding program which “will not only be more economical but also . . . will contribute to better designs, better workmanship, less disruption of industry, and will keep the national defense on a higher level than is possible under old wasteful methods of building a Navy by alternate spasms of intense activity and practically complete idleness.”

Both the Washington and London Naval Treaties expired in 1936. With war tensions rising, it was necessary for the Congress in carrying out its constitutional duty of “providing and maintaining a Navy,” to establish a new goal or standard of naval strength in substitution for the limitations of the treaties. Actually, with the expiration of the treaties, the criterion for an adequate U. S. Navy became the collective underage naval strength of adversary naval powers. This was the logical extension of the Vinson-Trammell concept of sea power, a Navy not measured subjectively in terms of “what the country could afford” or “what the Navy’s rightful share of the budget should be,” but a Navy objectively and positively defined as equal or superior in underage warship tonnage to the Navy of any other nation, or any combination of adversary nations.

The authorized composition of the U. S. Navy was, therefore, increased above treaty limits in 1938, 1940, and later during World War II. Additional authorizations for the construction of major combatant ships were provided to meet the nation’s wartime requirements. Full replacement authority was provided for lost or overage warships, with “overage” for various types of warships defined in terms of age criteria similar to those included in the treaties, and following their expiration, enacted as part of the wartime tonnage act of 14 June 1940 (now 10 USC 7295). Interchangeability of tonnage for the various warships types was also provided for.

During World War II, specific authorizations, in tonnages and sometimes by numbers, were also provided for the Navy to construct auxiliary vessels, landing craft, and patrol vessels. These authorizations did not, however, take the form of amendments to the Vinson-Trammell Act, and no provision was made for replacement of the additional vessels authorized.

Following World War II, a fact that had been apparent during the Vinson-Trammell debate in 1934 again became a controversial issue: namely, that the Act, with its automatic replacement authority, provided a continuing authorization to the President of such broad scope that no annual shipbuilding authorization act would be required in the foreseeable future.

The large balance of available tonnage was, in fact, placing the entire review of the Navy’s program in the Appropriations Committees of Congress. It seemed inevitable that the Armed Services Committees would soon propose an annual authorization act for ship construction and conversion despite existing tonnage authorizations. The Senate Armed Services Committee, noting the existence of these large tonnage balances, asked the Navy to study the matter and report to Congress thereon by 1 January 1951.

A few months later, Congress enacted the first broad naval ship authorization bill since World War II, to provide an impetus to the increased naval program made necessary by the Korean hostilities. The Act of 10 March 1951 (Public Law 3, 82d Congress) was the first of numerous post-World War II authorization acts which provided new tonnage in various categories. However, Public Law 3 differed from the others in that it (1) established the postwar composition of the Navy by categories and subcategories, i.e., combatant ships (divided into subcategories of warships, amphibious warfare vessels and landing craft, mine warfare vessels, and patrol vessels), auxiliary vessels, service craft and experimental vessels; and (2) provided a sizable new warship authorization, although large warship replacement balances were available from prior statutes.

A few years later, the Navy in response to the Senate Armed Services Committee request in 1951, recommended to Congress a new “Naval Vessels Authorizations Bill,” or “Big Ship Bill” (in contrast to the piecemeal tonnage statutes being enacted from year to year for vessels other than warships). This “Big Ship Bill,” which was proposed by the Bureau of Ships, would have repealed all existing tonnage authorizations and substituted one basic authorizing act. It would have effected redistribution and some reduction in unobligated tonnage balances. The Bureau also suggested that the new bill, notwithstanding its continuing authority, provide for an annual review of the Navy’s shipbuilding and conversion program by the Armed Services Committees.

In contrast to the Vinson-Trammell Act, which provided a continuing authorization for certain types of combatant vessels (warships), the proposed “Big Ship Bill” would have established a continuing shipbuilding, conversion and modernization program for each category and subcategory of ships (including warships) and would have provided for orderly replacement of all types of naval vessels. The underage strength of the Navy would have been fixed at 10,000,000 tons. The bill, H.R. 2036, and similar bills were introduced in the 84th Congress by Chairman Vinson, but no hearings were scheduled. Subsequently, the “Big Ship Bill” was dropped from the DOD legislative program.

In the ensuing years, tonnage balances for warship construction increased very greatly as large numbers of warships built during World War II became overage. Replacements did not nearly keep pace with increments of recaptured tonnage. As of 1 January 1965, there were 3,338,784 tons of warship authority available under the Vinson-Trammell Act and succeeding statutes. At the same time, tonnage authority for non-warships, which were not subject to automatic replacement, had become virtually exhausted. Up until 1960, new legislation was required from time to time to obtain authorizations to build such ships and craft. Such piecemeal authorization legislation constituted the means whereby the Armed Services Committees reviewed the Navy’s entire shipbuilding program.

In 1959, the Senate initiated a provision in the Military Construction (Milcon) Bill for Fiscal 1960 which, in effect, required that, after 31 December 1960, prior authorization legislation would be necessary in the case of appropriations for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. Such authorization legislation would provide the Armed Services Committees a means for reviewing aircraft and missile programs each year, as well as Navy shipbuilding and conversion programs.

Insofar as naval vessels were concerned, this new authorization procedure constituted a reversion to the old method of authorizing the appropriation of specific sums for ship construction, as in the case of public works, a method which had been discarded in favor of the underage tonnage concept of authorization, without dollar limitation, at the time of enactment of the Vinson-Trammell Act. The trouble with money authorizations always had been that they often were only rubber stamps of the appropriation bill. It was partly as a result of this authorization process that the United States had become weak in underage ships, far below authorized treaty limits, following World War I, although possessing a large number of obsolete ships. This dangerous situation had been rectified, partly as a result of the Vinson-Trammell Act, in time for the tremendous naval exigencies of World War II.

At the time of approving (in 1961) what was to become the first money authorization act pursuant to the above-mentioned Milcon Act provision, the House Armed Services Committee pointed out that the bill did not repeal any specific statutory authorizations relating to construction and conversion of naval vessels. The Navy was enjoined, therefore, to give effect to this unrepealed legislation and to charge the ships authorized against outstanding tonnage balances remaining in law. In those ship categories where there was insufficient or no tonnage authorization remaining, the appropriation authorization bill would constitute sufficient tonnage authorization.

Between 1961 and enactment of the appropriation authorization bill for FY 1966 (Act of 11 June 1965), the Vinson-Trammell Act and amending statues remained alive in the sense that their tonnage balances were still used, although no longer necessary. In the House Armed Services Committee Report (No. 271) accompanying the above-mentioned Act of 11 June 1965, the Committee reversed its mandate of 1961, expressing the view that enactment of annual authorization acts had rendered “existing tonnage authorizations meaningless.” The Act repealed all outstanding tonnage balances remaining in law for construction of Navy ships.

Specifically, the Act repealed the balances of tonnage authorizations for naval vessels and replacement authority for overage or lost warships remaining in the Vinson-Trammell Act and five succeeding statutes, and the balances of tonnage authorizations for other categories and subcategories of ships, remaining in four other statutes enacted since World War II.

In recent years, Congressional critics have expressed the view that our postwar shipbuilding programs have not nearly kept pace with requirements to maintain an adequate Navy of underage ships, just as in 1934, when the United States was far below treaty limits in underage tonnage. Of course, the underage criteria of 10 USC 7295 do not necessarily represent the useful life of warships of various types, as such criteria do not take into account the effects of modernization and obsolescence resulting from changes in naval warfare techniques.

In September 1962, a Special Subcommittee on “Composition of the Fleet and Block Obsolescence of Naval Vessels,” of the House Armed Services Committee, following an exhaustive study, issued a report on this subject. The report pointed out that of the 860 ships then in the active fleet, 598 were authorized during World War II. The average useful life of a Navy ship traditionally has been accepted as 20 years. The Committee found that the Navy’s annual building program from 1948 to 1963 had averaged 24 ships. On this basis, the size of our Fleet would dwindle to 503 by 1973. Yet, our strategic plans according to the Committee, call for approximately the same number of ships as we now have. In commenting on the outlook for the Navy, the Committee stated, much as Mr. Vinson had described the situation in 1934:

It is a statistical certainty that if this country continues with a shipbuilding program which reflects past history our Navy will cease to be an effective military instrument. Our Navy, if we can judge by the past, is on an inexorable march toward its own destruction as an arm of our foreign policy and as an effective agency for national defense. The Subcommittee cannot stress this point too strongly. While there may be uncertainty about the future requirements for other weapons systems as to type and quantity, there cannot be any doubt, so long as we live in our present geographical environment, that a modern, second-to-none Fleet is an absolute and fundamental requirement for our national survival. And even with this realization, a realization which must be shared by the Congress and the people generally, we are headed toward a point in time when our Navy will be so reduced in effective strength as to make it physically impossible to perform its roles and missions. . . . Suffice it to say that we are not obviously outstripping the Soviet Union in some very important areas.

Although in the years immediately following enactment of the Vinson-Trammell Act, some effort was made to adhere to the “alternate vessel” provision, since 1948 the bulk of warships has been awarded to the private shipbuilding industry. In Fiscal 1964, 85 per cent of the Navy’s ship construction (including warships) was awarded to private yards. When compliance with a provision of law has been waived so consistently in the public interest, its repeal might be expected. However, the recently enacted authorization statute for the fiscal 1966 program (Act of 11 June, 1965) reenacted the “alternate vessel” provision and enlarged its applicability to include escort vessels.

The profit limitation provision of the Vinson-Trammell Act has been superseded since 1948 by the Renegotiation Act, applicable to all defense contracts. The Vinson- Trammell Act limited shipbuilding profits on a contract basis, whereas the Renegotiation Act limits profits on an across-the-board basis on government work.

As previously indicated, the total of unobligated tonnage available for warship construction prior to enactment of the repealer in the Act of 11 June 1965 was over 3,000,000 tons. On the basis of recent warships building programs—six submarines authorized in fiscal 1965 and six submarines and one frigate authorized in fiscal 1966—this total of tonnage, originally authorized to meet the needs of World War II, might have lasted 100 years or more, if it had not been repealed.

Although this vast unused warship replacement tonnage is no longer legally meaningful, our aging World War II ships—20 years old or older—which still comprise the bulk of the Navy’s Active and Reserve Fleets, serve to remind us, especially in this period of accelerated naval operations off Southeast Asia, of the truth of the Vinson-Trammell maxim that sea power consists not of numbers of ships, but of modern, underage warship tonnage. This basic principle of the Vinson-Trammell Act should be constantly reaffirmed and acted upon, especially in view of the Navy’s increasing world-wide commitments, the inexorably advancing age of every ship of the Fleet, and the growing challenge of Communist sea power.